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Abstract 
This thesis contains three chapters exploring the female labour force participation in 
China. The first chapter investigates how fertility influences female labour force 
participation; the second chapter investigates how grandparents’ childcare determines 
mothers’ labour force participation; and the third chapter investigates the relationship 
between maternal employment in rural China and children’s health development. For 
each chapter, instruments are selected for the endogenous regressors and instrumental 
variable estimators are adopted. Results from this thesis show that there is a negative 
relationship between fertility and female labour force participation in China but 
grandparents’ providing childcare can increase mothers’ labour force participation, 
and children in rural China can benefit from their mothers’ off-farm work. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
China has experienced a high growth rate in the three decades since 1978 and has 
become the second largest economy in the world. Various studies have paid attention 
to investigation of China’s economic growth and many factors have been identified as 
contributors to this remarkable performance; for example, technological innovation, 
educational reforms and their effects on human resource improvement, trade and 
foreign direct investments and so on (Chen & Feng, 2000; Wang & Yao, 2003). One 
contributor that has long been considered an important source of rapid development in 
China is the demographic dividend. It can be seen from Figures 1.1 and 1.2 that both 
the labour force participation rate and the female labour force participation rate in 
China are higher than in the other seven developed countries shown.  
Rapid population growth during the 1960s and 1970s formed this large base of work 
force, but also created demographic problems for the nation. Consequently, a unique 
experiment to control population growth emerged, namely the One Child Policy 
(OCP). In essence, the policy set a quota for each Han
1
 couple and, in general, 
non-agricultural registered
2
 couples were only allowed to have one child. In the 
literature, a negative relationship between fertility and female labour force 
participation has been widely shown, meaning that mothers can work more if they 
                                                     
1
 Han is the ethnic majority group in China, which accounts for over 90% of total population. 
2
 Non-agricultural registration is one of the two types of registration (Hukou system) in China. 
Detailed information is provided in Section 2.  
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have fewer children. However, it seems what has happened in China contradicts this 
conclusion - as seen in Figure 1.2, the female labour force participation rate in China 
is decreasing while the fertility rate in China is decreasing, too.  
Another indirect consequence of the OCP is “4-2-1” families, in which there are four 
grandparents, two parents and only one child. This smaller family size, together with 
the traditional Confucianism culture leads to a strong kinship ties across the 
generations and it is quite common in China that grandparents look after 
grandchildren, especially when the grandchildren are young and their mothers go back 
to work.  
Overall, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the factors that influence mothers’ 
labour force participation, and the effect of maternal employment on children’s health 
development. Starting with the OCP, I will first estimate the effect of fertility on 
female labour force participation, and will then investigate how grandparents’ 
childcare influences mothers’ working decisions, and last investigate how mothers in 
rural China influence children’s health development. 
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
The organisation of this thesis is as follows. 
A full description of the data is provided in chapter 2. The China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), used here to create all three chapters of estimation, is a longitudinal 
survey and a collaborative work carried out by the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and the National Institution for Nutrition and Health at the Chinese 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. More features of this dataset, including 
17 
 
the survey design, participating regions and the sample selection method, survey 
levels, and advantages of these data will be discussed later. 
In chapter 3, the background information related to this thesis is introduced. For 
example, the instruments used in the first estimation of relationship between fertility 
and female labour force participation are the relaxation of the OCP and the fines 
imposed; therefore, explanations of the policy itself, explanations of how it has been 
relaxed and how it is implemented, and explanations of how and why fines are 
imposed are necessary. In general, six aspects of background information are 
discussed. These are the household registration system, the family planning policy, 
the Chinese labour market, the childcare system in China, left behind children and 
healthcare in rural China. 
Chapter 4 is the first estimation, which aims to investigate the effect of fertility on 
female labour force participation. Considering the endogeneity of fertility, I employed 
two unique instruments to represent the variations in family size. One is based on the 
relaxation of the One Child Policy and the other is the fine imposed for one additional 
unpermitted child. Therefore, two samples are created from CHNS data due to the fact 
that fine levels data are only available in wave 1989, 1991 and 1993. Using two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) and instrumental variables probit (IV-probit) estimations, I found 
that an additional child significantly reduces the mother's likelihood of participating in 
the labour force by eight percentage points, and this negative influence is more 
noticeable for women living in rural areas. 
18 
 
A further estimation of the effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers’ labour 
supply is provided in chapter 5 as co-resident with elderly parents are found positively 
related to female labour force participation in chapter 4. When modelling this 
relationship, one challenge is that grandparents’ childcare could be endogenous due to 
unobserved factors, such as attitudes on the part of both grandparents and mothers. By 
creating an instrument that reflects both the availability and capability of 
grandparents, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and instrumental variables probit 
(IV-probit) estimations show that childcare provided by grandparents increases 
mothers' possibility of labour force participation significantly (by more than 30 
percentage points in China), and this positive effect is stronger for mothers living in 
rural areas. 
The direction of estimation in chapter 6 is the opposite to the previous ones, as 
maternal employment form the variable of interest. The research objective in this 
estimation is children’s health development, so weight-to-age Z scores (WAZ) and 
height-to-age Z scores (HAZ) created based on children’s weight and height are used, 
and underweight and/or underheight children are identified if their Z score(s) was 
(were) less than 2. A sample containing children in rural China aged between 0-10 
was created, without considering whether the child was living with or without parents 
in the household. Maternal employment in this estimation, specifically, is mothers’ 
off-farm working status that takes binary values. Moreover, two instruments are 
selected from the community-level data and one more instrument created according to 
mothers’ own characteristics. Similar to the previous two chapters, instrument 
estimators were used. 
19 
 
The last chapter presents the conclusions and shortcomings of this thesis. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis provides an innovative analytical and methodological approach around the 
topics of female labour force participation in China. The contributions of this thesis 
are threefold. 
Firstly, the main contribution of this thesis comes from its methodology. Each chapter 
of estimations has employed different instruments, some are selected from the dataset 
and some are uniquely created. I believe the instruments in this thesis are advanced 
comparing with the existing ones in literature. For example, the instrument I created 
for grandparents’ childcare is based on both proximity of grandparents, reflecting the 
availability, and health conditions of grandparents, reflecting the capability of 
grandparents. Therefore, the instrumental variable estimators can reveal the causality 
better. 
Secondly, this thesis bridges the gaps of research on female labour force participation 
in China. Previous research on fertility and female labour force participation in China 
focuses on either urban or rural areas; this thesis gave the attempt of including both 
urban and rural areas in the sample. Moreover, this thesis firstly modelled the 
relationship between grandparents’ childcare and female labour force participation in 
China, and investigated how mothers in rural areas taking off-farm work locally 
influence children’s health development. 
Last but not the least, this thesis is the first piece of progressing study that applying 
the investigations to the same data as well as trying to account an extended story 
20 
 
about mothers’ labour force participation and about children’s health development in 
China.  
  
Figure 1. 1 The labour force participation rate in China and other seven developed 
countries 
 
Source: World Bank Data. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator  
 
Figure 1. 2 The female labour force participation rate in China and in seven other 
developed countries 
 
Source: World Bank Data. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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2. Data 
2.1 CHNS description  
The data used in this thesis are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), 
which is mainly designed to see how the health status of Chinese population has been 
affected by social and economic transformation after the economic reform. It is an 
on-going, open cohort and is a collaborative project designed by the Carolina Population 
Centre at the University of North Carolina and executed by the National Institute of 
Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Centre of Disease Control and Prevention. In 
this survey, questionnaires contain different sections including health and physical 
examinations, diet and nutrition intake, work, time allocation and income, and family 
planning policy and program implemented by the local and national governments
3
.  
Initially, eight provinces were covered from the first wave (1989), namely Liaoning, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou. In the fourth wave 
(1997), Heilongjiao replaced Liaoning province and, in the fifth wave (2000), both 
provinces were included in the survey. In 2011, three direct-controlled municipalities 
joined the survey and, in the latest completed round of interviews, three more provinces 
were included
4
. In total, including the newly added households in 2015, there are 7,200 
                                                     
3
 China Health and Nutrition Survey: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china 
4
 Three direct-controlled municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing. Three newly joined 
provinces are Yunnan, Zhejiang and Shaanxi.  
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households with over 30,000 individuals. Since the first round of survey in 1989, 10 
rounds of data covering over 20 years are available for public use. The subsequent waves 
were in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2015
5
. In general, 
households included in the surveys will be followed up, with the exception of families 
that migrated to other villages, towns or cities that are not included in the survey area. 
The samples surveyed in each province were drawn via a multi-stage, random cluster 
process so that the characteristics of the households and individuals in the sample are 
sufficient. The steps in the sample selection of CHNS data are as follows: (i) firstly, 
capital cities and a lower income city in each province are selected; (ii) counties are 
stratified according to income (high, middle and low), following which four are selected 
randomly; and (iv) villages and towns within counties and urban/suburban 
neighbourhoods then are selected randomly. 
Figure 2.1 shows the locations of the provinces covered in the survey
6
, and Figure 2.2 
provides the distribution of ethnic minorities in China
7
. Comparing the two figures, it can 
be seen that the CHNS data cover households from north to south China and contains a 
good variety of ethnic groups. This is useful for our study of fertility and female labour 
force participation, as the ethnic minorities are not targeted by the family planning policy 
                                                     
5
 Wave 2015 is not yet available for use. 
6
 Shaded areas in Figure 2.1 are the provinces covered in our sample. 
7
 Figure 2.2 is a map of ethnolinguistic groups in China, but it can also be used as a map of ethnic minority 
distribution. Shaded areas are inhabited by ethnic minorities. 
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in China; thus, the data can reveal the difference in working patterns affected by fertility 
of the ethnic majority and minorities. 
CHNS questionnaire layouts were redesigned once in wave 2004. Before 2004, survey 
sections were divided according to the aim of the survey to include household surveys, 
nutrition surveys, physical examinations, ever married women survey
8
 and energy 
record. Since 2004, survey sections have been divided according to the survey level 
(although the nutrition survey has been kept separate); therefore, they cover household 
surveys, individual surveys and community surveys. In general, the questions in the 
individual surveys have been extracted from the previous household surveys related to 
individual information, and individual surveys have been further divided into adult 
surveys and child surveys based on the interviewees’ ages. Specifically, the three levels 
of CHNS are described as follows: 
Individual level survey — questions in this part of the survey are about individual details 
such as education, work and occupation, time allocation, income, physical examinations 
and health status, as well as marriage, pregnancies and birth histories. The child survey 
also contains questions about physical activities, body shape and mass media, diet and 
activity knowledge, and the use of health services. Furthermore, the link between 
children and their parents is clarified in the child survey by asking children “who is your 
father and who is your mother”. With this information, I can match mother and children. 
                                                     
8
  Ever married women survey is for women age under 52; it also contains questions about pregnancy 
history and birth history. 
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Household level survey — questions in this part of survey are mainly about economic 
activities, household income and the household infrastructure. Specifically, a household 
roster is first conducted to identify new and returning member(s)
9
. Data about work 
activities, working income and other income, expenses and assets owned are obtained for 
all households and for every household member. Total household income is computed in 
three ways: through responses to direct questions about income, the summation of net 
receipts from all reported activities and responses to questions about expenditure; all 
three sections produce the households’ gross income and net income. 
Community level survey — questions in this survey are answered by knowledgeable 
community respondents such as local cadres. Community infrastructures such as water, 
markets and transport, and services such as family planning, health facilities and 
childcare facilities, as well as other information such as population and prevailing wages 
are covered in this part of survey. However, the in-depth data collection regarding the 
family planning policy was discontinued in 1997 and only selected questions have 
remained in the survey since then. Family planning fine level data are one of the data 
collections that have been suspended
10
. 
CHNS is a representative data not only because the provinces it covered vary 
substantially in geography, public resources and economic development, but also the 
provinces it covered contain over 40 percent populations in China. Table 2.1 shows the 
                                                     
9
 For new households entering the survey, demographic information will also be recorded. 
10
 Partly due to its sensitivity, the original question about specific fines has been replaced by whether local 
cadres are connected with economic incentives. 
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population distribution in the whole country as well as the provinces covered in the 
CHNS, among which Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou are ethnic minorities 
inhabited while Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan are with Han as majority people. 
Compared with other datasets, such as the Chinese Population Census data, a frequently 
used dataset in the research on female labour supply in China, and the National Nutrition 
and Health Survey (China), another dataset often used in the research on child nutrition 
and health status, CHNS data have some unique advantages. 
The first and also the most important advantage is that CHNS contains richer and wider 
information. Working status or wage, for example, is not provided in the Population 
Census data. The CHNS data, on the other hand, contain highly specific information, 
including whether the interviewee is presently working, the nature of the interviewee's 
occupation and position in the work unit, the type of work unit, and how much the 
interviewee earns each month, including normal wages and bonuses. Other information, 
such as fertility history, time allocation, diet patterns and nutrition, and specific 
demographic background and inter-generational links to parents is available in the CHNS 
data. 
Secondly, CHNS has considerably better data quality. Collecting information on family 
planning is a potentially sensitive task in China (Greenhalgh, 1994). Couples, particularly 
couples from rural households, will become cautious when they are asked about how 
many children they have due to the tense relationship between the families and the local 
commission of family planning in the 1990s because of the risk of an unaffordable fine 
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for those families violating the family planning policy. Three facts about the CHNS data 
contribute to the better quality: (i) the questionnaires are designed not to be particularly 
sensitive to certain aspects of family planning; (ii) family planning is only a small part of 
the entire survey; and (iii) the group of people collecting the data are not from the local 
family planning commission, thus, they are viewed as nonthreatening with regard to 
family planning. 
Next, the CHNS data are rich in terms of variety. CHNS data have been collected in 10 
waves with gaps between two waves of two to four years, while the Chinese Population 
Census data have only been collected in six rounds since 1953, with intervals of eight or 
ten years in between. With smaller intervals, CHNS is able to observe more variation and 
capture different scenarios.  
Finally, the CHNS data are easily accessible, as the individual and the household level 
data are publicly downloadable from the official website and the community-level data 
are distributed following the completion of a data use agreement. 
Because of these merits and the nature of the data, the CHNS has been used in many 
research areas, such as microeconomics ( Chen, 2006; Lee & Malin, 2013; Wang, 2014), 
labour economics ( Li & Liu, 2014), health economics ( Chen & Jin, 2012; Huang & 
Gan, 2015; Qin & Pan, 2015), nutrition (Thompson, Adair, Gordon-Larsen, Zhang, & 
Popkin, 2015; Xu, Hall, Byles, & Shi, 2015), epidemiology (Jones-Smith, 
Gordon-Larsen, Siddiqi, & Popkin, 2011; Reynolds, 2012), and so on.  
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2.2 Usage of CHNS in this thesis 
Although CHNS is designed to follow up the households, it is not a strictly panel data set. 
In wave 1991, individuals only belong to wave 1989 were surveyed but from 1993, new 
households formed from the sample households who resided in the same areas were 
added and from 1997, new households formed from the same areas were added. Table 2.2 
shows the follow up rate in CHNS data that from 1989 to 2009, 47% of households have 
been followed up for 8 waves and 39% of households have been followed up for 4-7 
waves. Table 2.2 also shows the follow up rate in CHNS data by areas (i.e. rural and 
urban). Generally, follow up rates are higher in rural areas than in urban areas that 53% of 
rural households compared to 33% of urban households have been followed up for 8 waves. 
However, the high follow up rate does not necessarily mean the information about rural 
households is complete. In the CHNS, some household members, especially working age 
household members, are not surveyed in the middle wave(s) and may or may not come 
back afterwards, and the main reason for not living in the household is seeking 
employment elsewhere.  
Basically, the CHNS as well as the sample selected from it are used as pooled 
cross-sectional data with time (wave) and county (province) effects captured by dummy 
variables in this thesis. The reasons are twofold. For one hand, follow up rate is the first 
reason. As discussed above, more than half of households were surveyed less than 8 
waves (from wave 1989 to wave 2009) which means there is/are gap(s) for these 
households. For example, it may be the situation that it has been continuously surveyed 
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for five times or the situation that it has one or more gaps if a household appears in the 
data for five waves. For the other hand, missing value of variables is second reason. In 
CHNS, missing information has been left as blank cells that some can be imputed or 
replaced, such as missing information on age, education years, household registration 
type, relationship to household head and gender, while some cannot, such as working 
status, health status and income. The difficulty of imputing these missing values lies on 
the fact that there are no clues. For example, individuals with missing value on working 
status as well as working time and income can be the situation that either the individuals 
are not working or the information is not recorded properly. Similarly, missing value on 
annual income cannot be imputed by monthly wage without information on working 
period. Therefore, during the process of sample selecting, observations are deleted due to 
the missing values, which further results in gap(s) for households and variation of 
households across the waves.  
The key difference between pooled cross-sectional and panel data is the participants that 
followed. In pooled cross-sectional data, households are randomly selected in different 
time periods while in panel data, households are surveyed repeatedly from the first wave. 
Applying this difference to the samples in this thesis, it is more suitable to use them as 
pooled cross-sectional rather than panel data due to the difference of households chased 
by CHNS data as well as the households selected in the samples in each wave.  
  
Table 2. 1 Populations in China (the whole country and provinces in 8 waves from CHNS). 
  1990 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
China whole country 114,333  115,823  118,517  123,626  126,743  129,988  131,448  133,474  
Liaoning 3,967  3,990  4,042  4,138  4,184  4,217  4,271  4,319  
Heilongjiang 3,543  3,575  3,640  3,751  3,807  3,817  3,823  3,826  
Jiangsu 6,767  6,844  6,967  7,148  7,327  7,433  7,550  7,725  
Shandong 8,493  8,570  8,642  8,785  8,998  9,180  9,309  9,470  
Henan 8,649  8,763  8,949  9,243  9,488  9,717  9,392  9,487  
Hubei 5,439  5,512  5,653  5,873  5,960  6,016  5,693  5,720  
Hunan 6,128  6,209  6,311  6,465  6,562  6,698  6,342  6,406  
Guangxi  4,261  4,324  4,438  4,633  4,750  4,889  4,719  4,856  
Guizhou 3,268  3,315  3,409  3,606  3,756  3,904  3,757  3,798  
Total population of provinces in CHNS 50,515  51,102  52,051  53,642  54,832  55,871  54,856  55,607  
Ratio of population of provinces in 
CHNS to total population in China 
44.18% 44.12% 43.92% 43.39% 43.26% 42.98% 41.73% 41.66% 
Note: numbers are in 10,000 people. 
Source: National bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 
  
  
Table 2. 2 Follow up rate in CHNS data. 
Number of 
waves 
Whole data Urban Rural 
Number of 
households % 
Number of 
households % 
Number of 
households % 
1 929 2.73  533  4.88  396  1.71  
2 1,196 3.51  635  5.81  561  2.42  
3 2,670 7.83  1,311  11.99  1,359  5.87  
4 2,752 8.07  1,180  10.79  1,572  6.79  
5 4,470 13.12  1,885  17.24  2,585  11.17  
6 1,872 5.49  660  6.04  1,212  5.24  
7 4,305 12.63  1,120  10.25  3,185  13.76  
8 15,888 46.62  3,608  33.00  12,280  53.05  
Total 34,082 100 10,932  100  23,150  100 
  
  
Figure 2. 1 Regions in China Health and Nutrition Survey 
 
Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey  
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/proj_desc/chinamap_600.jpg/view 
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Figure 2. 2 Distribution of ethnic minorities in China 
 
Source: map courtesy of University of Texas Libraries, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_ethnolinguistic_83.jpg. 
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3. Institutional background 
In this section, background information related to this thesis is provided and explained, 
including the household registration system in China, the family planning policy, the 
Chinese labour market, the childcare system, left behind child and the rural health care 
system. 
3.1 The household registration (Hukou) system in China 
The current household registration system (Hukou) in China started after the foundation 
of the People's Republic of China, and was initially designed to segregate the urban and 
rural populations in geographic terms and to limit rural to urban migration (Chan, 2010). 
Since 1950, as the newly founded country needed to resume production and enhance 
industrialisation, strong mechanisms were required to prevent rural exodus because the 
strategy was to extract agricultural surplus from the peasantry to work in the cities. After 
some early measures aimed to collect information about population characteristics, a 
more comprehensive system, namely the household registration system, was introduced 
in 1958 to control the population’s mobility. The Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress passed a regulation to provide a legal basis for this registration system 
(Cheng & Selden, 1994).  
Via this registration system, each person in China has an official record of all personal 
information including gender, date of birth, place of birth, place of origin (father or 
grandfather's place of birth) and place of residence. It would seem that this identification 
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document is not significantly different from birth certificates in some developed 
countries, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, but it actually induced two 
classes of citizenship in China as the registration type is closely bound to people's social 
and economic circumstances (Li & Cooney, 1993).  
There are two types of household registration, one is rural (or agricultural) and the other 
is urban (or non-agricultural). Briefly put, the former is for individuals who live in rural 
areas and mainly depend on working farm land for their household income. The latter is 
for individuals who live in cities or towns and who are engaged in paid work. People with 
agricultural registrations were essentially “producers” as they were not allowed to retain 
or sell agricultural products freely until the agricultural reform that started in the early 
1980s. Each household with agricultural registration received food rations and other 
necessities determined by a local authority called the production team, which usually 
administrated a few villages, depending on the household's working points that were 
calculated directly from the household members' work efforts. People with 
non-agricultural registrations, on the other hand, received daily necessities via the direct 
allocation of coupons, such as food coupons, oil coupons and cloth coupons, from their 
work unit or from the government
11
 (Potter, 1983). In addition, people with 
non-agricultural registrations also enjoyed guaranteed job placement, house allocation 
and social welfare, such as medical services, day-care nursery and children's education, 
                                                     
11
 Before the Chinese economic reform, daily necessities were sold by quota and people needed to provide 
coupons to buy them; for example, food coupons were for buying rice or flour, egg coupons were for 
buying eggs, and soap coupons were for buying soap. People with non-agricultural registrations would 
receive coupons directly from their work units, which were supervised by the government. 
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maternity leave, unemployment insurance and pensions (Cooney & Li, 1994; Potter, 
1983). Moreover, as the first place registered is considered the official place of residence, 
individuals who wish to have a permanent change of place of residence and/or 
registration type must obtain the approval of both the original and the destination’s 
administrative authorities, which makes the opportunity for successful transfer extremely 
limited.  
However, the benefits for non-agricultural registration people are connected to a 
remarkably high opportunity cost in that one may be punished by severe administrative 
and economic sanctions, which means that some or all benefits will be denied if one 
violates any regulations or restrictions (Li & Cooney, 1993). For example, in some 
circumstances, such as violating the family planning policy, both husband and wife will 
be discharged from their employment.  
Although agricultural (rural) people are allocated fewer social resources, they are allowed 
to have bigger families. The family planning policy in China, which will be discussed 
below, is implemented based on household registration. The policy relaxation is only 
applicable to agricultural couples as they need more labour on the farm land, and this 
applies whether the agricultural couple lives in an urban or a rural area. 
One important characteristic of the household registration system is that it is successive. 
Children's registration follows their parents' registration type when the parents have the 
same registration and can choose either of the types when parents are registered 
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differently. If one of the parents transferred his or her registration successfully, the 
children can also decide to retain or transfer their registrations. 
Since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, household management has 
experienced four stages. The earliest stage was from 1949 to 1957. During that period, 
there was no proper or strict household registration system, and populations were free to 
migrate as the Chinese constitution stated that citizens had the right and freedom of 
residence and migration. The second stage was the strictly controlled period, which lasted 
for two decades from 1958, and the household registration system is the outcome of this 
stage. Under the household registration system, less than 0.15% of the population 
transferred successfully from agricultural registration to non-agricultural registration, as 
the system aimed to exclude the rural population from access to state-provided goods, 
welfare and entitlements (Chan, 2010). The third stage, from 1978 to 1994, was the 
relaxation stage. Due to the country's economic growth strategy and the high intensity of 
exports, some adjustments and relaxations were made to the system and people were 
allowed to live outside of their place of residence legally, although this does not indicate 
transferring the place of residence and the registration type. In 1993, food and oil 
coupons were withdrawn from market circulation, representing the end of a connection 
between household registration and food allocation. One year later, the two aspects of 
household registration type based simply on food allocation were terminated. The last 
stage is the reform stage. From 1995, household registration has entered a new era in 
which limitations to migration have been greatly reduced. On the 30
th
 of July, 2014, the 
38 
 
State Council of China issued “Suggestions on further reform on household 
registration”12, representing the official cancellation of rural and urban registration.  
Close up the gaps to reduce the number of pages  
3.2 Chinese family planning policy 
Similarly to the establishment of the household registration system, the family planning 
policy in China has also experienced several stages and reforms. In general, controlling 
population size is the primary purpose of China's family planning policy and it was also 
the original intention when the policy was approved.  
The total population in China has been controlled at 1.32 billion according to the results 
from Population Census 2010
13
, which is consistent with the initial population target. 
Simply speaking, this target was achieved by setting a "quota" of children allowed per 
family (Wang, 2012). In each different stage of the family planning policy in China, the 
policy was stricter for non-agricultural than agricultural households because the "quota" 
was smaller for households that enjoyed more social welfare benefits and resources.  
Figure 3.1 shows the total fertility rate and total population in China from 1950 to 2010. 
It can be seen that total fertility rate is decreasing, with a "V" shape observed in the early 
period. This is because of the Great Famine that occurred from 1959 to 1961, during 
which time many people died and infant mortality was high. From 1970, the total fertility 
rate has decreased due to the introduction of the family planning policy. 
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  Details can be found on: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-07/30/content_8944.htm.  
13
  Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
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3.2.1 Stage 1: Fumbling and experimentation period (1949-1979) 
It is not accurate to think that there was no proper family planning policy before the OCP 
in China, because social scientists and population specialists in China proposed some 
measures to control the population a few years after the founding of People's Republic of 
China (PRC). However, given the circumstances during the first decade of the PRC, 
experts on population were not allowed to provide any proposals to help the new 
government to understand the dynamic of population growth and to work out the 
complexities of policy making (Greenhalgh, 2008). As a result, because of the general 
political environment and the extensive influence of the birth-encouraging policy of the 
Soviet Union, the PRC experienced a period of rapid population growth with no policy to 
control the population until 1962.  
After experiencing the Great Famine, the Chinese government issued an instruction 
regarding the implementation of family planning on the 18th of December 1962, known 
as the No. [62]698 document, which marked the start of China's family planning policy. 
This policy varied according to province and was designed to be limited to urban Han 
people
14
. This policy did not have an official name, but its emphasis was more like a 
slogan: "One is the best, Two are just right, Three are too many". This policy literally set 
a population growth target without drawing up a quota for each family so that, in general, 
when registering a new-born baby, a third birth or more was penalised but a second birth 
                                                     
14
 There are 56 ethnic groups in China, the Han is the majority and accounts for more than 90% of the 
population. 
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was only not encouraged. However, this early form of family planning policy was 
abandoned in 1966 when the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution started.  
During 1970-1971, Premier Zhou and other development-minded moderates tentatively 
institutionalised a process of population planning, policy making and programme 
creation. Until then, the population in China had increased exponentially for two decades. 
Document No. [71]51 reemphasised the importance of a family planning policy and a 
moderate and flexible policy, namely "Later, Longer, Fewer", was then announced. 
"Later" means later marriage and parenthood. In China, a traditional saying is "Man 
should get married, woman should get married"
15
, which has dominated people's opinions 
about marriage for hundreds of years; accordingly, it was considered normal for young 
adults to be married before the age of 20 before the 1960s. The age for marriage 
recommended by this policy was 25 or above for men and 23 or above for women, and 
the recommended age for childbearing was 24 or above. "Longer" encouraged couples to 
space their births at least four years apart, and "Fewer" encouraged couples to have fewer 
children; generally, not more than two (Wang, 2012). The policy "Later, Longer, Fewer" 
was stricter than the previous one because a quota for each family was set and the 
enforcement was stronger because of its wide population coverage. While the previous 
policy was only designed for the urban Han people, "Later, Longer, Fewer" was aimed at 
the entire Han population, both rural and urban.  
                                                     
15
  In Chinese it is "男大当婚，女大当嫁 (nan da dang hun, nv da dang jia)". It means men and women 
should get married when they reach a certain age, which was 18 for men and 16 for women in old China. 
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3.2.2 Stage 2: One Child Policy (1980-2015) 
With the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, the family planning policy process 
became more regulated. "Four modernisations" were introduced by Deng Xiaoping, the 
second generation of leaders in China, and his party to shift the nation's agenda towards 
rapid modernisation. At this time, population control began to receive strong and 
consistent attention from the leadership because Deng’s regime argued that rapid 
population growth would retard the achievement of the "four 
modernisations"(Greenhalgh, 2008)
16
. Against this background, the OCP was conceived 
of in 1979 and implemented intensively from 1980 onwards. 
The OCP literally restricted the number of children each couple could have except in 
some extraordinary circumstances, such as the first child being mentally or physically 
disabled, one member of the couple being a disabled military or a person who was 
wounded or disabled at work, a remarried couple with only one child from one person, 
one or both spouses being engaged in mining work continuously for more than five years, 
and so on. This policy only applied to Han couples, both in urban and in rural areas
17
. 
Before giving birth to a child, each woman had to apply for a birth permission certificate 
from her local family planning institution providing her marriage certificate, 
identification card and permanent residence registration notebook. The birth permission 
certificate was one of the documents required to register a birth, and those births without 
birth permission certificates are unsanctioned births. According to the OCP  urban 
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 Four modernisations: modernisation of industry, agriculture, science and technology. 
17
 Couples with at least one Han member were also targeted by the One Child Policy. 
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couples who wished to have second child would not receive a birth permission certificate 
and rural couples would be only granted one if their first child was a girl. 
Economic incentives, namely family planning subsidies, were provided to families that 
voluntarily had only one child and penalties were imposed on families with unapproved 
births. Fines were usually much higher than the family planning subsidies, 
18
and were 
sometimes unaffordable for families with agricultural registration (Doherty, Norton & 
Veney, 2001). In urban areas, One-child certificates were granted to couples who signed 
a pledge agreeing to have only one child. The certificate might be accompanied by cash 
such as a one-child subsidy, or other benefits such as better housing or extra food rations 
(Short & Zhai, 1998). If the couples with non-agricultural registrations violated the policy 
and had unapproved births, in addition to being fined, both spouses would be discharged 
from their employment and all social benefits would be cancelled. 
The OCP did not set a universal standard for all provinces in China. The government 
modified the policy to address the local situation. Specifically, the OCP was only 
centrally implemented for four years; following the relaxation of the original policy, there 
are now three versions of the OCP. These are the "Strict OCP ", the "One-and-half Child 
Policy", and "Two Children Policy". Together with the unlimited policy concerning 
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 Family planning subsidies for married couples included many categories. For example, the child subsidy 
was five RMB every month for couples with only one child until their child was 14 years’ old; bonuses 
were given to couples who voluntarily accepted sterilisation, and specific amounts varied across provinces 
and cities, but all amounts were less than 1000 RMB. 
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minority couples, which is called the "More Children Policy", these four policies 
constitute the contemporary Chinese family planning policy
19
. 
The OCP has experienced three periods nationwide. 
Period 1: The strictly implemented period (1980-1984) 
Since the firm and national implementation of the OCP in 1980, the number of children 
each family could have was strictly limited to one until 1984. Furthermore, the revised 
Marriage Law of 1980 stated that every Han couple was required to practice birth control 
(Bongaarts & Greenhalgh, 1985). However, some unintended consequences began to 
appear. Examples include female infanticide, sexual selection abortion which leads to an 
unbalanced sex ratio and missing girls (Qian, 2008), forced abortion and forced 
sterilisation, which lead to a strained relations between the local birth planning institution 
and the residents. 
Period 2: The first relaxation (1984-2000) 
Taking into account the traditional preference for a son, a second birth was officially 
permitted by Document 7 issued by the Central Party Committee on the 13th of April 
1984. The principle of the relaxation announced in Document 7 is called the 
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 The "Strictly OCP" is for couples who are either ethnic majorities or of whom one is an ethnic majority 
and is non-agriculturally registered. The "One-and-half Child Policy" is for couples who are either ethnic 
majorities or of whom one is an ethnic majority as well as being agriculturally registered, and whose 
first-born child is a girl. The "Two Children Policy" is for couples who are both from single child families 
and for couples with extraordinary circumstances. The "More Children Policy" is for couples who are both 
ethnic minorities. 
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"1-son-2-child" rule (Qian, 2009). As males constitute the main labour force for working 
farm land in rural areas and sons are the traditional source of old-age care for parents in 
families with agricultural registrations, male children are preferred to female children 
(Lee, 2011)
20
. To decrease female infanticide, this relaxation allows families with 
agricultural registrations to have a second child if the first-born child is a girl. 
Period 3: Further relaxation (2001-2015) 
Further relaxation was first discussed in the late 1990s, but was not approved or formally 
implemented until 2000. Unlike the previous relaxation, all Han couples are eligible for 
this relaxation. Considering the first generation of only children has reached the age of 
marriage and childbearing, this relaxation was aimed at easing the imbalanced sex ratio 
as well as lowering the dependency rate, as the first generation of only children is 
experiencing the consequences of the "4-2-1" family structure, which has created 
tremendous pressure for them
21
.  
According to this relaxation, couples, no matter whether they have agricultural or 
non-agricultural registrations, could have a second child if both the husband and wife, or 
one of them, came from one child families. 
                                                     
20
 Households with agricultural registrations are not guaranteed any social benefits such as pensions or 
health insurance; thus, rural couples rely entirely on their children for old-age care. However, in a 
Confucian society, women should devote themselves to their husbands' families after getting married and 
they educated to be subordinate to men and to provide care for children and parents-in-law. In other words, 
rural couples can only rely on their sons. 
21
  The "4-2-1" family structure is four grandparents, two parents, and one grandchild.           
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On 27
th
 December 2015, with the approval of Amendment of Population and Family 
Planning Policy by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, all 
second children in the families born after 1
st
 January 2016 are permitted. This event 
represents the end of OCP and a new era of family planning policy. 
3.2.3 Fines and penalties 
Although a central family planning commission has been set up, the responsibility for 
enforcement became linked to local birth-planning institutions administrated by local 
governments after the first relaxation of the OCP in 1984. As a result, the local 
birth-planning institutions reserve the right to set fines according to local population 
targets; therefore, the level of fines may vary across provinces or even counties. 
The general standards and methods of collecting social maintenance fees, such as fines, 
are specified in the Social Maintenance Fees Collection and Management Measures 
issued by the State Council in 2002. Rule No. 3 in the measures states that the rate of 
social maintenance fee should be based on the urban/rural annual income per capita, 
combining the actual household income level and the real situation regarding an 
unpermitted birth. Specifically, fines should be three to six times the local annual per 
capita income; thus, the provincial government determines the actual amount when 
collecting social maintenance fees. 
The direct effect of this regional governance rule is that there is no unique administrative 
standard across the country; for example, even two neighbouring counties may have 
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different levels of fines. As a result, some couples or pregnant women travel away from 
their hometowns to give birth
22
. 
There may be situations in which rural couples are too poor to pay the fines. In fact, other 
forms of penalties have been used as part of the fines, such as taking the household's 
property when the couple do not have ability to pay in full, or being discharged from 
work if one or both parents are employed by government or state-owned enterprises. 
3.3 Chinese labour market 
3.3.1 The labour market and labour market reforms in China 
Before the establishment of the PRC, or more precisely before the anti-Japanese war 
started in 1937, the vast majority of people in China were peasant farmers and cities 
played the role of trade and manufacture (Cai, Park & Zhao, 2008). Migration was 
uncontrolled and labour mobility was quite common. Moreover, as there were no 
restrictions on the sector in which people were eligible to work, farmers could also find 
temporary jobs in cities when farm work was not busy.  
The new government of the PRC installed a planned economy in the country whereby 
goods’ prices were determined centrally, and inputs, including labour and products, were 
allocated administratively. The household registration system bound regional migration, 
meaning that agriculturally registered households had to remain in their original places, 
join the production teams and take on farm work only. The rationale for keeping most of 
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 ‘Missing girls’ is one of the unintended consequences of the One Child Policy and fines. Couples with 
unpermitted births may choose not to register the child, especially a female child, to evade paying fines; 
therefore, local authorities are not aware of these unpermitted births. 
47 
 
the population on farms was to ensure the food provision of cities due to the outdated 
production implements and low productivity (Meng, 2012). People with non-agricultural 
registrations had jobs arranged by the Bureau of Labour and Personnel based on their 
education attainment level. Once the job match was finalised, there was little opportunity 
for further mobility, which meant lifetime employment. Because of the low probability of 
being fired if the worker did not violate any regulations, lifetime employment was 
criticised for encouraging over-staffing and low productivity (Meng, 2000).  
The earliest reform started in rural areas with the introduction of the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS) in the late 1970s. By signing an agreement of cultivating 
responsibility, rural households could freely retain or sell agricultural products as long as 
they sold the amounts specified in the agreement to the government. This reform 
increased rural productivity dramatically because it allowed rural households to retain 
agricultural profits (Lin, 1992). Furthermore, from 1984, rural farmers were allowed to 
work freely in nearby towns or in collectively-owned township or village enterprises 
(Cai, Park & Zhao, 2008). During the period from 1985 to 1992, managers of 
state-owned enterprises in urban areas sensed a great opportunity for development and 
began to attract rural farmers to work in urban areas on a temporary basis. Meanwhile, 
relaxations to household registrations also meant that agriculturally registered households 
could migrate to small towns and cities to seek better lives. Thereafter, with gradually 
flexible rules regarding migration, an increasing number of rural farmers came to urban 
areas searching for a better life. 
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In urban areas, reform is focused mainly on two dimensions; one is lifetime employment 
and the other is wages. The attempt to change the practice of lifetime employment was 
made by the gradual introduction of a labour contract system, which represents a 
relatively flexible labour allocation mechanism (Meng, 2000)
23
. Since then, the "iron rice 
bowl" model, which is a popular metaphor used by people for lifetime employment, has 
been phased out. With regard to wage reform, new wage systems have replaced the 
previous one in which wages were mainly determined based on an employee’s 
professional qualifications (Xia, Li, Song, & Appleton, 2012). The current wage system 
in China consists of four categories, namely the grade wage system, the professional 
qualification wage system, the structures wage system and skill wage system
24
. Figure 6 
briefly illustrates how the labour market was organised before and after the reform. 
3.3.2 Employment and labour force participation 
Most workers in China are full-time, although part-time jobs exist and some people are 
self-employed (Warner, 2010). In fact, part-time jobs are very rare and people are more 
eager to find a permanent and full-time job because pensions are directly connected to 
labour contracts provided by full-time employers
25
, the main contributors to employees' 
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  This labour contract is only applicable to new entrants to the work unit, as existing employees are still 
employed for life. 
24
  Both old and new wage systems apply to state-owned enterprise employees.  
25
  In China, private firms and self-employed people may refuse to participate in the pension system 
because they have a relatively young work force and the incentives for people to join is unattractive 
because the return rate set by government is very low (Zhao &Xu, 2002). 
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pensions
26
. By means of full-time jobs, the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China 
(1994) established an eight-hour working day and a 40-hour working week (Cai, Park & 
Zhao, 2008). 
The labour force participation rate in China was high by international standards, 
particularly for women (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes & Zhang, 2005). It was partly due to the 
job allocation system, which effectively prevented unemployment in urban China prior to 
the labour market reform. It can also be seen in Figure 1.1 and 1.2 that the general trend 
in both the labour force participation rate and the female labour force participation rate in 
China was decreasing. This was because of the state-owned enterprise reform in the late 
1990s and further expansion in early 2000s, when massive numbers of workers were laid 
off. Some of the state-owned enterprises that laid off workers were textile factories in 
which female workers accounted for a large proportion of the workforce. Meanwhile, the 
market economy has provided many opportunities for people to run their own businesses 
and to invest in the financial market. The rise in household income and in non-labour 
income could be viewed as an income effect leading to women withdrawing from the 
labour market to concentrate on home activities such as housework, caring for the elderly 
and child care. 
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  The Chinese pension system has undergone several reforms, such as the economic reform. The 
pre-reform pension system was PAYGO (pay as you go), and it only existed in state and urban collective 
sectors. Pensioners received pensions directly from their previous employers and this paying channel 
worked very well due to the infrequent mobility of labour. After the reform, the pension system has been 
expected to cover every urban worker by setting up individual accounts, and the workers themselves 
contribute to these accounts. The new system retains the previous pension pool and the employers' pension 
injection goes partly to the pension pool and partly to an individual's account. 
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3.4 The childcare system in China 
Childcare in China used to be centrally planned before the Chinese economic reform and 
was regarded as a public service. As early as 1952, the Chinese government issued the 
"Regulation for Kindergartens (draft plan)", which specified the kindergartens' targets, 
goals, teaching principles and activities, as well as the responsibility for developing 
kindergartens. In this regulation, kindergartens were confirmed as being the first stage of 
the education system in China. In particular, one of the main goals of kindergartens was 
to reduce the childcare burden on mothers so they could carry on with their work and 
participate in other activities. Children aged between three and six are eligible for 
kindergarten, and full-time stay is the only option
27
. Therefore, public childcare services 
are aimed at toddlers and older children rather than at infants. 
In terms of the responsibility for developing kindergartens, four mechanisms jointly 
provide childcare in China. Firstly, the Ministry of Education ran a small number of 
kindergartens directly, which had better facilities and resources, as experimental and 
demonstrative examples. Secondly, work units in urban areas, including state-owned 
enterprises, public institutions and local governments, administrated kindergartens. As 
the principle supplier of childcare services before the economic reform, work units 
developed nurseries mainly to provide welfare because their employees freely enjoyed 
childcare services (Du & Dong, 2013). Thirdly, communities ran a few kindergartens as 
supplements to accommodate the needs of urban families whose employers did not have 
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Full time means that children stay at kindergartens for eight to 12 hours per day. 
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childcare programmes. Lastly, in rural areas, kindergartens are primarily administrated by 
the people’s communes, but childcare services are relatively less available. The disparity 
in childcare services between urban and rural areas is distinct because childcare services 
are essentially one of the public welfare systems that cater mainly for non-agricultural 
families. Apart from the quality of childcare, the quantity of childcare in rural areas lags 
far behind that in urban areas. In many rural areas, childcare is only available until the 
year prior to enrolling in primary school. 
Before the Chinese economic reform, the management mode of kindergartens followed 
that of the Soviet Union in that the government administered this service directly. It was 
not until the middle of 1980s that privately run kindergartens started to play an 
increasingly important role in the development of Chinese society.  
While privately run kindergartens are gradually increasing, public kindergartens and 
childcare programmes supported by the government and work units have been cut back 
substantially in the post-reform period. Vast state-owned enterprises ceased to offer 
subsidised childcare to employees due to the increasing pressure to make profits and, 
from the mid-1990s and as a result of the welfare reform, some of the state-owned 
enterprises transferred their facilities to local governments, such as hospitals, schools and 
kindergarten (Du & Dong, 2013). On the other hand, quite a number of community-run 
kindergartens were closed because a lack of government funding.  
Although kindergartens have been set as the first stage of education in China, they are not 
compulsory for entering primary school. The nine years of compulsory education in 
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China covers primary schools and junior middle schools. As a result, in some 
under-developed areas in which kindergartens are not available, childcare by families is 
essential. 
3.5 Left behind children 
As discussed above, household registration system induced two classes of citizenship, 
‘residents’ (jumin) in urban areas and ‘peasants’ (nongmin) in rural areas (Xiang, 2007). 
After the Economic Reform, peasants started to seek jobs in cities as the Agriculture 
Reform
28
 released their responsibilities on farm land working and further relaxation on 
migration rules provided opportunities for them to work in cities. However, obtaining a 
permanent urban registration for peasant workers
29
 (nongmingong) is still highly 
difficult, which means rural migrants often have to work in the informal sectors taking 
temporary jobs, without secured wages and social benefits.  
Moreover, apart from the household registration system, other social factors remain the 
obstacles for whole family migration, for example, education resources for peasant 
workers’ children. Although the nine years compulsory education has been popularized in 
China, it is essentially location based, which means children only can obtain free 
education in their original registered place, namely hometown. If children are attending 
schools outside their hometown, parents need to pay sponsorship fees to the selected 
schools, which is a big burden for peasant workers as it can be over 10,000 yuan annually 
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 See explanation in section 3.3.1. 
29
 Specifically, peasant workers are those populations coming from rural areas with agricultural 
registration and taking temporary jobs in urban cities.   
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while the average annual income for a peasant worker is 36,000 Yuan in 2015
30
. As a 
result, with different reasons, peasant workers often choose to separate with their families 
and work in cities alone. Thus, a large population consisting children, female spouse and 
elderly parents are left behind in rural areas (Chang, Dong, & MacPhail, 2011; Wen & 
Lin, 2012; Xiang, 2007). Those children who live in a single-parent family or a 
non-parent family cared for by grandparent, relatives, non-relatives or even live by 
themselves, are called left behind children.  
3.6 Healthcare in rural China 
Before the agricultural reform, health services for China’s rural population were 
organised and financed through the Cooperative Medical System (CMS) and, in general, 
rural health care was organised according to a three tier structure, namely ‘barefoot 
doctors’, township clinics and county hospitals. Rural residents with common illness 
usually went to see a ‘barefoot doctor’ first and were prescribed Chinese herbal 
medicines. For slightly more serious illness, barefoot doctors referred patients to the 
second tier, township clinics, where patients receive basic treatment. More patients with 
more serious illnesses that township clinics cannot handle were referred to county 
hospitals and, in rare cases of the most serious illness, patients were transferred to urban 
hospitals (Liu, Hsiao, Li, Liu, & Ren, 1995).  
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 Peasant Worker Monitoring and Survey Report 2015, National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
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After the agricultural reforms, most CMS schemes collapsed because communes 
disappeared, many barefoot doctors stopped providing services and township clinics 
closed due to suspended financial support (Yip & Hsiao, 2008). Therefore, the vast 
majority of rural population had to self-fund their health care rather than enjoying the 
services on the previously pre-paid basis. Although the number of private medical 
practices, such as individual or family run clinics, has increased rapidly in the past two 
decades, and rural residents can seek medical services directly from urban hospitals when 
the illness is serious or treatment is not available in county hospitals, rural residents are 
still disadvantaged in terms of health services due to rising medical costs, the lack of 
availability of health facilities and urban-rural resource gaps. 
Medical costs are the main reason that rural residents feel under pressure. Data collected 
by the World Bank (1997) show that approximately 40% of individuals who are referred 
to higher level hospitals for treatment do not go because they cannot afford the costs. At 
present, one solution, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme, is in place to insure rural 
residents against catastrophic health expenses. However, one major limitation of this 
scheme is that it does not reduce the out-of-pocket expenses per outpatient visit 
(Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, & Juncheng, 2009; You & Kobayashi, 2009). 
Simply speaking, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme is a health insurance system 
rather than a health care system. Even though its coverage has expanded to 2,429 
counties in China, accounting for over 85% of all rural counties, the impact of the New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme on health care services and rural residents’ health status is 
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limited (Hu, 2008). Income is still the most important factor that influences residents’ 
medical choices and subsequent health outcomes. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, background information related to this thesis is introduced. In particular, 
detailed description of the household registration system and family planning policy in 
China has been provided to help understand the concepts of building instruments for the 
first estimation. China used to be a country with planned economy that many public 
services and social benefit were centrally administrated. Therefore, brief explanations on 
the institutional background are useful at delivering a fully understanding of the research 
in this thesis. For example, part-time jobs in China are not as common as in some western 
countries due to the characteristics of Chinese labour market, so that in the estimations of 
female labour force participation in this thesis, only working status is taken into 
consideration, not the working hours.  
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Figure 3. 1 Total population growth and total fertility rate in China, 1950-2010 
 
Data source: The World Bank. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=CHN&series=&period= 
 
 
Figure 3. 2 Changes in Chinese labour market 
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4. Fertility and female labour force participation in China 
4.1 Introduction 
In traditional family life, women are more responsible for family issues, such as looking 
after children and taking care of elderly parents. Particularly during the early stage of 
childhood, mothers are the primary mediators to help children build and develop their 
first-stage skills (Ravnbol & Grover, 2011). Therefore, it is common to see a greater 
labour force participation rate for male workers than for female workers.  
Many factors can influence women's labour market behaviours, such as women’s 
education levels and health condition, labour market structures, institutional systems and 
even cultural variations. Of all these factors, fertility is an important one because women 
disproportionately face the responsibilities of bearing and raising children, and both of 
these activities are time intensive. The interaction between fertility and female labour 
force participation has fascinated social scientists for decades, and a great deal of 
investigation has been carried out to reveal the causality. In general, a negative 
relationship is well established, in that more children present in the household would 
decrease mother’s inclination to work outside the home.  
While extensive research could be found in literature regarding the link between fertility 
and female labour force participation in developed countries, little work has been done to 
investigate this link in China, which is of particular importance given its rapid economic 
growth rate, enormous population and controversial family planning policy (Fang et. al., 
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2013). According to Figure 1.2 in the previous section, the female labour force 
participation rate in China was over 70% before it started to decrease in 2001 but, overall, 
it is always higher than it is in most other developed countries.  
Before the Chinese labour market reform, which aimed to increase productivity, all 
able-bodied individuals were expected to work. While workers in urban areas were 
guaranteed life-time employment based on their educational attainment, workers in rural 
areas were obliged to work on farm lands because rural households had to earn their 
productive capitals and necessities (for example, matchsticks) via a production team 
based on their household members' work efforts (Meng, 2000). In order to maintain the 
rural and urban production system and to deter geographic labour mobility, the household 
registration (Hukou) system was designed to maintain the urban and rural labour market 
segregation. It assigned agricultural or non-agricultural status to each person, based on 
the place of birth, place of living and place of working. New-born children’s obtain status 
followed that of their parents, and changing from agricultural registration to 
non-agricultural registration was extremely difficult as people needed to get permissions 
from both their original registration and their destination’s local governments (Cai, Park 
& Zhao, 2008).   
Furthermore, governments protected urban workers by issuing regulations. On one hand, 
the central government prevented enterprises from firing urban workers by restricting the 
ratio of dismissed workers; on the other hand, municipal governments continued to 
allocate jobs to new graduates even though additional staff or workers were not required. 
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Thus, there was virtually no unemployment in urban areas until the mid-1990s (Cai, Park 
& Zhao, 2008). Things changed dramatically when the central government started to 
implement the state-owned enterprise reform, allowing some insufficient enterprises to 
reduce employment or go bankrupt. As a result, millions of workers were been laid off 
and over 50% of the layoffs affected women (Xia et. al., 2009). This is the reason for a 
distinct reduction in the number of females participating in the labour force since the 
mid-1990s.  
The high female labour force participation rate, together with the characteristics of the 
Chinese labour market and the planned economy, led to few researchers devoting their 
time and energy to modelling the relationship between fertility and female labour force 
participation. Not until the late 2000s did social scientists, whether from domestic China 
or worldwide, start to investigate the determinants of female labour force participation in 
China.  
One important issue related to the interaction between fertility and female labour force 
participation is the endogeneity of fertility. The reason for considering fertility as 
endogenous is twofold. Firstly, fertility and the female labour supply may be jointly 
determined. For example, career-oriented women tend to delay childbirth or limit the 
number of children they have. Secondly, fertility and labour supply may be influenced by 
unobservable factors, such as personal preferences. Therefore, one should be cautious 
when interpreting this relationship. 
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In the existing literature, two approaches have been employed to resolve this endogeneity 
problem. One is estimating the determinants of fertility and labour supply within a 
simultaneous-equation framework, as done by Moffitt (1984). The other is seeking valid 
instruments to reflect family size. Frequently used instruments include multiple birth or 
twins (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1980), the sex of the first two children (Angrist & Evans, 
1998) and infertility (Agüero & Marks, 2008).  
The starting point for this chapter is China's family planning policy. After the foundation 
of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the population in China experienced a vast 
growth for two decades before demographers proposed some measures to control 
population growth in the late 1960s. Figure 3.1 in the previous section also plots the 
population growth in China from 1950 to 2010. In that figure, the entire time horizon has 
been divided into three parts based on the implementation of family planning policies. 
Stage 1 fumbling period is from 1950 to 1970, during which there was no proper family 
planning policy. Stage 1 experiment period is from 1970 to 1980, during which some 
local measures were in place to control population. Stage 2 OCP is after 1980, when the 
OCP was implemented nationally. Three features can be seen in the figure. The first one 
is in stage 1 fumbling period, the total population was small but there was a high total 
fertility rate. The second one is in stage 1 experiment period, the total fertility rate 
decreased sharply, but the total population was still increasing. The third one is in OCP 
period, total population increased although the fertility rate was low. 
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China's family planning policy is legally applicable to all married couples with Chinese 
nationality, but its validation is in fact based on married couples' ethnicities and it varies 
according to registration types. Ethnic minority groups, such as the Zhuang, Hui and 
Man, are not affected by this policy and they can have as many children as they wish. 
Han couples, the ethnic majority in China, are facing stricter family planning policies 
especially non-agriculture registered Han couples, are having higher opportunity cost for 
violating the policy as they enjoy more social resources, such as state-provided housing. 
Formally implemented from 1980, the OCP provides a good means of assessing the 
correlation between fertility and female labour force participation because it limited the 
number of children each married couple could have. This policy was implemented strictly 
for four years and experienced two relaxations, which provides a good variation in  
family size. Taking the traditional preference for sons into consideration, the first 
relaxation that was implemented in 1984 allowed agriculturally registered couples to 
have a second child if the firstborn child was a girl, while the second relaxation that has 
been gradually implemented since 2000 allows couples who are from both one-child 
families, whether they have agricultural registrations or non-agricultural registrations, to 
have a second child. 
An analysis conducted by He and Zhu (2016) was the first study of the link between 
fertility and female labour force participation in China. Using Population Census Data 
and employing twins as an instrument for fertility, He and Zhu concluded that there was 
no significant impact of fertility on female labour force participation. I am using the 
62 
 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to model this relationship. Fertility is treated 
as endogenous, and I employ two different instruments. One was developed by Qian 
(2009), who created an instrument based on the relaxation of the OCP to investigate the 
effect of family size on children's school enrolment, and the other is the level of fines 
imposed for one additional unpermitted child. My study is the first to use this instrument 
in this context.  
Using 2SLS and IV probit estimation techniques, I find a significant effect in that an 
additional child reduces the possibility of female labour force participation by up to nine 
percentage points. I also find that children aged under three reduce mothers' labour 
supply significantly, in both rural and urban areas. However, the size of this effect shows 
that rural women are more vulnerable when they have young children. Furthermore, 
women who live in urban areas reduce their labour market attachment significantly if 
they have primary school aged children present in their households. 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, the sample I constructed for this 
analysis covers women living in rural and urban areas. Previous studies about female 
labour force participation focused on urban China; for example, those by He and Zhu 
(2013), Maurer-Fazio et al. (2009) and Liu et al (2010). Secondly, I applied the 
instrument created by Qian (2009) representing family size to another research area and 
this instrument works as expected in the analysis of correlation between fertility and 
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female labour force participation in China
31
. Lastly, this chapter is the first study to use 
variations in fine levels as an instrument for fertility in the empirical studies investigating 
female labour force participation in China.  
4.2 Literature review and methodology 
4.2.1 Previous research in other countries 
Attempted investigations of the labour force participation of married women started in 
the early 20th century with Mincer's work (1962) acting as pioneering research that 
focused on determinants of married women's decisions to participate in the labour force. 
The classic labour supply theory assumes leisure time is a normal good, so that a positive 
substitution effect and a negative income effect would be observed in response to hours 
of work supplied and variations in the wage rate. According to Mincer (1962), however, 
this assumption is not sufficiently true for analyse the labour force behaviour of married 
women. He pointed out that working at home is part of married women's labour supply, 
apart from working in the labour market, and women would adjust the time devoted to 
both via a change in hours of leisure (Mincer, 1962). 
Mincer's seminal (1962) study introduced some new concepts to model female labour 
supply. Firstly, income is more likely to be used by the entire family and secondly, the 
work-leisure choice for married women is actually a three-way choice. The former 
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 This instrument has been used in a study by Islam and Smyth (2010), who investigated children and 
parental health. The instrument was designed to represent family size to see how a parent's health status 
would be influenced by family size. 
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concept implies that each family member may alter his/her consumption pattern in 
response to one member's change in income, as the change means a variation in the entire 
family's budget constraints. The latter comes from the fact that housework and child care 
are part of marriage; thus, married women face three life components, namely leisure, 
work in the marketplace and work at home. The success of Mincer’s work relies on his 
consistent conclusion from both cross-sectional analyses and a time-series analysis. He 
found that the effect of the husband's income was negative and the effect of the wife's 
earning power was positive on wife's labour force participation, and that the effect of the 
wife's earning power was stronger.  
After Mincer, research on female labour force participation experienced extensive 
development and the theory has been revitalised. The wage rate was no longer the 
dominant factor influencing married women's labour force participation decisions and 
new concepts concerning non-market behaviours, such as education, marriage and 
childbearing, were added to the analysis framework. Another improvement was 
delimiting endogenous variables that were previously regarded as exogenous;. Research 
in this period can be roughly divided into three camps. The first camp estimates the 
determinants of fertility and labour supply within a simultaneous-equation framework, 
the second camp is to instrument fertility with exogenous events, and the last camp 
focuses on finding causality directions between fertility and female labour force 
participation, i.e. direction from fertility to female labour force participation, or female 
labour force participation to fertility, or mutual causality. 
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Three core research studies using simultaneous-equation estimation include those by Cain 
and Dooley (1976), Moffitt (1984) and Hotz and Miller (1988). Cain and Dooley (1976) 
adopted a one-period, life-time model that aimed to explain long-term behaviour. 
However, this approach was criticised by Moffitt (1984) because the results are difficult 
to interpret, as the one-period model is static in conception and specification. By 
regarding labour supply and fertility as life-time decisions, Moffitt claimed the model in 
his work was more complete because labour supply and fertility decisions are modelled 
jointly in a life-cycle not separately in multiple periods. On the other hand, Hotz and 
Miller adopted a dynamic approach and used longitudinal data to analyse both fertility 
and the related life-cycle labour supply behaviour of married women. Comparing these 
three studies, it can be seen that all the authors concluded that there was a negative 
correlation between fertility and female labour force participation. Hotz and Miller 
further pointed out that young children have a negative effect on female labour force 
participation, and that the presence of older children had a positive effect. 
The pioneers in the instrument camp are Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) who formulated 
a multi-period optimisation model containing a production function and an inter-temporal 
relationship between earning capacity and labour supply. They believed in a 
heterogeneous population and that personal tastes were unobservable and varied from 
individual to individual. They then argued that, in a labour supply equation, consistent 
estimates of effects only come from an exogenous instrument that accurately identifies 
endogenous fertility in a manner unconnected to personal tastes. Thus, the authors 
considered multiple births or twins delivered in the first birth could be used as 
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instruments, as these natural events provided a close approximation for exogenous 
variation in the number of children and reflect the impact of an additional, unanticipated 
child. Despite the advantages of having twins in the first birth, the authors pointed out 
one limitation of this instrument that twins at first birth cannot actual change the family 
size but only alters the life-cycle pattern of fertility.   
Surprisingly, few works have made use of twins at first birth as an instrument in female 
labour force participation studies after Rosenzweig and Wolpin until 1999, when 
Jacobsen, Pearce III and Rosenbloom (1999) conducted research using twin births as a 
natural experiment. They found that an unanticipated twins birth had a pronounced but 
transitory impact on labour supply, reducing both the proportion of women working for 
pay and working hours. 
A new instrument providing variation in the number of children was constructed by 
Angrist and Evans (1998). The principle of this instrument relies on the widely observed 
phenomenon of parental preference for a mixed-sibling sex composition. Therefore, in a 
family in which the first two siblings are the same sex, the parents are significantly and 
substantially more likely to have an additional child. Thus, a dummy for whether the sex 
of second child matches the sex of the first child provides a plausible instrument for 
additional childbearing among women with at least two children. The authors also 
confirmed that children lead to a reduction in the female labour supply. Another work, 
carried out by Cruces and Galiani (2007), followed this instrument’s strategy and applied 
it to two developing countries, Argentina and Mexico. The authors found that the 
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instrument was feasible for these two countries and that the effect of fertility on the 
female labour supply in these two countries was quantitatively similar to the effect in the 
U. S. 
Another instrument used is infertility shock, devised by Agüero and Marks (2008). They 
proposed this alternative exogenous source of variation in family size because neither of 
the previous instruments could reveal the relationship between fertility and female labour 
force participation in terms of no children or one child. Together with another study 
carried out by Rondinelli and Zizza (2011), infertility has been proven to be valid 
instrument. However, the results from this instrument contradict the twins at first birth or 
same-sex sibling compositions, finding that there was no evidence that children had a 
causal effect on female labour force participation. 
While a large amount of literature has tested the correlation between fertility and female 
labour force participation, few studies have paid attention to the direction of the causality 
of these two factors. The hypothesis in the literature is that fertility levels will fall as 
female labour force participation rates rise because both child rearing and employment 
are time-intensive issues. However, some researchers have found evidence showing the 
relationship may be more complicated than the hypothesis, as some countries that are 
experiencing low fertility levels have low female labour force participation rates 
(Bernhardt, 1993; Bettio & Villa, 1998; Rindfuss et al., 2000; Rindfuss & Brewster, 
1996). Four possible explanations are suggested by this camp: (i) women's fertility 
influences their labour force participation; (ii) women's labour force participation 
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influences their fertility; (iii) a reciprocal relationship exists between the two factors; and 
(iv) Negative association is spurious, so other factors are dominant (Cramer 1980, Weller 
1977). 
However, this camp fails to provide consistent conclusions because some studies have 
found a short-term unidirectional Granger causality between fertility and female labour 
force participation (Cheng, Hsu & Chu, 1997), while some studies have found a 
short-term bi-directional Granger causality between fertility and female labour force 
participation (Michael, 1985; Klijzing, Sieger, Keilman & Groot, 1988). 
4.2.2 Empirical studies in China 
China has the largest population in the world and its family planning policy, particularly 
the OCP, is a good experiment regarding population control as the policy limits the 
number of children each family could have. The Chinese labour market has also changed 
tremendously because of the Chinese economic reform and other policy changes, such as 
the labour market reform and migration relaxation. These factors have created an 
excellent research background for examining people's labour supply patterns and 
investigating the factors that may influence labour supply.   
Numerous previous works have shed light on research into Chinese family planning 
policies and the labour market, such as the impact of the family planning policy (Wang, 
2012; Du, 2012; Lee, 2012; Li, Zhang & Zhu, 2005; Li, Zhang & Zhu, 2009), labour 
market reform and its outcomes (Meng, 2012; Xia et.al., 2009), or employment, labour 
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supply and the gender wage gap ( Knight & Song, 1999; Li & Song, 2011; Zhang et al., 
2008; Appleton, Song & Xia, 2014; Maurer-Fazio, Hughes & Zhang, 2005).  
However, very few works have focused on the relationship between fertility and female 
labour force participation in China. It was not until 2000 that married women's labour 
supply in China attracted the attention of researchers, although most of the studies have 
concentrated on one particular region, either rural area or urban areas, due to the unique 
Chinese situation in which people's migrations are restricted by household registration 
(Cai and Wang, 2012; Liu, Dong & Zheng, 2010; Du & Dong, 2013).  
Two empirical works are related to my research. One was carried out by Maurer-Fazio et 
al. (2011), and the other is by He and Zhu (2016). Both of these work used Population 
Census data and focus on urban China. The former work is particularly interested in how 
the presence of pre-school and school-age children and/or elderly and disabled parents in 
the household affects women's likelihood of engaging in work outside of the home. The 
authors also compared the labour force participation patterns of rural migrant women and 
non-migrant women, and explored the determinants of labour force participation 
decisions for the two groups to see how the determinants changed over time. In their 
work, fertility was not included as an explanatory variable as the primary interest was 
childcare; thus, children in the household were divided into different age groups, namely 
0-5, young school-age children aged 6-12, older school-age children aged 13-15, and 
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those aged 16-17 whose school fees were substantially higher
32
. Therefore, this 
instrument was not employed. They found co-residency with older adults increased 
prime-age women's labour force participation and that pre-school age children reduced 
mothers' labour supply to the highest degree. They also found that migrant women's 
labour force participation appeared to be more hampered by childcare than was that of 
non-migrants. 
The latter consideration, which is the closest to our research, investigated the relationship 
between fertility and female labour force participation. Similarly to other western 
research, the authors treated fertility as endogenous and used twin births as an instrument 
for the number of children in the household. At the end of their work, He and Zhu (2016) 
concluded that the instrument estimations suggested very small and insignificant effects 
of fertility on female labour force participation. Nevertheless, limitations still exist in 
their work and are mainly caused by the data used in the analysis. Firstly, 1% of the 
sample of the 1990 Chinese Population Census and 0.095% of the sample of the 2000 
Chinese Population Census were used separately; thus, information about the households 
might not be coherent. In essence, the aim of the Chinese Population Census was a 
comprehensive survey of information about the population and to count the population in 
                                                     
32
  The compulsory education period in China is six years of primary school and three years of junior 
school, and the youngest age at which children start primary school is six. There are no tuition fees for 
compulsory education because the fees are paid by the country, but students still have to pay for books and 
other things such as study tools and materials, which are cheap. When children progress to higher education, 
such as senior school, tuition fees are sponsored by the household itself; fees are moderate for public 
schools but are much higher for private schools. Moreover, unlike university or college education, students 
cannot get bank loans to cover their fees, so fees are a burden to the household.  
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order to provide a basis for future population policies and social and economic 
development programmes
33
. Therefore, the population census questionnaire did not ask 
interviewees about their economic status, such as personal income or household income, 
resulting in no information on that view, which leads to the second limitations. Through 
the ages, wages or income has been considered an important factor that influences 
people's labour supply decisions, and Mincer (1962) pointed out women's income power 
is even stronger. Finally, the husband's income also influences women's labour supply 
decisions. Therefore, a model with missing income variables is not complete. 
4.3 Methodology  
The neoclassical theory of labour supply posits that people have to make a trade-off 
between paid work and leisure because of time limitations. To get paid work, an 
individual has to participate in the labour market. The reservation wage, according to the 
theory, is the factor that an individual relies on to decide whether to participate in the 
labour market, and non-wage income is the only parameter that can modify the 
reservation wage if an individual's other tastes are stable. Once an individual participates 
in the labour market, wage is an important determinant of labour supply. However, when 
household production is taken into account, the wage is not the only determinant as, 
within the household, leisure is not the sole alternative to paid work. People will devote 
time to household activities if the marginal productivity of such types of work is superior 
to an hourly wage. 
                                                     
33
 See State Council Document No. 576, 24th April, 2010. 
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Other factors can also influence people's labour supply decisions. Income earned from 
outside the labour market, the family environment, the number of children, and other 
family members’ incomes can play a role in people's labour market choices. 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework 
Before starting discussing the framework, one important issue should be clarified is the 
female labour force participation and how it is defined in this chapter. Although doing 
housework has been considered as the labour supply inside home, what this chapter 
focuses is women’s labour force participation outside home, i.e. taking paid jobs. This is 
because, unlike mothers working outside home who sacrifice their time on other family 
issues such as childcare, mothers supplying labour at home can balance. For example, 
while working mothers may not be able to, housewife mothers can attend the important 
events of children such as school meetings. Simply, the logic behind this definition is that 
the number of children may not influence housewife mothers’ labour force participation.  
I first examine the impact of fertility on female labour force participation and then 
expand the model to examine the impact of children of different ages on mothers' labour 
supply. It is hypothesised that women's labour force participation will decrease as the 
more children they have and that younger children will reduce women’s labour supply to 
the highest degree. 
4.3.1.1 Effect of the number of children 
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I started with the following model in which the dependent variable is a binary working 
decision that equals 1 if the woman is in the labour force and 0 if not. 
                    LFPit = βi0 + βi1Childrenit + βi2Xit + εit1                  (1) 
In this equation, Childrenit is the number of children each woman has and βi1 is the 
parameter of interest. Xit is a vector for personal characteristics including age, age 
squared, education levels, health conditions, an ethnic minority dummy, an urban 
registration dummy, annual wage, other personal incomes, husband's income and a 
dummy indicating whether the individual was co-resident with older parents and adult 
children. Year dummy variables and province dummy variables are included to capture 
the yearly fixed effect and the county fixed effect. 
The dependent variable, female labour force participation, is a binary variable which 
takes values of 0 and 1 that 1 represents joining the labour market while 0 not. Therefore, 
equation 1 is a non-linear model as the dependent variable is not continuous. Long (1997) 
argued that the effects of independent variables will have diminishing returns as the 
predicted probability approaches 0 or 1, so that a linear model gives a the biased effect of 
a non-linear relationship.  
The strategy is both linear and non-linear estimations are adopted so that the differences 
between them can be observed. In addition to this, the number of children is treated as 
endogenous following the literatures and instrument variable (IV) estimators are used to 
reveal the causal effects. More discussion about instruments employed in this chapter will 
be presented in later section.  
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In general, OLS and probit estimations provide the baseline results and IV estimations, in 
particular the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Instrument Variable probit, provide 
consistent results in the face of endogenous fertility. 
4.3.1.2 Effect of household structure 
Children of different ages have different childcare needs and, obviously, new-born babies 
and young children aged under three need more intensive care. The model is as follows: 
                      LFPit = γi0 + γi1Ageit + γi2Xit + εit2                   (2) 
The same as before, Xit in Equation 2 is the vector for personal characteristics, the same 
as in equation 2. Ageit, is the vector for different age groups of children and shows how 
many children a woman has in each group. When defining children, I adopted the 
principle of the upper age limit of 16 and divided children into four groups; 0-3, 4-6, 7-12 
and 13-16
34
. It is expected that children within the age group 0-3 would have the greatest 
influence on mothers’ working decisions among the four groups. 
For equation 2, OLS and probit estimation results will be presented as household 
structure (variable Ageit) is exogenous.  
4.3.2 Instrument 
                                                     
34
 Correspondingly, the four age groups of children are (1) at home and being taken care of by parents, (2) 
at nursery, (3) in primary school, and (4) in junior middle school. In China, the official age for registering 
at a nursery is three, so infants and toddlers are usually at home being looked after by parents or 
grandparents. 
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4.3.2.1 Relaxation to OCP 
A good instrument should satisfy the restriction that it must be correlated with family size 
but have no direct effect on the mother's labour supply or any other right-hand-side 
variable. It is not difficult to find instruments for family size in the literature since family 
size has long been regarded as endogenous. Some variables are highly correlated with 
fertility, but it is difficult to argue that they have no effect on labour market behaviour 
other than via fertility. These variables may include ethnic group, mother's education, 
mother's number of siblings and length of the marriage (Lacovou, 2001)
35
. 
Besides, shortcomings still exist regarding the instruments for family size used in 
previous studies. Firstly, although the occurrence of multiple births or twins is random 
and not correlated with female labour force participation, it mainly represents a time 
failure on the complete family size. Secondly, the same sex of the first two children is not 
suitable for developing countries because, in some developing countries with a deeply 
rooted culture of preferring sons, the gender composition might be affected by selective 
abortion (Basu & Das Gupta, 2001). Finally, infertility is not suitable for China either 
                                                     
35
  For example, ethnic culture may influence people's attitudes towards children as well as towards work, 
as some ethnic groups prefer big families and believe that women should stay at home looking after 
children, such as men in China. Women's fertility may also be influenced by the number of siblings. They 
may want more children if they have many siblings, or vice versa. Their labour supply pattern may also be 
influenced by their siblings as their sisters can help them to look after children. To some degree, the 
duration of the marriage can reflect the number of children in the household, but this is not absolute. 
Therefore, it is difficult to explain why these variables are good instruments. 
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because women who are childless due to infertility are very rare as they usually adopt a 
child. 
In this chapter, instruments employed have distinct Chinese characteristics. The first 
instrument strategy relies on the OCP and its relaxation. The "1-son-2-children" 
relaxation policy started in 1984 and is only applicable to one-child rural registration 
families. The strict OCP was formally implemented in 1980, so this relaxation applies to 
those families with only one child that was born after 1980. However, Qian (2009) 
argued that, if the previous four-year spacing policy had been enforced well, the OCP 
should be binding on those families with only one child born in 1976 or after. Therefore, 
following Qian, the instrument takes the form of a triple interaction of the first born 
child's sex, year of birth and household registration type. Specifically, in our estimation, 
dummy variables will be created to indicate child's sex (0 = boy, 1 = girl), year of birth (0 
= born before 1976, 1 = born after 1976) and household registration (0 = non-agricultural 
registration, 1 = agricultural registration). Therefore, only agricultural couples whose first 
child was a girl born after 1976 have an instrument that equals 1. 
4.3.2.2 Fines for unpermitted births 
The second instrument was constructed using fines imposed for one extra unpermitted 
child. Theoretically, it is believed that fine level and fertility are inversely correlated. 
From the previous background, according to the Social Maintenance Fees Collection and 
Management Measures issued in 2002, actual fines are calculated based on households 
and the local community's income per capita, but the records of fines in the CHNS data 
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discontinued in the wave of 1997, which means fines data used in this estimation are not 
regulated according to national standard. However, local economic development and the 
population situation will be taken into consideration when setting fines; for example, 
provinces with a high GDP like Jiangsu province would have a high level of fines, as 
would provinces with a large population like Henan province.  
Basically, instead of using the fines directly, a ratio of fines to household annual income 
is created to use as instrument. This is because the restriction power of imposing fines for 
unpermitted births cannot be demonstrated without comparing the fines with actual 
household income. Put it simply, a 5,000RMB fine would be severe for a household in 
rural inland China with totally 3,000RMB annual income while it would be acceptable 
for a household in rural China along the east coast with totally 6,000RMB annual income. 
Therefore, the ratio can reflect the extent of the penalty imposed on households. Besides, 
fines recorded in the CHNS community level data are penalty standard rather than actual 
amount of money, so the ratios are always bigger than zero.  
4.3.4 Fitted wage for non-working females 
From the discussion in section 4.3.1, annual wage is included in the model capturing one 
of women’s personal characteristics. However, for those women who are not 
participating in the labour market, their annual wage cannot be observed. The strategy 
here is to estimate a wage equation first and predict a value of annual wage for those 
non-working women.  
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By concluding previous wages have a significant effect on the reservation wage, Hogan 
(2004) examined a reservation wage equation with previous wages and distribution wage 
offers which cannot be actually observed. So he first estimated a standard wage equation 
on a sample consisting of all the newly employed, i.e. all those who are in their current 
jobs for less than a year and predict a fitted value afterwards as the mean distribution of 
wage offers. Inspired by Hogan’s method, a standard wage equation will be estimated 
firstly and it is as follows: 
Ln AWageit  =   δ0  +  δ1Eduit  + δ2Xit  +  δ3Occu +  εit3              (3) 
where AWage is working women’s annual wage, Edu is their education years and X is 
the vector for personal characteristics, including age, age square, marital status, a dummy 
variable indicating excellent and good health status, a dummy variable indicating their 
registration type (1=urban), a dummy variable indicating their ethnic groups (1=minority) 
and logged value of husbands’ income, and Occu is a vector of women’s occupations.  
Table 4.1 presents the estimation results of equation 3, in which column 1 doesn’t 
consider year and county effects while column 2 does. The results show that except 
marriage status and ethnics, all other variables play significant influence on women’s 
wage income. For example, holding others constant, having one more schooling year can 
help women increase 4 per cent of their annual wage. Similarly, holding others constant, 
taking professional jobs can increase women’s annual wage by over 30 per cent. So, with 
the estimation coefficients, non-working women’s annual wage can be predicted based on 
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their characteristics by assuming the same character would lead to the same working 
decision.  
4.4 Sample and Variables 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
The raw longitudinal data contain 66747 observations of women, consisting of 14525 
individuals including children and elderly people. Since the main focus of this chapter is 
female participation in the labour force, some restrictions were applied to the sample 
selection process. 
Firstly, after narrowing down the raw data to women aged between 16 and 55
36
, 
individuals who were single
37
, currently in school or who were not working at the time 
due to disability or retirement were excluded.  Individuals whose primary occupations 
were farmers, fisher people and hunters were also excluded from the sample because 
women engaged in these occupations can still have considerable time and flexibility to 
combine work and childcare. Secondly, individuals who had at least one child born 
                                                     
36
 The official working ages for male and female workers are different in China. For male workers, the 
working age is 16-60, while for female workers, the working age is 16-50 if their work position is that of a 
worker and 16-55 if their work position is that of a cadre. The new retirement age was implemented in 
2015, which is outside of the scope of this research. 
37
 Single mothers in China are very rare because, as explained in the previous section, birth permission 
certificates must be provided if a newborn baby is registered and birth permission certificates are only 
issued to married women. 
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before 1976 were excluded because these births were not under the OCP and the parents 
could have had one more child according to the four-year gap policy, which means that 
the relaxation of the policy did not apply to these couples. Thirdly, individuals whose 
self-reported number of children was not equal to the actual number of children living in 
the household, or whose self-reported household size was not equal to the counted 
household size, were excluded from the sample because an accurate number of children 
cannot be attributed to those mothers
38
. In addition, women who were step-mothers were 
excluded to avoid an estimation bias. Furthermore, individuals with uncertain marital 
status, registration type or any other information that had been lost, such as missing 
records of gender, date of birth and household relationship to head of household, were 
excluded from the sample. Figure 4.1 illustrates the steps in the sample selection. With 
regard to the sample for the levels of fines, this was further narrowed down to women for 
whom data concerning fines were available, based on the whole sample.  
4.4.2 Sample description and variables 
There are 5029 observations in total, representing for 2093 women in the whole sample 
and 1485 observations that represent for 758 women in the fine levels sample. Both 
samples are unbalanced. 
                                                     
38 Inter-generational linkage was provided as the interviewees were asked "who is your mother?" and the 
line numbers are presented in the data in order to create an ID variable to match mothers and children. 
Details of the matching method are provided in Appendix. 
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The dependent variable is a binary variable representing work decisions. Working time 
was not used as a dependent variable because there is little part-time work in China, and 
around 90% of the observations in our sample worked for more than 40 hours per week. 
Personal characteristics such as age, marital status, education levels, registration types, 
ethnicity, health conditions, women's annual wages and other personal income
39
 were 
taken into account. Family characteristics were also considered in order to capture the 
additional worker effect; thus, a dummy equal to 1, representing ‘living with adult 
children and husband's income’, was included. A dummy variable was also created that 1 
representing ‘living with elderly parents’. County dummies and year dummies were also 
included.   
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, in which 
Table 4.2 presents the statistics of the whole sample and Table 4.3 presents the statistics 
of fine levels sample. In order to check the sample selection bias, each table contains the 
statistics of raw data
40
 as the comparisons. Generally, difference between raw data and 
samples still exists but it is not tremendous. Average female labour force participation in 
raw data from wave 1989 to 2009 is 80.31% while in the whole sample it is 82.52%, 
                                                     
39
  In our sample, some women had personal income although they did not work. In fact, this is usual in 
China. Rurally registered households own farm land for cultivation and house land for living. During the 
process of urbanisation, some rurally registered households that used to live in the peri-urban areas had 
their farm land requisitioned; thus, they expanded the houses on their housing land and rented out the 
rooms to earn money. Therefore, rent is the main source of personal income for those women who do not 
work.  
40
 To produce the raw data statistics, male observations and non-working age female observations have 
been excluded. 
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leaving a 2% difference on this variable. For the fine levels sample, this difference is 
even smaller. The big difference observed lies on the household structures that women 
have no children and education categories. This is because the raw data contains single 
women who do not have children and the income information for most less educated 
women is missing that they have been excluded from the sample selection. Apart from 
these two variables, statistics of other variables in the samples are close to their levels in 
the raw data.  
Average female labour force participation rates in both samples were over 80%, which is 
higher than the number reported by the World Bank
41
. This is due to the sample selection 
criteria that excluded some women because of incomplete information. The average 
number of children each woman had was 1.3 in both samples, which is also slightly 
higher than the official total fertility rate in the National Population Census 2010
42
. 
However, it is still acceptable because the CHNS data covers less households compared 
to the national census survey and also Greenhalgh (1994) claimed that in fact, the data 
quality of fertility from CHNS data is better. Furthermore, the statistics showed that, on 
average, women who did not work had more children than women who worked. 
Mothers with children under the age of three tended to work less, which was the only 
category in which the proportion of mothers who did not work was higher than was the 
proportion of mothers who did. Education levels in the two samples were relatively low. 
                                                     
41
 According to World Bank, Female labour force participation rate in China was 73% in 1990 and 64% in 
2014. 
42
  The total fertility rate in the National Population Census 2010 is 1.18. 
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Only 20% of the women who participated in the labour market had higher education (a 
college degree or higher). About 40% of women in the two samples joined the labour 
market after graduating from junior middle school. More non-agriculturally registered 
women participated in the labour market than did agriculturally registered women. 
Moreover, women from ethnic minorities tended to work less. Meanwhile, women who 
did not participate in the labour market had higher personal income from other sources 
and/or higher husband’s income. More women participated in the labour market when 
they lived with elderly parents whose health conditions were good or excellent. 
Figures 4.2 to 4.4 show the variation in the levels of fines in the fine level sample. Taking 
all three figures together, it can be seen that the sample contains data regarding fine levels 
for eight provinces
43
 and that the variations are distinct. Fines in areas inhabited by 
ethnic minorities, such as Guizhou, Hunan and Hubei provinces, are relatively lower than 
they are in other provinces, especially those in which the population consists mainly of 
Han people, who are in the majority, such as Henan province. Liaoning, Shandong and 
Jiangsu are the top three provinces with high ratios.  
Possible reasons for high fine levels in the three provinces mentioned are, firstly, the 
population mainly consists of Han people in those provinces and the GDP growth is 
relatively high. In particular, Liaoning province has had consistently high ratios across 
the three waves, and this is partly because Liaoning used to be an important industrial 
                                                     
43
 The areas that have been shaded in the figures are the provinces covered in our sample. Heilongjiang 
province has no data about fine levels because it joined the survey in 1997 as a replacement for Liaoning 
province and the fine level data are only available for 1989, 1991 and 1993. 
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base in China, with many heavy industrial manufactures providing long-term 
employment. Thus, as a consequence of being employed and enjoying social benefits, a 
high level of fines for violating the family planning policy is imposed. 
4.5  Empirical results 
In this section, estimation results are presented to show the effect of the number of 
children on female participation in the labour force. The baseline results are from the 
OLS and probit estimations, in which the number of children is treated as exogenous. IV 
estimations reveal the true effects. As two instruments were employed, I also compared 
them to see which worked better in this research. Investigation of how household 
structures, such as children of different ages, affected women’s labour supply is presented 
in the last section. 
4.5.1 Effect of fertility on the female labour supply 
4.5.1.1. Baseline results 
Tables 4.4 to 4.7 show the baseline results, in which Tables 4.4 and 4.5 contain the 
results from the whole sample with waves 1989 to 2009, and Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show 
results from the fine levels sample with waves 1989 to 1993. 
Negative coefficients are observed in all four tables, showing a negative correlation 
between the number of children and married women's labour force participation. This 
negative correlation is in line with the hypothesis in this chapter and is also consistent 
85 
 
with the well-established negative correlation between fertility and female labour force 
participation in the existing literature. It can be seen in the four tables that, with 
everything else being constant, an additional child will reduce the possibility of mother's 
labour force participation significantly, by over 10 percentage points. 
The baseline results show that, compared to those women who attended primary school 
or who had less education, gaining further education increased the possibility of joining 
labour market. However, a difference in the effect of education on married women's 
labour supply between the whole sample and the fine level sample can be observed. In 
the whole sample, this positive effect was only significant for married women who had 
qualifications above the junior middle school level, which means that having a junior 
middle school qualification did not influence married women's labour supply decisions. 
However, in the fine level sample, junior middle school qualifications increased married 
women's labour force participation. This is partly because the fine levels sample contains 
waves from 1989 to 1993, during which period educational resources were not as 
plentiful as they were in the 2000s, which means that people with junior middle school 
qualifications were considered to be well educated and had a competitive advantage in 
the labour market. 
Having a good health condition and living with elderly parents who were in good health 
can also help married women to contribute more to the labour market. Consistent with the 
features explained in the background that people with non-agricultural registrations had 
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more opportunities to find jobs, the results confirmed that married women with 
non-agricultural registrations had a higher possibility of working. 
A negative effect was found for the variable ‘ethnic minority’, meaning that ethnic 
minority women with more children were less likely to work. In addition, income 
variables played expected roles in female labour force participation. Women's annual 
wages, fitted value I used, had a positive effect, and the husband's income had a negative 
effect. The magnitude of effects of these two variables in our research is consistent with 
Mincer's findings that women's earning power influences their labour supply decisions 
more strongly than does their husbands' incomes. Women's other income also had a 
negative influence on their labour supply, and the magnitude of this effect was even 
greater than was the negative effect of husbands’ income.  
Although the baseline results explained the correlation between the number of children 
and female labour force participation reasonably well, one should interpret such negative 
effects with caution because the estimation could be either upwardly biased or 
downwardly biased due to the endogeneity of family size. Next, the two-stage least 
square (2SLS) regression and the IV probit estimation results are presented using two 
different instruments, respectively.  
4.5.1.2 First instrument - relaxation of the OCP  
Looking at Tables 4.8 and 4.9, it can be seen that relaxation as instrument is positively 
and significantly related to family size. The results showed that relaxation policy is 
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significantly related to the number of children, which can increase the chance of having 
another child by 50 percentage points if couples are eligible to the relaxation policy.  
The rest results from the first stage estimation demonstrate that, among the factors 
influencing women’s fertility decision, non-agricultural registration exerts the greatest 
effect. Others being equal, women with non-agricultural registration have 50 percentage 
points lower chance of giving birth to another child comparing to women with 
agricultural registration. This is true with the fact that non-agriculturally registered 
residents enjoy more social benefits than agriculturally registered while in exchange, 
non-agricultural residents have less children.  
Women’s annual wage income is the second biggest factor that influences fertility 
decision. Holding other variables constant, a 10% increase in women’s annual wage will 
reduce 25-45 percentage points’ chance of having another child. Education years also 
play negative effect on their fertility decision, the more years they attained, the fewer 
children they have. For example, comparing with women who only attained primary 
school education, women with a college degree will reduce their possibility of having 
more children by over 30 percentage points.  
On the other hand, positive effects on fertility decision can be found on variables of 
women’s health condition, living with elderly parents, women’s non-labour income 
(other income) and husband’s income. With other characters being the same, the 
possibility of having more children is 10 percentage points higher when women live with 
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elderly parents
44
. Likewise, the possibility of having more children is also over 10 
percentage points higher when there is a 10% increase in women’s other income or 
husband’s income.  
From the second stage estimation results, number of children continues to suggest a 
negative effect on female labour force participation. Holding other variables constant, an 
additional child reduces the possibility of married women's labour force participation by 
around six percentage points. Comparing the size of effect with baseline results, however, 
it can be seen that the magnitudes from the instrument estimations are smaller, which 
confirms there is an upward bias from estimations treating the family size as exogenous.   
Other variables have shown expected results that greater educational attainment, good 
health condition, non-agricultural registration, higher annual wage and living with 
healthy elderly parents all contributed to greater likelihood of labour force participation, 
while the factors of ethnic minority, non-labour income and partners’ income reduced 
this possibility. The negative effect size of husband’s income is smaller than the positive 
effect size of women’s annual income, consistent with the conclusion from Mincer that 
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 This may not be true in western countries but, in China, it is understandable. Due to the traditional ideas 
of Confucius and Mencius, big families are preferred and not producing descendants is considered the 
worst unfilially conduct with regard to ancestors. Therefore, having been bound by such opinions for 
thousands of years, elderly parents would suggest that young married couples have children as soon as 
possible. If they live together, this suggestion may be interpreted as an order and pressure from parents as 
well as from the surroundings would be extremely intense. Meanwhile, living with healthy elderly parents 
means childcare provided by grandparents is available. 
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women’s earning power is stronger when making the decision of labour force 
participation.  
Comparing the coefficients of women's annual wages and other income in Tables 4.8 and 
4.9, the negative effect of other income is greater than is the positive effect of women's 
annual wages, showing that married women would prefer to withdraw from the labour 
market if they had higher non-labour income. This is true when simply assuming that 
leisure is a normal good, but if it is considered in the family context, it is difficult to tell 
whether this is related to women's household responsibilities to look after children or 
elderly parents.  
4.5.1.3 Second instrument - fine levels 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 present the results of the estimations using the second instrument, 
fine levels. Unlike the instrument of relaxation, fine levels are negatively related to the 
number of children, which means higher fine levels leads to families having fewer 
children. As explained in section 4.3.2, the instrument used is a ratio of fine levels to 
household income, therefore with one time increase in the ratio, women will reduce about 
30 percentage points’ chance of having one more child.  
Similar to the whole sample, the first stage results showed that women who had higher 
non-labour income, higher husbands’ income, who lived with healthy grandparents and 
who were ethnic minorities tended to have more children, while women who had higher 
education attainments and non-agricultural registrations had a reduced chance of having 
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more children. A college or higher degree reduced women's willingness to have big 
families tremendously. Everything being equal, women with college or higher degrees are 
in lower chances of having more children. Instead, better education increased the 
possibility of joining labour market. A college or higher degree can help women to 
increase their possibility of labour force participation by up to 30 percentage points. 
The second stage results from the fine levels sample confirmed the results from the whole 
sample in that having one more child would reduce the likelihood of married women 
joining labour market significantly, with a slightly greater effect of about eight 
percentage points. Women's annual income and co-residence with healthy grandparents 
increased the possibility of labour force participation, and women's earning power was 
more influential on their labour supply decisions than was the husband's income. 
4.5.1.4  Urban-rural differences  
Considering the urban and rural differences, such as the economic development gap, 
unequal facility recourses and uneven job opportunities, I investigated whether there were 
any urban-rural differences in the effect of the number of children on female labour force 
participation. It was expected that an additional child would reduce the labour supply of 
married women living in rural areas dramatically due to the inefficiency of public 
nurseries and formal childcare.  
Tables 4.12 to 4.19 present the 2SLS and IV probit estimation results from urban areas 
and rural areas. Tables 4.12 to 4.15 show the estimation results using the whole sample, 
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and Tables 4.16 to 4.19 show the results using the fine level samples. The main concern 
is still the effect of the number of children on married women's labour force participation, 
and it can be seen that an urban-rural difference of this negative effect does exist.  
In urban areas, women are more likely to be involved in the labour market because the 
size of this negative effect is smaller than it is in rural areas. Particularly when 
considering the results using the fine level sample, holding other variables constant, an 
additional child will reduce the mother's labour supply by up to 12 percentage points 
when living in rural areas, while this figure is seven percentage points in urban areas. 
The first stage results also tell different stories about family size in the two areas. Based 
on the whole sample, relaxation is more attractive for agriculturally registered households 
in rural areas as the size of its positive effect is greater than it is for agriculturally 
registered households in urban areas. However, fine levels play the opposite role in that 
they have a greater effect on households in urban areas than they do in rural areas.  
In addition, non-agricultural registration, a college degree or higher, and women's annual 
wages are the top three obstacles to having big families in urban areas, according to both 
the whole sample and the fine level sample. Among these three factors, non-agricultural 
registration can reduce the chance of having one more child by over 60%. In rural areas, 
on the other hand, the results from the whole sample show that women's annual wage 
reduced the chance of having one more child to the greatest degree, while the results from 
fine level sample show that having a college or higher degree was the main factor in 
reducing the likelihood of having more children.  
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4.5.1.5 Validity of the instruments 
One may question the validity of the first instrument, the relaxation of the OCP, because 
only agriculturally registered households are eligible for this relaxation. Would the 
instrument also apply to the non-agriculturally registered households? Estimations for 
agriculturally registered households living in urban areas will provide the answer. The 
reason for this approach is that agriculturally registered households living in urban areas 
have some similarities to non-agricultural households as they share similar facilities and 
may have similar attitudes as agricultural couples towards family size even after many 
years of living in urban areas. 
Tables 4.20 and 4.21 present the estimation results. It can be seen that the first 
instrument, relaxation, is positively and significantly related to family size, and the 
magnitude is less than it is in rural areas and slightly greater than it is in urban areas, 
showing that there has been changes for agricultural couples towards family size after 
few years living in urban areas. Furthermore, the influence of an additional child on 
married women's labour supply is milder for agriculturally registered women living in 
urban area as the effect is smaller than it is for women living in rural areas. 
Other variables provide similar coefficients to those in the previous estimations. The first 
stage results show that women with higher education and higher annual wages have less 
chance of having another child, while women who are ethnic minorities, live with healthy 
elderly parents, earn higher non-labour income and having higher husband's income tend 
to have more children. 
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4.5.1.6 Which instrument is better? 
From the IV regression results, both of the instruments work well in this chapter as they 
provide proper correlations and are statistically significant. So, which instrument is 
better? The following estimation approach, using relaxation as instrument for the fine 
levels sample, will reveal the difference. 
Tables 4.22 and 4.23 present the estimation results. Compared to Tables 4.10 and 4.11, 
which contain the results from the fine levels sample with fine ratio as instrument, it can 
be seen that the first stage results are similar, except that fine levels are negatively related 
to family size while relaxation of the OCP is positively related to family size, which is as 
expected. Regarding the effect size, magnitudes of coefficients in Table 4.22 and 4.23 are 
slightly bigger than they are in Table 4.10 and 4.11. This might be due to the feature of 
fine levels sample that it contains fewer waves than whole sample, only 1989, 1991 and 
1993, as well as the attitudes that couples have towards the family size. Before 1990s, 
people, especially agriculturally registered people, prefer large family size as more 
household labours will bring more household income. While later on, with the economic 
development and changes to people daily life, couples begin to care more about quality of 
children rather than quantity. 
Other results from the first stage and second stage estimations are similar to what they 
look like in Table 4.10 and 4.11. It can be concluded that, together with the fact that 
F-statistics for the two instruments reveal neither of them are weak instruments, both the 
OCP and fine levels are good instruments. 
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4.5.1.7 Robustness Check 
In this section, robustness checks are carried out from three aspects. The first aspect is 
releasing the selection criteria to include farmers, fisher people and hunters into the 
sample; the second aspect is adding a dummy variable indicating mothers’ working unit 
as well as an interaction term between fine ratios and working unit since discharge from 
employment is also a punishment for mothers being as employees; and the third aspect is 
testing the relationship using a random effect model.  
For the first aspect, Table 4.24 to 4.27 present the results of estimation with farmers, 
fisher people and hunters reintroduced to the whole sample. The rational is farmers, 
fisher people and hunters are believed to have more flexibility to balance the time spent 
working and looking after children, or they can perform the two jobs simultaneously, 
therefore the influence from number of children to mothers’ labour force participation 
would change. From the first stage results in Table 4.26 and 4.27, the instrument variable 
estimation results show that having one more child still reduces the possibility of 
mothers’ labour force participation significantly, even with farmers, fisher people and 
hunters included in the whole sample. Holding other variables constant, having one more 
child can reduce the probability of joining labour market by around six percentage points. 
Table 4.28 to 4.31 present the results of estimation with farmers, fisher people and 
hunters reintroduced to the fine levels sample.  
Comparing these results with results in Table 4.8 to 4.11, some similarities and 
differences can be observed. Similarities lie on the effect size of number of children on 
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mothers’ labour force participation while the differences lie on the effect size of 
instrument and education variables on women’s fertility, and the effect size of women’s 
annual income on their labour force participation. For the whole sample with farmers, 
fisher people and hunters, the size of the positive effect of the instrument, relaxation, on 
the number of children increased. This is because most of the farmers, fisher people and 
hunters are agriculturally registered and may eligible to have a second child. The size of 
negative effect of education levels on the number of children decreased as well as the 
positive effect of women’s annual income on their labour force participation. For the fine 
levels sample with farmers, fisher people and hunters, the size effect of fines on extra 
unpermitted births also decreased indicating that the strength of punishment becomes 
smaller. 
For the second aspect, the rationale behind this strategy is that people who work for the 
government, in government institutions or for state-owned enterprises will experience 
administrative punishment in addition to fines if they have one extra child; for example, 
they will be discharged from work or denied any benefits. The work place dummy takes a 
value of 1 if mothers worked for the government, in government institutions or for a 
state-owned company. Results in Table 4.32 and 4.33 show that, with other characters 
being the same, having one more child would consistently reduce the possibility of 
mothers’ labour force participation by up to eight percentage points. The first stage 
results also show that fines decrease the chance of having more children even after 
controlling mothers’ working place, indicating the strength of punishment on fertility is 
independent and strong. Meanwhile, working for the government, in government 
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institutions and for state-owned enterprises reduced the chance of having more children 
and the magnitude is approximately the same as fine levels. 
For the third aspect, since CHNS is a longitudinal data, random effect estimations were 
carried out. Results are presented in Table 4.34 and 4.35 using 2SLS estimator, in which 
Table 4.34 is whole sample with relaxation as instrument and Table 4.35 is fine levels 
sample with fine ratios. The two instruments are significantly related to number of 
children showing that couples eligible for relaxation to OCP are 50 percentage points 
higher possible to have another child and with one time increase in the fine ratio, chance 
of having another child will be reduced by up to 20 percentage points, assuming other 
variables constant. Likewise, comparing with Table 4.8 to 4.11, generally there is no 
tremendous difference between the baseline results and random effect model results apart 
from the variable of women’s annual wage. The magnitudes from random effect model 
estimations are much smaller than are from the baseline instrument estimations, showing 
that when taking individual specific effect, negative effect of women’s own income on 
fertility would decrease.  
4.5.2 Effect of household structure on female labour supply 
The previous estimation results showed that one additional child could reduce the 
possibility of married women's labour force participation significantly, but the age group 
of children that has the greatest influence on mothers’ labour supply remained unknown. 
In this section, I will investigate the correlation between household structure and 
mothers’ labour supply. As discussed in the section 4.3.1.2, children will be divided into 
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four age categories: (i) at home being looked after by parents (0-3); (ii) at nurseries (4-6); 
(iii) in primary school (7-12); and (iv) in middle school (13-16). 
Tables 4.36 and 4.37 provide the OLS estimation results and probit estimation results, 
respectively. In each table, the upper section provides the results from the whole sample, 
the middle section provides the results from urban areas, and the lower section shows the 
results from rural areas. 
According to the results for the whole sample, either OLS or probit, with the exception of 
children in middle school, the other three age categories negatively affect mothers’ labour 
force participation. Young children in the age group 0-3 have the biggest effect across all 
age groups. Holding other variables constant, mothers reduce their labour supply by 
about 8.5 percentage points if they are living with a child under the age of three.  
Comparing results from urban and rural areas, children under the age of three still reduce 
mothers’ labour force participation to the greatest degree in both areas. This negative 
effect can account for up to 16 percentage points in rural areas. The effects of 
pre-schoolers on their mothers' labour force participation are opposite in the two areas. A 
negative effect is observed for women living in rural areas but, in urban areas, 
pre-schoolers do not influence mothers’ labour supply. Conversely, primary school aged 
children reduce the mothers’ labour force participation in urban areas but not in rural 
areas. Holding other variables constant, a mother with a primary school aged child living 
in an urban area would reduce her labour force participation by up to five percentage 
points.  
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Although not shown in the table, other control variables produced similar results as 
previous estimations. In general, higher education or degrees, good health conditions, 
non-agricultural registration, higher annual wages and living with healthy grandparents 
can increase mothers’ labour force participation, while being an ethnic minority, having 
higher non-labour income and higher partners’ income decreased their attachment to the 
labour market
45
. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this study, I estimated the effect of fertility, or the actual number of children, on 
female labour force participation in China and examined how the different ages of 
children influence mothers’ labour supply. The two samples were derived from CHNS; 
one is the baseline sample, or whole sample, while the other is the sample of fine levels. 
Treating fertility as endogenous and using two different instruments, one a 
triple-interaction term based on relaxation of the OCP and the other fine levels for 
unpermitted births, I found evidence that an additional child reduces the possibility of 
married women's labour force participation significantly, by six to eight percentage 
points.  
Women's annual wages positively affected their labour supply and its effect was indeed 
stronger than was that of the husbands’ income, which is consistent with Mincer's (1962) 
conclusion. Furthermore, estimation results in this chapter showed that women tended to 
reduce their attachment to the labour market if they had other, non-labour incomes, and 
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  The full table of results is presented in Appendix B to G. 
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that the magnitude of this negative effect can be greater than that of women's earning 
power.  
I further divided the two samples to see whether children influenced married women's 
labour force participation differently in rural and in urban areas. The results showed that 
a difference exists and that women living in rural areas are more vulnerable than are 
women living in urban areas in that one additional child could reduce the likelihood of 
married women's labour force participation by up to 12 percentage points. This might be 
due to inefficient health support and childcare support, meaning that women in rural areas 
have to spend more time on child rearing. Women with agricultural registrations but 
living in urban areas were luckier as they had a higher possibility of remaining in the 
labour market. This is understandable, urban areas have more facilities to help mothers 
with childcare, and people also have to work longer hours in order to afford their living 
costs in cities. 
The first stage estimation results in this study also tell interesting stories. 
Non-agricultural registration and higher educational qualifications are two factors that 
reduce the chance of having more children dramatically. Ethnic minorities tend to have 
more family members, and this is consistent with the fact that they are not targeted by the 
OCP. Women are substantially less inclined to have more children if annual wages are 
increased, but have a greater chance of having more children if they receive non-labour 
income. Furthermore, the estimation results for agriculturally registered women living in 
urban areas show that they have smaller families than do women living in rural areas. 
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There may be numerous possible reasons for this phenomenon. For example, high living 
costs in cities cause people to limit the size of their families they may change their 
opinions of having large families the longer they live in urban areas. 
I also estimated how household composition affects women's labour supply, and I found 
that childcare played different roles across age groups as well as according to the area. In 
general, infants reduce mothers' likelihood of labour force participation to the greatest 
degree. Pre-schoolers reduce rural mothers' possibility of labour force participation by 
about five percentage points, while primary school aged children reduce mothers’ labour 
force participation in urban areas.  
I believe the research in this chapter has some advantages over the previous empirical 
research on female labour force participation in China. Firstly, I used a different data set 
containing richer information, which makes the model more precise as more variables are 
controlled. Secondly, more women were included in the sample. This does not 
necessarily mean I had a large sample size, but it did include women living in both rural 
and urban areas, unlike previous empirical studies in China that focused only on one 
particular area. Finally, I have presented the first attempt to use fines as an instrument for 
fertility in the empirical studies of female labour force participation in China, and have 
proved that this instrument performed as expected. 
4.7 Shortcomings and future research 
This chapter still has one shortcoming. Rural migrant women and comparisons of their 
labour force participation to that of non-migrant women have not been discussed. 
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Although estimations on agriculturally registered women living in urban area have been 
carried out, this does not necessarily mean these women are migrants. Normally, the term 
‘rural migrant people’ in China refers to those who have agricultural registrations but 
who leave their hometowns to seek work opportunities in more developed areas. Women 
who have non-agricultural registrations would not change their fertility behaviour or 
labour supply patterns significantly, but those with agricultural registrations would. For 
example, migrant women with agricultural registrations may maintain their fertility levels 
but increase their labour supply to afford living costs. 
Therefore, more work on migrant women's labour force participation is needed in the 
future to determine any specific factors that influence their labour supply. Furthermore, a 
comparison of labour supply between migrant and non-migrant women could be useful 
for drawing policy implications.  
Another interesting finding in this chapter is that co-residency with healthy elderly 
parents helped married women to increase the possibility of labour force participation. In 
addition, estimation results using the household structure showed that children of 
different age groups influenced mothers’ labour force participation in different ways. 
Certainly, children's ages determine their childcare demands, but the fact that 
grandparents looking after children is important and cannot be neglected. Therefore, in 
the next chapter, I will estimate how grandparents’ childcare affects mothers’ labour 
force participation. 
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Figure 4. 1 Selection progress of whole sample 
  Whole data (135898 observations) 
Male observations  
( 65,132 observations dropped ) 
Female observations (70,766 
left) 
 
Missing information  
(4,353 observations dropped ) 
Single women  
(6,483 observations dropped) 
Married women  
(36474 left) 
Age<16 & age>55 & missing 
age information 
 (27,809 observations dropped) 
 
Economically active  
(18638 left) 
Age between 16 and 55  
(42957 left) 
Students, first occupation is 
farmer, fisher and hunter, and 
disabled people and retired 
 (17,836 observations dropped) 
 
Women with uncertain number of 
children, women who are step 
mothers, women with at least one 
child born before 1976. 
(9,256 observations dropped) 
 
Analysis sample 
(5,029 observations) 
Women with children born after 1976 
and economically active 
(9,382 left) 
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Figure 4. 2 Fine variations in fine level sample, wave 1989 
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Figure 4. 3 Fine variations in fine sample, wave 1991 
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Figure 4. 4 Fine variations in fine sample, wave 1993 
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Table 4. 1 OLS estimation of working women’s annual wage. 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) 
Age 0.0729*** 0.0702*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Age square -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education years 0.0402*** 0.0491*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Married (1=yes) -0.0941 -0.1284* 
  (0.0756) (0.0773) 
Health status: excellent/good (1=yes) 0.1067*** 0.0345 
  (0.0143) (0.0226) 
Non-agriculture registration (1=yes) 0.0566*** 0.1161*** 
  (0.0150) (0.0149) 
Ethnic minority (1=yes) 0.0250 0.0077 
  (0.0194) (0.0223) 
Husband's income (logged value) 0.1652*** 0.1858*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0097) 
Occupations  
  Base case: non-skilled 
  Skilled workers 0.2387*** 0.2841*** 
  (0.0258) (0.0248) 
Professional 0.3337*** 0.4393*** 
  (0.0257) (0.0244) 
Administrator 0.2866*** 0.2694*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0237) 
Service industry 0.2534*** 0.2479*** 
  (0.0210) (0.0208) 
Other occupations 0.1913*** 0.2293*** 
  (0.0503) (0.0493) 
Constant 2.6106*** 3.9523 
  (0.1338) (0.1465) 
Year effect No Yes 
County effect No Yes 
R-squared 0.358 0.406 
Observations 17,159 17,159 
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Table 4. 2 Descriptive statistics of key variables, whole sample 
  
raw data                          
(age between 
16-55, female only) 
whole sample                                              
( married and with 
partners ) 
women participate 
in labour markets 
women don't 
participate in 
labour markets 
Explanatory variables 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Female labour force participation rate (%) 80.31  39.77  82.52 37.98 1 0 0 0 
Number of children 0.86  2.71  1.28 0.56 1.25 0.54 1.39 0.63 
         Household structure 
        Women without children (%) 18.53  38.85  1.57 12.44 1.52 12.23 1.82 13.38 
Women with children under3 (%) 9.84  31.79  12.85 34.23 11.4 32.31 19.68 41.46 
Women with children age 3-6 (%) 12.16  35.47  16.74 38.08 17.4 38.54 13.65 35.65 
Women with children age 6-12 (%) 27.83  55.76  41.14 56.44 42.55 56.33 34.47 56.53 
Women with children age 12-16 (%) 21.67  47.96  24.18 46.69 24.36 46.7 23.32 46.66 
         Age 35.82  10.90  36.22 7.25 36.11 6.92 36.7 8.59 
         Education categories (dummy %) 
        Primary or less 41.90  49.34  18.25 38.63 16.77 37.37 25.26 43.47 
Junior middle school 32.87  46.97  40.72 49.14 38.94 48.77 49.15 50.02 
Senior middle school 12.24  32.78  23.88 42.64 24.46 42.99 21.16 40.87 
College or more 7.59  26.49  17.14 37.69 19.83 39.88 4.44 20.6 
Urban registration (%) 32.93  47.00  71.64 45.08 74.48 43.6 58.25 49.34 
Ethnic minority (%) 14.82  35.53  8.59 28.02 8.27 27.54 10.13 30.18 
Health condition (good/excellent, %) 30.63  46.10  31.74 46.55 34.07 47.4 20.71 40.54 
         Women's annual wage (logged value & inflated, RMB) 8.22  1.13  8.71 0.87 8.71 0.87 0 0 
Women's other income (logged value & inflated, 
RMB) 8.31  2.49  
8.95 0.93 8.92 0.91 9.1 1.02 
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Husband's annual income(logged value & inflated, 
RMB) 8.56  1.12  
7.77 3.58 7.75 3.5 7.9 3.93 
         Co-resident with adult children (%) 32.10  48.51  28.22 45.01 26.07 43.91 38.34 48.65 
Co-resident with elder parents (%) 17.28  37.81  23.23 42.23 23.78 42.58 20.59 40.46 
         Year dummy (%) 
        1989 14.36  35.07  12.87 33.48 13.71 34.4 8.87 28.45 
1991 13.34  34.00  11.97 32.46 12.87 33.49 7.74 26.73 
1993 12.54  33.12  11.99 32.49 13.18 33.83 6.37 24.44 
1997 13.31  33.96  14.67 35.39 15.28 35.98 11.83 32.32 
2000 14.80  35.51  14.1 34.8 14.05 34.75 14.33 35.06 
2004 11.03  31.33  9.92 29.9 8.87 28.43 14.9 35.63 
2006 10.55  30.73  9.7 29.6 8.99 28.6 13.08 33.74 
2009 10.08  30.10  14.77 35.49 13.06 33.7 22.87 42.02 
         Province dummy (%) 
        Liaoning 9.63  29.50  13.4 34.07 13.95 34.65 10.81 31.07 
Heilongjiang 6.76  25.11  8.15 27.37 7.49 26.33 11.26 31.63 
Jiangsu 11.49  31.89  14.77 35.49 16.41 37.04 7.05 25.62 
Shandong 11.01  31.31  14.18 34.89 13.76 34.45 16.15 36.82 
Henan 12.60  33.19  8.15 27.37 8.07 27.24 8.53 27.95 
Hubei 11.78  32.24  11.77 32.23 11.93 32.42 11.04 31.35 
Hunan 11.69  32.13  12.27 32.81 10.43 30.57 20.93 40.71 
Guangxi 12.79  33.40  10.14 30.19 10.65 30.85 7.74 26.73 
Guizhou 12.23  32.77  7.16 25.78 7.3 26.02 6.48 24.64 
Total observations 31,551 5,029 4,150 879 
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Table 4. 3 Descriptive statistics of key variables, fine levels sample 
  
raw data 
 (age between 16-55, 
female only) 
whole sample 
women participate in 
labour markets 
women don't 
participate in labour 
markets 
Explanatory variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Female labour force participation rate (%) 88.65  31.72  89.89 30.16 1 0 0 0 
Number of children 1.08  2.39  1.27 0.53 1.25 0.5 1.5 0.68 
         Household structure 
  
      Number of women without children (%) 24.77  43.17  2.42 15.38 2.23 14.77 4.13 19.99 
Number of women with children under3 (%) 14.32  38.07  19.8 40.49 18.31 39.17 33.06 48.97 
Number of women with children age 3-6 (%) 18.90  43.55  30.41 47.8 30.2 47.33 32.23 51.99 
Number of women with children age 6-12 (%) 35.50  63.09  53.55 58.82 52.42 57.41 63.64 69.52 
Number of women with children age 12-16 (%) 23.39  50.90  19.13 43.2 19.24 43.26 18.18 42.82 
         Age 32.97  10.68  32.66 5.53 32.9 5.41 30.6 6.09 
         Education categories (dummy %) 
  
      Primary or less 48.76  49.99  18.55 38.88 17.19 37.75 30.58 46.27 
Junior middle school 29.21  45.48  44.61 49.73 44.24 49.69 47.93 50.17 
Senior middle school 10.70  30.91  25.73 43.73 26.21 44 21.49 41.24 
College or more 3.80  19.11  11.11 31.44 12.36 32.93 0 0 
Urban registration (%) 30.85  46.19  85.71 35.01 86.9 33.76 75.21 43.36 
Ethnic minority (%) 17.84  38.29  9.36 29.13 9.2 28.92 10.74 31.1 
Health condition (good/excellent, %) 50.27  50.00  56.39 49.61 56.51 49.6 55.37 49.92 
         Women's annual wage (logged value & inflated, RMB) 7.79  0.99  8.12 0.6 8.12 0.6 / / 
Women's other income (logged value & inflated, RMB) 8.39  1.42  8.79 0.94 8.82 0.91 8.57 1.09 
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Husband's annual income(logged value & inflated, RMB) 8.09  0.94  8.33 0.65 8.31 0.63 8.48 0.83 
         Co-resident with adult children (%) 15.55  49.69  6.68 24.98 6.6 24.84 7.44 26.35 
Co-resident with elder parents (%) 12.07  32.58  10.69 30.92 11.06 31.38 7.44 26.35 
         Year dummy (%) 
  
      1989 35.68  47.91  30.91 46.23 30.95 46.25 30.58 46.27 
1991 33.14  47.08  38.68 48.72 38.1 48.59 43.8 49.82 
1993 31.18  46.32  30.41 46.02 30.95 46.25 25.62 43.83 
Province dummy (%) 
  
      Liaoning 11.26  31.61  17.63 38.12 18.59 38.92 9.09 28.87 
Heilongjiang 0.00  0.00  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jiangsu 11.68  32.12  9.36 29.13 9.57 29.44 7.44 26.35 
Shandong 11.54  31.95  15.2 35.92 14.68 35.41 19.83 40.04 
Henan 13.63  34.31  8.1 27.3 8.74 28.25 2.48 15.61 
Hubei 12.83  33.44  15.87 36.56 16.26 36.92 12.4 33.09 
Hunan 11.99  32.48  13.53 34.22 11.62 32.06 30.58 46.27 
Guangxi 13.27  33.93  10.78 31.02 11.34 31.72 5.79 23.44 
Guizhou 13.81  34.50  9.52 29.37 9.2 28.92 12.4 33.09 
total observations 12,696  1,485  1,335  150  
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Table 4. 4 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - OLS estimation & 
whole sample (baseline results) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children -0.1080*** -0.1081*** -0.1092*** -0.1080*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0118) 
Age 0.0519*** 0.0502*** 0.0528*** 0.0506*** 
  (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0074) 
Age suqare -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0219 0.0239 0.0220 0.0266 
  (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
  Upper middle school 0.0480*** 0.0743*** 0.0477*** 0.0740*** 
  (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0177) 
  College or more 0.1668*** 0.2166*** 0.1672*** 0.2167*** 
  (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0178) (0.0186) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0775*** 0.0728*** 0.0736*** 0.0724*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0193) (0.0110) (0.0193) 
Ethnic minority -0.0419** -0.0442** -0.0455** -0.0482** 
  (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0196) (0.0204) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0411*** 0.0442*** 0.0423*** 0.0405*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0115 -0.0076 -0.0169 -0.0066 
  (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0161) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0220* 0.0292** 0.0250** 0.0288** 
  (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0128) 
Women's annual wage                              0.0990*** 0.1324*** 0.0908*** 0.1348*** 
 
(0.0262) (0.0242) (0.0256) (0.0268) 
Women's other income  -0.1206*** -0.1431*** -0.1258*** -0.1403*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0502*** -0.0515*** 
  
  
(0.0072) (0.0077) 
Constant -0.4047*** -0.9881*** -0.3534* -0.9096*** 
  (0.1941) (0.2082) (0.1924) (0.2044) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.325 0.359 0.332 0.360 
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income 
take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 4. 5 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - probit estimation & 
whole sample (baseline results) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children -0.1443*** -0.1483*** -0.1453*** -0.1480*** 
  (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0096) 
Age 0.0439*** 0.0441*** 0.0446*** 0.0445*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057) 
Age square -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0071 0.0064 0.0071 0.0260 
  (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0132) 
  Upper middle school 0.0400*** 0.0582*** 0.0391*** 0.0575*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0143) (0.0128) 
  College or more 0.1562*** 0.1642*** 0.1551*** 0.1635*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0088) (0.0104) (0.0087) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0762*** 0.0772*** 0.0737*** 0.0772*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0202) (0.0105) (0.0202) 
Ethnic minority -0.0413** -0.0482** -0.0456** -0.0497** 
  (0.0190) (0.0207) (0.0193) (0.0209) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0380*** 0.0461*** 0.0398*** 0.0481*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0123) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0171 -0.0127 -0.0123 -0.0114 
  (0.0161) (0.0150) (0.0160) (0.0149) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0215* 0.0300** 0.0241** 0.0298** 
  (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120) 
Women's annual wage                      0.0713*** 0.0748*** 0.0755*** 0.0786*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0064) 
Women's other income  -0.1015*** -0.0902 -0.1053*** -0.0941*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0349*** -0.0395*** 
  
  
(0.0067) (0.0066) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.249 0.331 0.251 0.379 
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's 
income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 6 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - OLS estimation & fine 
levels sample (baseline results) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children -0.1454*** -0.1440*** -0.1452*** -0.1438*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0197) 
Age 0.0820*** 0.0767*** 0.0815*** 0.0764*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0190) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0010*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0480* 0.0503* 0.0471* 0.0501* 
  (0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0282) 
  Upper middle school 0.0672** 0.0747*** 0.0665** 0.0746*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0287) 
  College or more 0.1250*** 0.1347*** 0.1229*** 0.1339*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0277) (0.0255) (0.0276) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1085*** 0.1301*** 0.1055*** 0.1309*** 
  (0.0189) (0.0276) (0.0191) (0.0276) 
Ethnic minority -0.0869*** -0.0913** -0.0895*** -0.0917*** 
  (0.0327) (0.0354) (0.0328) (0.0355) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0394** 0.0376** 0.0392** 0.0376** 
  (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0162) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0059 -0.0081 -0.0048 -0.0073 
  (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0342) (0.0347) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0518** 0.0389* 0.0505** 0.0381* 
  (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0206) (0.0218) 
Women's annual wage                              0.0956*** 0.0970*** 0.1039*** 0.1123*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0098) (0.0106) 
Women's other income  -0.1068*** -0.1060*** -0.1168*** -0.1161*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0068) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0680*** -0.0706*** 
  
  
(0.0156) (0.0161) 
Constant -0.5740* -0.5681* -0.5016 -0.5234 
  (0.3192) (0.3272) (0.3289) (0.3396) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.266 0.300 0.297 0.321 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Note: The same as Table 4.3. 
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Table 4. 7 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - probit estimation & 
fine levels sample (baseline results) 
  Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children -0.1456*** -0.1450*** -0.1451*** -0.1448*** 
  (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0170) 
Age 0.0742*** 0.0706*** 0.0735*** 0.0703*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Age square -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0444* 0.0410* 0.0433* 0.0405* 
  (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0233) 
  Upper middle school 0.0595** 0.0654** 0.0588** 0.0648** 
  (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0267) 
  College or more 0.1233*** 0.1259*** 0.1211*** 0.1255*** 
  (0.0299) (0.0311) (0.0300) (0.0311) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0962*** 0.0962*** 0.0933*** 0.0974*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0306) (0.0207) (0.0306) 
Ethnic minority -0.0847*** -0.0892*** -0.0876*** -0.0899*** 
  (0.0260) (0.0294) (0.0261) (0.0294) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0412** 0.0430** 0.0422** 0.0435** 
  (0.0201) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0209) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0033 -0.0052 -0.0012 -0.0035 
  (0.0411) (0.0413) (0.0411) (0.0412) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0731*** 0.0525* 0.0715*** 0.0515** 
  (0.0279) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0273) 
Women's annual wage                              0.1084*** 0.1022*** 0.1024*** 0.1093*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0099) (0.0106) 
Women's other income  -0.1168*** -0.1162*** -0.1169*** -0.1164*** 
  (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0052) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0876*** -0.0915*** 
  
  
(0.0133) (0.0134) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.205 0.342 0.206 0.343 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Note: The same as Table 4.4. 
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Table 4. 8 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation & whole sample 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0579* 
 
-0.0613* 
 
-0.0604* 
 
-0.0627* 
  
 
(0.0301) 
 
(0.0334) 
 
(0.0313) 
 
(0.0346) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.5191*** 
 
0.4974*** 
 
0.5182*** 
 
0.4974*** 
   (0.0295) 
 
(0.0277) 
 
(0.0295) 
 
(0.0278) 
 Age 0.1351*** 0.0297*** 0.1611*** 0.0317*** 0.1434*** 0.0291*** 0.1580*** 0.0321*** 
  (0.0183) (0.0137) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0182) (0.0083) (0.0146) (0.0082) 
Age square -0.0015*** -0.0004* -0.0018*** -0.0004*** -0.0016*** -0.0004** -0.0018*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1752*** 0.0260 -0.1571*** 0.0209 -0.1748*** 0.0227 -0.1572*** 0.0216 
  (0.0254) (0.0199) (0.0244) (0.0159) (0.0254) (0.0195) (0.0240) (0.0159) 
  Upper middle school -0.1827*** 0.0645*** -0.1852*** 0.0858*** -0.1834*** 0.0635*** -0.1852*** 0.0853*** 
  (0.0277) (0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0160) (0.0277) (0.0183) (0.0264) (0.0202) 
  College or more -0.3244*** 0.1964*** -0.3049*** 0.2313*** -0.3244*** 0.1958*** -0.3049*** 0.2314*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0233) (0.0241) (0.0237) (0.0273) (0.0180) (0.0270) (0.0237) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0923*** 0.0463*** 0.0947*** 0.0513*** 0.0894*** 0.0489*** 0.0947*** 0.0529*** 
  (0.0163) (0.0110) (0.0295) (0.0188) (0.0163) (0.0108) (0.0295) (0.0187) 
Ethnic minority 0.3083*** -0.0156 0.2817*** -0.0207 0.3609*** -0.0182 0.3046*** -0.0216 
  (0.0262) (0.0201) (0.0281) (0.0196) (0.0262) (0.0195) (0.0289) (0.0212) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.5172*** 0.0344* -0.5392*** 0.0406** -0.5192*** 0.0386** -0.5539*** 0.0395** 
  (0.0292) (0.0178) (0.0281) (0.0190) (0.0291) (0.0175) (0.0281) (0.0188) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0451 -0.0601 0.0371 -0.0272 0.0504 -0.0555 0.0472 -0.0257 
  (0.0353) (0.0591) (0.0248) (0.0191) (0.0353) (0.0492) (0.0347) (0.0191) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1135*** 0.0488*** 0.1035*** 0.0365*** 0.1114*** 0.0507*** 0.0713*** 0.0363*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0180) (0.0136) (0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0180) (0.0136) 
Women's annual wage                             -0.4792*** 0.0968** -0.4320*** 0.1305*** -0.4349*** 0.1152*** -0.4275*** 0.1411*** 
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(0.0703) (0.0443) (0.0426) (0.0375) (0.0703) (0.0428) (0.0467) (0.0377) 
Women's other income  0.1182*** -0.1372*** 0.1178*** -0.1433*** 0.1162*** -0.1378*** 0.1179*** -0.1338*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0030) (0.0062) (0.0031) (0.0077) (0.0031) (0.0069) (0.0031) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1651*** -0.0350*** 0.1548*** -0.0329*** 
  
    
(0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0128) (0.0074) 
Constant 0.5252*** 0.3231*** 0.5562*** 0.3798** 0.5853*** 0.3803*** 0.5506*** 0.3127* 
  (0.2016) (0.1594) (0.1902) (0.1642) (0.2067) (0.1632) (0.2080) (0.1740)  
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 99.24 / 59.69 / 92.25 / 57.75 / 
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029 
R-squared 0.250 0.353 0.306 0.341 0.249 0.316 0.297 0.342 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 9 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation & whole sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0625* 
 
-0.0641* 
 
-0.0632* 
 
-0.0643* 
  
 
(0.0334) 
 
(0.0338) 
 
(0.0330) 
 
(0.0335) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.5191*** 
 
0.4974*** 
 
0.5182*** 
 
0.4974*** 
   (0.0294) 
 
(0.0277) 
 
(0.0295) 
 
(0.0278) 
 Age 0.1351*** 0.0245*** 0.1611*** 0.0303*** 0.1434*** 0.0253*** 0.1580*** 0.0307*** 
  (0.0183)  (0 .0066) (0.0127) (0.0066) (0.0182) (0.0066) (0.0146) (0.0066) 
Age square -0.0015*** -0.0003*** -0.0018*** -0.0004*** -0.0016*** -0.0003*** -0.0018*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0003) (0 .0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1752*** 0.0172 -0.1571*** 0.0288 -0.1748*** 0.0165 -0.1572*** 0.0282 
  (0.0254) (0.0155) (0.0244) (0.0150) (0.0254) (0.0155) (0.0240) (0.0150) 
  Upper middle school -0.1827*** 0.0562*** -0.1852*** 0.0729*** -0.1834*** 0.0545*** -0.1852*** 0.0719*** 
  (0.0276) (0.0174) (0.0264) (0.0170) (0.0277) (0.0173) (0.0264) (0.0170) 
  College or more -0.3244*** 0.2640*** -0.3049*** 0.2898*** -0.3244*** 0.2612*** -0.3049*** 0.2885*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0285) (0.0241) (0.0277) (0.0273) (0.0284) (0.0270) (0.0276) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0923*** 0.0498*** 0.0947*** 0.0607*** 0.0894*** 0.0484*** 0.0947*** 0.0709*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0127) (0.0295) (0.0223) (0.0163) (0.0127) (0.0295) (0.0222) 
Ethnic minority 0.3083*** -0.0157 0.2817*** -0.0268 0.3609*** -0.0185 0.3046*** -0.0279 
  (0.0262)  (0.0187) (0.0281) (0.0192) (0.0262) (0.0187) (0.0289) (0.0193) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.5172*** 0.0394*** -0.5392*** 0.0453*** -0.5192*** 0.0430*** -0.5539*** 0.0470*** 
  (0.0292) (0.0148) (0.0281) (0.0152) (0.0291) (0.0148) (0.0281) (0.0151) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0451 -0.0387 0.0371 -0.0238 0.0504 -0.0338 0.0472 -0.0220 
  (0.0353)   (0.0317) (0.0248) (0.0168) (0.0353)  (0.0369) (0.0347) (0.0168) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1135*** 0.0507*** 0.1035*** 0.0394*** 0.1114*** 0.0521*** 0.0713*** 0.0392*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.0180) (0.0147) (0.0171) (0.0149) (0.0180) (0.0147) 
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Women's annual wage                             -0.4792*** 0.0814*** -0.4320*** 0.0970*** -0.4349*** 0.0856*** -0.4275*** 0.0979*** 
 
(0.0703) (0.0065) (0.0426) (0.0069) (0.0703)  (0.0057) (0.0467) (0.0062) 
Women's other income  0.1182*** -0.1001*** 0.1178*** -0.1000*** 0.1162*** -0.1009*** 0.1179*** -0.1013*** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0014) (0.0062) (0.0014) (0.0077) (0.0014) (0.0069) (0.0014) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1651*** -0.0454*** 0.1548*** -0.0461*** 
        (0.0099)  (0.0069) (0.0128) (0.0070) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F statistics on instrument 106.22 / 69.88 / 98.54 / 67.64 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 3.09 (0.048) 1.64 (0.028) 3.44 (0.031) 1.42 (0.035) 
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029 
Note: Marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB  
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Table 4. 10 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation & fine levels sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0819* 
 
-0.0829* 
 
-0.0831* 
 
-0.0850* 
  
 
(0.0442) 
 
(0.0444) 
 
(0.0441) 
 
(0.0443) 
Instrument-fine -0.2806*** 
 
-0.2628*** 
 
-0.2824*** 
 
-0.2638*** 
   (0.0150) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0152) 
 Age 0.1666*** 0.0823*** 0.1702*** 0.0855*** 0.1674*** 0.0842*** 0.1707*** 0.0865*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0304) (0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0303) 
Age square -0.0020*** -0.0011*** -0.0021*** -0.0011*** -0.0021*** -0.0011*** -0.0021*** -0.0011*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.2989*** 0.0374* -0.2806*** 0.0487* -0.2967*** 0.0376* -0.2798*** 0.0493* 
  (0.0424) (0.0200) (0.0416) (0.0307) (0.0423) (0.0200) (0.0416) (0.0304) 
  Upper middle school -0.2761*** 0.0866*** -0.2746*** 0.0813*** -0.2748*** 0.0818*** -0.2741*** 0.0891*** 
  (0.0474) (0.0285) (0.0466) (0.0256) (0.0474) (0.0285) (0.0466) (0.0263) 
  College or more -0.5794*** 0.2626*** -0.5855*** 0.2845*** -0.5756*** 0.2619*** -0.5834*** 0.2793*** 
  (0.0454) (0.0297) (0.0478) (0.0312) (0.0455) (0.0296) (0.0479) (0.0303) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0638** 0.0822*** 0.0106 0.0886*** 0.0698** 0.0888*** 0.0089 0.0895*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0193) (0.0417) (0.0280) (0.0296) (0.0196) (0.0418) (0.0279) 
Ethnic minority 0.2400*** -0.0867*** 0.2638*** -0.0875** 0.2434*** -0.0885*** 0.2647*** -0.0875** 
  (0.0440) (0.0330) (0.0482) (0.0359) (0.0437) (0.0331) (0.0482) (0.0360) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4757*** 0.0913** -0.4958*** 0.0935** -0.4754*** 0.0971*** -0.4957*** 0.0914** 
  (0.0419) (0.0352) (0.0419) (0.0395) (0.0420) (0.0355) (0.0419) (0.0393) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0450 -0.0463 0.0382 -0.0308 0.0432 -0.0425 0.0367 -0.0339 
  (0.0708) (0.0479) (0.0720) (0.0619) (0.0707) (0.0479) (0.0720) (0.0615) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1047*** 0.0459*** 0.0951*** 0.0496*** 0.1023*** 0.0428*** 0.0935*** 0.0582*** 
  (0.0363) (0.0140) (0.0384) (0.0154) (0.0362) (0.0140) (0.0385) (0.0153) 
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Women's annual wage                             -0.2758*** 0.0820*** -0.2569** 0.0828*** -0.2618*** 0.0884*** -0.2762*** 0.0883*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0130) (0.0257) (0.0147) (0.0299) (0.0118) (0.0298) (0.0131) 
Women's other income  0.0818*** -0.1039*** 0.0923*** -0.1031*** 0.0817*** -0.1041*** 0.0821*** -0.1032*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0065) (0.0079) (0.0067) 
Husband's income  
 
      0.1027*** -0.0718*** 0.1018*** -0.0702*** 
  
 
      (0.0281) (0.0157) (0.0283) (0.0165) 
Constant -1.2992*** -0.5088 -1.4144*** -0.5862 -1.3980*** -0.4615 -1.4996*** -0.5564 
  (0.4090) (0.3550) (0.4109) (0.4133) (0.4202) (0.3617) (0.4275) (0.4255) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 48.32 / 32.92 / 44.97 / 31.56 / 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
R-squared 0.300 0.283 0.314 0.2913 0.301 0.280 0.325 0.288 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 11 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation & fine levels sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0807* 
 
-0.0816* 
 
-0.0800* 
 
-0.0821* 
  
 
(0.0424) 
 
(0.0436) 
 
(0.0429) 
 
 (0.0440) 
Instrument-fine -0.2806*** 
 
-0.2628*** 
 
-0.2824*** 
 
-0.2638*** 
   (0.0150) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0152) 
 Age 0.1666*** 0.0802*** 0.1702*** 0.0772*** 0.1674*** 0.0812*** 0.1707*** 0.0875*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0215) (0.0237) (0.0254) (0.0238) (0.0210) (0.0235)  (0.0230) 
Age square -0.0020*** -0.0010*** -0.0021*** -0.0010*** -0.0021*** -0.0010*** -0.0021*** -0.0011*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.2989*** 0.0478* -0.2806*** 0.0502* -0.2967*** 0.0496* -0.2798*** 0.0521* 
  (0.0424) (0.0299) (0.0416) (0.0309) (0.0423) (0.0292) (0.0416)   (0.0300) 
  Upper middle school -0.2761*** 0.0814** -0.2746*** 0.0875** -0.2748*** 0.0875** -0.2741*** 0.0877** 
  (0.0474) (0.0391) (0.0466)  (0.0390) (0.0474) (0.0387) (0.0466) (0.0391) 
  College or more -0.5794*** 0.2899*** -0.5855*** 0.3033*** -0.5756*** 0.2922*** -0.5834*** 0.3054*** 
  (0.0454) (0.0311) (0.0478) (0.0315) (0.0455) (0.0315) (0.0479) (0.0320) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0638** 0.1087*** 0.0106 0.1083*** 0.0698** 0.1016*** 0.0089 0.1034*** 
  (0.0293) (0.0208) (0.0417)  (0.0207) (0.0296) (0.0210) (0.0418)  (0.0304) 
Ethnic minority 0.2400*** -0.0833*** 0.2638*** -0.0821*** 0.2434*** -0.0854*** 0.2647*** -0.0802*** 
  (0.0440) (0.0263) (0.0482) (0.0303) (0.0437) (0.0265) (0.0482) (0.0309) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4757*** 0.1088*** -0.4958*** 0.1032*** -0.4754*** 0.1070*** -0.4957*** 0.1012*** 
  (0.0419) (0.0334) (0.0419)  (0.0430) (0.0420) (0.0326) (0.0419)    (0.0419) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0450 -0.0268 0.0382 -0.0263 0.0432 -0.0326 0.0367 -0.0480 
  (0.0708) (0.0538) (0.0720)  (0.0603) (0.0707) (0.0532) (0.0720)   (0.0594) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1047*** 0.0622** 0.0951*** 0.0625** 0.1023*** 0.0593* 0.0935*** 0.0642** 
  (0.0363) (0.0308) (0.0384) (0.0308) (0.0362) (0.0305) (0.0385)  (0.0307) 
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Women's annual wage                                 -0.2758*** 0.0830*** -0.2569** 0.0850*** -0.2618*** 0.0880*** -0.2762*** 0.0869*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0257) (0.0136) (0.0299) (0.0122) (0.0298)  (0.0131) 
Women's other income  0.0818*** -0.1008*** 0.0923*** -0.1055*** 0.0817*** -0.1005*** 0.0821*** -0.1005*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0053) (0.0079)   (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0053) (0.0079)    (0.0056) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1027*** -0.0662*** 0.1018*** -0.0690*** 
          (0.0281) (0.0137) (0.0283) (0.0143) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F statistics on instrument 38.86 / 25.43 / 36.07 / 24.35 / 
Wald test of exogeneity  (p value) 1.53 (0.047) 1.85 (0.035) 1.55 (0.045) 1.99 (0.033) 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Note: Marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 12 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, whole sample & urban areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0504* 
 
-0.0609* 
 
-0.0534* 
 
-0.0623* 
  
 
(0.0316) 
 
(0.0356) 
 
(0.0319) 
 
(0.0352) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.3914*** 
 
0.3679*** 
 
0.3906*** 
 
0.3683*** 
   (0.0452) 
 
(0.0425) 
 
(0.0452) 
 
(0.0425) 
 Age 0.0425*** 0.0581*** 0.0426*** 0.0640** 0.0425*** 0.0584*** 0.0429*** 0.0680*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0110) (0.0201) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0201) 
Age square -0.0005*** -0.0003* -0.0005*** -0.0004** -0.0005*** -0.0003* -0.0005*** -0.0004** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1138*** 0.0022 -0.1246*** 0.0390 -0.1153*** 0.0022 -0.1228*** 0.0372 
  (0.0334) (0.0310) (0.0305) (0.0308) (0.0334) (0.0310) (0.0306) (0.0307) 
  Upper middle school -0.2738** 0.0412 -0.3026*** 0.0474* -0.2755** 0.0367 -0.3009*** 0.0857*** 
  (0.0354) (0.0304) (0.0328) (0.0303) (0.0356) (0.0303) (0.0328) (0.0303) 
  College or more -0.4669*** 0.1788*** -0.5068*** 0.2248*** -0.4684*** 0.1742*** -0.5054*** 0.2232*** 
  (0.0357) (0.0343) (0.0340) (0.0372) (0.0357) (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0369) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0616*** 0.0365** 0.0603** 0.0485** 0.0603*** 0.0336** 0.0605** 0.0487** 
  (0.0184) (0.0166) (0.0291) (0.0225) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0291) (0.0225) 
Ethnic minority 0.1398*** -0.0534 0.1400**** -0.0349 0.1389*** -0.0551 0.1406*** -0.0353 
  (0.0388) (0.0366) (0.0381) (0.0357) (0.0389) (0.0363) (0.0381) (0.0357) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.6271*** 0.1171*** -0.6825*** 0.1088*** -0.6277*** 0.1146*** -0.6832*** 0.1089*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0367) (0.0283) (0.0372) (0.0287) (0.0369) 0.0282524 (0.0372) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0340 -0.0222 0.0358 -0.0314 0.0363 -0.0265 0.0352 -0.0308 
  (0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0277) (0.0259) (0.0289) (0.0265) (0.0277) (0.0258) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1172*** 0.0749*** 0.1524*** 0.0667*** 0.1157*** 0.0779*** 0.1522*** 0.0665*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0215) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0196) (0.0199) 
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Women's annual wage                             -0.5098*** 0.0619*** -0.5416*** 0.0706*** -0.5023*** 0.0606*** -0.5333*** 0.0783*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0092) (0.0156) (0.0126) (0.0163) (0.0082) (0.0171) (0.0109) 
Women's other income  0.2050*** -0.0922*** 0.2039*** -0.0928*** 0.2049*** -0.0924*** 0.2040*** -0.0928*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
Husband's income  
    
0.2161*** -0.0495*** 0.2147*** -0.0535*** 
  
    
(0.0148) (0.0110) (0.0153) (0.0121) 
Constant 0.4368* 0.4273* -0.1207* -0.4371* 0.4759** 0.5252* -0.1939 -0.3697 
  (0.2257) (0.2338) (0.2593) (0.2379) (0.2294) (0.2426) (0.2781) (0.2593) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 40.10 / 48.56 / 38.11 / 43.22 / 
Observations 2411 2411 2411 2411 
R-squared 0.284 0.336 0.298 0.380 0.296 0.332 0.285 0.382 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB.
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 13 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, whole sample & urban areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0456* 
 
-0.0510* 
 
-0.0481* 
 
-0.0522* 
  
 
(0.0288) 
 
(0.0294) 
 
(0.0285) 
 
 (0.0290) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.3914*** 
 
0.3679*** 
 
0.3906*** 
 
0.3683*** 
   (0.0451) 
 
(0.0422) 
 
(0.0450) 
 
(0.0422) 
 Age 0.0425*** 0.0186** 0.0426*** 0.0347*** 0.0425*** 0.0192** 0.0429*** 0.0344*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0093) (0.0110) (0.0088) (0.0110) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0088) 
Age square -0.0005*** -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0002)   (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1138*** 0.0006 -0.1246*** 0.0283 -0.1153*** 0.0048 -0.1228*** 0.0260 
  (0.0333) (0.0233) (0.0303) (0.0220) (0.0333) (0.0232) (0.0304)   (0.0219) 
  Upper middle school -0.2738** 0.0559** -0.3026*** 0.0654*** -0.2755** 0.0511** -0.3009*** 0.0635*** 
  (0.0353) (0.0245) (0.0326) (0.0230) (0.0354) (0.0244) (0.0326)    (0.0229) 
  College or more -0.4669*** 0.2271*** -0.5068*** 0.2499*** -0.4685*** 0.2187*** -0.5054*** 0.2468*** 
  (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0338) (0.0333) (0.0356)  (0.0350) (0.0338)  (0.0330) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0616*** 0.0436** 0.0703** 0.0610** 0.0603*** 0.0423** 0.0705** 0.0618** 
  (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0289) (0.0272) (0.0185) (0.0176) (0.0290)  (0.0271) 
Ethnic minority 0.1398*** -0.0511 0.1400*** -0.0259 0.1389*** -0.0505 0.1406*** -0.0260 
  (0.0386) (0.0325) (0.0379) (0.0323) (0.0387)  (0.0322) (0.0378) (0.0322) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.6271*** 0.0831*** -0.6825*** 0.0749*** -0.6277*** 0.0807*** -0.6832*** 0.0749*** 
  (0.0287) (0.0260) (0.0283) (0.0268) (0.0287)  (0.0261) 0.0282524   (0.0268) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0340 -0.0242 0.0358 -0.0240 0.0363 -0.0280 0.0352 -0.0224 
  (0.0288) (0.0224) (0.0276) (0.0208) (0.0288)   (0.0224) (0.0275)  (0.0207) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1172*** 0.0695*** 0.1524*** 0.0564*** -0.1157*** 0.0711*** 0.1522*** 0.0562*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0218) (0.0194) (0.0198) (0.0189)  (0.0219) (0.0194)    (0.0198) 
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Women's annual wage                             -0.5098*** 0.0637*** -0.5416*** 0.0650*** -0.5023*** 0.0601*** -0.5333*** 0.0660*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0093) (0.0155) (0.0105) (0.0162)  (0.0082) (0.0170)  (0.0094) 
Women's other income  0.2050*** -0.0910*** 0.2197*** -0.0913*** 0.2049*** -0.0911*** 0.2040*** -0.0913*** 
  (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0021)    (0.0019) (0.0022)    (0.0018) 
Husband's income  
    
0.2161*** -0.0364*** 0.2147*** -0.0363*** 
  
 
      (0.0147) (0.0101) (0.0152)  (0.0097) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Yesr effect No Yes No Yes 
F statistics on instrument 41.34 / 31.07 / 38.51 / 30.05 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 6.60 (0.010) 5.11 (0.024) 6.12 (0.013) 4.85 (0.028) 
Observations 2411 2411 2411 2411 
Note: Marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 14 Effect of family size on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, whole sample & rural areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0793*** 
 
-0.0892*** 
 
-0.0800*** 
 
-0.0883*** 
  
 
(0.0146) 
 
(0.0174) 
 
(0.0147) 
 
(0.0176) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.5764*** 
 
0.5391*** 
 
0.5755*** 
 
0.5393*** 
   (0.0372) 
 
(0.0350) 
 
(0.0372) 
 
(0.0350) 
 Age 0.0653*** 0.0332*** 0.0702*** 0.0336*** 0.0676*** 0.0343*** 0.0706 0.0346*** 
  (0.0173) (0.0119) (0.0175) (0.0121) (0.0171) (0.0120) (0.0173) (0.0121) 
Age square -0.0006** -0.0004*** -0.0006** -0.0004*** -0.0006** -0.0005*** -0.0006** -0.0005*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.0955*** 0.0444* -0.0956*** 0.0475* -0.0919*** 0.0458* -0.0951*** 0.0387 
  (0.0347) (0.0248) (0.0328) (0.0241) (0.0348) (0.0248) (0.0328) (0.0241) 
  Upper middle school -0.1536*** 0.0727*** -0.1260*** 0.0812*** -0.1527*** 0.0730*** -0.1258*** 0.0817*** 
  (0.0392) (0.0276) (0.0373) (0.0274) (0.0392) (0.0276) (0.0373) (0.0274) 
  College or more -0.3489*** 0.2047*** -0.2989*** 0.2477*** -0.3467*** 0.2054*** -0.2987*** 0.2486*** 
  (0.0390) (0.0330) (0.0398) (0.0319) (0.0391) (0.0331) (0.0399) (0.0320) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1186*** 0.0531*** 0.1206*** 0.0547*** 0.1140*** 0.0511*** 0.1209*** 0.0540*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0180) (0.0604) (0.0189) (0.0253) (0.0181) (0.0604) (0.0389) 
Ethnic minority 0.4014*** -0.0205 0.4113*** -0.0222 0.4185*** -0.0221 0.4118*** 0.0213 
  (0.0337) (0.0258) (0.0388) (0.0273) (0.0335) (0.0258) (0.0388) (0.0274) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.3883*** 0.0073 -0.4094*** 0.0126 -0.3892*** 0.0069 -0.4096*** -0.0111 
  (0.0325) (0.0200) (0.0305) (0.0206) (0.0325) (0.0199) (0.0305) (0.0204) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0552 -0.0210 0.0447 -0.0247 0.0638 -0.0272 0.0583 -0.0225 
  (0.0402) (0.0283) (0.0390) (0.0285) (0.0402) (0.0285) (0.0390) (0.0285) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1121*** 0.0377** 0.1001*** 0.0465** 0.1103*** 0.0385** 0.1003*** 0.0462** 
  (0.0277) (0.0191) (0.0289) (0.0196) (0.0277) (0.0191) (0.0289) (0.0196) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.5066*** 0.1201*** -0.5135*** 0.1244*** -0.4410*** 0.1210*** -0.5093*** 0.1251*** 
 
(0.0170) (0.0093) (0.0193) (0.0098) (0.0213) (0.0078) (0.0218) (0.0086) 
Women's other income  0.2009*** -0.1524*** 0.2094*** -0.1511*** 0.2087*** -0.1523*** 0.2094*** -0.1510*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1366*** -0.0965*** 0.1407*** -0.0972*** 
  
    
(0.0186) (0.0104) (0.0189) (0.0110) 
Constant 0.2953 0.2643 -0.4867 0.1831 0.3640 0.2955 -0.4575 0.2484 
  (0.3202) (0.2224) (0.3542) (0.2298) (0.3277) (0.2255) (0.3743) (0.2386) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 77.46 / 47.56 / 72.13 / 45.96 / 
Observations 2618 2618 2618 2618 
R-squared 0.275 0.250 0.342 0.281 0.277 0.252 0.342 0.283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses     
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 15 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, whole sample & rural areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0726*** 
 
-0.0712*** 
 
-0.0774*** 
 
-0.0707*** 
  
 
(0.0203) 
 
(0.0224) 
 
(0.0204) 
 
(0.0223) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.5764*** 
 
0.5391*** 
 
0.5755*** 
     (0.0371) 
 
(0.0348) 
 
(0.0371) 
   Age 0.0653*** 0.0273*** 0.0702*** 0.0293*** 0.0676*** 0.0282*** 0.0706*** 0.0300*** 
  (0.0173) (0.0098) (0.0174) (0.0099) (0.0170) (0.0098) (0.0172) (0.0099) 
Age square -0.0006** -0.0004*** -0.0006** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.0955*** 0.0481** -0.0956*** 0.0475** -0.0919*** 0.0489** -0.0951*** 0.0480** 
  (0.0346) (0.0212) (0.0326) (0.0203) (0.0347) (0.0212) (0.0326) (0.0204) 
  Upper middle school -0.1536*** 0.0656** -0.1260*** 0.0720*** -0.1527*** 0.0650** -0.1258*** 0.0716*** 
  (0.0391) (0.0251) (0.0370) (0.0248) (0.0391) (0.0251) (0.0370) (0.0247) 
  College or more -0.3489*** 0.2964*** -0.2989*** 0.3398*** -0.3467*** 0.2959*** -0.2987*** 0.3394*** 
  (0.0389) (0.0500) (0.0395) (0.0495) (0.0390) (0.0500) (0.0396) (0.0495) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1186*** 0.0550*** 0.1206*** 0.0554** 0.1140*** 0.0538*** 0.1209*** 0.0549*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0185) (0.0600) (0.0260) (0.0252) (0.0185) (0.0600) (0.0161) 
Ethnic minority 0.4014*** -0.0030 0.4113*** -0.0045 0.4185*** -0.0030 0.4118*** -0.0056 
  (0.0336) (0.0247) (0.0386) (0.0263) (0.0334) (0.0247) (0.0386) (0.0264) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.3883*** 0.0548*** -0.3094*** 0.0538** -0.3892*** 0.0536*** -0.4096*** 0.0517*** 
  (0.0286) (0.0186) (0.0281) (0.0190) (0.0286) (0.0185) (0.0281) (0.0189) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0552 -0.0538** 0.0470 -0.0232 0.0638 -0.0505** 0.0575 -0.0216 
  (0.0401) (0.0255) (0.0388) (0.0261) (0.0401) (0.0257) (0.0387) (0.0261) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1121*** 0.0415* 0.1001*** 0.0474** 0.1103*** 0.0422** 0.1002*** 0.0471** 
  (0.0277) (0.0218) (0.0287) (0.0220) (0.0277) (0.0217) (0.0288) (0.0220) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.4655*** 0.1118*** -0.5135*** 0.1073*** -0.4410*** 0.1012*** -0.5093*** 0.1024*** 
 
(0.0170) (0.0093) (0.0192) (0.0098) (0.0212) (0.0083) (0.0216) (0.0088) 
Women's other income  0.2090*** -0.1502*** 0.2094*** -0.1510*** 0.2087*** -0.1522*** 0.2094*** -0.1510*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1366*** -0.0857*** 0.1377*** -0.0851*** 
  
    
(0.0186) (0.0099) (0.0187) (0.0102) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 67.83 / 42.81 / 63.46 / 41.33 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 6.09 (0.027) 6.01 (0.048) 6.08 (0.027) 6.01(0.048) 
Observations 2618 2618 2618 2618 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and 
logged, in RMB.       Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 16 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, fine levels sample & urban areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0712* 
 
-0.0723* 
 
-0.0720* 
 
-0.0725* 
  
 
(0.0417) 
 
(0.0450) 
 
(0.0420) 
 
(0.0451) 
Instrument-fine -0.3189*** 
 
-0.3250*** 
 
-0.3210*** 
 
-0.3216*** 
   (0.0107) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0122) 
 Age 0.1291*** 0.0704** 0.1241*** 0.0715** 0.1347*** 0.0720** 0.1294*** 0.0725** 
  (0.0319) (0.0320) (0.0293) (0.0342) (0.0313) (0.0326) (0.0288) (0.0348) 
Age square -0.0017*** -0.0009*** -0.0016*** -0.0009*** -0.0018*** -0.0009*** -0.0017*** -0.0009*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.2055*** 0.0214 -0.2038*** 0.0225 -0.1975*** 0.0223 -0.1965*** 0.0235 
  (0.0688) (0.0165) (0.0638) (0.0168) (0.0682) (0.0167) (0.0635) (0.0170) 
  Upper middle school -0.2743*** 0.0329* -0.2894*** 0.0345* -0.2683*** 0.0330* -0.2821*** 0.0350* 
  (0.0716) (0.0195) (0.0686) (0.0201) (0.0714) (0.0200) (0.0685) (0.0202) 
  College or more -0.4606*** 0.2443*** -0.4698*** 0.2488*** -0.4503*** 0.2425*** -0.4573*** 0.2501*** 
  (0.0697) (0.0242) (0.0694) (0.0250) (0.0695) (0.0240) (0.0694) (0.0251) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0769** 0.0755** 0.0745** 0.0800** 0.0691* 0.0811** 0.0706* 0.0815** 
  (0.0355) (0.0378) (0.0373) (0.0380) (0.0357) (0.0410) (0.0374) (0.0411) 
Ethnic minority 0.1228** -0.0998 0.1292** -0.0988 0.1194** -0.0792 0.1240** -0.0811 
  (0.0603) (0.0857) (0.0602) (0.0855) (0.0597) (0.0721) (0.0600) (0.0719) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.6779*** 0.0301** -0.7215*** 0.0321** -0.6702*** 0.0354** -0.7142*** 0.0355** 
  (0.0751) (0.0154) (0.0734) (0.0155) (0.0765) (0.0150) (0.0747) (0.0155) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0221 -0.0401 -0.0159 -0.0389 -0.0179 -0.0411 -0.0086 -0.0399 
  (0.0910) (0.0487) (0.0900) (0.0480) (0.0906) (0.0490) (0.0900) (0.0485) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1096*** 0.0451** 0.0880** 0.0423** 0.1093*** 0.0436** 0.0890** 0.0443** 
  (0.0401) (0.0198) (0.0423) (0.0200) (0.0399) (0.0194) (0.0423) (0.0201) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.3988*** 0.0786*** -0.3746*** 0.0801*** -0.3703*** 0.0805*** -0.3482*** 0.0811*** 
 
(0.0398) (0.0267) (0.0394) (0.0271) (0.0448) (0.0213) (0.0418) (0.0215) 
Women's other income  0.0611*** -0.0978*** 0.0636*** -0.0981*** 0.0693*** -0.0913*** 0.0616*** -0.0950*** 
  (0.0181) (0.0207) (0.0178) (0.0211) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0195) 
Husband's income  
 
      0.0922** -0.0630** 0.0934** -0.0644** 
  
 
      (0.0431) (0.0269) (0.0410) (0.0270) 
Constant -1.3622** 0.8191 -1.3820** 0.8375 -1.6096*** 0.8268 -1.6530*** 0.9168 
  (0.5805) (0.9322) (0.5577) (0.9428) (0.5896) (0.8707) (0.5842) (0.8828) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 21.52 / 21.49 / 21.06 / 21.42 / 
Observations 764 764 764 764 
R-squared 0.247 0.195 0.334 0.200 0.250 0.205 0.337 0.210 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 17 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, fine levels sample & urban areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0743* 
 
-0.0753* 
 
-0.0726* 
 
-0.0735* 
  
 
(0.0453) 
 
(0.0473) 
 
 (0.0454) 
 
(0.0471) 
Instrument-relaxation -0.3189*** 
 
-0.3250*** 
 
-0.3210*** 
 
-0.3216*** 
   (0.0107) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0122) 
 Age 0.1291*** 0.0754** 0.1241*** 0.0946*** 0.1347*** 0.0765** 0.1294*** 0.0925*** 
  (0.0319) (0.0346) (0.0293) (0.0363) (0.0313) (0.0350) (0.0288) (0.0368) 
Age square -0.0017*** -0.0005*** -0.0016*** -0.0006** -0.0018*** -0.0005*** -0.0017*** -0.0006** 
  (0.0005)   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.2055*** 0.0315 -0.2038*** 0.0366 -0.1975*** 0.0458 -0.1965*** 0.0435 
  (0.0688)   (0.0491) (0.0638) (0.0498) (0.0682) (0.0578) (0.0635) (0.0570) 
  Upper middle school -0.2743*** 0.0452* -0.2894*** 0.0474* -0.2683*** 0.0483* -0.2821*** 0.0490* 
  (0.0716) (0.0253) (0.0686) (0.0259) (0.0714)  (0.0253) (0.0685) (0.0262) 
  College or more -0.4606*** 0.2568*** -0.4698*** 0.2599*** -0.4503*** 0.2503*** -0.4573*** 0.2511*** 
  (0.0697) (0.0281) (0.0694) (0.0300) (0.0695)   (0.0355) (0.0694) (0.0351) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0769** 0.0862** 0.0745** 0.0918** 0.0691* 0.0870** 0.0706* 0.0925** 
  (0.0355)  (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0459) (0.0357)  (0.0383) (0.0374) (0.0479) 
Ethnic minority 0.1228** -0.0750 0.1292** -0.0727 0.1194** -0.0770 0.1240** -0.0751 
  (0.0603)    (0.0506) (0.0602) (0.0606) (0.0597)   (0.0513) (0.0600) (0.0519) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.6779*** 0.0355* -0.7215*** 0.0403* -0.6702*** 0.0352* -0.7142*** 0.0415** 
  (0.0751)   (0.0181) (0.0734) (0.0221) (0.0765)   (0.0183) (0.0747) (0.0225) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0221 -0.0431 -0.0159 -0.0484 -0.0179 -0.0468 -0.0086 -0.0499 
  (0.0910)  (0.0489) (0.0900) (0.0506) (0.0906)  (0.1040) (0.0900) (0.0515) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1096*** 0.0521** 0.0880** 0.0544** 0.1093*** 0.0563** 0.0890** 0.0563** 
  (0.0401) (0.0237) (0.0423) (0.0248) (0.0399) (0.0240) (0.0423) (0.0241) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.3988*** 0.0740*** -0.3746*** 0.0817*** -0.3703*** 0.0757*** -0.3482*** 0.0831*** 
 
(0.0398)  (0.0289) (0.0394) (0.0291) (0.0448)  (0.0282) (0.0418) (0.0295) 
Women's other income  0.0611*** -0.0983*** 0.0636*** -0.0960*** 0.0693*** -0.0935*** 0.0616*** -0.0950*** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0140) (0.0183)  (0.0166) (0.0181) (0.0155) 
Husband's income  
    
0.0922** -0.0621*** 0.0934** -0.0654*** 
  
    
(0.0431)   (0.0229) (0.0410) (0.0230) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 23.49 / 22.19 / 22.82 / 21.48 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 4.19 (0.041) 4.38 (0.040) 3.45 (0.043) 3.25 (0.041) 
Observations 764 764 764 764 
Note: Marginal effects are reported 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 18 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, fine levels sample & rural areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.1017** 
 
-0.1209** 
 
-0.1026** 
 
-0.1213** 
  
 
(0.0502) 
 
(0.0560) 
 
(0.0502) 
 
(0.0559) 
Instrument-fines -0.1731*** 
 
-0.1552*** 
 
-0.1748*** 
 
-0.1565*** 
   (0.0281) 
 
(0.0337) 
 
(0.0282) 
 
(0.0337) 
 Age 0.2060*** 0.1030*** 0.2070*** 0.1420*** 0.2057*** 0.1050*** 0.2067*** 0.1430*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0346) (0.0352) (0.0436) (0.0350) (0.0349) (0.0350) (0.0436) 
Age square -0.0024*** -0.0013*** -0.0025*** -0.0017*** -0.0024*** -0.0013*** -0.0025*** -0.0017*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1701*** 0.0855** -0.1828*** 0.0844** -0.1689*** 0.0825** -0.1825*** 0.0852** 
  (0.0531) (0.0363) (0.0527) (0.0358) (0.0530) (0.0366) (0.0527) (0.0358) 
  Upper middle school -0.1840*** 0.1075** -0.2123*** 0.1015** -0.1829*** 0.1045** -0.2122*** 0.1023** 
  (0.0642) (0.0465) (0.0617) (0.0485) (0.0643) (0.0467) (0.0618) (0.0484) 
  College or more -0.3259*** 0.2204*** -0.3373*** 0.2396*** -0.3216*** 0.2121*** -0.3350*** 0.2427*** 
  (0.0797) (0.0688) (0.0885) (0.0702) (0.0802) (0.0695) (0.0890) (0.0703) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0901** 0.1252*** 0.0970** 0.1273*** 0.0975** 0.1278*** 0.0977** 0.1233*** 
  (0.0458) (0.0314) (0.0415) (0.0321) (0.0464) (0.0318) (0.0417) (0.0322) 
Ethnic minority 0.3570*** -0.1570*** 0.3804*** -0.1050* 0.3524*** -0.1610*** 0.3580*** -0.1062* 
  (0.0610) (0.0480) (0.0643) (0.0530) (0.0608) (0.0481) (0.0740) (0.0631) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.2050*** 0.1457*** -0.2169*** 0.1490*** -0.2055*** 0.1470*** -0.2175*** -0.1500*** 
  (0.0513) (0.0369) (0.0513) (0.0473) (0.0514) (0.0372) (0.0513) (0.0473) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0359 -0.0413 0.0339 -0.0505 0.0349 -0.0449 0.0330 -0.0570 
  (0.1075) (0.0647) (0.1063) (0.0624) (0.1074) (0.0650) (0.1063) (0.0621) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1020* 0.0831** 0.1082* 0.0858** 0.0992* 0.0993** 0.1062* 0.0971** 
  (0.0579) (0.0376) (0.0593) (0.0358) (0.0578) (0.0379) (0.0593) (0.0459) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.1871*** 0.0904*** -0.1827*** 0.0959*** -0.1782*** 0.0975*** -0.1748*** 0.0997*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0191) (0.0311) (0.0242) (0.0369) (0.0196) (0.0377) (0.0252) 
Women's other income  0.1503*** -0.1299*** 0.1593*** -0.1218*** 0.1535*** -0.1282*** 0.1594*** -0.1217*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0084) 
Husband's income  
 
      0.1869*** -0.0762*** 0.1896*** -0.0753*** 
  
 
      (0.0370) (0.0235) (0.0373) (0.0273) 
Constant -1.5541** -0.6934 -1.7472*** -0.7264 -1.6103** -0.6580 -1.8036*** -0.7245 
  (0.6096) (0.5400) (0.6144) (0.6720) (0.6256) (0.5450) (0.6353) (0.6850) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 37.86 / 24.48 / 35.03 / 23.37 / 
Observations 721 721 721 721 
R-squared 0.345 0.195 0.364 0.200 0.345 0.205 0.364 0.210 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 19 Effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, fine levels sample & rural areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.1081** 
 
-0.1286** 
 
-0.1098** 
 
-0.1257** 
  
 
(0.0481) 
 
  (0.0523) 
 
(0.0469) 
 
 (0.0516) 
Instrument-fines -0.1731*** 
 
-0.1552*** 
 
-0.1748*** 
 
-0.1565*** 
   (0.0281) 
 
(0.0337) 
 
(0.0282) 
 
(0.0337) 
 Age 0.2060*** 0.0981*** 0.2070*** 0.1154*** 0.2057*** 0.0982*** 0.2067*** 0.1152*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0244) (0.0352)  (0.0212) (0.0350) (0.0243) (0.0350) ( 0.0212) 
Age square -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0025*** -0.0014*** -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0025*** -0.0014*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005)   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005)  (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1701*** 0.0797** -0.1828*** 0.0735** -0.1689*** 0.0703** -0.1825*** 0.0734** 
  (0.0531) (0.0381) (0.0527)   (0.0369) (0.0530) (0.0380) (0.0527)  (0.0369) 
  Upper middle school -0.1840*** 0.0951** -0.2123*** 0.0928** -0.1829*** 0.0934** -0.2122*** 0.0923** 
  (0.0642) (0.0449) (0.0617)   (0.0447) (0.0643) (0.0447) (0.0618)  (0.0444) 
  College or more -0.3259*** 0.2188*** -0.3373*** 0.2212*** -0.3216*** 0.2105*** -0.3350*** 0.2258*** 
  (0.0797) (0.0690) (0.0885) (0.0701) (0.0802) (0.0698) (0.0890) (0.0721) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0901** 0.1257*** 0.0970** 0.1228*** 0.0975** 0.1173*** 0.0977** 0.1229*** 
  (0.0458) (0.0290) (0.0415)    (0.0454) (0.0464) (0.0291) (0.0417)  ( 0.0455) 
Ethnic minority 0.3570*** -0.1229*** 0.3804*** -0.1276*** 0.3524*** -0.1257*** 0.3580*** -0.1277*** 
  (0.0610) (0.0332) (0.0643)  (0.0417) (0.0608) (0.0333) (0.0740)  (0.0418) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.2050*** 0.1426*** -0.2169*** 0.1674*** -0.2055*** 0.1414*** -0.2175*** 0.1468*** 
  (0.0513) (0.0306) (0.0513)  (0.0297) (0.0514) (0.0303) (0.0513)   (0.0296) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0359 -0.0152 0.0339 -0.0440 0.0349 -0.0168 0.0330 -0.0439 
  (0.1075) (0.0645) (0.1063)   (0.0719) (0.1074) (0.0642) (0.1063)   (0.0716) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1020* 0.0833** 0.1082* 0.0841** 0.0992* 0.0817** 0.1062* 0.0840** 
  (0.0579) (0.0393) (0.0593) (0.0369) (0.0578) (0.0391) (0.0593) (0.0369) 
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Women's annual income                             -0.1871*** 0.0943*** -0.1827*** 0.0964*** -0.1782*** 0.0908*** -0.1748*** 0.0976*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0174) (0.0311) (0.0177) (0.0369) (0.0176) (0.0377) (0.0188) 
Women's other income  0.1503*** -0.1223*** 0.1593*** -0.1228*** 0.1535*** -0.1222**** 0.1594*** -0.1228*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0066) (0.0084)  (0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0065) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1869*** -0.0702*** 0.1896*** -0.0710*** 
  
    
(0.0370) (0.0190) (0.0373)  (0.0187) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 27.04 / 26.78 / 22.82 / 26.02 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 5.97 (0.015) 11.99 (0.001) 6.30 (0.012) 12.37 (0.0004) 
Observations 721 721 721 721 
Note: Marginal effects are reported 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 20 Validity of instrument - 2SLS estimation on agriculture registered families in urban areas using instrument 
relaxation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0682** 
 
-0.0658** 
 
-0.0675** 
 
-0.0656** 
  
 
(0.0326) 
 
(0.0322) 
 
(0.0327) 
 
(0.0322) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.4522*** 
 
0.4318*** 
 
0.4520*** 
 
0.4322*** 
   (0.0557) 
 
(0.0486) 
 
(0.0557) 
 
(0.0483) 
 Age 0.0572* 0.0585** 0.0516* 0.0763*** 0.0573* 0.0590** 0.0504* 0.0764*** 
  (0.0304) (0.0268) (0.0274) (0.0261) (0.0305) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0260) 
Age square -0.0005* -0.0009** -0.0005* -0.0011*** -0.0005* -0.0009** 0.0005* -0.0011*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1091* 0.0882* -0.1047* 0.0833* -0.1089* 0.0890* -0.1059* 0.0845* 
  (0.0588) (0.0525) (0.0561) (0.0491) (0.0587) (0.0523) (0.0545) (0.0500) 
  Upper middle school -0.2133*** 0.1495* -0.2097*** 0.1456* -0.2128*** 0.1518* -0.2246*** 0.1472* 
  (0.0794) (0.0782) (0.0760) (0.0776) (0.0802) (0.0780) (0.0746) (0.0799) 
  College or more -0.2571*** 0.1519*** -0.2745*** 0.1820*** -0.2569*** 0.1525*** -0.2926*** 0.1500*** 
  (0.0336) (0.0475) (0.0328) (0.0451) (0.0368) (0.0473) (0.0325) (0.0421) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1010*** 0.0435** 0.0871** 0.0515** 0.1010*** 0.0481** 0.0859** 0.0413** 
  (0.0389) (0.0217) (0.0369) (0.0247) (0.0390) (0.0218) (0.0392) (0.0205) 
Ethnic minority 0.2117*** -0.0599 0.2168*** -0.0535 0.2115*** -0.0589 0.2160*** -0.0535 
  (0.0472) (0.0492) (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0472) (0.0491) (0.0427) (0.0430) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0393 -0.0025 0.0349 -0.0189 0.0392 -0.0015 0.0349 -0.0189 
  (0.0774) (0.0673) (0.0631) (0.0635) (0.0778) (0.0673) (0.0626) (0.0635) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1142*** 0.0529** 0.1184*** 0.0516** 0.1139*** 0.0514** 0.1127*** 0.0517** 
  (0.0620) (0.0254) (0.0564) (0.0256) (0.0630) (0.0253) (0.0563) (0.0256) 
Women's annual income                             -0.2663*** 0.0545** -0.2742*** 0.0554** -0.2674*** 0.0540** -0.2745*** 0.0590** 
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(0.0346) (0.0259) (0.0378) (0.0265) (0.0399) (0.0258) (0.0419) (0.0259) 
Women's other income  0.2604*** -0.1357*** 0.2615*** -0.1397*** 0.2604*** -0.1360*** 0.2624*** -0.1341*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0054) 
Husband's income  
    
0.3017*** -0.0433* 0.3066*** -0.0474* 
  
    
(0.0363) (0.0227) (0.0333) (0.0255) 
Constant (0.2162) -0.2760 -0.7299 -0.7347 0.2208 -0.2383 -1.0040 -0.7041 
  (0.5677) (0.5196) (0.6095) (0.5759) (0.5799) (0.5379) (0.6184) (0.6242) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 38.31 / 51.45 / 39.21 / 52.01 / 
Observations 364 364 364 364 
R-squared 0.264 0.238 0.342 0.281 0.277 0.252 0.342 0.283 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses     
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 21 Validity of instrument – IV-probit estimation on agriculture registered families in urban areas using instrument 
relaxation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0658** 
 
-0.0640** 
 
-0.0677** 
 
-0.0639** 
  
 
(0.0275) 
 
(0.0255) 
 
(0.0268) 
 
(0.0251) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.4522*** 
 
0.4318*** 
 
0.4520*** 
 
0.4322*** 
   (0.0557) 
 
(0.0486) 
 
(0.0557) 
 
(0.0483) 
 Age 0.0572* 0.0499** 0.0516* 0.0513** 0.0573* 0.0511** 0.0504* 0.0525** 
  (0.0304) (0.0231) (0.0274) (0.0227) (0.0305) (0.0230) (0.0276) (0.0353) 
Age square -0.0005* -0.0008** -0.0005* -0.0010*** -0.0005* -0.0008** 0.0005* -0.0010*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) ( 0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) ( 0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1091* 0.0910* -0.1047* 0.0981* -0.1089* 0.0916* -0.1059* 0.0991* 
  (0.0588) (0.0511) (0.0561) (0.0597) (0.0587) (0.0558) (0.0545) (0.0579) 
  Upper middle school -0.2133*** 0.1611** -0.2097*** 0.1725** -0.2128*** 0.1616** -0.2246*** 0.1623** 
  (0.0794) (0.0737) (0.0760) (0.0710) (0.0802) (0.0730) (0.0746) (0.0716) 
  College or more -0.3571*** 0.1801*** -0.3745*** 0.2035*** -0.3569*** 0.1894*** -0.3926*** 0.1837*** 
  (0.0336) (0.0675) (0.0328)  (0.0685) (0.0368) (0.0676) (0.0325) (0.0681) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1010*** 0.0420* 0.0871** 0.0480* 0.1010*** 0.0464* 0.0859** 0.0492* 
  (0.0389) (0.0234) (0.0369)  (0.0238) (0.0390) (0.0258) (0.0392) (0.0263) 
Ethnic minority 0.2117*** -0.0578 0.2168*** -0.0564 0.2115*** -0.0551 0.2160*** -0.0547 
  (0.0472) (0.0967) (0.0427)  (0.0949) (0.0472) (0.0961) (0.0427) (0.0941) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0393 -0.0101 0.0349 -0.0120 0.0392 -0.0110 0.0349 -0.0125 
  (0.0774) (0.0655) (0.0631) (0.0673) (0.0778) (0.0656) (0.0626) (0.0623) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1142*** 0.0587** 0.1184*** 0.0561** 0.1139*** 0.0588** 0.1127*** 0.0559** 
  (0.0620) (0.0263) (0.0564) (0.0236) (0.0630) (0.0260) (0.0563) (0.0230) 
Women's annual income                             -0.2663*** 0.0608* -0.2742*** 0.0658* -0.2674*** 0.0617* -0.2745*** 0.0663* 
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(0.0346) (0.0332) (0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0399) (0.0339) (0.0419) (0.0373) 
Women's other income  0.2604*** -0.1268*** 0.2615*** -0.1340*** 0.2604*** -0.1225*** 0.2624*** -0.1293*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0126) 
Husband's income  
    
0.3017*** -0.0468*** 0.3066*** -0.0434*** 
  
    
(0.0363) (0.0148) (0.0333) (0.0171) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 41.19 / 55.40 / 42.84 / 55.90 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 6.45 (0.028) 6.22 (0.039) 6.39 (0.029) 6.15 (0.039) 
Observations 364 364 364 364 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB.
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 22 Instruments comparison - relaxation as instrument in fine levels sample, 2SLS estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0810* 
 
-0.0879* 
 
-0.0888* 
 
-0.0856** 
  
 
(0.0466) 
 
(0.0498) 
 
(0.0470) 
 
(0.0402) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.6471*** 
 
0.6263*** 
 
0.6476*** 
 
0.6269*** 
   (0.0506) 
 
(0.0517) 
 
(0.0505) 
 
(0.0515) 
 Age 0.1339*** 0.0627*** 0.1403*** 0.0598*** 0.1337*** 0.0617*** 0.1401*** 0.0592*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0216) -0.0236 (0.0221) (0.0241) (0.0215) (0.0237) (0.0220) 
Age square -0.0017*** -0.0008*** -0.0017*** -0.0008** -0.0017*** -0.0008*** -0.0017*** -0.0008** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.3164*** 0.0715** -0.2943*** 0.0663** -0.3167*** 0.0712** -0.2943*** 0.0669** 
  (0.0408) (0.0332) (0.0399) (0.0330) (0.0408) (0.0332) (0.0400) (0.0331) 
  Upper middle school -0.3066*** 0.0908*** -0.3069*** 0.0934*** -0.3068*** 0.0908*** -0.3070*** 0.0940*** 
  (0.0459) (0.0343) (0.0449) (0.0351) (0.0459) (0.0344) (0.0450) (0.0352) 
  College or more -0.5586*** 0.2681*** -0.5577*** 0.2706*** -0.5594*** 0.2667*** -0.5581*** 0.2708*** 
  (0.0447) (0.0414) (0.0461) (0.0440) (0.0447) (0.0413) (0.0461) (0.0441) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0653** 0.0845*** 0.0030 0.0813*** 0.0663** 0.0813*** 0.0034 0.0822*** 
  (0.0278) (0.0195) (0.0407) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0198) (0.0407) (0.0281) 
Ethnic minority 0.2447*** -0.1017*** 0.2317*** -0.1032*** 0.2437*** -0.1053*** 0.2314*** -0.1041*** 
  (0.0439) (0.0350) (0.0494) (0.0370) (0.0435) (0.0351) (0.0491) (0.0370) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4935*** 0.0720** -0.4605*** 0.0671** -0.4936*** 0.0722** -0.4608*** 0.0677** 
  (0.0407) (0.0296) (0.0416) (0.0312) (0.0406) (0.0297) (0.0414) (0.0313) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0277 0.0393 0.0427 0.0509 0.0278 0.0395 0.0426 0.0505 
  (0.0853) (0.0442) (0.0850) (0.0450) (0.0853) (0.0440) (0.0850) (0.0449) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1125*** 0.0665*** 0.0868** 0.0462** 0.1130*** 0.0652*** 0.0872** 0.0454** 
  (0.0345) (0.0227) (0.0365) (0.0227) (0.0345) (0.0227) (0.0366) (0.0228) 
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Women's annual income                             
-0.2630*** 0.0891*** -0.2484*** 0.0859*** -0.2661*** 0.0817*** -0.2508*** 0.0821*** 
(0.0244) (0.0118) (0.0243) (0.0122) (0.0284) (0.0100) (0.0281) (0.0104) 
Women's other income  0.0839*** -0.1074*** 0.0818*** -0.1064*** 0.0839*** -0.1075*** 0.0818*** -0.1066*** 
  (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0070) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1060*** -0.0607*** 0.1047*** -0.0629*** 
  
    
(0.0261) (0.0160) (0.0266) (0.0165) 
Constant -1.5451*** -0.3575 -1.5692*** -0.3754 -1.5210*** -0.2701 -1.5493*** -0.3170 
  (0.4097) (0.3499) (0.4027) (0.3566) (0.4217) (0.3612) (0.4183) (0.3723) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 51.42 / 35.35 / 47.86 / 33.78 / 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
R-squared 0.327 0.278 0.354 0.310 0.327 0.279 0.354 0.310 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 23 Instruments comparison - relaxation as instrument in fine levels sample, IV probit estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0878* 
 
-0.0821* 
 
-0.0862* 
 
-0.0809* 
  
 
(0.0463) 
 
(0.0497) 
 
(0.0462) 
 
(0.0497) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.6462*** 
 
0.6191*** 
 
0.6462*** 
 
0.6190*** 
   (0.0507) 
 
-0.052 
 
(0.0505) 
 
(0.0518) 
 Age 0.1325*** 0.0562*** 0.1386*** 0.0559*** 0.1325*** 0.0552*** 0.1386*** 0.0555*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0174) (0.0251) (0.0177) (0.0256) (0.0173) (0.0251) (0.0176) 
Age square -0.0016*** -0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0007*** -0.0016*** -0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0007*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.3137*** 0.0654** -0.2871*** 0.0527* -0.3137*** 0.0646** -0.2870*** 0.0526* 
  (0.0406) (0.0273) (0.0398) (0.0272) (0.0406)  (0.0272) (0.0398) (0.0271) 
  Upper middle school -0.3042*** 0.0814*** -0.3030*** 0.0801** -0.3042*** 0.0810*** -0.3029*** 0.0798** 
  (0.0457) (0.0310) (0.0446) (0.0316) (0.0456) (0.0309) (0.0446) (0.0315) 
  College -0.5463*** 0.2710*** -0.5489*** 0.2786*** -0.5472*** 0.2755*** -0.5490*** 0.2805*** 
  (0.0440) (0.0433) (0.0456) (0.0495) (0.0440) (0.0430) (0.0456) (0.0495) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0650** 0.0838*** -0.0012 0.0855*** 0.0649** 0.0805*** -0.0013 0.0870*** 
  (0.0299) (0.0210) (0.0451) (0.0321) (0.0304) (0.0213) (0.0451) (0.0321) 
Ethnic minority 0.2222*** -0.0931*** 0.2344*** -0.0928*** 0.2223*** -0.0971*** 0.2345*** -0.0941*** 
  (0.0457) (0.0271) (0.0513) (0.0302) (0.0453)  (0.0273) (0.0511) (0.0302) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4912*** 0.0614*** -0.4545*** 0.0575** -0.4911*** 0.0628*** -0.4544*** 0.0583** 
  (0.0407) (0.0243) (0.0415) (0.0255) (0.0406)  (0.0242) (0.0413) (0.0255) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0010 0.0470 0.0166 0.0589 0.0010 0.0460 0.0166 0.0576 
  (0.0902) (0.0643) (0.0904) (0.0663) (0.0902) (0.0641) (0.0903) (0.0661) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1147*** 0.0897*** 0.0944** 0.0615** 0.1147*** 0.0880*** 0.0943** 0.0605** 
  (0.0369) (0.0310) (0.0391) (0.0297) (0.0369)  (0.0308) (0.0392) (0.0297) 
 146 
 
Women's annual income                             
-0.2681*** 0.0819*** -0.2538*** 0.0815*** -0.2678*** 0.0806*** -0.2532*** 0.0801*** 
(0.0252) (0.0116) (0.0251) (0.0120) (0.0292)  (0.0099) (0.0288) (0.0105) 
Women's other income  0.0839*** -0.1073*** 0.0812*** -0.1065*** 0.0839*** -0.1074*** 0.0812*** -0.1067*** 
  (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0053) (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0053) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1006*** -0.0607*** 0.1012*** -0.0642*** 
  
    
(0.0266) (0.0136) (0.0269) (0.0138) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 45.39 / 29.47 / 41.87 / 28.11 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 3.14 (0.037) 3.30 (0.043) 3.13 (0.037) 3.32 (0.044) 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 4. 24 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 
OLS estimation, whole sample with farmers, fisher people and hunters 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children -0.0964*** -0.0954*** -0.0959*** -0.0958*** 
  (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0245) (0.0248) 
Age 0.0249*** 0.0269*** 0.0258*** 0.0274*** 
  (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Age square -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0238*** 0.0220*** 0.0286*** 0.0267*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) 
  Upper middle school 0.0495*** 0.0466*** 0.0459*** 0.0486*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0112) 
  College or more 0.1348*** 0.1705*** 0.1405*** 0.1718*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0562*** 0.0517*** 0.0517*** 0.0523*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0105) 
Ethnic minority -0.0210** -0.0211** -0.0265** -0.0263** 
  (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0099) (0.0112) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0356*** 0.0583*** 0.0328*** 0.0540*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0475*** -0.0155 -0.0424*** -0.0150 
  (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0879*** 0.0824*** 0.0839*** 0.0819*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0087) 
Women's annual wage          0.0979*** 0.0933*** 0.0954** 0.0943*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0027) 
Women's other income  -0.1047*** -0.1037*** -0.1038*** -0.1033*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.00150) (0.0015) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0485*** -0.0457*** 
  
  
(0.0037) (0.0037) 
Constant 0.6061*** 0.2328*** 0.7225*** 0.3514*** 
  (0.0806) (0.0830) (0.0815) (0.0857) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.252 0.304 0.261 0.308 
Observations 9,788 9,788 9,788 9,788 
Note: The same as Table 4.3. 
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Table 4. 25 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 
probit estimation, whole sample with farmers, fisher people and hunters 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of children 0.1231*** -0.1297*** -0.1207*** -0.1298*** 
  (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0047) 
Age 0.0171*** 0.0228*** 0.0175*** 0.0228*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Age suqare -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0486*** 0.0342*** 0.0449*** 0.0330*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071) 
  Upper middle school 0.0509*** 0.0461*** 0.0583*** 0.0492*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0101) 
  College or more 0.1425*** 0.1618*** 0.1499*** 0.1641*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0197) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0622*** 0.0667*** 0.0686*** 0.0675*** 
  (0.0074) (0.0126) (0.0075) (0.0126) 
Ethnic minority -0.0299*** -0.0278*** -0.0260*** -0.0291*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0108) (0.0101) (0.0108) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0560*** 0.0516*** 0.0519*** 0.0500*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0251* -0.0092 -0.0213* -0.0081 
  (0.0159) (0.0090) (0.0151) (0.0089) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0314*** 0.0338*** 0.0359*** 0.0327*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0087) 
Women's annual wage                   0.0713*** 0.0738*** 0.0782*** 0.0802*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0026) 
Women's other income  -0.1001*** -0.1034*** -0.1005*** -0.1031*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0295*** -0.0238*** 
  
  
(0.0034) (0.0035) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.220 0.183 0.225 
Observations 9,788 9,788 9,788 9,788 
Note: The same as Table 4.4. 
    
  
  
Table 4. 26 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, whole sample with farmers, fisher people and 
hunters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0627** 
 
-0.0636* 
 
-0.0592* 
 
-0.0542* 
  
 
(0.0326) 
 
(0.0341) 
 
(0.0327) 
 
(0.0341) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.6669*** 
 
0.5875*** 
 
0.6627*** 
 
0.5874*** 
   (0.0163) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0153) 
 Age 0.0896*** 0.0138*** 0.0916*** 0.0182*** 0.0912*** 0.0150*** 0.0919*** 0.0189*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0042) (0.0073) (0.0042) (0.0077) (0.0042) (0.0073) (0.0042) 
Age square -0.0009*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0003*** -0.0009*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1360*** 0.0377*** -0.1175*** 0.0212** -0.1275*** 0.0334*** -0.1165*** 0.0191** 
  (0.0155) (0.0083) (0.0147) (0.0083) (0.0155) (0.0083) (0.0147) (0.0082) 
  Upper middle school -0.1304*** 0.0507*** -0.1589*** 0.0518*** -0.1253*** 0.0517*** -0.1581*** 0.0534*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0111) (0.0198) (0.0111) (0.0211) (0.0111) (0.0198) (0.0110) 
  College -0.2981*** 0.1553*** -0.2655*** 0.1793*** -0.2892*** 0.1593*** -0.2644*** 0.1817*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0158) (0.0278) (0.0156) (0.0294) (0.0157) (0.0278) (0.0156) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1241*** 0.0416*** 0.1216*** 0.0457*** 0.1174*** 0.0382*** 0.1214*** 0.0462*** 
  (0.0141) (0.0075) (0.0224) (0.0121) (0.0141) (0.0075) (0.0224) (0.0121) 
Ethnic minority 0.3801*** -0.0233** 0.3325*** -0.0052 0.3719*** -0.0190* 0.3330*** -0.0041 
  (0.0206) (0.0107) (0.0220) (0.0119) (0.0206) (0.0106) (0.0220) (0.0119) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4956*** 0.0464*** -0.4600*** 0.0626*** -0.4902*** 0.0436*** -0.4582*** 0.0587*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0102) (0.0174) (0.0108) (0.0184) (0.0101) (0.0175) (0.0107) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0285 -0.0172 0.0194 -0.0151 0.0294 -0.0110 0.0199 -0.0140 
  (0.0215) (0.0111) (0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0215) (0.0111) (0.0206) (0.0113) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1020*** 0.0492*** 0.0625*** 0.0485*** 0.0980*** 0.0412*** 0.1026*** 0.0482*** 
  (0.0180) (0.0094) (0.0172) (0.0094) (0.0179) (0.0094) (0.0172) (0.0094) 
Women's annual income                -0.4796*** 0.0757*** -0.4201*** 0.0725*** -0.4453*** 0.0735*** -0.4147*** 0.0793*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0044) (0.0081) (0.0044) 
Women's other income  0.2101*** -0.1106*** 0.2093*** -0.1108*** 0.2099*** -0.1105*** 0.2093*** -0.1107*** 
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  (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0012) 
Husband's income  
    
0.0572*** -0.0325*** 0.0505*** -0.0328*** 
  
    
(0.0074) (0.0039) (0.0071) (0.0039) 
Constant 0.0265 0.8104*** -0.793*** 0.469*** 0.1958 0.9066*** -0.7453*** 0.5720*** 
  (0.1483) (0.0763) (0.1478) (0.0808) (0.1495) (0.0770) (0.1514) (0.0825) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 436.73 / 458.19 / 442.25 / 467.78 / 
Observations 9,788 9,788 9,788 9,788 
R-squared 0.351 0.257 0.356 0.261 0.349 0.246 0.352 0.250 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
    Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
    
 151 
 
Table 4. 27 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, whole sample with 
farmers, fisher people and hunters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0630** 
 
-0.0635* 
 
-0.0595* 
 
-0.0541* 
  
 
(0.0312) 
 
(0.0339) 
 
(0.0325) 
 
(0.0339) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.6669*** 
 
0.5875*** 
 
0.6627*** 
 
0.5874*** 
   (0.0163) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0163) 
 
(0.0153) 
 Age 0.0896*** 0.0181*** 0.0916*** 0.0162*** 0.0912*** 0.0190*** 0.0919*** 0.0165*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0073) (0.0041) (0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0073) (0.0040) 
Age2 -0.0009*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0002*** -0.0009*** -0.0002*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1360*** 0.0361*** -0.1175*** 0.0394*** -0.1275*** 0.0337*** -0.1165*** 0.0387*** 
  (0.0155) (0.0082) (0.0147) (0.0080) (0.0155) (0.0082) (0.0147) (0.0079) 
  Upper middle school -0.1304*** 0.0429*** -0.1589*** 0.0409*** -0.1253*** 0.0429*** -0.1581*** 0.0405*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0112) (0.0198) (0.0110) (0.0211) (0.0111) (0.0198) (0.0109) 
  College -0.2981*** 0.2030*** -0.2655*** 0.2206*** -0.2892*** 0.2028*** -0.2644*** 0.2201*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0224) (0.0278) (0.0215) (0.0294) (0.0222) (0.0278) (0.0215) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.1241*** 0.0439*** 0.1216*** 0.0416*** 0.1174*** 0.0410*** 0.1214*** 0.0423*** 
  (0.0141) (0.0079) (0.0224) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0079) (0.0224) (0.0129) 
Ethnic minority 0.3801*** -0.0227** 0.3325*** -0.0201* 0.3719*** -0.0180* 0.3330*** -0.0209* 
  (0.0206) (0.0113) (0.0220) (0.0118) (0.0206) (0.0112) (0.0220) (0.0119) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.4956*** 0.0405*** -0.4600*** 0.0580*** -0.4902*** 0.0381*** -0.4582*** 0.0541*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0098) (0.0174) (0.0104) (0.0184) (0.0097) (0.0175) (0.0104) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0285 -0.0108 0.0194 -0.0109 0.0294 -0.0148 0.0199 -0.0150 
  (0.0215) (0.0103) (0.0205) (0.0104) (0.0215) (0.0104) (0.0206) (0.0103) 
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Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1020*** 0.0405*** 0.0625*** 0.0477*** 0.0980*** 0.0416*** 0.1026*** 0.0468*** 
  (0.0180) (0.0098) (0.0172) (0.0096) (0.0179) (0.0097) (0.0172) (0.0095) 
Women's annual income       -0.4796*** 0.0781*** -0.4201*** 0.0750*** -0.4453*** 0.0738*** -0.4147*** 0.0788*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0032) (0.0072) (0.0031) (0.0084) (0.0024) (0.0081) (0.0027) 
Women's other income 0.2101*** -0.1065*** 0.2093*** -0.1033*** 0.2099*** -0.1056*** 0.2093*** -0.1009*** 
  (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0012) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0572*** -0.0319*** 0.0505*** -0.0325*** 
        (0.0074) (0.0039) (0.0071) (0.0038) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Yesr effect No Yes No Yes 
F statistics on instrument 407.47 / 421.33 / 410.58 / 422.86 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 3.05 (0.023) 3.64 (0.038) 3.14 (0.025) 3.66 (0.040) 
Observations 9,788 9,788 9,788 9,788 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Women's annual income takes fitted 
value and logged, in RMB.        Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 28 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 
OLS estimation, fine levels sample with farmers, fisher people and hunters 
Explanatory variables 
OLS estimations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of kids -0.1039*** -0.1049*** -0.1029*** -0.1051*** 
  (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0054) 
Age 0.0252** 0.0280*** 0.0246** 0.0273*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
Age square -0.0004** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0213** 0.0208** 0.0177* 0.0178* 
  (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0107) 
  Upper middle school 0.0372*** 0.0337** 0.0331** 0.0304** 
  (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0135) 
  College 0.0758*** 0.0802*** 0.0778*** 0.0819*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0117) (0.0104) (0.0117) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0843*** 0.0824*** 0.0860*** 0.0836*** 
  (0.0090) (0.0137) (0.0090) (0.0137) 
Ethnic minority -0.0224 -0.0315** -0.0256* -0.0317** 
  (0.0139) (0.0157) (0.0139) (0.0157) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0684*** 0.0620*** 0.0663*** 0.0693*** 
  (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0033 0.0037 0.0020 0.0017 
  (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0197) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0245** 0.0231** 0.0235** 0.0225* 
  (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0117) 
Women's annual wage        0.1109*** 0.1056** 0.1107 0.1032*** 
  (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0023) 
Women's other income  -0.0850*** -0.0834*** -0.0860*** -0.0844*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0259*** -0.0199*** 
  
  
(0.0049) (0.0049) 
Constant 0.5500*** 0.4567*** 0.6533*** 0.5456*** 
  (0.1632) (0.1641) (0.1634) (0.1645) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.266 0.300 0.297 0.321 
Observations 3,599 3,599 3,599 3,599 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Women's other income and 
husband's income takes logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 29 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 
probit estimation, fine levels sample with farmers, fisher people and hunters 
Explanatory variables 
probit estimations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of kids -0.0945*** -0.0954*** -0.0843*** -0.0853*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) 
Age 0.0212*** 0.0235*** 0.0196*** 0.0222*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0062) 
Age square -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education category 
      base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0199** 0.0188** 0.0171* 0.0167* 
  (0.0098) (0.00933) (0.00969) (0.00922) 
  Upper middle school 0.0467*** 0.0427*** 0.0537*** 0.0510*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0119) 
  College 0.0649*** 0.0682*** 0.0678*** 0.0719*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0077) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0680*** 0.0649*** 0.0647*** 0.0662*** 
  (0.0090) (0.0114) (0.0088) (0.0112) 
Ethnic minority -0.0222* -0.0311** -0.0255** -0.0308** 
  (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0124) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0660*** 0.0688*** 0.0630*** 0.0654*** 
  (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0091) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0003 0.0026 0.0022 0.0004 
  (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0183) (0.0166) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0270** 0.0212* 0.0252* 0.0199 
  (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0123) 
Women's annual wage        0.0828*** 0.0863** 0.0805*** 0.0828*** 
  (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
Women's other income  -0.0539*** -0.0530*** -0.0546*** -0.0536*** 
  (0.00351) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0267*** -0.0190*** 
  
  
(0.0052) (0.0049) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.178 0.135 0.186 
Observations 3,599  3,599  3,599  3,599  
Notes: Margins are presented; robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Women's other income and 
husband's income takes logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 30 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – 2SLS estimation, fine levels sample 
with farmers, fisher people and hunters  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0605** 
 
-0.0663* 
 
-0.0600** 
 
-0.0638* 
  
 
(0.0269) 
 
(0.0372) 
 
(0.0268) 
 
(0.0369) 
Instrument-fine ratios -0.1623*** 
 
-0.1314*** 
 
-0.1633*** 
 
-0.1319*** 
   (0.0117) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0127) 
 Age 0.2578*** 0.0117 0.2567*** 0.0139 0.2583*** 0.0137 0.2567*** 0.0156 
  (0.0208) (0.0102) (0.0200) (0.0121) (0.0208) (0.0101) (0.0200) (0.0120) 
Age square -0.0031*** -0.0002 -0.0032*** -0.0002 -0.0031*** -0.0002 -0.0032*** -0.0002 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1245*** 0.0412*** -0.1600*** 0.0411*** -0.1255*** 0.0419*** -0.1618*** 0.0415*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0112) (0.0267) (0.0124) (0.0273) (0.0111) (0.0267) (0.0124) 
  Upper middle school -0.1456*** 0.0619*** -0.1963*** 0.0654*** -0.1467*** 0.0626*** -0.1978*** 0.0655*** 
  (0.0366) (0.0145) (0.0355) (0.0158) (0.0366) (0.0144) (0.0355) (0.0158) 
  College or more -0.4845*** 0.1332*** -0.5453*** 0.1354*** -0.4845*** 0.1278*** -0.5445*** 0.1311*** 
  (0.0638) (0.0277) (0.0620) (0.0318) (0.0638) (0.0275) (0.0620) (0.0316) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0882*** -0.0127 0.0058 0.0223* 0.0877*** -0.0102 0.0050 0.0234* 
  (0.0242) (0.0089) (0.0329) (0.0127) (0.0242) (0.0089) (0.0329) (0.0126) 
Ethnic minority 0.2925*** -0.0292** 0.3136*** -0.0357** 0.3018*** -0.0313** 0.3136*** -0.0357** 
  (0.0336) (0.0126) (0.0373) (0.0144) (0.0336) (0.0125) (0.0373) (0.0143) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.5778*** 0.0400** -0.5398*** 0.0424* -0.5789*** 0.0419** -0.5424*** 0.0444* 
  (0.0275) (0.0191) (0.0266) (0.0231) (0.0276) (0.0189) (0.0267) (0.0230) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.3589*** 0.0156 -0.3734*** 0.0208 -0.3582*** 0.0098 -0.3711*** 0.0153 
  (0.0527) (0.0221) (0.0511) (0.0242) (0.0527) (0.0220) (0.0511) (0.0240) 
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Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0497 0.0325** 0.1052*** 0.0333** 0.0492 0.0305** 0.1054*** 0.0314** 
  (0.0334) (0.0127) (0.0330) (0.0133) (0.0334) (0.0126) (0.0330) (0.0132) 
Women's annual wage                             -0.3013*** 0.0858** -0.2732*** 0.0839*** -0.3232*** 0.0815*** -0.2918*** 0.0841*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0049) (0.0127) (0.0049) (0.0144) (0.0054) (0.0140) (0.00538) 
Women's other income  0.1214*** -0.0619*** 0.1144*** -0.0606*** 0.1210*** -0.0631*** 0.1137*** -0.0616*** 
  (0.0092) (0.00348) (0.0089) (0.0035) (0.0092) (0.0035) (0.0089) (0.0035) 
Husband's income  
    
0.1824*** -0.0429*** 0.2149*** -0.0483*** 
  
    
(0.0139) (0.0052) (0.0135) (0.0052) 
Constant -1.8944*** 0.7294*** -2.1256*** 0.6667*** -1.9241*** 0.7934*** -2.1845*** 0.7200*** 
  (0.3521) (0.1499) (0.3445) (0.1692) (0.3556) (0.1499) (0.3489) (0.1703) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,599 3,599 3,599 3,599 
R-squared 0.315 0.207 0.321 0.237 0.318 0.219 0.324 0.245 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 4. 31Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IVprobit estimation, fine levels sample 
with farmers, fisher people and hunters 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0695* 
 
-0.0655* 
 
-0.0625* 
 
-0.0602* 
  
 
(0.0380) 
 
(0.0362) 
 
(0.0385) 
 
(0.0363) 
Instrument-fine ratios -0.1655*** 
 
-0.1323*** 
 
-0.1662*** 
 
-0.1334*** 
   (0.0134) 
 
(0.0133) 
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0133) 
 Age 0.2571*** 0.0175 0.2562*** 0.0124 0.2571*** 0.0190 0.2568*** 0.0137 
  (0.0243) (0.0217) (0.0225) (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0258) 
Age square -0.0031*** -0.0011 -0.0032*** -0.0017 -0.0031*** -0.0012 -0.0032*** -0.0019 
  (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0012) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1231*** 0.0426* -0.1580*** 0.0480* -0.1239*** 0.0404* -0.1597*** 0.0431* 
  (0.0281) (0.0234) (0.0265) (0.0250) (0.0281) (0.0243) (0.0265) (0.0255) 
  Upper middle school -0.1470*** 0.0592*** -0.1978*** 0.0544*** -0.1479*** 0.0543*** -0.1994*** 0.0426*** 
  (0.0347) (0.0108) (0.0335) (0.0120) (0.0346) (0.0108) (0.0335) (0.0120) 
  College or more -0.4839*** 0.1256*** -0.5263*** 0.1254*** -0.4615*** 0.1286*** -0.5125*** 0.1241*** 
  (0.0625) (0.0248) (0.0600) (0.0258) (0.0648) (0.0269) (0.0620) (0.0246) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0881*** -0.0923 0.0827*** 0.195** 0.0875*** -0.0686 0.0818*** 0.211** 
  (0.0249) (0.0673) (0.0345) (0.0955) (0.0250) (0.0683) (0.0345) (0.0959) 
Ethnic minority 0.3097*** -0.0206 0.3189*** -0.278*** 0.3090*** -0.228** 0.3190*** -0.281*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0879) (0.0390) (0.106) (0.0332) (0.0899) (0.0390) (0.107) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.5723*** 0.0635*** -0.5309*** -0.300* -0.5734*** -0.248* -0.5339*** -0.315* 
  (0.0258) (0.0146) (0.0250) (0.180) (0.0259) (0.146) (0.0251) (0.177) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.3657*** 0.0115 -0.3726*** 0.119 -0.3648*** 0.0704 -0.3707*** 0.0724 
  (0.0704) (0.0154) (0.0699) (0.168) (0.0704) (0.157) (0.0699) (0.171) 
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Co-resident with elderly parents 0.1470*** 0.0451** 0.1106*** 0.0445** 0.1465*** 0.0437** 0.1099*** 0.0417* 
  (0.0346) (0.0102) (0.0347) (0.0110) (0.0346) (0.0104) (0.0347) (0.0112) 
Women's annual wage                             -0.3006*** 0.0763*** -0.3031*** 0.0807*** -0.3346*** 0.0806*** -0.3100*** 0.0807*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0235) (0.0133) (0.0255) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0148) (0.0200) 
Women's other income  0.1207** -0.0684*** 0.1280*** -0.0646*** 0.1203*** -0.0656*** 0.1120*** -0.0614*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0263) (0.0078) (0.0296) (0.0086) (0.0254) (0.0077) (0.0284) 
Husband's income  
    
0.2091*** -0.0383*** 0.2159*** -0.0354*** 
  
    
(0.0152) (0.0424) (0.0143) (0.0430) 
Constant -1.8633*** 0.4492 -2.1114*** -0.5976 -1.8964*** 1.0234 -2.1734*** -0.1183 
  (0.3981) (1.0300) (0.3722) (1.1967) (0.4026) (1.0464) (0.3778) (1.2089) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,599 3,599 3,599 3,599 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 4. 32 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation - 2SLS estimation, fine levels sample with 
working unit dummy and interaction term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0720* 
 
-0.0742* 
 
-0.0759* 
 
-0.0779* 
  
 
(0.0445) 
 
(0.0423) 
 
(0.0443) 
 
(0.0419) 
Instruments: fine levels -0.2430*** 
 
-0.2210*** 
 
-0.2455*** 
 
-0.2232*** 
   (0.0291) 
 
(0.0298) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
(0.0299) 
 Age 0.1976*** 0.0645*** 0.1976*** 0.0671** 0.1983*** 0.0692*** 0.1989*** 0.0608** 
  (0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0275) (0.0240) (0.0223) (0.0238) (0.0269) 
Age2 -0.0025*** -0.0009*** -0.0025*** -0.0009** -0.0025*** -0.0009*** -0.0025*** -0.0009** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1946*** 0.0030 -0.1790*** 0.0055 -0.1919*** 0.0025 -0.1776*** 0.0049 
  (0.0370) (0.0296) (0.0375) (0.0324) (0.0370) (0.0288) (0.0375) (0.0317) 
  Upper middle school -0.1571*** 0.0614** -0.1478*** 0.0685** -0.1553*** 0.0659** -0.1466*** 0.0622** 
  (0.0416) (0.0287) (0.0420) (0.0310) (0.0416) (0.0281) (0.0420) (0.0304) 
  College or more -0.4111*** 0.2641*** -0.4094*** 0.2555*** -0.4061*** 0.2430*** -0.4053*** 0.2398*** 
  (0.0547) (0.0508) (0.0562) (0.0609) (0.0547) (0.0493) (0.0563) (0.0592) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0492* 0.0867*** 0.0263 0.0872*** 0.0485* 0.0883*** 0.0237 0.0911*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0166) (0.0420) (0.0241) (0.0296) (0.0164) (0.0420) (0.0238) 
Ethnic minority 0.2202*** -0.0715*** 0.2463*** -0.0855*** 0.2242*** -0.0766*** 0.2473*** -0.0856*** 
  (0.0431) (0.0247) (0.0482) (0.0276) (0.0431) (0.0244) (0.0482) (0.0273) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.3903*** 0.0636*** -0.4043*** 0.0621*** -0.3894*** 0.0617*** -0.4034*** 0.0687*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0262) (0.0344) (0.0318) (0.0342) (0.0255) (0.0344) (0.0311) 
Work in 
government/enterprises/institutions 
-0.2424*** 0.4597*** -0.2288*** 0.4610*** -0.2401*** 0.4474*** -0.2262*** 0.4523*** 
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(0.0567) (0.0424) (0.0566) (0.0535) (0.0567) (0.0412) (0.0566) (0.0522) 
Interactions of fine ratios and working 
in government/ enterprises/institutions 
-0.0882*** 0.0157 -0.0795** 0.0162 -0.0888*** 0.0155 -0.0805** 0.0165 
  (0.0321) (0.0109) (0.0321) (0.0113) (0.0321) (0.0108) (0.0321) (0.0113) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0434 -0.0370* -0.0499 -0.0251 -0.0404 -0.0303 -0.0473 -0.0201 
  (0.0362) (0.0222) (0.0376) (0.0228) (0.0362) (0.0218) (0.0376) (0.0225) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0626** 0.0577** 0.0608** 0.0557** 0.0675** 0.0528** 0.0611** 0.0440* 
  (0.0248) (0.0260) (0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0245) 
Women's annual income                 -0.2518*** 0.0765*** -0.2456*** 0.0711*** -0.2350*** 0.0618*** -0.2295*** 0.0619*** 
  (0.0216) (0.0128) (0.0218) (0.0131) (0.0243) (0.0139) (0.0242) (0.0139) 
Women's other income 0.0955*** -0.0956**** 0.0950*** -0.0968*** 0.0911*** -0.0968*** 0.0909*** -0.0972*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.0048) (0.0086) (0.0049) 
Husband's income 
 
      0.0331 -0.0463*** 0.0334 -0.0406*** 
  
 
      (0.0218) (0.0124) (0.0219) (0.0127) 
Constant -1.033** 0.0110 -1.2145*** -0.0035 -1.1610** 0.1447 -1.3499*** 0.1257 
  (0.4504) (0.2945) (0.4510) (0.3355) (0.4581) (0.2976) (0.4595) (0.3438) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 28.34 / 20.70 / 29.06 / 21.11 / 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
R-squared 0.375 0.353 0.364 0.311 0.371 0.340 0.355 0.301 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Interaction takes the form of Fine levels multiplies the dummy of works in government, government institutions or state owned company. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
    Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 4. 33 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, fine levels sample 
with working unit dummy and interaction term  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0653* 
 
-0.0657* 
 
-0.0685* 
 
-0.0675* 
  
 
(0.0398) 
 
(0.0394) 
 
(0.0363) 
 
(0.0369) 
Instruments: fine levels -0.2430*** 
 
-0.2210*** 
 
-0.2455*** 
 
-0.2232*** 
   (0.0291) 
 
(0.0298) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
(0.0299) 
 Age 0.1976*** 0.0647*** 0.1976*** 0.0644** 0.1983*** 0.0622*** 0.1989*** 0.0672*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0274) (0.0240) (0.0222) (0.0238) (0.0246) 
Age2 -0.0025*** -0.0009*** -0.0025*** -0.0009*** -0.0025*** -0.0009*** -0.0025*** -0.0009*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1946*** 0.0104 -0.1790*** 0.0112 -0.1919*** 0.0036 -0.1776*** 0.0059 
  (0.0370) (0.0269) (0.0375) (0.0276) (0.0370) (0.0258) (0.0375) (0.0262) 
  Upper middle school -0.1571*** 0.0609** -0.1478*** 0.0636** -0.1553*** 0.0673** -0.1466*** 0.0698** 
  (0.0416) (0.0277) (0.0420) (0.0287) (0.0416) (0.0269) (0.0420) (0.0277) 
  College or more -0.4111*** 0.2499*** -0.4094*** 0.2311*** -0.4061*** 0.2389*** -0.4053*** 0.2355*** 
  (0.0547) (0.0488) (0.0562) (0.0422) (0.0547) (0.0476) (0.0563) (0.0418) 
Health condition (good/excellent) 0.0492* 0.0796*** 0.0263 0.0789*** 0.0485* 0.0726*** 0.0237 0.0764*** 
  (0.0294) (0.0183) (0.0420) (0.0272) (0.0296) (0.0183) (0.0420) (0.0264) 
Ethnic minority 0.2202*** -0.0593*** 0.2463*** -0.0753*** 0.2242*** -0.0669*** 0.2473*** -0.0769*** 
  (0.0431) (0.0217) (0.0482) (0.0250) (0.0431) (0.0209) (0.0482) (0.0241) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.3903*** 0.0675** -0.4043*** 0.0668** -0.3894*** 0.0626** -0.4034*** 0.0696** 
  (0.0342) (0.0279) (0.0344) (0.0292) (0.0342) (0.0241) (0.0344) (0.0281) 
Work in 
government/institutions/enterprises 
-0.2424*** 0.4285*** -0.2288*** 0.4271*** -0.2401*** 0.4169*** -0.2262*** 0.4218*** 
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(0.0567) (0.0695) (0.0566) (0.0654) (0.0567) (0.0670) (0.0566) (0.0627) 
Interactions of fine ratios and working 
in government/ enterprises/institutions 
-0.0882*** 0.0243*** -0.0795** 0.0258*** -0.0888*** 0.0248*** -0.0805** 0.0253*** 
  (0.0321) (0.0096) (0.0321) (0.0092) (0.0321) (0.0093) (0.0321) (0.0087) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0434 -0.0404* -0.0499 -0.0352 -0.0404 -0.0486* -0.0473 0.0527 
  (0.0362) (0.0238) (0.0376) (0.0473) (0.0362) (0.0224) (0.0376) (0.0452) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0626** 0.0549** 0.0608** 0.0589** 0.0675** 0.0589** 0.0611** 0.0535** 
  (0.0248) (0.0267) (0.0248) (0.0265) (0.0248) (0.0258) (0.0248) (0.0256) 
Women's annual income                 -0.2518*** 0.0708*** -0.2456*** 0.0793*** -0.2350*** 0.0735*** -0.2295*** 0.0710*** 
  (0.0216) (0.0112) (0.0218) (0.0116) (0.0243) (0.0134) (0.0242) (0.0131) 
Women's other income 0.0955*** -0.0955*** 0.0950*** -0.0931*** 0.0911*** -0.0960*** 0.0909*** -0.0937*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0040) (0.0086) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0042) 
Husband's income 
 
      0.0331 -0.0409*** 0.0334 -0.0406*** 
          (0.0218) (0.0125) (0.0219) (0.0133) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F statistics on instrument 28.34 / 20.70 / 29.06 / 21.11 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value) 1.57 (0.041) 1.75 (0.037) 1.65 (0.043) 1.89 (0.035) 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Note: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Interaction takes the form of Fine levels multiplies the dummy of works in government, government institutions or state owned enterprises. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. 
Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
     
  
 163 
 
Table 4. 34 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – random effects estimation, whole 
sample, relaxation as instrument & 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0800* 
 
-0.0807* 
 
-0.0757* 
 
-0.0761* 
  
 
(0.0477) 
 
(0.0477) 
 
(0.0476) 
 
(0.0475) 
Instrument-relaxation 0.5313*** 
 
0.5015*** 
 
0.5299*** 
 
0.5014*** 
   (0.0326) 
 
(0.0287) 
 
(0.0324) 
 
(0.0287) 
 Age 0.0442*** 0.0203** 0.0546*** 0.0280*** 0.0452*** 0.0218*** 0.0544*** 0.0285*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0101) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0085) (0.0101) (0.0087) 
Age square -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0005 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.1678*** 0.0171 -0.1478*** 0.0361* -0.1663*** 0.0192 -0.1480*** 0.0358* 
  (0.0266) (0.0227) (0.0244) (0.0215) (0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0244) (0.0215) 
  Upper middle school -0.1758*** 0.0535** -0.1770*** 0.0800*** -0.1754*** 0.0539** -0.1773*** 0.0790*** 
  (0.0291) (0.0245) (0.0270) (0.0233) (0.0291) (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.0233) 
  College or more -0.2964*** 0.1689*** -0.2836*** 0.2144*** -0.2952*** 0.1711*** -0.2844*** 0.2144*** 
  (0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0281) (0.0266) (0.0274) (0.0263) 
Health condition 
(good/excellent) 0.0691*** 0.0392*** 
0.0622** 
0.0386** 
0.0675*** 
0.0363*** 
0.0623** 
0.0083 
  (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0271) (0.0191) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0272) (0.0191) 
Ethnic minority 0.0527* -0.0173 0.0555* -0.0231 0.0505* -0.0213 0.0556* -0.0249 
  (0.0280) (0.0262) (0.0285) (0.0267) (0.0278) (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.0266) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.0198 0.0478** -0.0427** 0.0438* -0.0205 0.0453** -0.0421** 0.0453** 
  (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0210) (0.0223) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0135 -0.0481*** 0.0674*** -0.0442** 0.0189 -0.0408** 0.0680*** -0.0413** 
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  (0.0209) (0.0185) (0.0233) (0.0194) (0.0210) (0.0184) (0.0234) (0.0194) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0844*** 0.0249* 0.0595*** 0.0344** 0.0827*** 0.0294** 0.0602*** 0.0345** 
  (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0175) (0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0145) 
Women's annual wage                             -0.2477*** 0.0876** -0.2316*** 0.0804*** -0.2303*** 0.0676*** -0.2312*** 0.0700*** 
  (0.0100) (0.0071) (0.0129) (0.0079) (0.0123) (0.0076) (0.0142) (0.00795) 
Women's other income  0.1445*** -0.0507*** 0.1484*** -0.0505*** 0.1441*** -0.0504*** 0.1449*** -0.0506*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
Husband's income  
    
0.0266** -0.0453*** 0.0306** -0.0355*** 
  
    
(0.0108) (0.0080) (0.0124) (0.0082) 
Constant 0.6829*** 0.2733 -0.0704 -0.3400* 0.7453*** 0.3845** -0.0690 -0.1789 
  (0.1713) (0.1699) (0.2212) (0.1756) (0.1785) (0.1722) (0.2393) (0.1833) 
County effect No  Yes No  Yes 
Year effect No Yes No  Yes 
Observations 5,029 5,029 5,029 5,029 
Number of households 1,781 1,781 1,781 1,781 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Other income and husband's income take logged values, in RMB.  
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Table 4. 35 Robustness check, effect of fertility on female labour force participation – random effects estimation, fine levels 
sample, fine ratios as instrument & 2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp No. of kids lfp 
Number of children 
 
-0.0859** 
 
-0.0847** 
 
-0.0840** 
 
-0.0838** 
  
 
(0.0416) 
 
(0.0357) 
 
(0.0417) 
 
(0.0359) 
Instrument-relaxation -0.1784*** 
 
-0.1633*** 
 
-0.1863*** -0.1736*** 
  (0.0249) 
 
(0.0246) 
 
(0.0256) 
 
(0.0255) 
 Age 0.1368*** 0.0610** 0.1464*** 0.0596** 0.1363*** 0.0606** 0.1461*** 0.0594** 
  (0.0242) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0243) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0249) 
Age square -0.0019*** -0.0008** -0.0018*** -0.0008** -0.0017*** -0.0008** -0.0018*** -0.0008** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary or less 
          Lower middle school -0.2719*** 0.0796** -0.2495*** 0.0774** -0.2726*** 0.0795** -0.2494*** 0.0777** 
  (0.0441) (0.0355) (0.0425) (0.0356) (0.0441) (0.0355) (0.0425) (0.0357) 
  Upper middle school -0.2755*** 0.0931** -0.2804*** 0.0994*** -0.2763*** 0.0929** -0.2807*** 0.0995*** 
  (0.0489) (0.0370) (0.0473) (0.0379) (0.0489) (0.0370) (0.0474) (0.0379) 
  College or more -0.5124*** 0.174*** -0.5165*** 0.181*** -0.5146*** 0.1733*** -0.5176*** 0.1811*** 
  (0.0465) (0.0432) (0.0478) (0.0470) (0.0464) (0.0431) (0.0478) (0.0471) 
Health condition 
(good/excellent) 
0.0841*** 
-0.0236 0.0816** 0.0140 0.0810*** -0.0218 0.0829*** 0.0146 
  (0.0222) (0.0178) (0.0324) (0.0256) (0.0225) (0.0180) (0.0323) (0.0258) 
Ethnic minority 0.0848* -0.1140** 0.0922* -0.1110** 0.0812* -0.1156** 0.0913* -0.1113** 
  (0.0482) (0.0449) (0.0520) (0.0462) (0.0478) (0.0450) (0.0518) (0.0463) 
Non-agriculture registration -0.1478*** 0.0739** -0.1491*** 0.0684* -0.1479*** 0.0739** -0.1498*** 0.0687* 
  (0.0430) (0.0349) (0.0434) (0.0368) (0.0428) (0.0349) (0.0432) (0.0368) 
Co-resident with adult children 0.0313 0.0424 0.0566 0.0502 0.0327 0.0431 0.0569 0.0503 
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  (0.0740) (0.0378) (0.0740) (0.0400) (0.0740) (0.0377) (0.0740) (0.0399) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0751*** 0.0595** 0.0623** 0.0494** 0.0756*** 0.0592** 0.0628** 0.0493** 
  (0.0295) (0.0243) (0.0310) (0.0249) (0.0295) (0.0243) (0.0312) (0.0250) 
Women's annual wage                             -0.1526*** 0.0843*** -0.1448*** 0.0850*** -0.1628*** 0.0884*** -0.1518*** 0.0821*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0119) (0.0204) (0.0123) (0.0239) (0.0121) (0.0238) (0.0123) 
Women's other income  0.1621*** -0.0550*** 0.1609*** -0.0459*** 0.1522*** -0.0551*** 0.1507*** -0.0447*** 
  (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0060) (0.0066) 
Husband's income  
    
0.2199*** -0.0417*** 0.2141*** -0.0460*** 
  
    
(0.0228) (0.0159) (0.0230) (0.0164) 
Constant -1.5650*** -0.2745 -1.6822*** -0.3122 -1.4760*** -0.2214 -1.6168*** -0.2833 
  (0.4082) (0.3856) (0.4038) (0.3982) (0.4190) (0.3962) (0.4181) (0.4134) 
County effect No  Yes No  Yes 
Year effect No Yes No  Yes 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Number of households 527 527 527 527 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Women's annual wage takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; Other income and husband's income take logged values.  
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Table 4. 36 Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - OLS 
estimation 
all married women in whole sample          (observations: 5029) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0635*** -0.0839*** -0.0802*** -0.0848*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0175) 
 number of child under 6 -0.0183* -0.0180* -0.0177* -0.0175* 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0209** -0.0234** -0.0212** -0.0266** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0116) 
 number of child under 16 0.0177 0.0193 0.0187 0.0197 
 
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
women live in urban areas                 (observations: 2411) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0617* -0.0685** -0.0619* -0.0678** 
 
(0.0355) (0.0328) (0.0353) (0.0328) 
 number of child under 6 0.0033 0.0049 0.0012 0.0052 
 
(0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0267) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0489** -0.0470** -0.0508** -0.0465** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0229) 
 number of child under 16 0.0238 0.0256 0.0228 0.0248 
 
(0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0367) (0.0256) 
women live in rural areas                  (observations: 2618) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.1464*** -0.1651*** -0.1474*** -0.1645*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0308) 
 number of child under 6 -0.0452** -0.0506** -0.0473** -0.0502** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0220) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0325 -0.0359 -0.0352 -0.0656 
 
(0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0297) (0.0300) 
 number of child under 16 0.0408 0.0479 0.0424 0.0471 
 
(0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) 
Husband income No No Yes Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No  Yes No  Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Included variables: age, age square, household structures, education categories variables, health 
condition, ethnic minority, non-agriculture registration, co-resident with adult children, 
co-resident with elderly parents, women's annual wage, women's other income and husbands' 
income. 
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Table 4. 37 Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - probit 
estimation 
all married women in whole sample          (observations: 5029) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0863*** -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.156*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0389) (0.0399) (0.0474) 
 number of child under 6 -0.0195* -0.0181* -0.0185* -0.0174* 
 
(0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0119) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0214** -0.0244** -0.0227** -0.0243** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0108) (0.0125) 
 number of child under 16 0.0176 0.0182 0.0181 0.0191 
 
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
women live in urban areas                 (observations: 2411) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0613** -0.0653** -0.0585* -0.0656** 
 
(0.0310) (0.0281) (0.0311) (0.0286) 
 number of child under 6 0.0060 0.0029 0.0061 0.0066 
 
(0.0277) (0.0262) (0.0277) (0.0174) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0433** -0.0447** -0.0448** -0.0539** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0190) (0.0205) (0.0191) 
 number of child under 16 0.0276 0.0246 0.0273 0.0261 
 
(0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0260) (0.0251) 
women live in rural areas                  (observations: 2618) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.1382*** -0.1568*** -0.1382*** -0.1560*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0254) 
 number of child under 6 -0.0462** -0.0435** -0.0476** -0.0432** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0201) 
 number of child under 12 -0.0314 -0.0326 -0.0318 -0.0332 
 
(0.0280) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0282) 
 number of child under 16 0.0421 0.0431 0.0432 0.0449 
 
 (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0294) (0.0296) 
Husband income No No Yes Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No  Yes No  Yes 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Included variables: age, age square, household structures, education categories variables, health 
condition, ethnic minority, non-agriculture registration, co-resident with adult children, 
co-resident with elderly parents, women's annual wage, women's other income and husbands' 
income. 
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5. Grandparents’ childcare and female labour force 
participation in China 
5.1 Introduction  
Family planning policy in China has changed Chinese household structures dramatically. 
Children used to have siblings, but are now "little emperors" in the family because of the 
unique "4-2-1" family style. Deeply influenced by Confucianism, links between parents 
and children are essential in traditional Chinese family life and Chinese grandparents are 
very keen to provide childcare. In fact, grandparents are the main childcare providers 
before children go to nurseries because mothers often have to return to their full-time 
work 
46
(Chen et al., 2000). Although formal childcare will be in place when children 
reach the age of three in China, this does not signal the end of grandparents’ childcare.  
On average Chinese employees retire at a younger age than do western workers, and most 
of them become grandparents when they retire
47
. Driven by strong kinship ties, traditional 
grandparents who have retired and who are still healthy choose to devote their time to 
taking care of grandchildren. The involvement of grandparents in childcare in China 
includes different aspects of daily life, such as buying and preparing food, doing 
                                                     
46
 98 days is the current official period for maternity leave in China, according to "Regulation and 
Protection for Female Labourers". This regulation was issued in 1988 and revised in 2012. Before its 
revision, maternity leave was 90 days. 
47
  The official retirement ages for women working in the state and in the collective sector are 50 for 
workers and 55 for administrators, and the official ages for men working in the state and collective sectors 
are 55 for workers and 60 for administrators. 
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housework and checking grandchildren's study (Nyland et al., 2009). It has been found 
that the presence of grandparents in the household significantly reduces the mother's 
involvement in childcare (Chen et al., 2000). 
On the other hand, female labour force participation rates in China are among the highest 
in the world. This is because the characteristics of the Chinese labour market have 
determined that mothers in China cannot spend as much time with their children as 
western mothers do. Part-time jobs are rarely found in China, while being a full-time 
mother is a risk because no job means no social security. As a result, working mothers in 
China, especially in urban areas, rely heavily on childcare centres (Du & Dong, 2010). 
However, formal childcare services in China are under-supplied, leaving mothers turning 
to informal childcare, especially before their children go to nurseries. 
Apart from grandparents’ childcare, looking for a resident nanny is another popular form 
of informal childcare in urban China. Women from rural areas coming to cities to find 
jobs or laid-off female workers who cannot find other skilled jobs may be hired as 
nannies. Nevertheless, grandparents still play an important role because of the strong 
kinship ties. Many grandparents have the idea that they missed out on their children's 
childhoods but cannot miss out on their grandchildren's childhoods. Meanwhile, young 
parents still turn to grandparents for help if the grandparents are available, even if the 
young parents and grandparents live in different cities or countries (Salaf & Greve, 
2004). 
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A large body of literature explores the relationship between public childcare and female 
labour supply, focusing on childcare costs. Some early research includes the works of 
Blau and Robins (1988), Connelly (1992), Ribar (1992) and Kimmel (1998), who all find 
increasing childcare costs decrease the possibility of mothers joining the labour market. 
Although Heckman (1974) was an early study, incorporating the availability of informal 
childcare in a childcare cost function and suggested that research on informal childcare 
would be fruitful, research on informal childcare is limited. 
Guzman (1999) and Wheelock and Jones (2002) investigated the usage of grandparents’ 
childcare in United States and United Kingdom, respectively, and from different points of 
view. Guzman found that grandparents’ availability was the main determinant of 
grandparents’ childcare, while Wheelock confirmed that grandparent s’ childcare was 
considered the best source of childcare if mothers could not look after children 
themselves due to employment. Since then, research has started to pay attention to 
childcare. In the early stages, such research focused mainly on childcare costs and 
childcare choices. Childcare costs are widely concluded as being negatively related to 
public childcare usage, and Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2005) claimed that informal 
childcare is the choice parents shift to when costs increase.  
Since Leibowitz et al. (1992) developed the hypothesis that the availability of relatives 
would have a greater impact on mothers’ labour supply in the first few years after giving 
birth, some research has been conducted to investigate the availability of grandparents on 
women's labour force participation. Kolodinsky and Shirey (2000) and Gray (2005) 
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concluded that having grandparents living in the same household or nearby would 
increase the possibility of mothers' labour force participation.  
With regard to the 21st century, research on the causal effect of grandparent s’ childcare 
on maternal employment has gradually been conducted. In general, grandparents’ 
childcare is positively related to mothers’ labour force participation. However, 
identifying the causal effect of grandparents' childcare on mother's labour force 
participation is challenging at least for two reasons. Firstly, unobserved factors may 
influence the availability of grandparents’ childcare as well as mothers' employment 
decisions. For example, traditional grandparents may be more willing to provide 
childcare than would modern grandparents who would not be prepared to sacrifice their 
time. Moreover, career-oriented mothers may be more passionate about their work than 
they are about looking after children, or mothers who care more about childhood 
development may stay at home with their children simultaneously with grandparents' 
help. Secondly, grandparent s’ childcare and mothers' employment may have a reverse 
effect on each other. For example, grandparents may offer themselves as alternatives to 
formal childcare after the mothers' decisions to return to work. To address this challenge 
when estimating the relationship, instruments used in the existing literature focus mainly 
on the availability of grandparents, such as the death of grandmothers, whether 
grandmothers are alive, especially the mother’s mother, and the number of siblings a 
woman has. 
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Although informal childcare is normal and popular in China, research on this topic is 
limited. Existing research mainly covers the areas of maternal childcare and childcare 
choices (F. Chen, Short, & Entwisle, 2000; Du & Dong, 2013; Short, Chen, Entwisle, & 
Zhai Fengying, 2002), but no particular study focuses on grandparents’ childcare in 
China. Chen, Short and Entwisle (2000) investigated the impact of the proximity of the 
grandparents' residence on mother's childcare involvement in China using the 1991 
CHNS, and concluded that only the proximity of paternal grandparents would reduce a 
mother's childcare involvement. Du and Dong (2013) also constructed their sample using 
the CHNS (waves 1991 to 2006), and found that access to informal childcare became 
increasingly important for women's labour force participation after child care reform in 
China. 
The starting point for this chapter is, as living close to grandparents can reduce mother's
48
 
childcare involvement and results from the previous chapter show that living with 
grandparents can increase mothers’ labour force participation, the correlation between 
grandparents’ childcare and mothers’ labour force participation is not clear.  
The sample is constructed using the CHNS, covering 20 years from 1991 to 2011. In 
total, 688 mothers are included in the sample. Grandparents’ childcare is treated as 
endogenous and an instrument reflecting both the availability of grandparents and their 
ability to provide care is used; ability to care is proxied by their health condition. A 
                                                     
48
 In this chapter, ‘grandparents’ refers to the first generation of both maternal and paternal grandparents. 
‘Mothers’ refers to the second generation, whose labour force participation is our research interest. 
‘Children’ are the third generation and this refers to grandchildren.  
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grandparent who is seriously ill cannot provide childcare but may require care 
themselves. Therefore, I created a dummy variable that 1 represents either maternal 
grandparents or paternal grandparents are living in the same city with mothers and 
grandparents are in a good health condition. More details are presented in the following 
section.  
By using 2SLS and IV probit estimation techniques, our instrument is negatively and 
significantly related to grandparents’ childcare. Other things being equal, with a healthy 
grandparent living in the same household, mothers have a greater chance of receiving 
grandparents’ childcare by up to 18 percentage points. With grandparents' helping with 
childcare, mothers increase their possibility of labour force participation by more than 30 
percentage points. 
5.2 Literature review 
Since Heckman (1974) first estimated a childcare cost function and found the price of 
childcare to be a determinant of the decision to work and of the actual hours of work, a 
large body of literature has investigated the relationship between childcare and maternal 
employment. Some early researchers were Blau and Robins (1988), Connelly (1992), 
Ribar (1992) and Kimmel (1998). Using the 1980 baseline household survey of the 
Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP) in the US and a simple family labour 
supply model, Blau and Robins first provided direct empirical results concerning the 
impact of childcare costs on family labour supply. They concluded that higher childcare 
costs discouraged women from working and, if the mother worked, higher childcare costs 
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reduced the probability that the other worked. Using the same Income Survey Program 
Participation (ISPP) data in the US but different year sections, Connelly (1992), Ribar 
(1992) and Kimmel (1998) provided supporting evidence that increased childcare costs 
lower the probability of mothers' labour force participation. Connelly (1992) pointed out 
mother's labour force participation was not as sensitive as Blau and Robins’ (1988) 
findings indicated, but he did not look at how the wage change and childcare cost change 
would influence the types of childcare used. Ribar (1992) and Kimmel (1998) both 
looked at the differences between paid and unpaid childcare, while Kimmel (1998) did 
not make a significant contribution except for adding single mothers to the estimation 
sample. 
Heckman (1974) also incorporated measures of the availability of informal childcare in 
his childcare cost function. These measures included a dummy indicating the presence in 
the household of sisters, parents and grandparents, variables for the number of children 
age between 14 and 18, a dummy indicating whether the mother had lived in a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) all her life, and another continuous variable 
measuring the number of years of having lived in an SMSA. He found that older children, 
relatives living in the home and the length of residence in the SMSA all had negative 
effects on the price of childcare. Although he did not investigate the relationship between 
informal childcare and women's work efforts, he suggested the approach of modelling 
informal childcare might be fruitful. 
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Meanwhile, informal childcare has been considered as grandparents’ childcare in most 
cases because grandparents are the primary informal childcare providers (Presser, 1989). 
In fact, grandparents would become the primary caregivers when their adult children 
were unable to raise their children due to extraordinary reasons, such as imprisonment, 
severe illness or death. Although grandparents’ childcare is often seen in daily life, 
research about this topic is limited (Kalb, 2009). 
Guzman (1999) looked at the role that maternal preferences and kinship ties plays in the 
decision to use grandparents’ childcare in the United States. Using data from the first and 
second waves of the National Survey of Families and Households (1987-88, and 
1992-94) and further creating a sample of females who were currently employed and who 
had children under the age of five, she concluded that the use of grandparents’ childcare 
was driven by the availability of grandparents, both maternal and paternal, but that 
mothers' childcare needs are less important. However, Guzman failed to reveal how 
maternal preferences influenced the use of grandparents’ childcare as she did not include 
mothers' preferences in her model, while her ambiguous definition of grandparents’ 
childcare due to deficient information concerning this variable also led to a biased 
estimation. 
Wheelock and Jones (2002) collected data by sending out packs of questionnaires via 
employers across a wide range of sectors, as well as conducting telephone interviews
49
 in 
                                                     
49
 According to Wheelock and Jones (2002), 3,000 survey packs were distributed, with 425 returns 
received and another 224 packs returned by informal childcare givers. In addition, as the authors carried out 
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Tyneside
50
 to capture the scenario of informal childcare usage in the United Kingdom. 
They found that a substantial proportion of parents saw grandparents as the next best 
source of childcare when mothers were working or could not look after the children. 
However, this work did not adopt a quantitative analysis to model grandparents’ 
childcare and mothers' labour supply.  
Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2005) explored how the decision to use childcare is made 
by dual workers’ families in Italy. Lacking data containing all the demographic, 
economic, and background information of the families and childcare information, the 
authors matched two data sets to overcome this limitation. One was the Bank of Italy 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which contained detailed information 
on the income and wealth of family members, labour market activities and 
socio-demographic characteristics. The other was the Multiscopo survey, collected by the 
Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) in 1998, which provided detailed information about 
family structures and the use of childcare including childcare costs, hours of childcare 
and types of childcare. By using a multinomial logit model and a maximum likelihood 
estimation method, they concluded that private childcare was not a substitute for public 
childcare when the cost of public childcare increased. Informal childcare, defined as 
                                                                                                                                                              
an additional qualitative analysis, 30 telephone interviews were conducted with the working parents who 
responded to the survey and who used grandparents’ childcare.   
50
 Tyneside used to be a region with many heavy industries, but these have been largely replaced by call 
centres. This labour market change provides more job opportunities for female workers. Moreover, 
population mobility is not commonly seen in the North East, so working-age women will often have family 
support as grandparents tend to live nearby (Wheelock & Jones, 2002). 
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childcare provided by family members or friends and baby-sitters, is the option to which 
parents turn when costs increase, especially when grandmothers live nearby and there are 
small children in the household. Because Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri (2005) used a 
matched sample in their study, one critical shortcoming is that there might be incorrect 
matches making their estimation inaccurate. 
Hank and Buber (2009) used the 2004 Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE) to investigate cross-national variations in grandparents’ childcare in 10 
continental European countries. They found some cross-national differences. Firstly, in 
southern European countries, co-residence is seen more often and grandparents’ childcare 
in this case is a unique way of transferring resources, while co-residence is rare in Nordic 
countries. Secondly, respondents to the survey had different concepts or interpretations of 
grandparents’ childcare. Thirdly, childcare and maternal employment patterns were 
different. Apart from the first finding that was estimated from a logit model, the other 
two were concluded from sample statistics; thus, it is too intuitive to be convincing. 
Leibowitz et al. (1992) proposed the hypothesis that the availability of relatives would 
have a greater impact on mother's labour supply in the first few years after giving birth. 
In their work, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in the U.S., they 
estimated the determinants of a mother returning to the labour market and childcare usage 
during the first two years of life. However, they found no significant relationship between 
mothers' labour force participation and grandparents living in the same household.  
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Later, Kolodinsky and Shirey (2000) revealed the impact of living with elderly parents on 
adult daughters’ labour supply in the US using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) data. They focused on two types of household, one in which adult daughters 
co-resided with elderly parents and another scenario in which adult daughters had living 
parents but did not co-reside with them. The authors concluded that co-residence with 
elderly parents increased adult daughters’ labour supply significantly. However, due to 
the limitations of the data, their analysis did not give the reasons for this correlation. 
More specifically, as PSID data do not contain any health information, it is unclear 
whether the adult daughters’ labour supply increased due to the elderly parents' help, or 
because the ill health of the elderly parents meant the daughters worked harder to pay the 
elderly parents' medical bills. 
Focusing on the United Kingdom, Gray (2005) uses the British Household Panel Survey 
to address the role of grandparents’ childcare in helping mothers to enter the labour 
market. She found that grandparents’ childcare helped more mothers to return to the 
labour market and to work longer hours. However, Gray's analysis is similar to Wheelock 
and Jones's study, in that she also did not adopt an econometric analysis.   
More recently, attention has been drawn to investigating the causal effect of 
grandparents’ childcare on maternal employment. A common issue in these works is that 
grandparents’ childcare has been treated as endogenous. The reason is twofold. The first 
factor is unobserved factors that influence the availability of grandparents’ childcare, as 
well as mothers' labour force participation decisions. For example, grandparents' attitude 
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towards providing childcare is one of the unobserved factors. Traditional grandparents 
may be willing to share some of the responsibilities of raising their grandchildren, while 
modern grandparents may be unwilling to sacrifice their time to look after grandchildren. 
This situation is similar with regard to the mothers' labour force participation decision. 
Career-oriented women may choose to continue their work even without grandparents' 
help, and family-oriented women or mothers who care more about children's 
development may suspend their careers even when grandparenta’ childcare is available. 
The mostly frequently used instrument mainly reflects the availability of grandparents, 
such as the distance from the grandparents, and a dummy variable indicating a living 
grandmother or the death of a grandmother. 
Arpino, Pronzato and Tavares (2010) used the Multiscopo Family and Social Subjects 
wave 2003 to estimate the causal effect of grandparenta’ childcare on mothers’ labour 
force participation decisions in Italy. They created four dummy indicators using 
information regarding whether the mother’s parents and in-laws were still alive as 
instruments, and found that, with the grandparents’ help with childcare, mothers’ increase 
their possibility of labour market participation by 39 percentage points. This positive 
effect was stronger for less-educated women. It was a good attempt to instrument the 
availability of grandparents’ childcare, but their estimations omitted the variable bias 
because they did not model the mothers’ income and the household income. 
Drawing on the Generations and Gender Survey, Aassve, Arpino and Giosis (2012) 
looked at seven European countries to reveal the differences because the role of 
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grandparents’ childcare varies across nations in Europe. Detailed explanations are given 
in their study regarding why grandparents’ childcare should be considered endogenous, 
and they used two instruments to indicate grandparents’ childcare, namely living 
grandmothers and the number of maternal siblings. They found differences in countries 
such as France, Germany and Hungary, in which grandparents’ childcare helped mothers 
to increase their labour supply after controlling the endogeneity, while in Georgia, the 
Netherlands and Russia, there was no indication of a causal effect. The drawbacks of this 
study are obvious. Firstly, no income variables were included in the model, leading to an 
omitted variable bias. Secondly, the authors should have included a variable indicating 
each country’s female labour force participation characteristics; for example, Russian 
family policies encourage women to stay at home rather than go out for work. 
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 in the US, Posadas and 
Vidal-Fernandez (2013) also created a dummy instrument indicating whether the 
maternal grandmother was still alive to take part in grandparents’ childcare. They found 
that grandparents’ childcare could help mothers to increase their likelihood of labour 
force participation by nine percentage points on average. However, this result used a 
fixed effect estimation instead of an IV estimation because the latter  failed to give 
consistent results. This may have been partly due to the limitations of the data, as the 
authors did not include income variables; thus, a biased estimation is expected. 
Compton and Pollak (2014) showed that married women with young children increased 
their labour supply if they lived near to grandmothers, either maternal or paternal, and 
 182 
 
that the potential mechanism was the childcare transferred from grandmothers. In their 
work, they pointed out two endogeneity issues, one is from the simultaneous decision of 
childcare and mothers’ labour force participation, and the other is from the potential 
endogeneity of family proximity. The authors believed the former endogeneity issue was 
commonly recognised in literature, but that the latter was generally ignored. They argued 
that the reasons for considering proximity as endogenous were that proximity could be 
influenced by some unobserved factors, such as family links or even the marriage market, 
and that these factors may also influence labour force participation in some way. 
Following the literature on childcare and mothers' labour force participation, they used 
the NSFH data and proximity as instruments for childcare provided by grandmothers, and 
found that mothers who had childcare help from grandmothers were 5.1 to 6.2 percentage 
points more likely to work in the paid labour force than were mothers who did not. To 
address the endogeneity of proximity, they used census data and created a sample of 
"military wives", civilian women with husbands serving in the US military, because they 
believed that, compared to other couples, proximity to military wives was more 
exogenous because their husbands' locations were determined by the US military. 
However, the authors failed to find a significant effect of proximity on military wives' 
labour force attachment, although they claimed proximity would be exogenous for these 
women. This is may be partly due to their initial consideration that proximity is not 
necessarily endogenous. 
Although no existing studies directly examine the causal effect of grandparents’ childcare 
on mothers' labour force participation in China, some literature pays attention either to 
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female labour force participation or to childcare. Chen, Short and Entwisle (2000) 
investigated the impact of the proximity of the grandparents' residence on mothers' 
childcare involvement using the CHNS wave 1991. They found that grandparents living 
in the household or nearby reduced the mothers' childcare load and this effect was more 
significant in rural areas than it was in urban areas. This study was a good attempt to 
investigate the availability of grandparents on childcare although it still had shortcomings 
in that this study did not take the grandparents' health into consideration. Also using the 
CHNS wave 1991, Short et al. (2002) expanded their research on childcare to maternal 
work and childcare involvement using both qualitative and quantitative methods. They 
claimed that both work compatibility and work intensity reduced mothers' childcare 
involvement but, on the other hand, grandmothers could greatly reduce mothers' childcare 
burdens.  
Although their original aim was not to investigate the effect of the availability of 
grandparents on mothers' labour supply, Maurer-Fazio et al. (2011) confirmed the 
previous research carried out by Chen, Short and Entwisle (2000), in that elderly parents 
living in the household would increase mothers' labour force participation by up to 20 
percentage points in China using the Chinese Population Census data.  
The most recent work on maternal employment and childcare was conducted by Du and 
Dong (2013), who examined the labour force participation and childcare choices of urban 
Chinese women during the economic transition. Because the public childcare system 
experienced a reform after China launched the Economic Reform, mothers’ access to 
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public childcare has been limited. Using six waves (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 
2006) from the CHNS, the authors found that access to informal caregivers became 
increasingly critical for women’s labour force participation. 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Conceptual framework 
Dependent variable in this chapter for estimation is mothers’ labour force participation 
which takes the value of 1 if the mother is part of the labour force and 0 if not. This set up 
is slightly different from the previous chapter which investigates married women’s labour 
force participation. This is because it is believed that grandparents’ childcare only 
happens when there are grandchildren in the household and those married women who 
haven’t gave birth to children may not receive grandparents’ childcare support. The 
estimation model in this chapter is as follows: 
               MLFPit = βi0 + βi1GPCit + βi3Yit + βi4Xit +ɛit                   (4) 
where i denotes individuals and t denotes survey years. Similarly, mother’s labour force 
participation focused in this estimation is defined the same as mothers taking paid job 
outside homes. More details can be found in Chapter 4 discussed in 4.3.1. 
GPC stands for grandparents’ childcare, and is the variable of interest. How 
grandparents’ childcare defined in this chapter is based mainly on three questions from 
the data questionnaires. The first question was for adults and asked whether they took 
care of children aged six and younger in their households. The second question was for 
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children aged 6 and younger and asked whether the children were taken care of by people 
living outside the household, followed by another question asking where the care took 
place. For the first question, if the adults were the grandparents in the household
51
 and 
their answer was yes, grandparents’ childcare was recognised as taking place and this 
variable would be replaced with 1. For the second question, if the children answered yes 
and the care took place in the home of either the maternal or paternal grandparent or both, 
variable grandparents’ childcare was replaced with 1. 
Instead of including the number of children each mother had, the household structure was 
used, which is the vector Yit. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, grandparents’ childcare 
only happens when there is a child in household. In other words, there would not be a 
need for grandparents’ childcare if the number of children in the household were 0. 
Secondly, childcare needs vary for different age groups of children. In order to reflect the 
effect of childcare needs on mothers' labour force participation rather than the effect of 
fertility on mothers' labour force participation, I think household structure is a better 
choice than is the number of children in the household. In the estimation, children will be 
divided into three groups based on their ages, namely 0-3, 4-6 and 7-16. 
Correspondingly, these groups represent children staying at home being looked after by 
their parents or grandparents, children going to kindergartens and children going to 
primary school. 
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The household relationship is recognised via the variable of relationship to household head.  
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Xit is a vector for personal characteristics including age, education levels, health 
condition, an ethnic minority dummy, a non-agricultural registration dummy, the age of 
the youngest child, youngest male child, the mother's annual wage and other income. In 
addition, two dummy variables indicating other male and female members in the 
households were included in the model. The husband's income was also included for 
different estimations. 
I expected children in the age group 0-3 to have the greatest influence on mothers’ labour 
force participation than would the other two groups of children because childcare for 
children in this age group is more intensive. Furthermore, public childcare for children 
aged 3 and younger is relatively less available in China.  
I also expected mothers' education levels, health condition, non-agricultural registration, 
age of youngest child, annual wage and having other female members in the household 
would be positively related to mothers' labour force participation. In particular, I believed 
other female members except mothers and grandmothers in the households, such as 
mother's siblings or other relatives, could also provide childcare and would allow mothers 
to increase their labour supply.  
Finally, year dummy variables and province dummy variables were included to capture 
the year fixed effect and the province fixed effect. 
5.3.2 Instruments 
Following the literature, grandparents’ childcare was treated as endogenous, and an IV 
estimation strategy was used.  
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Instruments in previous studies focused mainly on the availability of grandparents, 
particularly of grandmothers; therefore, the instruments indicated whether grandmothers 
were still alive. However, one important factor has been left out, which is the ability of 
grandparents to provide childcare. Some grandparents are seriously ill and need to be 
cared for rather than providing care. In this case, availability cannot reflect the possibility 
of grandparents' childcare. Moreover, I assumed that grandparents’ childcare was only 
available when both grandmothers and grandfathers were healthy, because if one of them 
needed care, the other grandparent would not have much time to look after grandchildren. 
The instrument in this chapter is an improvement regarding this issue. In essence, the 
instrument is a dummy variable derived from both the availability and ability of 
grandparents to provide care. Firstly, two variables indicating maternal and paternal 
grandparents’ places of residence were created representing ‘living in the same 
household’, ‘living in the same city’ and ‘living in different cities from the mothers’. 
Next, two variables indicating maternal and paternal grandparents’ health status were 
created representing ‘none of the grandparents needing care’, ‘one of the grandparents 
needing care’ and ‘both of the grandparents needing care’. Finally, the instrument was 
labelled 1 for one of the following four situations: (i) maternal grandparents living in the 
same household as mothers and neither of them needs care; (ii) paternal grandparents 
living in the same household as mothers and neither of them needs care; (iii) maternal 
grandparents living in the same city and neither of them needs care; and (iv) paternal 
grandparents living in the same city as mothers and neither of them needs care. 
Otherwise, the instrument is 0. 
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5.3.3 Estimation methods – Binary choice model with binary endogenous 
independent variable  
Since the grandparents’ childcare is endogenous, instrument estimation techniques need 
to be used. However, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation assumes the 
dependent variables in the first and second stages are continuous while our model falls 
into a binary choice model with binary endogenous independent variable since the 
grandparents’ childcare also takes value of 1 if there is, and 0 vice versa. 
Angrist (2001) argued that 2SLS can simply deliver consistent estimators for models 
containing binary dependent variables and binary endogenous variables. He mentioned 
that a probit or logit estimation may seem more appropriate for 2SLS if the endogenous 
variable is binary, but the second stage estimation can be inconsistent unless the first 
stage conditional expectation function is totally correct.  
Meanwhile, Wooldridge (2010) introduced a bivariate probit model for a limited 
dependent variable with endogenous regressors, typically specified for two probit models 
as: 
𝑦1 = 1[𝛽1 𝑋1 + 𝜀1 > 0] 
       𝑦2 = 1[𝛽2 𝑋2 + φ𝑦1  + 𝜀2 > 0] 
where 𝑦2 is an endogeneous regressor for 𝑦1. Consistent estimators can be obtained 
from separate probit models for the first and second stages with the assumption that the 
error terms, ε1 and ε2,  are independent of X1  and X2  with a bivariate normal 
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distribution. However, if ε1 and ε2  are correlated, a joint maximum likelihood 
procedure is more efficient than are separate probit estimations.  
Angrist (2001) also compared his empirical estimations on the labour supply 
consequences of a third child using 2SLS, IV probit and a bivariate probit approach. The 
results show that the IV probit model generates identical effects to the 2SLS estimate. 
Therefore, in this study, 2SLS and IV probit estimations are used to deliver the main 
analysis, and the results are presented in the chaper while OLS and probit estimation 
results are presented in Appendix H-O. 
5.4 Sample selection and statistics 
5.4.1 Defining grandparents’ childcare and sample selection 
Before selecting the sample of this chapter, I firstly defined grandparents’ childcare based 
on the CHNS questionnaires and the steps are illustrated in Figure 5.1. Generally, 
grandparents’ childcare is identified in three generations households when grandparents 
answered “yes” to the question “During the past week, did you take care of children age 6 
and younger in your household?” In two generations households, grandparents childcare 
is identified when children age 6 and younger answered “yes” to the question “During the 
past week, were you taken care of by people who do not live in your household?” and the 
childcare took place in either maternal grandparents’ or paternal grandparents’ home. 
Of the 173,778 observations that were included in the raw longitudinal data set, male 
observations and those with missing information on gender were excluded. Following 
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this, 87,309 females’ observations remained. Next, the data were narrowed down to 
women who were aged 16 to 55 and currently married. Individuals who were currently at 
school, or not working due to disability or retirement were excluded to place the focus on 
economically active women. Furthermore, females’ observations were excluded if their 
youngest children were aged six and older because information about grandparents’ 
childcare could not be tracked due to the design of the questionnaire
52
. Some other 
females’ observations were also excluded because of uncertainty, such as an uncertain 
number of children or uncertain grandparents’ childcare. Lastly, those observations with 
missing records for any of the regression variables were excluded. Unlike the sample 
selection in the previous chapter, I included farmers, hunters and fisher people in the 
whole sample and excluded them in the robustness check estimation. The process of 
sample selection is shown in Figure 5.2. 
5.4.2 Sample and statistics 
Before presenting the statistics of the sample, Table 5.1 demonstrates how the raw data 
looks like considering females age between 16 and 55 then Table 5.2 presents the 
characteristics of the sample, including further slit the sample into groups of women 
participate in the labour market and not, and women live with grandparents and not. 
Firstly, comparing Table 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that labour force participation rate in 
the sample is higher than it is in the raw data, with a difference less than 10%. However, 
the ratio of receiving grandparents’ childcare is much higher in the sample. This is 
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 Questions about childcare targeted children aged six and younger. 
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because the age range in the raw data is wider since it covers females aged from 16 to 55 
while the sample covers females who have children age under 6. Therefore, the average 
age of females in the sample should be smaller, which also can be found in Table 5.2. For 
those females who are single and female who have children age above 6, the raw data 
does not contain information on grandparents’ childcare, so the ratio on this variable is 
low. Another big difference is seen on the variable of age of youngest child, which is 
nearly a 10 years gap between the raw data and the sample. This is limited by the nature 
of CHNS questionnaires that only children age under 6 were asked about the informal 
childcare, so that the average age of youngest child is much smaller. Other variables 
statistics, such non-agricultural registration and ethnic minority, are very close in the raw 
data and sample.  
From Table 5.2, mothers’ labour force participation rate in the sample is 80%. 40% of 
mothers in the sample received childcare support from grandparents and a large 
difference was observed between mothers living with grandparents in the same household 
and those who did not. Mothers who lived with grandparents in the same household had 
nearly tripled the chances of gaining support from grandparents compared to those living 
in different households. However, mothers in good health were less likely to receive help 
from grandparents. 
Another finding from Table 5.2 is that mothers live closer to their in-laws in this sample. 
Only 5% of the mothers lived with maternal grandparents in the same household and 
most of the mothers lived with maternal grandparents in the same city. However, nearly 
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half of the mothers lived with paternal grandparents in the same household and less than 
10% of mothers lived in different cities from those of paternal grandparents. 
Average age of mothers in this sample is 30 years old with 12% of them are ethnic 
minorities. 36% of mothers are holding non-agricultural registration and about half of the 
mothers report they are in good health conditions.  
5.5 Results 
In this section, only instrument estimation results are discussed while the OLS and probit 
estimation results are presented in Appendix H-O. 
5.5.1 IV estimation results 
According to the first stage estimation results in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, the instrument is 
positively and significantly related to grandparents’ childcare, meaning that other things 
being equal, mothers living with healthy grandparents in the same household or in the 
same city had a 25 percentage points higher chance of receiving grandparents’ childcare 
support.  
Surprisingly, having a young child under the age of six does not influence the chance of 
mothers receiving childcare support from grandparents. This also reflects the fact that the 
possibility of receiving childcare from grandparents does not reply on how young the 
children are, but on the availability and capability of grandparents. Mothers’ education 
levels, meanwhile, does not affect the chance of receiving childcare from grandparents 
neither, reflecting that childcare from grandparents neither is an outcome of culture rather 
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than education. On the other hand, healthy mothers tended to have a lower chance of 
receiving childcare support that other characters being the same, a healthy mother is 15 
percentage points less likely to be helped by grandparents on childcare compared with a 
less healthy mother. While male members in the household seem not really helpful, 
female members can help out. Usually in China, most non-agricultural households are 
two generations families, which means except mothers, there may not be other female 
members, while in rural areas, agricultural households may be two generations as well as 
three generations families. Since the first stage estimation is about the chance of 
receiving childcare from grandparents, it can be understood that female members living 
in the household, especially in rural areas, will make effort on other family issues, such as 
cooking and cleaning, so that grandparents can provide childcare.  
Grandparents with non-agricultural registration tended to be more positive about 
providing childcare; this was possibly due to the fact that grandparents with 
non-agricultural registration enjoy social benefits, such as pension and medical insurance, 
unlike grandparents with agricultural registrations, who are much less socially secure and 
have to work to cover their expenses. Income variables, however, do not influence the 
chance of receiving grandparents’ childcare too much except mothers’ non-labour income. 
This can be true that with more non-labour income, such as returns from investing stocks 
or rent income from real estate, the families have ability to provide higher standard life or 
more resources, such as health care to elderly parents.  
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The second stage estimation results showed that grandparents’ childcare was positively 
and significantly related to mothers' labour force participation. As a result of 
grandparents’ childcare, mothers increased their possibility of joining labour market by 
over 30 percentage points. This result is similar to the findings of Arpino et al. (2010; 
2012) who concluded that grandparents’ childcare could help mothers in Italy to increase 
their labour force participation by up to 40 percentage points; however, it is higher than 
the findings by Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2013), who concluded that grandparenta’ 
childcare could help mothers in the US to increase their labour force participation by at 
least nine percentage points.  
Education levels increased mothers' possibility of joining the labour market, and the 
higher the education level the mothers attained, the greater the effect on their labour force 
participation. With other variables being constant, a college or higher degree increased 
the possibility of mothers' labour force participation by up to 25 percentage points. A 
positive effect was also seen for the variables of good health and non-agricultural 
registration. Although having other female members in the household increased the 
chance of mothers receiving grandparents’ childcare, it did not influence mothers' labour 
force participation. 
Mothers' annual wages increased their possibility of labour force participation, while 
mothers' other income and husband's income reduced mothers' possibility of labour force 
participation. The magnitude of the negative effect of the husbands’ income was less than 
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was the magnitude of the positive effect for the mothers' annual wages, showing that the 
mothers' earning power was stronger.  
5.5.2 Urban-rural difference 
To discover the urban-rural difference, the sample was divided into two sub-samples 
based on the interviewees' places of residence. Tables 5.5 to 5.8 present the 2SLS and 
IV-probit estimation results. 
It can be seen that the magnitude of grandparents’ childcare in rural areas is greater than 
it is in urban areas. In rural areas, grandparents’ childcare can help mothers to increase 
their labour force participation by over 40 percentage points, while the amount is around 
25 percentage points in urban areas. This is because public childcare systems are more 
popular in urban areas than they are in rural areas. Therefore, in urban areas, 
grandparents’ childcare is supplementary while in rural areas, grandparents’ childcare is 
relatively essential for mothers due to the incomplete childcare system. 
The results also show some other differences. Firstly, mothers in urban areas are more 
likely to receive childcare from grandparents than are mothers in rural areas. Secondly, 
young children under the age of three reduce mothers’ labour supply to a greater degree 
in urban areas than is the case in rural areas. Thirdly, good health is more important for 
mothers living in rural areas because, with the other variables remaining constant, good 
health can increase the possibility of labour force participation three times higher for 
mothers in rural areas than mothers in urban areas. Fifthly, mothers' labour force 
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participation decisions are more sensitive to income variables in rural areas than they are 
in urban areas. 
5.5.3 Robustness check 
In this section, mothers whose primary occupations were farmers, fisher people and 
hunters will be excluded from the sample. The IV estimation results are presented in 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
It can be seen that grandparents’ childcare is still positively related to mothers' labour 
force participation and that its magnitude is greater than it is in the baseline estimation. 
Other things being equal, grandparents’ childcare can increase mothers' possibility of 
joining the labour market by over 35 percentage points. 
The first stage results are similar to the baseline estimation in that having children aged 
between seven and 16 reduces the chance of receiving grandparents’ childcare, but the 
having children under the age of six did not affect this possibility. The mothers’ health 
condition was still the most important factor that reduced the chance of receiving 
grandparents’ childcare. With the other variables remaining constant, mothers in good 
health were about 20 percentage points less likely to receive the grandparents’ support in 
terms of childcare.  
Comparing second stage results with base line results, differences can also be seen on the 
variables of children age under three and age of youngest child. The magnitude of having 
children age under three has slightly increased, showing that having young child in the 
family will decrease mothers’ labour force participation to a higher degree if mothers 
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working in regular patterns. With the youngest child getting bigger, however, mothers’ 
labour force participation will increase. 
5.5.4 Is grandparents’ childcare over-controlled? 
The most frequently used instruments for grandparents’ childcare focus mainly on the 
availability of grandparents, i.e. whether grandparents are alive, particularly of 
grandmothers. In this section, estimations are carried out to investigate whether there is 
any over-control effect on grandparents’ childcare. Two instruments will be used 
separately; one is a dummy variable indicating grandmothers, either maternal or paternal 
grandmothers, are alive and the other is a dummy variable indicating both grandparents, 
either maternal or paternal, are in good health condition. Results are presented in Table 
5.11 to 5.14. 
It can be seen that both instruments are positively and significantly related to 
grandparents’ childcare. Mothers can have 40 percentage points higher chance of 
receiving childcare support when either maternal grandmothers or paternal grandmother 
are alive assuming other characters are the same as those mothers with grandmothers 
passed away. Similarly, using grandparents’ health condition only as instrument, mothers 
can have 25 percentage points higher chance of receiving childcare from grandparents if 
both grandparents, either maternal or paternal, are in good health condition holding other 
variables constant.  
Nevertheless, the two instruments are weak instrument in this sensitivity check since the 
F statistics from weak instrument test show that they are not strong enough to provide 
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consistent estimation results. For example, the magnitudes of effects from two 
instruments on grandparents’ childcare are higher than those using the interactive 
instrument representing both the availability and capability of grandparents, leading to 
potential upward bias. In a word, the interactive instrument works well and there is no 
over-control effect for the grandparents’ childcare. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Grandparents’ childcare has attracted much attention from researchers. Literature on 
grandparents’ childcare include research on grandparents’ childcare as a supplementary 
childcare choice to formal childcare, on grandparental proximity to help mothers' to 
increase their labour supply or to decrease their childcare involvement, and on 
grandparents’ childcare to help mothers to increase their labour force participation. One 
important issue related to grandparents’ childcare is that it can be endogenous. The 
reasons are twofold. Firstly, grandparents’ childcare and mothers' labour force 
participation decisions can simultaneously influence each other, such as via negotiations 
between mothers and grandparents. Secondly, unobserved factors can influence 
grandparents' decisions to provide childcare and mothers' decision to accept 
grandparents’ childcare, such as grandparents' attitudes towards sacrificing time to look 
after grandchildren and mothers’ attitudes towards formal and informal childcare. The 
mostly frequently used instruments in the literature mainly indicate the availability of 
grandparents; for example, living grandparents, particularly grandmothers.  
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In this chapter, the relationship between grandparents’ childcare and mothers' labour 
force participation in China was examined by creating an instrument indicating both the 
availability and the ability of grandparents. The first stage results from 2SLS and 
IV-probit estimations show that mothers were less likely to receive grandparents’ 
childcare if the grandparents lived far away and/or were not in good health.  
The second stage results confirmed that the provision of childcare by grandparents 
increased mothers’ possibility of labour force participation by more than 30 percentage 
points. Young children under the age of three reduces mothers' possibility of joining the 
labour market the most, as other things being equal, having a child under the age of three 
could reduce the mothers' possibility of labour force participation by more than 25 
percentage points in the robustness check estimations. 
An urban-rural difference was observed in the estimations. I found that mothers living in 
rural areas benefited more from grandparents’ childcare. In rural areas, other things being 
equal, grandparents’ childcare could help mothers to increase their possibility of labour 
force participation by up to 40 percentage points. This may be partly due to the 
incomplete public childcare system in rural areas, leading mothers to depend more on 
family support than do mothers living in urban areas. 
A robustness check using a sample that excluded mothers who were farmers, fisher 
people and hunters showed that grandparents’ childcare consistently helped mothers to 
increase their labour supply and the magnitude of this positive effect was even greater 
than it was in the previous estimations. Other things being equal, grandparents’ childcare 
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can help mothers to increase their possibility of labour force participation by over 35 
percentage points.  
Finally, I also tested whether grandparents’ childcare has been over-identified. Similar to 
previous research in the literature, I used the availability of grandmothers as an 
instrument. A dummy variable that took the value of 1 if the grandmothers were still alive 
was created, but the estimations show that this instrument is a weak instrument. The 
magnitudes of the estimation results were greater than they were when using the 
interaction term as an instrument. Therefore, the instrument in this chapter is an effective 
one for grandparents’ childcare. 
5.7 Shortcomings and future research 
In this chapter, although the estimation results supported the hypothesis that 
grandparents’ childcare can help mothers to increase their possibility of remaining in the 
labour market, there are still some limitations.  
Firstly, although grandparents’ childcare was defined based on three questions that asked 
both children and adults about childcare, the time period was "during the past 
week";
53
thus, if the childcare took place before this, such as two weeks or a month 
previously, I was unable to track this information regarding grandparents’ childcare. This 
may lead to an under-identification of grandparents’ childcare. 
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 Adults were asked, "During the past week, did you take care of children under the age of six?" and 
children were asked, "During the past week, were you taken care of by people who do not live in your 
household?" 
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Secondly, I did not distinguish between maternal and paternal grandparents when 
defining grandparents’ childcare. There may be differences if grandparents’ childcare can 
be distinguished and one form may predominate; for example, there may be a preference 
for maternal or paternal grandparents’ childcare, or they may be equally important for 
mothers' labour force participation.  
Thirdly, improvements to the instrument are still needed. As discussed above, 
grandparents’ childcare is endogenous due to unobserved factors, and grandparents’ 
attitude is one of them. In this chapter, the instrument used reflected availability and 
ability of grandparents without controlling for their attitudes. This may result in an 
over-estimation of the instrument for grandparents’ childcare. For example, even though 
the grandparents are still alive and healthy, they may not be willing to sacrifice their time 
or may prefer to do other things in which they are interested. Furthermore, the real 
distance to the grandparents’ houses could be used instead of a dummy variable 
indicating where the grandparents live.  
Therefore, future work can be done to distinguish the effect of maternal grandparents and 
paternal grandparents, and to re-identify grandparents’ childcare. 
  
 202 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 Defining grandparents’ childcare 
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Figure 5. 2 Selection process of baseline sample 
Figure 1. Steps of sample selecWhole data (173778 observations) 
Male observations and missing records for 
gender (86469 observations dropped) 
 
Female observations (87309 observations left) 
Age between 16 and 55 (36069 
observations left) 
Age<16 and age>55 and 
missing records for age (51240 
observations dropped) 
Single or missing records 
for marital status (7517 
observations dropped) 
Married (28552 observations left) 
Economic active (15871) Students, disabled and retired women 
(12681 observations dropped) 
Women who are step mothers, women with 
uncertain number of children, uncertain 
grandparents’ childcare, and missing records 
for regression variables (4456 observations 
dropped) 
Analysis sample  
(1,651 observations left) 
Youngest child age 6 and older 
(9764 observations dropped) 
Youngest child age 6 and 
younger (6107 observations left) 
  
Table 5. 1 Descriptive statistics of key variables, raw data 
  raw data 
Independent variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Labour force participation rate (%) 79.36 40.48 
Grandparents' childcare (dummy, 1=yes) 0.10 0.29 
Have children age under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.09 0.29 
Have children age 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.11 0.31 
Have children age 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.35 0.48 
Age 36.33 10.86 
Education categories (dummy, 1=yes) 
  
  primary school 0.41 0.49 
  lower middle school 0.35 0.48 
  upper middle school 0.13 0.34 
  college or more 0.10 0.29 
Ethnic minority (dummy, 1=yes) 0.12 0.32 
Non-agriculture registration (dummy, 1=yes) 0.30 0.46 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes)  0.27 0.44 
Age of youngest child 13.16 7.76 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes)  0.59 0.49 
Maternal grandparents in the same household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.02 0.15 
Maternal grandparents in the same city (dummy, 1=yes) 0.41 0.49 
Maternal grandparents in other cities (dummy, 1=yes) 0.07 0.25 
Paternal grandparents in the same household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.14 0.34 
Paternal grandparents in the same city (dummy, 1=yes) 0.26 0.44 
Paternal grandparents in other cities (dummy, 1=yes) 0.02 0.15 
None of maternal grandparents needs health care (dummy, 1=yes)  1.46 0.50 
None of paternal grandparents needs health care (dummy, 1=yes) 1.46 0.50 
Other female adult in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.40 0.49 
Other male adult in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.53 0.50 
Women's annual wage 8.44 1.19 
Women's other income 8.58 2.42 
Husband's annual income 8.64 1.22 
County (%) 
  
Liaoning 9.37 29.14 
Heilongjiang 6.94 25.41 
Jiangsu 11.16 31.48 
Henan 10.59 30.77 
Shandong 12.15 32.67 
Hubei 11.37 31.75 
Hunan 11.35 31.72 
Guangxi 12.34 32.90 
Guizhou 11.58 32.00 
Beijing (joined the survey in 2011) 1.13 10.58 
Shanghai (joined the survey in 2011) 1.07 10.28 
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Chongqing (joined the survey in 2011) 0.95 9.71 
Year (%) 
  
1991 11.84 32.31 
1993 11.13 31.45 
1997 11.84 32.30 
2000 13.14 33.79 
2004 9.77 29.69 
2006 9.36 29.13 
2009 8.96 28.56 
2011 11.21 31.55 
Total observations 35,756 
   
  
Table 5. 2 Descriptive statistics of key variables, baseline sample 
  whole sample 
women with 
grandparents' 
childcare 
women without 
grandparents 
childcare 
Women live with 
grandparents in the 
same household 
Woman and 
grandparents live in 
different households 
Independent variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Labour force participation rate (%) 87.22 33.40 87.85 33.82 85.46 33.13 88.06  34.66  86.10  32.40  
Grandparents' childcare (dummy, 1=yes) 0.40 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65  0.48  0.21  0.40  
Have children age under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.45 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.39 0.53 0.56  0.56  0.37  0.52  
Have children age 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.67  0.47  0.55 0.45 0.76 0.47 0.56  0.47  0.74  0.44  
Have children age 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.32 0.47 0.19 0.44 0.52 0.68 0.23  0.48  0.51  0.67  
Age 30.43 4.34 29.16 3.58 31.27 4.58 29.47  4.06  31.16  4.40  
Education categories (dummy, 1=yes) 
            primary school 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.40 0.37 0.48 0.26  0.44  0.34  0.47  
  lower middle school 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.43  0.50  0.40  0.49  
  upper middle school 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.15  0.35  0.13  0.34  
  college or more 0.14 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.11 0.31 0.17  0.37  0.13  0.33  
Ethnic minority (dummy, 1=yes) 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13  0.34  0.11  0.31  
Non-agriculture registration (dummy, 1=yes) 0.36 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.29 0.46 0.41  0.49  0.32  0.47  
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes)  0.44 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.34  0.47  0.51  0.50  
Age of youngest child 3.21 1.72 2.91 1.71 3.41 1.70 2.90  1.75  3.45  1.66  
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes)  0.59 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.57  0.50  0.60  0.49  
Maternal grandparents in the same household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.08  0.27  0.00  0.00  
Maternal grandparents in the same city (dummy, 1=yes) 0.84 0.37 0.81 0.39 0.85 0.36 0.79  0.41  0.87  0.34  
Maternal grandparents in other cities (dummy, 1=yes) 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.13  0.33  0.13  0.34  
Paternal grandparents in the same household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.40 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.93  0.26  0.00  0.00  
Paternal grandparents in the same city (dummy, 1=yes) 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.05  0.21  0.93  0.26  
Paternal grandparents in other cities (dummy, 1=yes) 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.03  0.16  0.07  0.26  
None of maternal grandparents needs health care (dummy, 1=yes)  0.93 0.25 0.93 0.26 0.93 0.25 0.93  0.25  0.93  0.26  
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None of paternal grandparents needs health care (dummy, 1=yes) 0.94 0.23 0.95 0.22 0.94 0.23 0.95  0.23  0.94  0.23  
Other female adult in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.18 0.38 0.36  0.48  0.13  0.34  
Other male adult in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.36  0.48  0.16  0.36  
Women's annual wage 8.46 1.18 8.71 1.26 8.31 1.10 8.61  1.23  8.35  1.13  
Women's other income 8.37 2.55 9.05 2.23 7.92 2.65 9.26  2.24  7.70  2.57  
Husband's annual income 8.71 1.25 8.90 1.31 8.59 1.19 8.79  1.30  8.65  1.20  
County (%) 
          Liaoning 9.63  29.51  6.12  23.98  11.94  32.44  6.20  24.13  12.22  32.77  
Heilongjiang 7.27  25.97  5.50  22.82  8.43  27.79  2.96  16.95  10.52  30.70  
Jiangsu 11.08  31.40  15.60  36.31  8.12  27.33  14.08  34.81  8.82  28.37  
Henan 12.05  32.57  10.09  30.14  13.34  34.02  12.54  33.14  11.69  32.15  
Shandong 10.36  30.48  11.47  31.89  9.63  29.51  11.41  31.81  9.56  29.43  
Hubei 11.99  32.50  9.33  29.10  13.74  34.45  12.54  33.14  11.58  32.02  
Hunan 7.75  26.75  5.81  23.41  9.03  28.67  5.35  22.52  9.56  29.43  
Guangxi 13.51  34.19  18.20  38.61  10.43  30.58  17.89  38.35  10.20  30.28  
Guizhou 9.87  29.84  9.48  29.32  10.13  30.19  10.28  30.39  9.56  29.43  
Beijing (joined the survey in 2011) 3.15  17.47  3.52  18.43  2.91  16.81  1.97  13.91  4.04  19.70  
Shanghai (joined the survey in 2011) 2.30  15.00  3.98  19.55  1.20  10.91  3.94  19.48  1.06  10.26  
Chongqing (joined the survey in 2011) 1.03  10.10  0.92  9.54  1.10  10.45  0.85  9.16  1.17  10.75  
Year (%) 
          1991 26.59  44.19  15.90  36.60  33.60  47.26  17.75  38.23  33.26  47.14  
1993 13.87  34.57  7.80  26.83  17.85  38.32  10.28  30.39  16.58  37.21  
1997 12.72  33.33  13.30  33.99  12.34  32.90  12.54  33.14  12.86  33.49  
2000 10.54  30.71  13.76  34.48  8.43  27.79  11.69  32.15  9.67  29.57  
2004 7.63  26.56  9.79  29.74  6.22  24.16  10.99  31.29  5.10  22.01  
2006 6.72  25.05  9.63  29.53  4.81  21.42  9.01  28.66  4.99  21.80  
2009 8.12  27.32  12.23  32.79  5.42  22.65  11.83  32.32  5.31  22.44  
2011 13.81  34.51  17.58  38.10  11.33  31.72  15.92  36.61  12.22  32.77  
Total observations 1651 654 997 710 941 
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Table 5. 3 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation - 2SLS estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparen
t's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparen
t's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparen
t's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.3110** 
 
0.3005** 
 
0.3061** 
 
0.2975** 
  
 
(0.1267) 
 
(0.1278) 
 
(0.1275) 
 
(0.1284) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.2596*** 
 
0.2538*** 
 
0.2597*** 
 
0.2509*** 
   (0.0505) 
 
(0.0505) 
 
(0.0506) 
 
(0.0501) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0391 -0.1802*** 0.0413 -0.1912*** 0.0391 -0.1803*** 0.0408 -0.1912*** 
  (0.0402) (0.0647) (0.0393) (0.0611) (0.0403) (0.0626) (0.0393) (0.0601) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0446 0.0660 -0.0283 0.0262 -0.0446 0.0607 -0.0288 0.0245 
  (0.0292) (0.0513) (0.0294) (0.0420) (0.0293) (0.0499) (0.0294) (0.0417) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0797*** 0.0766 -0.0503** 0.0196 -0.0797*** 0.0688 -0.0507** 0.0173 
  (0.0206) (0.0666) (0.0216) (0.0478) (0.0208) (0.0649) (0.0217) (0.0480) 
Age  0.0158 -0.0136 0.0004 0.0149 0.0158 -0.0115 0.0005 0.0151 
  (0.0240) (0.0334) (0.0244) (0.0293) (0.0240) (0.0324) (0.0244) (0.0287) 
Age square -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0002 
  （0.0004） (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0477 0.0690** 0.0452 0.0644** 0.0477 0.0679** 0.0465 0.0667** 
  (0.0472) (0.0293) (0.0465) (0.0282) (0.0472) (0.0261) (0.0456) (0.0258) 
  Upper middle school 0.0277 -0.0857 0.0884** -0.0842 0.0777* -0.0765 0.0902** -0.0786 
  (0.0396) (0.0781) (0.0391) (0.0835) (0.0396) (0.0760) (0.0392) (0.0847) 
  College or more 0.0651 0.1556*** 0.0423 0.1600*** 0.0651 0.1656*** 0.0434 0.1712*** 
  (0.0455) (0.0456) (0.0459) (0.0451) (0.0455) (0.0450) (0.0459) (0.0448) 
Health condition (good/excellent) -0.1540*** 0.2410*** -0.1531*** 0.2206*** -0.1540*** 0.2380*** -0.1530*** 0.2106*** 
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  (0.0243) (0.0930) (0.0368) (0.0818) (0.0245) (0.0920) (0.0368) (0.0808) 
Ethnic minority  0.0164 -0.00575 0.0432 -0.0311 0.0165 -0.00900 0.0429 -0.0302 
  (0.0359) (0.0474) (0.0406) (0.0603) (0.0359) (0.0462) (0.0406) (0.0594) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0874*** 0.0635* 0.1100*** 0.0680** 0.0874*** 0.0690* 0.1110*** 0.0730** 
  (0.0290) (0.0376) (0.0292) (0.0327) (0.0290) (0.0355) (0.0292) (0.0333) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 
1=yes) 
0.1070*** -0.1470 0.0603** -0.0815 0.1070*** -0.1430 0.0595** -0.0809 
  (0.0301) (0.0908) (0.0301) (0.0597) (0.0301) (0.0881) (0.0301) (0.0589) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 
1=yes) 
0.0391 -0.0275 0.0254 -0.0268 0.0391 -0.0281 0.0249 -0.0269 
  (0.0298) (0.0473) (0.0291) (0.0388) (0.0299) (0.0458) (0.0291) (0.0380) 
Age of youngest child 0.0012 0.0117 0.0040 0.0074 0.0012 0.0104 0.0035 0.0068 
  (0.0108) (0.0146) (0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0106) (0.0131) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0315 0.0621 -0.0392* 0.0637 -0.0315 0.0610 -0.0391* 0.0627 
  (0.0224) (0.0393) (0.0218) (0.0423) (0.0224) (0.0382) (0.0218) (0.0420) 
Women's annual wage  0.0161 -0.0586*** -0.0071 -0.0565*** 0.0160 0.0621*** -0.0020 0.0654*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0177) (0.0124) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0187) (0.0143) (0.0154) 
Women's other income 0.0340*** -0.0287 0.0307*** -0.0218 0.0340*** -0.0272 0.0307*** -0.0209 
  (0.0047) (0.0277) (0.0045) (0.0255) (0.0047) (0.0270) (0.0045) (0.0255) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0001 -0.0328** -0.0094 -0.0348** 
  
    
(0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0119) (0.0161) 
Constant 0.2184 0.9795*** 0.6987 0.4540 0.2152 1.0442*** 0.7298 0.5629* 
  (0.4036) (0.3133) (0.4172) (0.3169) (0.4055) (0.3106) (0.4207) (0.3161) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 33.08 / 25.49 / 33.11 / 25.31 / 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
R-squared 0.232 0.243 0.262 0.298 0.223 0.251 0.261 0.306 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 4 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation - IV-probit estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.3479*** 
 
0.3403*** 
 
0.3596*** 
 
0.3505*** 
  
 
(0.0794) 
 
(0.0714) 
 
(0.0786) 
 
(0.0717) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.2796*** 
 
0.2708*** 
 
0.2739*** 
 
0.2708*** 
   (0.0534) 
 
(0.0534) 
 
(0.0534) 
 
(0.0534) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0300 -0.1647**
* 
0.0341 -0.1786**
* 
0.0301 -0.1731**
* 
0.0338 -0.1803**
*   (0.0393) (0.0419) (0.0385) (0.0428) (0.0394) (0.0415) (0.0386) (0.0426) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0424 0.0151 -0.0259 0.0125 -0.0423 0.0114 0.0263 0.0146 
  (0.0289) (0.0228) (0.0291) (0.0224) (0.0290) (0.0227) (0.0291) (0.0224) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0703*** 0.0348* -0.0435** 0.0324* -0.0701*** 0.0338* -0.0438** 0.0324* 
  (0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0215) (0.0200) 
Age  0.0141 0.0548*** 0.0106 0.0597*** 0.0140 0.0557*** 0.0106 0.0604*** 
  (0.0239) (0.0182) (0.0241) (0.0179) (0.0239) (0.0181) (0.0241) (0.0177) 
Age square -0.0005 -0.0009**
* 
-0.0003 -0.0012**
* 
-0.0005 -0.0010**
* 
-0.0003 -0.0012**
*   (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0507 0.0548** 0.0500 0.0473** 0.0506 0.0524** 0.0509 0.0450** 
  (0.0469) (0.0216) (0.0464) (0.0210) (0.0270) (0.0216) (0.0464) (0.0209) 
  Upper middle school 0.0232 0.0640** 0.0221 0.0552* 0.0229 0.0514 0.0334 0.0102 
  (0.0392) (0.0308) (0.0389) (0.0308) (0.0393) (0.0309) (0.0390) (0.0309) 
  College or more 0.0159 0.1176*** 0.0168 0.1390*** 0.0156 0.1237*** 0.0176 0.1420*** 
  (0.0443) (0.0380) (0.0451) (0.0375) (0.0443) (0.0383) (0.0450) (0.0376) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1475*** 0.1137*** -0.1459*** 0.1343*** -0.1473*** 0.1079*** -0.1458*** 0.1318*** 
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  (0.0241) (0.0228) (0.0367) (0.0313) (0.0242) (0.0233) (0.0367) (0.0313) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0077 -0.0171 -0.0262 -0.0147 -0.0080 -0.0163 -0.0260 -0.0159 
  (0.0349) (0.0252) (0.0400) (0.0280) (0.0349) (0.0253) (0.0399) (0.0279) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.1008*** 0.0508** 0.1229*** 0.0717*** 0.1007*** 0.0496** 0.1235*** 0.0683** 
  (0.0285) (0.0229) (0.0286) (0.0232) (0.0285) (0.0229) (0.0286) (0.0233) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0862*** 0.0308 0.0467* 0.0158 0.0863*** 0.0343 0.0861*** 0.0159 
  (0.0294) (0.0228) (0.0296) (0.0222) (0.0294) (0.0229) (0.0296) (0.0221) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0284 0.0101 0.0180 0.0165 0.0285 0.0076 0.0176 0.0076 
  (0.0291) (0.0214) (0.0285) (0.0206) (0.0291) (0.0214) (0.0285) (0.0204) 
Age of youngest child -0.0014 0.0115 -0.0037 0.0115 -0.0015 0.0101 -0.0033 0.0104 
  (0.0106) (0.0082) (0.0104) (0.0075) (0.0106) (0.0081) (0.0104) (0.0074) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0296 0.0351** 0.0275 0.0322** 0.0296 0.0364** 0.0375 0.0330** 
  (0.0219) (0.0167) (0.0214) (0.0163) (0.0219) (0.0166) (0.0214) (0.0162) 
Women's annual wage 0.0168 0.0928*** 0.0053 0.0992 0.0160 0.0942*** 0.0015 0.0944*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0079) (0.0122) (0.0085) (0.0138) (0.0069) (0.0140) (0.0077) 
Women's other income 0.0274*** -0.0607**
* 
0.0255*** -0.0618** 0.0274 -0.0604**
* 
0.0255*** -0.0618**
*   (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0038) 
Husband's annual income 
    
0.0013 -0.0265**
* 
0.0069 -0.0242**
*   
    
(0.0120) (0.0083) (0.0118) (0.0082) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 28.16 / 27.38 / 30.05 / 28.16 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 3.18 (0.035) 3.64 (0.026) 3.10 (0.037) 3.36 (0.033) 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
  
 212 
 
Table 5. 5 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – 2SLS estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.2383** 
 
0.2474** 
 
0.2629** 
 
0.2697** 
  
 
(0.1054) 
 
(0.1047) 
 
(0.1199) 
 
(0.1177) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.3966*** 
 
0.3886*** 
 
0.3950*** 
 
0.3873*** 
   (0.1059) 
 
(0.1064) 
 
(0.1078) 
 
(0.1092) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1703 -0.3543**
* 
0.1756 -0.3611**
* 
0.1698 -0.3526**
* 
0.1745 -0.3622**
*   (0.1293) (0.1236) (0.1301) (0.1292) (0.1292) (0.1233) (0.1305) (0.1296) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0449 0.1639 0.0615 0.1566 0.0445 0.1627 0.0604 0.1596 
  (0.1323) (0.1727) (0.1159) (0.1755) (0.1323) (0.1724) (0.1166) (0.1730) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1728*** 0.0635 -0.1837** 0.0627 -0.1737*** 0.0618 -0.1806** 0.0703 
  (0.0678) (0.1356) (0.0877) (0.1174) (0.0681) (0.1308) (0.0897) (0.1154) 
Age  0.0136 0.0904** 0.0064 0.0865** 0.0121 0.0857* -0.0067 0.0839** 
  (0.0809) (0.0435) (0.0870) (0.0415) (0.0802) (0.0473) (0.0876) (0.0403) 
Age square -0.0005 -0.0005**
* 
-0.0002 -0.0005**
* 
-0.0005 -0.0005**
* 
-0.0002 -0.0005**
*   (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0002) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0983 0.0253 0.1574 -0.0161 0.1033 0.0221 0.1558 -0.0188 
  (0.1110) (0.1401) (0.1039) (0.1286) (0.1095) (0.1307) (0.1046) (0.1261) 
  Upper middle school 0.0646 0.1387 0.1221 0.0948 0.0692 0.1335 0.1204 0.0911 
  (0.1144) (0.1408) (0.1103) (0.1274) (0.1128) (0.1311) (0.1106) (0.1246) 
  College or more -0.0080 0.2947** -0.0539 0.2546** -0.0074 0.2926** -0.0535 0.2542** 
  (0.1164) (0.1423) (0.1114) (0.1239) (0.1150) (0.1322) (0.1119) (0.1221) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1904*** 0.0972** -0.2097** 0.0937** -0.1795*** 0.0942** -0.1814** 0.0929** 
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  (0.0643) (0.0463) (0.0984) (0.0454) (0.0660) (0.0455) (0.0990) (0.0449) 
Ethnic minority  -0.1069 0.0696 -0.0221 0.0423 -0.1097 0.0666 -0.0235 -0.0365 
  (0.0981) (0.1230) (0.1122) (0.1157) (0.0981) (0.1175) (0.1120) (0.1152) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0407 0.1562* 0.0424 0.1576** 0.0414 0.1547* 0.0437 0.1513** 
  (0.0835) (0.0871) (0.0821) (0.0759) (0.0844) (0.0872) (0.0824) (0.0752) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1153* 0.0080 -0.0300 0.0038 0.1162* 0.0074 -0.0308 0.0041 
  (0.0603) (0.0895) (0.0797) (0.0800) (0.0607) (0.0837) (0.0798) (0.0792) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0606 -0.0165 0.0590 -0.0058 0.0643 -0.0201 0.0581 -0.0079 
  (0.0620) (0.0676) (0.0597) (0.0574) (0.0621) (0.0635) (0.0598) (0.0566) 
Age of youngest child -0.0232 0.0591*** -0.0159 0.0509*** -0.0222 0.0547*** -0.0161 0.0499*** 
  (0.0158) (0.0202) (0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0168) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0380 0.0380 0.0030 0.0042 -0.0371 0.0325 0.0026 0.0030 
  (0.0494) (0.0578) (0.0502) (0.0459) (0.0495) (0.0544) (0.0503) (0.0452) 
Women's annual income  0.0314 0.0887*** -0.0517 0.0906*** 0.0118 0.0813*** -0.0471 0.0965*** 
  (0.0317) (0.0315) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0399) (0.0305) (0.0413) (0.0352) 
Women's other income 0.0267*** -0.0658**
* 
0.0238*** -0.0619**
* 
0.0271*** -0.0742**
* 
0.0237*** -0.0719**
*   (0.0068) (0.0165) (0.0072) (0.0134) (0.0069) (0.0158) (0.0072) (0.0133) 
Husband's annual income  
    
0.0290 -0.0697** -0.0099 -0.0664** 
  
    
(0.0349) (0.0318) (0.0380) (0.0313) 
Constant -0.1268 0.5915 1.0343 -0.9792 -0.2211 0.8072 1.0999 -0.7176 
  (1.2553) (1.4358) (1.3751) (1.4048) (1.2589) (1.3453) (1.4219) (1.4156) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 20.50 / 19.45 / 21.65 / 19.88 / 
Observations 481 481 481 481 
R-squared 0.198 0.211 0.200 0.224 0.196 0.215 0.198 0.228 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB 
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Table 5. 6 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – 2SLS estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.4050*** 
 
0.3958*** 
 
0.4026*** 
 
0.3965*** 
  
 
(0.1350) 
 
(0.1469) 
 
(0.1367) 
 
(0.1474) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.1438*** 
 
0.1486*** 
 
0.1505*** 
 
0.1530*** 
   (0.0411) 
 
(0.0418) 
 
(0.0468) 
 
(0.0483) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0757 -0.2205* 0.0780 -0.2215** 0.0765 -0.2210** 0.0788 -0.2220** 
  (0.0861) (0.1210) (0.0855) (0.1222) (0.0865) (0.1212) (0.0858) (0.1226) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0364 -0.1438 0.0320 -0.1486 0.0626*** -0.1409 0.0613*** -0.1456 
  (0.0763) (0.1176) (0.0726) (0.1251) (0.0243) (0.1139) (0.0227) (0.1250) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0393 0.0547 -0.0196 0.0645 -0.0392 0.0576 -0.0193 0.0642 
  (0.0616) (0.1052) (0.0620) (0.0992) (0.0616) (0.1055) (0.0619) (0.0985) 
Age  0.0531 0.0508*** 0.0366 0.0653*** 0.0532 0.0593*** 0.0364 0.0651*** 
  (0.0464) (0.0109) (0.0483) (0.0222) (0.0464) (0.0108) (0.0484) (0.0222) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0012** -0.0009 -0.0013** -0.0011 -0.0012** -0.0009 -0.0013** 
  (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0175 0.0193 0.0236 0.0187 0.0176 0.0202 0.0236 0.0191 
  (0.0712) (0.1092) (0.0716) (0.1217) (0.0713) (0.1083) (0.0716) (0.1204) 
  Upper middle school 0.0090 0.0512* 0.0396 0.0533* 0.0095 0.0546* 0.0404 0.0556* 
  (0.0785) (0.0313) (0.0780) (0.0303) (0.0785) (0.0314) (0.0778) (0.0339) 
  College or more 0.0513 0.2590* 0.0297 0.2603* 0.0517 0.2523* 0.0300 0.2571* 
  (0.0886) (0.1454) (0.0896) (0.1458) (0.0886) (0.1462) (0.0895) (0.1454) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.2062*** 0.2834*** -0.2258*** 0.2915*** -0.2069*** 0.2875*** -0.2253*** 0.2907*** 
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  (0.0545) (0.0905) (0.0803) (0.0954) (0.0545) (0.0964) (0.0603) (0.1002) 
Ethnic minority  -0.1027 0.0060 -0.0741 0.0137 -0.1038 -0.0023 -0.0759 0.0087 
  (0.0736) (0.1944) (0.0814) (0.1634) (0.0740) (0.1956) (0.0815) (0.1645) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0806** 0.0416** 0.1195** 0.0485** 0.0805** 0.0416** 0.1196** 0.0416** 
  (0.0381) (0.0203) (0.0494) (0.0291) (0.0382) (0.0214) (0.0494) (0.0208) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1659*** 0.0604** 0.1056** 0.0640** 0.1656*** 0.0617** 0.1048** 0.0641** 
  (0.0493) (0.0287) (0.0517) (0.0281) (0.0495) (0.0283) (0.0520) (0.0279) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0143 -0.0407 -0.0145 -0.0379 0.0138 -0.0440 -0.0154 -0.0400 
  (0.0557) (0.0795) (0.0556) (0.0867) (0.0559) (0.0792) (0.0556) (0.0868) 
Age of youngest child -0.0127 0.0603** -0.0076 0.0546** -0.0129 0.0590** -0.0080 0.0538** 
  (0.0139) (0.0284) (0.0139) (0.0232) (0.0140) (0.0285) (0.0139) (0.0233) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0126 0.0554 -0.0037 0.0620 0.0128 0.0569 -0.0034 0.0625 
  (0.0434) (0.0608) (0.0446) (0.0655) (0.0433) (0.0604) (0.0445) (0.0649) 
Women's annual income  0.0215 0.1227*** 0.0019 0.1268*** 0.0237 0.1276*** 0.0058 0.1253*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0517) (0.0329) (0.0480) (0.0358) (0.0555) (0.0358) (0.0483) 
Women's other income  0.0357*** -0.0396 0.0333*** -0.0461 0.0356*** -0.0395 0.0332*** -0.0458 
  (0.0083) (0.0617) (0.0085) (0.0557) (0.0084) (0.0608) (0.0086) (0.0552) 
Husband's annual income  
    
-0.0031 -0.0815**
* 
-0.0067 -0.0845**
*   
    
(0.0258) (0.0349) (0.0252) (0.0389) 
Constant -0.6844 1.0290 -0.1974 0.0356 -0.6771 1.0750 -0.1642 0.1052 
  (0.7911) (1.4182) (0.8584) (1.2345) (0.7958) (1.3985) (0.8705) (1.2463) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 20.98 / 18.65 / 21.84 / 18.98 / 
Observations 1170 1170 1170 1170 
R-squared 0.185 0.215 0.190 0.218 0.187 0.219 0.193 0.221 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 7 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.2605** 
 
0.2742** 
 
0.2642** 
 
0.2800** 
  
 
(0.1221) 
 
(0.1323) 
 
(0.1232) 
 
(0.1326) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.3866*** 
 
0.3886*** 
 
0.3750*** 
 
0.3803*** 
   (0.1073) 
 
(0.1044) 
 
(0.0988) 
 
(0.0964) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1703 -0.3627** 0.1756 -0.3605**
* 
0.1698 -0.3537**
* 
0.1745 -0.3559**
*   (0.1293) (0.1150) (0.1301) (0.1057) (0.1292) (0.0975) (0.1305) (0.0981) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0449 0.0879 0.0515 0.0897 0.0445 0.0800 0.0504 0.0856 
  (0.1323) (0.0705) (0.1159) (0.0752) (0.1323) (0.0768) (0.1166) (0.0717) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1728*** 0.0734 -0.1837** 0.0353 -0.1737*** 0.0750 -0.1806** 0.0337 
  (0.0678) (0.0826) (0.0877) (0.0918) (0.0681) (0.0855) (0.0897) (0.0893) 
Age  0.0136 0.0881** 0.0064 0.0856*** 0.0121 0.0846*** -0.0067 0.0812*** 
  (0.0809) (0.0383) (0.0870) (0.0332) (0.0802) (0.0264) (0.0876) (0.0302) 
Age square -0.0005 -0.0006** -0.0002 -0.0006** -0.0005 -0.0006** -0.0002 -0.0006** 
  (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0983 0.0104 0.1574 0.0059 0.1033 0.0168 0.1558 0.0114 
  (0.1110) (0.0914) (0.1039) (0.0777) (0.1095) (0.0859) (0.1046) (0.0743) 
  Upper middle school 0.0646 0.0892 0.1221 0.1091 0.0692 0.0894 0.1204 0.1006 
  (0.1144) (0.0861) (0.1103) (0.0567) (0.1128) (0.0796) (0.1106) (0.0537) 
  College or more -0.0080 0.2231*** -0.0539 0.2453*** -0.0074 0.2312*** -0.0535 0.2435*** 
  (0.1164) (0.0859) (0.1114) (0.0654) (0.1150) (0.0785) (0.1119) (0.0633) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1904*** 0.0852** -0.2097** 0.0906** -0.1795*** 0.0898** -0.1814** 0.0920** 
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  (0.0643) (0.0424) (0.0984) (0.0447) (0.0660) (0.0438) (0.0990) (0.0458) 
Ethnic minority  -0.1069 -0.0608 -0.0221 -0.0037 -0.1097 -0.0652 -0.0235 -0.0015 
  (0.0981) (0.0855) (0.1122) (0.1021) (0.0981) (0.0831) (0.1120) (0.0983) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0407 0.1197* 0.0424 0.1267* 0.0414 0.1138* 0.0437 0.1228* 
  (0.0835) (0.0612) (0.0821) (0.0787) (0.0844) (0.0617) (0.0824) (0.0777) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1153* 0.0651 0.1300* 0.0778 0.1162* 0.0637 0.1308* 0.0792 
  (0.0603) (0.0743) (0.0797) (0.0742) (0.0607) (0.0725) (0.0798) (0.0715) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0606 0.0015 0.0590 0.0336 0.0643 -0.0081 0.0581 0.0208 
  (0.0620) (0.0548) (0.0597) (0.0455) (0.0621) (0.0544) (0.0598) (0.0446) 
Age of youngest child -0.0232 0.0483*** -0.0159 0.0465*** -0.0222 0.0468*** -0.0161 0.0435*** 
  (0.0158) (0.0133) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0157) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0133) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0380 0.0297 0.0030 0.0009 -0.0371 0.0276 0.0026 0.0026 
  (0.0494) (0.0457) (0.0502) (0.0397) (0.0495) (0.0459) (0.0503) (0.0395) 
Women's annual income  0.0314 0.1026*** -0.0517 0.1004*** 0.0118 0.1069*** -0.0471 0.1072*** 
  (0.0317) (0.0237) (0.0373) (0.0277) (0.0399) (0.0255) (0.0413) (0.0270) 
Women's other income  0.0267*** -0.0657**
* 
0.0238*** -0.0604**
* 
0.0271*** -0.0650**
* 
0.0237*** -0.0603**
*   (0.0068) (0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0187) (0.0069) (0.0101) (0.0072) (0.0085) 
Husband's annual income 
    
0.0290 -0.0697**
* 
-0.0099 -0.0529** 
  
    
(0.0349) (0.0283) (0.0380) (0.0263) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 20.86 / 19.50 / 20.64 / 19.21 / 
Wald test on endogeneity (p value in bracket) 4.56 (0.033) 3.83 (0.0404) 6.84 (0.0089) 3.07 (0.0445) 
Observations 481 481 481 481 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 8 Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – IV-probit estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.3960*** 
 
0.3887*** 
 
0.4016*** 
 
0.4076*** 
  
 
(0.0962) 
 
(0.0954) 
 
(0.1106) 
 
(0.1055) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.1568*** 
 
0.1444*** 
 
0.1555*** 
 
0.1430*** 
   (0.0311) 
 
(0.0318) 
 
(0.0368) 
 
(0.0323) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0757 -0.1993**
* 
0.0780 -0.1985**
* 
0.0765 -0.1996**
* 
0.0788 -0.1989**
*   (0.0861) (0.0689) (0.0855) (0.0678) (0.0865) (0.0691) (0.0858) (0.0680) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0364 0.0571 0.0320 0.0586 0.0626*** 0.05281 0.0613*** 0.0503 
  (0.0763) (0.0517) (0.0726) (0.0552) (0.0243) (0.0513) (0.0227) (0.0576) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0393 0.0260 -0.0196 0.0644 -0.0392 0.0249 -0.0193 0.0628 
  (0.0616) (0.0812) (0.0620) (0.0878) (0.0616) (0.0803) (0.0619) (0.0870) 
Age  0.0531 0.0880* 0.0366 0.0846* 0.0532 0.0875* 0.0364 0.0849* 
  (0.0464) (0.0455) (0.0483) (0.0490) (0.0464) (0.0456) (0.0484) (0.0488) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0010* -0.0009 -0.0010* -0.0011 -0.0010* -0.0009 -0.0010* 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0175 0.0157 0.0236 0.0257 0.0176 0.0154 0.0236 0.0249 
  (0.0712) (0.0759) (0.0716) (0.0814) (0.0713) (0.0756) (0.0716) (0.0813) 
  Upper middle school 0.0090 0.0402 0.0396 0.0276 0.0095 0.0419 0.0404 0.0288 
  (0.0785) (0.0846) (0.0780) (0.0922) (0.0785) (0.0852) (0.0778) (0.0933) 
  College or more 0.0513 0.2332** 0.0297 0.2449** 0.0517 0.2357** 0.0300 0.2488** 
  (0.0886) (0.1060) (0.0896) (0.1114) (0.0886) (0.1049) (0.0895) (0.1126) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.2062*** 0.2824*** -0.2258*** 0.2813*** -0.2069*** 0.2847*** -0.2253*** 0.2825*** 
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  (0.0545) (0.0490) (0.0803) (0.0415) (0.0545) (0.0469) (0.0603) (0.0417) 
Ethnic minority  -0.1027 0.0085 -0.0741 0.0001 -0.1038 0.0055 -0.0759 0.0028 
  (0.0736) (0.1124) (0.0814) (0.0947) (0.0740) (0.1152) (0.0815) (0.0984) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0806** 0.0530* 0.1195** 0.0508* 0.0805** 0.0544* 0.1196** 0.0508* 
  (0.0381) (0.0295) (0.0494) (0.0294) (0.0382) (0.0278) (0.0494) (0.0292) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1659*** 0.0697** 0.1056** 0.0612** 0.1656*** 0.0618** 0.1048** 0.0601** 
  (0.0493) (0.0314) (0.0517) (0.0306) (0.0495) (0.0308) (0.0520) (0.0296) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0143 -0.0266 -0.0145 -0.0301 0.0138 -0.0281 -0.0154 -0.0304 
  (0.0557) (0.0537) (0.0556) (0.0653) (0.0559) (0.0545) (0.0556) (0.0662) 
Age of youngest child -0.0127 0.0409 -0.0076 0.0403 -0.0129 0.0402 -0.0080 0.0402 
  (0.0139) (0.0276) (0.0139) (0.0259) (0.0140) (0.0265) (0.0139) (0.0258) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0126 0.0424 -0.0037 0.0543 0.0128 0.0439 -0.0034 0.0555 
  (0.0434) (0.0634) (0.0446) (0.0540) (0.0433) (0.0639) (0.0445) (0.0549) 
Women's annual income 0.0215 0.2094*** 0.0019 0.2164*** 0.0237 0.2072*** 0.0058 0.2133*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0281) (0.0329) (0.0323) (0.0358) (0.0325) (0.0358) (0.0365) 
Women's other income 0.0357*** -0.0271 0.0333*** -0.0285 0.0356*** -0.0273 0.0332*** -0.0285 
  (0.0083) (0.0140) (0.0085) (0.0128) (0.0084) (0.0136) (0.0086) (0.0126) 
Husband's annual income  
    
-0.0031 -0.0822**
* 
-0.0067 -0.0895**
*       (0.0258) (0.0291) (0.0252) (0.0266) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 37.65 / 38.99 / 37.32 / 39.01 / 
Wald test of endogeneity (p value in bracket) 3.86 (0.0235) 6.67 (0.0136) 2.98 (0.0345) 5.49 (0.0201) 
Observations 1170 1170 1170 1170 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 9 Robustness check, Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – 2SLS estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.3673*** 
 
0.3812*** 
 
0.3615*** 
 
0.3889*** 
  
 
(0.1230) 
 
(0.1257) 
 
(0.1255) 
 
(0.1294) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.2801*** 
 
0.2808*** 
 
0.2861*** 
 
0.2832*** 
   (0.0756) 
 
(0.0747) 
 
(0.0786) 
 
(0.0762) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0820 -0.2162**
* 
0.0846 -0.2201**
* 
0.0969 -0.2383**
* 
0.0980 -0.2365**
*   (0.0680) (0.0518) (0.0678) (0.0520) (0.0677) (0.0579) (0.0682) (0.0588) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0222 0.0522 0.0293 0.0568 0.0218 0.0538 0.0272 0.0573 
  (0.0639) (0.0394) (0.0609) (0.0433) (0.0640) (0.0402) (0.0581) (0.0430) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0971** 0.0525 -0.0878* 0.0432 -0.0973** 0.0501 -0.0909* 0.0422 
  (0.0489) (0.0708) (0.0486) (0.0846) (0.0490) (0.0694) (0.0496) (0.0795) 
Age  -0.0447 0.0826** 0.0319 -0.0884** 0.0446 0.0899** 0.0195 -0.0843* 
  (0.0380) (0.0405) (0.0395) (0.0434) (0.0380) (0.0491) (0.0393) (0.0508) 
Age square 0.0010 -0.0020** 0.0008 -0.0020** -0.0010 -0.0010** -0.0006 -0.0010** 
  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0417 0.0075 0.0691 -0.0261 0.0418 0.0083 0.0625 -0.0075 
  (0.0586) (0.0798) (0.0578) (0.0940) (0.0586) (0.0775) (0.0568) (0.0835) 
  Upper middle school 0.0126 0.0873* 0.0519 0.0836* 0.0123 0.0897* 0.0511 0.0823* 
  (0.0630) (0.0525) (0.0631) (0.0517) (0.0630) (0.0522) (0.0620) (0.0507) 
  College or more -0.0065 0.2077*** -0.0216 0.2516*** -0.0071 0.1817** -0.0124 0.2304** 
  (0.0673) (0.0773) (0.0670) (0.0990) (0.0673) (0.0780) (0.0658) (0.0894) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1955*** 0.1653*** -0.1770*** 0.1854** -0.1898*** 0.1649*** -0.1779*** 0.1827*** 
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  (0.0410) (0.0432) (0.0557) (0.0555) (0.0409) (0.0444) (0.0733) (0.0598) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0927 -0.0042 -0.0391 -0.0203 -0.0914 -0.0077 -0.0484 -0.0138 
  (0.0588) (0.0785) (0.0637) (0.0845) (0.0591) (0.0769) (0.0632) (0.0793) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0788** 0.0528*** 0.0887** 0.0584*** 0.0798* 0.0553*** 0.0857** 0.0622*** 
  (0.0389) (0.0182) (0.0397) (0.0183) (0.0389) (0.0198) (0.0398) (0.0200) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1263*** 0.0646 0.0930** 0.0629 0.1267*** 0.0614 0.1251*** 0.0641 
  (0.0396) (0.0530) (0.0414) (0.0510) (0.0397) (0.0511) (0.0411) (0.0509) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0314 -0.0263 0.0129 -0.0361 0.0322 -0.0304 0.0166 -0.0445 
  (0.0412) (0.0499) (0.0411) (0.0547) (0.0412) (0.0487) (0.0400) (0.0493) 
Age of youngest child -0.0149 0.0565*** -0.0125 0.0580*** -0.0146 0.0541*** -0.0097 0.0504*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0139) (0.0103) (0.0156) (0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0135) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0120 0.0475 -0.0167 0.0433 -0.0121 0.0473 -0.0191 0.0450 
  (0.0323) (0.0396) (0.0323) (0.0454) (0.0323) (0.0386) (0.0321) (0.0416) 
Women's annual wage  0.0292 0.1022*** 0.0091 0.1058*** 0.0253 0.1039*** -0.0138 0.1211*** 
  (0.0218) (0.0263) (0.0225) (0.0291) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0301) 
Women's other income 0.0305*** -0.0693**
* 
0.0272*** -0.0632**
* 
0.0305*** -0.0683**
* 
0.0270*** -0.0696**
*   (0.0051) (0.0160) (0.0052) (0.0199) (0.0051) (0.0156) (0.0052) (0.0170) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0057 -0.0469** 0.0108 -0.0351* 
  
    
(0.0206) (0.0226) (0.0207) (0.0216) 
Constant -0.6096 0.9100 -0.2272 0.4956 -0.6282 1.0045 0.3687 -0.3373 
  (0.6271) (0.7797) (0.6629) (0.8934) (0.6332) (0.7617) (0.6883) (0.8966) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 25.26 / 18.91 / 25.95 / 19.21 / 
Observations 838 838 838 838 
R-squared 0.185 0.201 0.190 0.210 0.186 0.215 0.191 0.220 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 10 Robustness check, Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation – IV-probit estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.3612*** 
 
0.3517*** 
 
0.3655*** 
 
0.3585*** 
  
 
(0.0865) 
 
(0.0854) 
 
(0.0886) 
 
(0.0878) 
Instrument-availability and capability of grandparents 0.2811*** 
 
0.2709*** 
 
0.2967*** 
 
0.2823*** 
   (0.0566) 
 
(0.0547) 
 
(0.0589) 
 
(0.0558) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0820 -0.2655**
* 
0.0846 -0.2622**
* 
0.0969 -0.2700**
* 
0.0980 -0.2655**
*   (0.0680) (0.0767) (0.0678) (0.0751) (0.0677) (0.0791) (0.0682) (0.0773) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0222 0.0533 0.0293 0.0523 0.0218 0.0559 0.0272 0.0543 
  (0.0639) (0.0404) (0.0609) (0.0412) (0.0640) (0.0408) (0.0581) (0.0414) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0971** 0.0324 -0.0878* 0.0397 -0.0973** 0.0343 -0.0909* 0.0398 
  (0.0489) (0.0333) (0.0486) (0.0527) (0.0490) (0.0372) (0.0496) (0.0523) 
Age  -0.0447 0.0778** 0.0319 0.0732** 0.0446 0.0866** 0.0195 0.0733** 
  (0.0380) (0.0343) (0.0395) (0.0363) (0.0380) (0.0342) (0.0393) (0.0362) 
Age square 0.0010 0.0007*** 0.0008 -0.0003** -0.0010 -0.0007** -0.0006 -0.0006** 
  (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0417 0.0012 0.0691 -0.0025 0.0418 0.0004 0.0625 -0.0043 
  (0.0586) (0.0532) (0.0578) (0.0549) (0.0586) (0.0526) (0.0568) (0.0545) 
  Upper middle school 0.0126 0.0670* 0.0519 0.0599* 0.0123 0.0698* 0.0511 0.0601* 
  (0.0630) (0.0351) (0.0631) (0.0313) (0.0630) (0.0362) (0.0620) (0.0321) 
  College or more -0.0065 0.1778*** -0.0216 0.1881*** -0.0071 0.1728*** -0.0124 0.1879*** 
  (0.0673) (0.0610) (0.0670) (0.0642) (0.0673) (0.0575) (0.0658) (0.0638) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1955*** 0.1429*** -0.1770*** 0.1432*** -0.1898*** 0.1516*** -0.1779*** 0.1517*** 
 223 
 
  (0.0410) (0.0300) (0.0557) (0.0387) (0.0409) (0.0311) (0.0733) (0.0390) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0927 0.0075 -0.0391 -0.0058 -0.0914 0.0015 -0.0484 -0.0073 
  (0.0588) (0.0530) (0.0637) (0.0561) (0.0591) (0.0538) (0.0632) (0.0564) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0688* 0.0342* 0.0887** 0.0359* 0.0688* 0.0358* 0.0757* 0.0369* 
  (0.0389) (0.0196) (0.0397) (0.0204) (0.0389) (0.0196) (0.0398) (0.0209) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1263*** 0.0605 0.0930** 0.0609 0.1267*** 0.0608 0.1251*** 0.0609 
  (0.0396) (0.0424) (0.0414) (0.0424) (0.0397) (0.0426) (0.0411) (0.0421) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0314 -0.0162 0.0129 -0.0323 0.0322 -0.0207 0.0166 -0.0341 
  (0.0412) (0.0373) (0.0411) (0.0381) (0.0412) (0.0375) (0.0400) (0.0384) 
Age of youngest child -0.0149 0.0434*** -0.0125 0.0385*** -0.0146 0.0426*** -0.0097 0.0383*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0106) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0120 0.0378 -0.0167 0.0380 -0.0121 0.0394 -0.0191 0.0385 
  (0.0323) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0291) (0.0321) (0.0292) 
Women's annual wage 0.0292 0.1238*** 0.0091 0.1253*** 0.0253 0.1003*** -0.0138 0.1052*** 
  (0.0218) (0.0183) (0.0225) (0.0208) (0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0265) (0.0210) 
Women's other income 0.0305*** -0.0636**
* 
0.0272*** -0.0829**
* 
0.0305*** -0.0634**
* 
0.0270*** -0.0729**
*   (0.0051) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0185) (0.0051) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0085) 
Husband's annual income 
    
0.0057 -0.0424** 0.0108 -0.0556**
*   
    
(0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0207) (0.0199) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 25.26 / 18.91 / 25.95 / 19.21 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 8.80 (0.003) 7.58 (0.006) 7.26 (0.007) 6.89 (0.009) 
Observations 838 838 838 838 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 11 Over-control check, effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation, instrument of grandmothers 
being alive – 2SLS estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent's 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.4749** 
 
0.5411** 
 
0.4856** 
 
0.5600** 
  
 
(0.2111) 
 
(0.2515) 
 
(0.2120) 
 
(0.2529) 
Instrument- grandparents alive 0.4055*** 
 
0.4089*** 
 
0.3988*** 
 
0.3985*** 
   (0.0700) 
 
(0.0850) 
 
(0.0750) 
 
(0.0899) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0915 -0.3004*** 0.0880 -0.3072** 0.0931 -0.3134*** 0.0887 -0.3145** 
  (0.0683) (0.1147) (0.0655) (0.1036) (0.0681) (0.1188) (0.0656) (0.1057) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0270 0.1772 0.0342 0.2518 0.0307 0.1929 0.0352 0.2610 
  (0.0642) (0.1204) (0.0607) (0.1756) (0.0641) (0.1239) (0.0609) (0.1773) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0839* 0.0900 -0.0529 0.0672 -0.0844* 0.0982 -0.0534 0.0728 
  (0.0480) (0.0723) (0.0478) (0.1218) (0.0482) (0.0756) (0.0479) (0.1230) 
Age  -0.0507 0.0556** -0.0269 0.0511** -0.0509 0.0603** -0.0272 0.0614** 
  (0.0386) (0.0251) (0.0401) (0.0240) (0.0386) (0.0253) (0.0402) (0.2508) 
Age square 0.0011** -0.0015* 0.0011** -0.0015* 0.0011** -0.0015* 0.0011** -0.0015* 
  (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0655 0.0698 0.0659 0.0626 0.0661 0.0774 0.0662 0.0727 
  (0.0579) (0.1177) (0.0561) (0.1144) (0.0579) (0.1218) (0.0562) (0.1162) 
  Upper middle school 0.0884 0.0576 0.0865 0.0512 0.0379 0.0566 0.0865 0.0533 
  (0.0627) (0.1182) (0.0619) (0.1199) (0.0626) (0.1219) (0.0619) (0.1214) 
  College or more 0.0061 0.3714*** 0.0299 0.3290*** 0.0059 0.3717*** 0.0302 0.3258*** 
  (0.0677) (0.1199) (0.0661) (0.1139) (0.0679) (0.1243) (0.0662) (0.1158) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1891*** 0.4183*** -0.0243 0.3994*** -0.1834*** 0.4117*** -0.0238 0.3956*** 
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  (0.0404) (0.0856) (0.0723) (0.0995) (0.0409) (0.0887) (0.0723) (0.1006) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0617 -0.0581 -0.0200 -0.0423 -0.0559 -0.0415 -0.0190 -0.0338 
  (0.0582) (0.0986) (0.0628) (0.1615) (0.0587) (0.1032) (0.0631) (0.1636) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0632* 0.0654 0.1126*** 0.0748 0.0631* 0.0500 0.1123*** 0.0741 
  (0.0383) (0.0641) (0.0391) (0.1440) (0.0383) (0.0667) (0.0392) (0.1448) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1144*** 0.1793** 0.0618 0.1500 0.1167*** 0.1968** 0.0627 -0.1587 
  (0.0390) (0.0759) (0.0406) (0.1189) (0.0391) (0.0803) (0.0408) (0.1208) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0189 -0.0396 0.0022 -0.0315 0.0207 -0.0476 -0.0018 -0.0349 
  (0.0403) (0.0694) (0.0393) (0.1028) (0.0401) (0.0721) (0.0392) (0.1033) 
Age of youngest child 0.0011 0.0086 0.0029 0.0031 0.0015 0.0072 0.0030 0.0021 
  (0.0168) (0.0290) (0.0168) (0.0446) (0.0168) (0.0300) (0.0168) (0.0450) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0296 0.0656 0.0378 0.0657 0.0307 0.0722 0.0380 0.0788 
  (0.0321) (0.0567) (0.0319) (0.0563) (0.0321) (0.0592) (0.0319) (0.0975) 
Women's annual wage  0.0333 0.0971*** 0.0124 0.0901*** 0.0212 0.0949** 0.0152 0.0941** 
  (0.0212) (0.0369) (0.0235) (0.0338) (0.0252) (0.0407) (0.0256) (0.0369) 
Women's other income 0.0324*** -0.0393** 0.0290*** -0.0670** 0.0327*** -0.0428*** 0.0290*** -0.0683** 
  (0.0050) (0.0155) (0.0052) (0.0326) (0.0051) (0.0165) (0.0052) (0.0331) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0179 -0.0664*** 0.0054 -0.0649*** 
  
    
(0.0198) (0.0156) (0.0192) (0.0116) 
Constant -1.0047 1.2810 -0.0445 -0.8453 -1.0621 1.5730 -0.0769 -0.5758 
  (0.6579) (1.0176) (0.7173) (1.8418) (0.6628) (1.0646) (0.7308) (1.8749) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 7.02 / 6.52 / 6.89 / 6.02 / 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
R-squared 0.279 0.154 0.262 0.149 0.261 0.146 0.250 0.144 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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 Table 5. 12 Over-control check, effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation, instrument of grandmothers 
being alive – IV-probit estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparent'
s childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparent's childcare 
 
0.4506*** 
 
0.4535*** 
 
0.4861*** 
 
0.4857*** 
  
 
(0.0616) 
 
(0.0623) 
 
(0.0615) 
 
(0.0624) 
Instrument- grandparents alive 0.4059*** 
 
0.4056*** 
 
0.3897*** 
 
0.3895*** 
   (0.0705) 
 
(0.0715) 
 
(0.0722) 
 
(0.0734) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0915 -0.1932**
* 
0.0880 -0.2518**
* 
0.0931 -0.2115**
* 
0.0887 -0.2603**
*   (0.0683) (0.0496) (0.0655) (0.0513) (0.0681) (0.0503) (0.0656) (0.0520) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0270 0.0901 0.0342 0.0958 0.0307 0.0923 0.0352 0.0901 
  (0.0642) (0.0946) (0.0607) (0.0980) (0.0641) (0.0968) (0.0609) (0.0997) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0839* 0.0419 -0.0529 0.0501 -0.0844* 0.0458 -0.0534 0.0519 
  (0.0480) (0.0376) (0.0478) (0.0411) (0.0482) (0.0402) (0.0479) (0.0420) 
Age  -0.0507 0.0831*** -0.0269 0.0855*** -0.0509 0.0849*** -0.0272 0.0828*** 
  (0.0386) (0.0291) (0.0401) (0.0300) (0.0386) (0.0289) (0.0402) (0.0278) 
Age square 0.0011** -0.0009** 0.0011** -0.0009** 0.0011** -0.0009** 0.0011** -0.0009** 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Education categories 
          Base case: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0655 0.0297 0.0659 0.0258 0.0661 0.0305 0.0662 0.0264 
  (0.0579) (0.0427) (0.0561) (0.0415) (0.0579) (0.0446) (0.0562) (0.0434) 
  Upper middle school 0.0884 0.0930* 0.0865 0.0915* 0.0379 0.0948* 0.0865 0.0925* 
  (0.0627) (0.0483) (0.0619) (0.0494) (0.0626) (0.0479) (0.0619) (0.0485) 
  College or more 0.0061 0.2066*** 0.0299 0.1855*** 0.0059 0.1956*** 0.0302 0.1848*** 
  (0.0677) (0.0546) (0.0661) (0.0535) (0.0679) (0.0545) (0.0662) (0.0546) 
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Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1891*** 0.3247*** -0.0243 0.3356*** -0.1834*** 0.3158*** -0.0238 0.3105*** 
  (0.0404) (0.0332) (0.0723) (0.0318) (0.0409) (0.0325) (0.0723) (0.0319) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0617 -0.0287 -0.0200 -0.0256 -0.0559 -0.0269 -0.0190 -0.0235 
  (0.0582) (0.0421) (0.0628) (0.0418) (0.0587) (0.0425) (0.0631) (0.0420) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0632* 0.0512* 0.1126*** 0.0568* 0.0631* 0.0535* 0.1123*** 0.0579* 
  (0.0383) (0.0294) (0.0391) (0.0311) (0.0383) (0.0300) (0.0392) (0.0316) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1144*** 0.1275*** 0.0618 0.1045*** 0.1167*** 0.1135*** 0.0627 0.1011*** 
  (0.0390) (0.0324) (0.0406) (0.0284) (0.0391) (0.0315) (0.0408) (0.0279) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0189 -0.0054 0.0022 -0.0065 0.0207 -0.0058 -0.0018 -0.0069 
  (0.0403) (0.0309) (0.0393) (0.0324) (0.0401) (0.0315) (0.0392) (0.0330) 
Age of youngest child 0.0011 0.0135 0.0029 0.0256 0.0015 0.0156 0.0030 0.0279 
  (0.0168) (0.0130) (0.0168) (0.0189) (0.0168) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0195) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0296 0.0172 0.0378 0.0246 0.0307 0.0195 0.0380 0.0259 
  (0.0321) (0.0254) (0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0321) (0.0267) (0.0319) (0.0319) 
Women's annual wage 0.0333 0.0985*** 0.0124 0.1005*** 0.0212 0.0947*** 0.0152 0.1021*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0144) (0.0235) (0.0195) (0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0256) (0.0205) 
Women's other income 0.0324*** -0.0600**
* 
0.0290*** -0.0695**
* 
0.0327*** -0.0632**
* 
0.0290*** -0.0724**
*   (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0055) 
Husband's annual income 
    
0.0179 -0.0584**
* 
0.0054 -0.0559**
*   
    
(0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0164) 
County effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
F-test on instrument 6.93 / 5.88 / 6.90 / 5.80 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 6.23 (0.036) 6.58 (0.038) 6.39 (0.037) 6.64 (0.040) 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 13 Over-control check, effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation, instrument of grandparents’ 
health condition – 2SLS estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparents' childcare 
 
0.2774* 
 
0.3419* 
 
0.2900* 
 
0.3475* 
  
(0.1584) 
 
(0.1865) 
 
(0.1685) 
 
(0.1934) 
Instrument - grandparents' health condition 0.2616*** 
 
0.2520*** 
 
0.2615*** 
 
0.2548*** 
 
 
(0.0857) 
 
(0.0834) 
 
(0.0857) 
 
(0.0839) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0167 -0.2228*** 0.0128 -0.2390*** 0.0167 -0.2271*** 0.0125 -0.2399*** 
 
(0.0497) (0.0551) (0.0482) (0.0781) (0.0498) (0.0601) (0.0481) (0.0802) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0784* 0.1180 -0.0608 0.1233 -0.0784* 0.1240 -0.0613 0.1260 
 
(0.0442) (0.0904) (0.0436) (0.1333) (0.0443) (0.0993) (0.0436) (0.1330) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1410*** 0.0837 -0.0983*** 0.0980 -0.1410*** 0.0986 -0.0983*** 0.1040 
 
(0.0289) (0.1400) (0.0294) (0.184) (0.0291) (0.1540) (0.0294) (0.1820) 
Age  0.0330 0.0498** 0.0144 -0.00326 0.0330 -0.0227 0.0143 -0.0041 
 
(0.0248) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0466) (0.0248) (0.0450) (0.0253) (0.0473) 
Age square -0.0008** 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0008** 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0006 
 
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
Education categories 
          Basecase: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0206 -0.0824 0.0293 -0.1030 0.0206 -0.0849 0.0207 -0.1040 
 
(0.0268) (0.0570) (0.0263) (0.1010) (0.0269) (0.0624) (0.0263) (0.1020) 
  Upper middle school 0.0403 -0.0564 0.0391 -0.1130 0.0403 -0.0605 0.0411 -0.1160 
 
(0.0392) (0.0873) (0.0387) (0.1750) (0.0392) (0.0958) (0.0388) (0.1760) 
  College or more 0.0548 0.3830*** 0.0362 0.3964*** 0.0548 0.3822*** 0.0376 0.3958*** 
 
(0.0455) (0.0709) (0.0459) (0.0967) (0.0455) (0.0775) (0.0458) (0.0993) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1480*** 0.3920*** -0.1553*** 0.4112*** -0.1480*** 0.4050*** -0.1526*** 0.4108*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.1480) (0.0364) (0.1558) (0.0245) (0.1620) (0.0365) (0.1575) 
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Ethnic minority 0.0235 -0.0031 0.0522 -0.0579 0.0235 -0.0101 0.0520 -0.0611 
 
(0.0356) (0.0409) (0.0404) (0.113) (0.0356) (0.0454) (0.0403) (0.1130) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0773*** -0.0963 0.1000*** -0.1960 0.0773*** -0.1040 0.1010*** -0.2010 
 
(0.0292) (0.0837) (0.0293) (0.1940) (0.0292) (0.0918) (0.0293) (0.1930) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1080*** -0.1100 0.0614** -0.1040 0.1080*** -0.1250 0.0606** -0.1090 
 (0.0301) (0.1100) (0.0301) (0.122) (0.0301) (0.122) (0.0301) (0.1190) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0344 -0.0132 0.0218 -0.0338 0.0344 -0.0201 0.0212 -0.0356 
 
(0.0297) (0.0475) (0.0290) (0.0630) (0.0297) (0.0523) (0.0290) (0.0630) 
Age of youngest child 0.0021 0.0167 0.0016 0.0134 0.0020 0.0156 0.0012 0.0129 
 
(0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0177) (0.0113) (0.0132) (0.0110) (0.0181) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0353 0.0524 -0.0420* 0.0814 -0.0353 0.0572 -0.0419* 0.0838 
 
(0.0223) (0.0415) (0.0218) (0.0841) (0.0223) (0.0454) (0.0218) (0.0831) 
Women's annual wage 0.0138 0.0935*** -0.0083 0.0905*** 0.0137 0.0993*** -0.0030 0.0947*** 
 
(0.0117) (0.0182) (0.0124) (0.0236) (0.0141) (0.0205) (0.0143) (0.0223) 
Women's other income 0.0348*** -0.0373*** 0.0314*** -0.0352** 0.0348*** -0.0419** 0.0314*** -0.0430** 
 
(0.0047) (0.0148) (0.0045) (0.0193) (0.0047) (0.0183) (0.0045) (0.0182) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0001 -0.0450*** -0.0096 -0.0499*** 
     
(0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0155) 
Constant -0.1400 0.0658** 0.4724 -0.1033 -0.140 1.149** 0.520 -0.0798 
 
(0.4212) (0.4722) (0.4400) (0.0343) (0.423) (0.515) (0.443) (1.101) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 8.68 / 9.38 / 7.20 / 8.76 / 
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
R-squared 0.206 0.112 0.258 0.135 0.206 0.120 0.258 0.139 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Instrument used here is a dummy variable indicating both grandparents are in good health condition. 
   Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
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Table 5. 14 Over-control check, effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation, instrument of grandparents’ 
health condition – IV-probit estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
grandparents' 
childcare 
mother's 
LFP 
Grandparents' childcare 
 
0.3384* 
 
0.3287* 
 
0.3386* 
 
0.3278* 
  
 
(0.1802) 
 
(0.1834) 
 
(0.1777) 
 
(0.1822) 
Instrument - grandparents' health condition 0.2616*** 
 
0.2520*** 
 
0.2615*** 
 
0.2548*** 
   (0.0853) 
 
(0.0825) 
 
(0.0852) 
 
(0.0829) 
 Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0167 -0.2194*** 0.0128 -0.2351*** 0.0167 -0.2232*** 0.0125 -0.2369*** 
  (0.0495) (0.0406) (0.0476) (0.0393) (0.0495) (0.0403) (0.0476) (0.0390) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0784* 0.0380 -0.0608 0.0089 -0.0784* 0.0339 -0.0613 0.0070 
  (0.0439) (0.0394) (0.0431) (0.0315) (0.0440) (0.0373) (0.0431) (0.0311) 
Having children age between 7-16 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1410*** -0.0211 -0.0983*** -0.0263 -0.1410*** -0.0237 -0.0983*** -0.0264 
  (0.0288) (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0208) (0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0291) (0.0209) 
Age  0.0330 0.0069 0.0144 0.0203 0.0330 0.0078 0.0143 0.0204 
  (0.0247) (0.0188) (0.0250) (0.0187) (0.0247) (0.0184) (0.0250) (0.0185) 
Age square -0.0008** 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0008** 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
          Basecase: primary school or less 
          Lower middle school 0.0206 -0.0420 0.0293 -0.0336 0.0206 -0.0394 0.0207 -0.0313 
  (0.0267) (0.0285) (0.0260) (0.0244) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0260) (0.0237) 
  Upper middle school 0.0403 0.0121 0.0491 0.0234 0.0403 0.0173 0.0411 0.0279 
  (0.0390) (0.0312) (0.0383) (0.0294) (0.0390) (0.0303) (0.0384) (0.0295) 
  College or more 0.0548 0.3128*** 0.0362 0.3148*** 0.0548 0.3134*** 0.0376 0.151*** 
  (0.0452) (0.0441) (0.0453) (0.0517) (0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0453) (0.0520) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) -0.1480*** 0.0873* -0.1532*** 0.0785** -0.1480*** 0.0818* 0.0053 0.0762** 
  (0.0242) (0.0442) (0.0360) (0.0315) (0.0244) (0.0491) (0.0361) (0.0314) 
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Ethnic minority 0.0235 0.0174 0.0522 0.0181 0.0235 0.0164 0.0520 0.0185 
  (0.0354) (0.0249) (0.0399) (0.0276) (0.0354) (0.0250) (0.0399) (0.0277) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0773*** -0.0372 0.1000*** -0.0567 0.0773*** -0.0361 0.1010*** -0.0541 
  (0.0290) (0.0330) (0.0290) (0.0352) (0.0290) (0.0312) (0.0290) (0.0335) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1080*** -0.0185 0.0614** -0.0073 0.1080*** -0.0192 0.0606** -0.00783 
  (0.0299) (0.0328) (0.0298) (0.0231) (0.0299) (0.0309) (0.0298) (0.0228) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0344 0.0123 0.0218 -0.0057 0.0344 0.0097 0.0212 -0.00717 
  (0.0295) (0.0210) (0.0287) (0.0208) (0.0296) (0.0211) (0.0287) (0.0208) 
Age of youngest child 0.0021 0.0163* 0.0016 0.0162* 0.0001 0.0151 0.0012 0.0152* 
  (0.0113) (0.0096) (0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0109) (0.00891) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0353 0.0298 -0.0320 0.0265 -0.0353 0.0310 -0.0319 0.0275 
  (0.0222) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0195) (0.0222) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0192) 
Women's annual wage 0.0138 0.0902*** -0.0083 0.0896*** 0.0137 0.0924*** -0.0030 0.0846*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0176) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0095) 
Women's other income 0.0348*** -0.0551*** 0.0314*** -0.0550*** 0.0348*** -0.0447*** 0.0314*** -0.0470*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.00445) (0.0036) 
Husband's income 
    
0.0031 -0.0353** -0.00964 -0.0346** 
  
    
(0.0120) (0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0097) 
Constant -0.1400 -1.0894 0.4720 -0.8640*** -0.1400 -0.8300*** 0.5203 -0.8640*** 
  (0.4219) (1.0572) (0.4350) (0.0130) (0.4200) (0.0117) (0.4381) (0.0130) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
F-statistics on instrument 8.68 / 9.38 / 7.20 / 8.76 / 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 2.86  (0.037) 2.70 (0.046) 3.25 (0.033) 3.10 (0.038) 
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 1,651 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   Instrument used here is a dummy variable indicating both grandparents are in good health condition. 
   Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB. Women's other income and husband's income take logged value, in RMB. 
  
  
6. Maternal employment and children’s health development 
in rural China 
6.1 Introduction  
Halving the proportion of people suffering from hunger between 1990 and 2015 is 
one of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. Up until 2013, the 
proportion of underweight children under the age of five in developing countries has 
declined from 28% in 1990 to 17%
54
. China, according to the first Chinese Child 
(aged 0-6) Nutrition Report (2012), has achieved this goal and its proportion of 
underweight children under the age of five was 3.6% in 2010, far below the 
international level. 
Another indicator described in the Chinese Child (aged 0-6) Nutrition Report (2012) 
is the stunted growth of children, which is measured by the children’s height. The 
overall rate of stunted growth in China in 2010 was 9.9%, which is 70% lower than it 
was in 1990. Nevertheless, the report mentioned the large gap in the nutrition status 
between children living in urban and in rural areas. The proportion of underweight 
children in rural areas is two to three times higher than it is in urban areas, and the 
ratio doubles in impoverished rural areas. 
Child nutrition in rural China has attracted much attention since it has been shown 
that children who experience poor health are more likely to have lower educational 
attainment, poorer health, and lower earning capacity in middle age ( Currie & 
                                                     
54
 Data source: World Health Organisation http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs290/en/ 
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Stabile, 2003; Currie, 2009). One group of children – ‘left-behind children’55 – is of 
particular interest. Various studies have made an effort to investigate how ‘left-behind 
children’ are affected by the absence of their parents, including research on physical 
health, mental health, time allocation and school attendance (Chang et al., 2011; He et 
al., 2012; F. Hu, 2012; Q. Li, Liu, & Zang, 2015; Mu & De Brauw, 2015; H. Zhang, 
Behrman, Fan, Wei, & Zhang, 2014; Zhao, Yu, Wang, & Glauben, 2014). In 
generally, left-behind children are more vulnerable in many aspects than are their 
peers who are living with parents.  
Children who live with parents (one or both parents) in rural China, however, have 
received less attention. despite the fact that children in rural areas are more 
disadvantaged in terms of health development, few works have attempted to explore 
the possible mechanisms to improve rural children’s nutrition and health status (Liu, 
2008; Mangyo, 2008; Zhang, 2012). Maternal employment is one of the possible 
mechanisms that can influence children’s health development, either positively or 
negatively. The positive effect of maternal employment on children’s health 
development stems mainly from the income effect. With a greater chance of 
participating in a paid job, particularly in off-farm work, mothers can increase the 
total household income and then further increase the proportion of income allocated to 
children’s nutritional intake and health costs (Thomas, 1990). On the other hand, the 
negative effect stems mainly from a decrease in the mothers’ supervision time and/or 
food preparation time, which can change the children’s nutritional intake or eating 
                                                     
55
 ‘Left-behind children’ are defined as children whose parents are both seeking jobs outside the 
hometown. 
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patterns. Other possible mechanisms in China, as stated in the Chinese Child (aged 
0-6) Nutrition Report (2012), may also include implementing government 
anti-poverty projects, improving mothers’ education levels and perfecting the health 
care system. 
In this study, children aged 0-10 in rural china are the research targets, and how 
maternal employment, in other words mothers taking off-farm work, influences 
children’s health development. Two indices are employed, the weight-to-age Z score 
(WAZ) and the height-to-age Z score (HAZ), to measure children’s health status in 
the short term and in the long term, respectively. Children whose WAZ and/or HAZ 
measurements fall below -2 are considered underweight and/or stunted. The rational 
of using this cut-off value is the statistical definition of the central 95% of a 
distribution as the “normal” range, assuming the outcomes are approximately 
normally distributed.  
When modelling the relationship between maternal employment and children’s health 
development, one key issue is that maternal employment can be endogenous. The 
reasons are twofold. Firstly, maternal employment and children’s health development 
can simultaneously influence each other. For example, a seriously ill or disabled child 
in the household will reduce the mothers’ labour supply, as childcare for such child is 
more intensive than is normal care. Secondly, there are some factors cannot be 
controlled but which influence maternal labour supply, such as the attitude towards 
taking on off-farm work. Women in rural china are generally less educated, and even 
more so in impoverished rural areas; therefore, less-educated mothers may feel 
hesitant to take on off-farm work when the work requires some skill. At the same 
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time, mothers’ negative attitude towards off-farm work may also be accompanied by 
negative attitudes towards nutrition or diet arrangements, for example, mothers in low 
income families tend to choose low nutrition food but which is cheap, and further 
influence children’s health.  
In this chapter, three different instruments are used to represent maternal employment. 
Two of them, access to bus stops and road conditions in villages, are selected from 
community level data and the last one is the age of the youngest child living in the 
family. In addition, as the mother is seen as the primary childcare provider, the direct 
consequence of mothers taking on off-farm work or changing their working patterns 
reduces childcare time and/or quality. Therefore, the effect of the mothers’ work time 
on child health development is also estimated as a sensitive test to see if there any 
difference to the results that use the mothers’ working status. Other sensitive tests, 
controlling different aspects including the parents’ BMI and household infrastructure, 
are carried out to check the consistency of the maternal employment effect. For all 
base line and sensitivity tests, OLS and 2SLS estimation results will be presented in 
the following section. 
This chapter makes two contributions to the literature. The first contribution is that 
this chapter is among the first attempts to model mothers’ employment and child 
health development in rural China. The second contribution is the instruments 
selected from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey community level data. 
Previous instruments used by Liu and Dong (2011), who also use CHNS data and 
investigated child health development in rural China, are limited to reflecting external 
conditions and personal availability for work. The instruments used in this chapter 
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capture both the external convenience when seeking jobs outside of the village and 
reflect the mothers’ personal nursing needs, which will influence the mothers’ 
availability to work. 
6.2 Literature and Methodology 
6.2.1 Maternal employment and child health 
In the literature, mothers have been stressed playing an important role in household 
productivity as well as determining household nutrition and health (Leibowitz, 1974). 
Early research focused on the relationship between mothers’ schooling and nutrition, 
child health and family health (Behrman & Wolfe, 1984, 1987), and the determinants 
of child health development (Wolfe & Behrman, 1982). Although the World Bank 
(1980) has suggested that increased education of women may be an important means 
for improvement of nutrition and health in developing countries, Behrman and Wolfe 
(1987) pointed out that the impact of mothers’ schooling on children’s health has been 
overstated when mothers’ childhood family background was added to the estimation.  
At the same time, various research has been  carried out investigating the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and health, both adult and children’s 
health, through three approaches (Haan, Kaplan, & Camacho, 1987). The first 
approach is the individual behavioural risk factors such as smoking and social 
connections (Rose & Marmot, 1981), the second one is socioeconomic factors such as 
access to medical care (Berg, Ross, & Latourette, 1977) and health insurance 
coverage and the last one is socioenvironmental risk factors such as poverty area 
residence (Haan et al., 1987). Evidence from the above studies consistently shows that 
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poor condition on each approach can increase the risk of experiencing anti-healthy 
events.  
One challenge of revealing the association between socioeconomic status and health 
is the gradient, or the mechanism that might explain the association (Adler et al., 
1994). When it is studied, socioeconomic status is usually treated as a control variable 
rather than a variable to examine because it long has been believed that higher 
economic class can increase life expectancy (Antonovsky, 1967). However, Smith 
(1999) argued that there is a dual relation between health and economic status for two 
possible reasons. One is that savings may fall as poor health condition would decrease 
the current period income and/or increase the consumption of medical care expenses, 
the other is that, as marginal utility of consumption is decreasing with poor health 
(Lillard & Weiss, 1997), individuals will tend to consume less during the periods of 
experiencing poor health. This dual relation applies to health in childhood, too. By 
combining four data sources
56
 and using chronic conditions of children
57
 to reveal 
the gradient, Case, Lubotsky and Paxson (2002) found that chronic conditions of 
children are more prevalent at lower incomes for children age under 18. 
More research can also be seen on the investigation of relationship between maternal 
employment and child health. For this relationship, a trade-off effect was first 
                                                     
56
 The four data sources are: National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the 1988 Child Health 
Supplement to the NHIS, the Panel Study of the Income Dynamics (PSID) and associated 1997 Child 
Development Supplement of PSID.  
57
 The chronic conditions the authors used include asthma, epilepsy, heart disease, hearing problem, 
bronchitis, hay fever, vision problem, digestive disorder and mental retardation.  
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suggested by Becker and Lewis (1973), who mentioned that maternal employment 
can increase the resources invested in children but decrease the parenting time.  
On one hand, maternal employment increases family income, thus having a positive 
effect on child health (Case, Lubotsky, & Paxson, 2002; Currie, Shields, & Price, 
2007; Murasko, 2008). For example, families can spent on more or better-quality food 
products and medical care, both of which are expected to produce positive health 
outcomes (McCracken & Brandt, 1987; Horton & Campbell, 1991). Furthermore, if 
mothers work and control their income, the effect of income on nutrition will be 
greater than they will from equivalent increments to the spouse’s or other household 
income, as women have stronger preferences for child welfare. Through a systematic 
literature review, Mindin and Law (2009) concluded that there is a higher tendency of 
vaccination uptake and a higher rate of overweight in children with employed mothers 
(Alio & Salihu, 2005; P. M. Anderson, Butcher, & Levine, 2003; Hawkins, Cole, 
Law, & The Millennium Cohort Study Child Health Group, 2008). In particular, using 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and matching mothers and children in the 
data, Anderson Butcher and Levine (2003) presented that percentage of children age 
3-11 being overweight is higher in groups of working mothers and the highest rate is 
observed in the group of full time working mothers.  The authors used five 
techniques to investigate the relationship including a standard probit model, three 
differencing approaches to phase out fixed effects of mothers and children, and an 
instrument approach accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Their probit estimation 
results show that a 10 hours increase in mothers’ employment will increase the 
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likelihood of being overweight by 1.2 percentage points and the more intense mothers 
work, the higher possible of being overweight for children in high income families.  
On the other hand, child health may be adversely affected by maternal employment, 
as working mothers may spend less time on certain activities related to health and 
nutrition, such as cooking and grocery shopping, and supervising children (Cawley & 
Liu, 2012; Fertig, Glomm, & Tchernis, 2009). According to Cawley & Liu (2012), 
maternal employment is associated with a substantial decrease on the time spent on 
the household activities. Using American Time Use Survey data, they found the 
working mothers spend 17 fewer minutes on cooking and 37 fewer minutes on caring 
children comparing with full-time mothers. Meanwhile, in terms of childcare, 
common substitutes for maternal care when mothers are not available are formal or 
informal childcare, such as babysitters, relatives or older children, but they may not 
guarantee the quality of care (Glick & Sahn, 1998; McGuire & Popkin, 1990).  
One feature of research on maternal employment and child health is that, as 
socioeconomic status are positively related to child health, research directions are 
different towards developed and developing countries, or high and low income 
families. Most studies on developed countries focus on the relationship between 
maternal employment and children’s diseases, injuries and obesity, while studies on 
developing countries are more concerned with children’s nutrition in low income 
families.  
For developed countries, obesity is an increasing concern as a working mother may 
raise a ‘couch potato’ child (Brown, Broom, Nicholson, & Bittman, 2010). Many 
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studies, from various countries and regions, suggest that maternal employment 
increases the childhood obesity risk as reductions in maternal time and supervision 
could lead to greater reliance on fast or less nutritious foods and less time spent on 
recreational activities (Anderson et al., 2003; Gwozdz et al., 2013; Phipps, 
Lethbridge, & Burton, 2006). A similar scenario appears in the relationship between 
maternal employment and children’s diseases. Morrill (2011) found that maternal 
employment increased the probability of adverse health events such as overnight 
hospitalisations, asthma episodes, and injuries/poisonings for children aged seven to 
17 in the United States. However, weak evidence was found for the occurrence of 
diseases. By examining Canadian mothers’ maternity leave and duration of 
breastfeeding, Baker and Milligan (2008) found that extended maternity leave 
mandates increased the duration of breastfeeding, but they did not find a consistent 
impact of breastfeeding on most of their health measures. There is evidence of 
beneficial effects on the incidence of asthma, allergies and chronic conditions, but the 
effects do not persist to older ages.  
For developing counties and low income families, child nutrition is the main concern. 
Gennetian et al. (2010) found that maternal employment decreased children’s 
probability of being in good or excellent health by a modest amount in low-income 
families by using an exogenous increase in employment induced by the National 
Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies in United States. Using survey data from 
Conakry, the capital city of Guinea, and height-to-age Z-score as health index, Glick 
and Sahn (1998) found that additional time devoted by the mother to market work was 
associated with reductions in height-for-age ratios of children under five, but an 
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increase in the mothers’ labour income led to increased child height in Guinea. Some 
other studies, however, concluded there is no connection between maternal 
employment and poorer nutritional status of children in developing countries. Leslie 
(1988) reviewed 25 studies from 16 developing countries and found no conclusive 
evidence linking maternal employment and children being under nutritional. Engle 
(1991) found no effect of maternal employment on children’s anthropometric growth 
patterns, but children taken care of by preteen siblings had significantly lower 
weight-for-height ratios in Guatemala. Lamontagne et al. (1998) showed that children 
of employed mothers were better in terms of weight/height than were those whose 
mothers were not employed, but children with inadequate alternate child care (care by 
a preteen or care at the work place) had lower height-for-age ratios in Nicaragua. 
6.2.2 Empirical research of Chinese case 
A few studies have attempted to investigate the determinants of child health in China, 
including the income gradient, parents’ education, insurance coverage, maternal 
employment and family planning policy. 
As the prevalence of overweight children in China has increased, OCP has been 
criticized as a cause of this phenomenon. Yang (2007) investigated the relationship 
between the OCP and overweight children using three waves from the CHNS data, 
1993, 1997 and 2000. The author adopted a two-step analysis strategy that the first 
step was only using wave 2000 to find the determinants of being overweight and the 
second step was using three waves to reveal the time trend of overweight risk. 
Urban-rural differences are also compared due to the fact that OCP is stricter for 
non-agricultural registration families.  Finally, the author concluded that younger 
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and urban children are at a higher risk of being overweight but there is no difference 
between children from one child families and multi-children families. 
Chen, Lei and Zhou (2010) investigated the income gradient of child health in China. 
One unique difference of their estimations to the previous studies is that the authors 
adopted an instrument approach. They argued that family income and child health are 
mutually related. Therefore exogenous sources of variation in family income are 
needed. The rural tax reform in China, began in 2000 which significantly increased 
farmers’ income but were unrelated to children’s health, was employed as instrument 
of family income. By using seven waves
58
 of CHNS data and creating height-to-age 
Z-scores as the measure of child health, the authors concluded that under instrument 
specification, family income does have a significant and positive effect on child 
health in China. 
Using the same data and the same time period, Liu and Dong (2011) modelled the 
relationship between maternal employment time, childcare substitution and child 
health in rural China. The authors also adopted an instrument estimation approaches 
and selected a few instruments from the CHNS community level data
59
. Three 
measures were created, weight-to-height, weight-to-age and height-to-age Z-scores, to 
represent child health development in short term and long term. After controlling 
family income, Liu and Dong found that both the weekly maternal working time and 
substitutions to maternal childcare had negative impacts on the three measures of 
child health. 
                                                     
58
 The seven waves are 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006. 
59
 More discussion of instruments used in Liu and Dong (2011) are presented in the next section.  
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As a consequence of relaxation on household registration system and migration, the 
number of left behind children in rural areas is continuously increasing. Mu and 
Brauw (2015) investigated parents’ migration and child health and nutrition status in 
rural China using four waves from the CHNS data
60
. Similar to Liu and Dong (2011), 
Mu and Brauw also created three measures, weight-to-age, height-to-age and 
BMI-to-age Z-scores, to represent child health development in short term and long 
term. In their study, Mu and Brauw claimed that migration is endogenous as it is 
mutually related with left-behind individuals. For example, on one hand, left-behind 
members benefit from higher income of migrators and on the other hand, poor health 
status of family members can influence adult labours’ willingness to seek higher paid 
jobs. Using wage growth rate in capital cities as instrument to migration, Mu and 
Brauw concluded that parents’ migration has a positive effect on children’s weight. 
Comparing the studies of Liu and Dong (2011) and Mu and Brauw (2015), it can be 
found that the conclusions in the two studies are contrary. Liu and Dong (2011) 
claimed increasing mothers’ working time had a negative impact on children’s health, 
while Mu and Brauw claimed the parents’ absence from families had a positive 
impact on children’s weight. However, one important feature in Mu and Brauw’s 
study is that they didn’t control childcare time. As they had three scenarios in the 
analysis – mother migrants only, father migrants only and both parents migrant – 
children will be looked after by left-behind members. Therefore, estimation results 
would be biased if childcare time is missing in the model.  
6.2.3 Endogeneity of maternal employment and instruments 
                                                     
60
 The four waves are 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006.  
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While a wide range of observed child and parent characteristics are usually controlled 
for when assessing how maternal employment affects child health, a key challenge is 
that employment is likely to be endogenous: mothers of children with health problems 
may be more likely to work in order to pay for medical costs, or to work less if their 
children need more care (Powers, 2001). 
Various instruments have been used to control for the endogeneity concerns of 
maternal employment. Anderson et al. (2003) used variations in state-level economic 
and policy contexts, such as state child care regulations, wages of child care workers, 
welfare benefit levels, the status of welfare reform in the state, and the annual 
unemployment rate in the state to identify the effect of mothers’ work hours on the 
likelihood that a child would be overweight. Baker and Milligan (2008) considered 
extended maternity leave mandates to examine the breastfeeding duration and young 
children’s health measures in Canada. Gennetian et al. (2010) addressed the issue 
using participation in an experimental welfare-to-work programme as an exogenous 
shock to maternal employment. Morrill (2011) used the child’s youngest sibling’s 
eligibility for kindergarten as an instrument to show maternal employment had 
far-reaching adverse effects on school-aged children’s health.  
Liu and Dong (2011) gave the first attempt to investigate how working mothers’ 
working hours in rural China influenced children’s health development. The 
instruments used in their research were selected from the CHNS community-level 
data and are: (i) the ratio of local service industry practitioners and its square term; (ii) 
the distance between the village and the train station; (iii) the ratio of families owning 
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televisions in the community; and (iv) the price of coal in the local market and 
household’s average area of farm land. 
6.2.4 Methodology 
In this chapter, maternal employment is treated as one of the independent variables, 
which is opposite to the previous two chapters, to see how it would influence 
children’s health development in rural China and the key equation can be written as: 
    CHealthit = β0 + β1MEit +  β2Xit +  β3Yit  +  β4Zit +  εit          (5) 
where CHealth is a binary dependent variable indicating underweight or underheight 
if it is equal to 1. Children’s weight-to-age Z-score (WAZ) and height-to-age Z-score 
(HAZ)
61
 are calculated first using reference scores
62
, and underweight and 
underheight are identified if the Z-scores are less than -2. The rational of using this 
cut-off value is the statistical definition of the central 95% of a distribution as the 
“normal” range. In particular, weight-to-age Z-score reflects children’s short term 
health status and height-to-age Z score reflects children’s long term health status (J. 
B. Anderson et al., 2009; WHO, 1997).   
The reason of using weight-to-age Z-score (WAZ) and height-to-age (HAZ) Z-score 
as measurements of children’s health status in this chapter is threefold. First, child 
anthropometric measurements have been proved as efficient tools assessing 
                                                     
61
 Z-score is calculated as Z-score = (observed value – median value of the reference population) / 
standard deviation of reference population. Source: World Health Organization.  
62
 Reference scores used in this study are from the World Health Organization.  
  WAZ: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/weight_for_age/en/ 
  HAZ: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/standards/height_for_age/en/  
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nutritional status of children both in developed and developing countries. WAZ and 
HAZ are two commonly used measures, not only because they are easy and 
inexpensive to obtain, but also because they are comparable across ages and sexes. 
Second, the new WHO child growth standards released in April 2006 provide a 
worldwide common base for data analysis as the standards were developed assuming 
all children have the same potential of growth given an optimum start of life 
regardless of birth regions. Third, estimation results from using WAZ and HAZ are 
comparable with other works as they have been widely adopted when investigating 
children’s health status (Y. Chen & Li, 2009; de Brauw & Mu, 2011; H. Liu, Fang, & 
Zhao, 2013; Mu & De Brauw, 2015).  
ME is maternal employment; therefore 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest. In particular, 
this maternal employment refers to mothers’ off farm works. Previously, discussion in 
section 4.3.1 has stated the reason of focusing on women taking paid jobs outside 
home for the estimations in chapter 4 that housewife mothers can balance their work 
and family issues such as childcare. Likewise, in this chapter, the reason of excluding 
mothers in rural areas working on farm land contains two similar concerns. The first 
one is that although mothers work on farm land, they don’t have individual income 
and the revenue of selling crops directly goes into total household income. The second 
one is that farm land working is relatively flexible that mothers can adjust their 
working time and there is no trade-off between housework, such as cooking, and paid 
work for them.   
X is a vector of a child’s characteristics, including the child’s age, gender, number of 
siblings, whether s/he is a ‘left-behind child’, whether s/he lives with grandparents 
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and the grandparents’ health condition. Y is a vector capturing household income and 
wealth, and Z is a vector for community characteristics, including ordinary annual 
wage for female workers, whether there is a market and whether there is a health 
service in the village.  
As discussed above, maternal employment is endogenous due to a simultaneous 
influence on child health, and omitted variables such as mothers’ attitudes towards 
off-farm work or children’s health. Thus, an instrument estimation approach was 
adopted. Instruments used to represent maternal employment, which are discussed 
more specifically, are two dummy variables, one indicating access to bus stop in the 
village (1=yes) and the other one indicating paved road in the village (1=yes), and a 
continuous variable indicating the age of youngest child. So, similar to chapter 5, the 
estimations in this chapter also fall into a binary dependent variable with binary 
endogenous regressor model. To deliver the consistent estimation results, 2SLS is 
used and the principle of using this technique is the same discussed in section 5.3.3. 
Besides, probit and ivprobit estimation results are presented in the appendix P-Z 
assisting the OLS and 2SLS results in the main text.  
6.2.5 Instruments 
There are three limitations to Liu and Dong (2011)’s instruments. Firstly, trains are 
not the first choice for people living in rural areas when seeking work opportunities 
outside the village; thus, the distance to the train station is not a good reflection of 
taking on off-farm work. Secondly, the ratio of families owning televisions may also 
be related to child health, as owning a television reflects household wealth and 
television programmes can increase women’s knowledge of nutrition. Thirdly, the 
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instruments in their work all involved the external environment of off-farm work, 
such as the ratio of local service industry practitioners reflecting the demand in the 
local labour market, not indicating women’s personal characteristics such as 
willingness or attitudes. 
In this chapter, I employed three different instruments, also derived from the CHNS 
community level data, considering both the external environment and personal 
situations. Two are related to public infrastructure, namely whether there is a bus stop, 
and road conditions in the village in which the woman resides. Public transport is 
particularly important in rural China, since it is the first choice for most people. Public 
transport in rural area includes buses, which link villages to towns and counties, 
coaches, which link counties and cities, and trains, which also link counties and 
cities
63
. The instrument of the bus stop has been used  in a study investigating the 
relationship between maternal employment and fertility (Fang, Eggleston, Rizzo, & 
Zeckhauser, 2013). The results showed that bus stops have proved to be a valid 
instrument for maternal employment and can increase the possibility of being 
employed by up to 10%. 
Road conditions also affect the chances of going from the village to some places that 
are more developed. It can be understood that good road conditions, such as paved 
roads, will increase the convenience and frequency of commuting between village and 
towns, counties and cities. The third instrument is the age of the youngest child in the 
family, which is an important determinant of the mother’s availability to work, 
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 Different from coach stations, as not every county has train stations due to the railway network, and 
not all trains stop at some of the country train stations, especially the express and high-speed services. 
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because the mother is normally the first childcare provider, especially during the early 
stage of childhood.  
It may be criticised that bus stops and road conditions can influence children’s health 
development because more developed rural areas are enjoying more access to bus 
stops and higher quality roads. In fact, bus stops and road construction are centrally 
planned by the government. “Village to Village” is a major programme planned by 
the central Chinese government aiming to develop new paved roads, thus improving 
the coverage of electricity, water, telephone lines and the Internet in rural China. 
Essentially, the instruments of the bus stops and road conditions take binary values 
where indicates there is a bus stop in the village or neighbourhood and that paved 
roads are ready for use in the village separately. 
6.3 Sample selection and variables 
The research object in this chapter is children in Rural China aged between 0 to 10, 
either living with or without parents in the household. The main reason for the focus 
on children of this age is that weight-to-age reference data are not available beyond 
age 10 and children experience pubertal growth spurts when they are over 10 years’ 
old. It may appear they have excess weight according to the weight-to-age indicator, 
but in fact they are just tall
64
.  
On the other hand, the reason of focusing children in rural areas is twofold. Firstly, 
the first Chinese Child (aged 0-6) Nutrition Report (2012) claimed that nutrition status 
and health development of children in rural areas are worse than children in urban 
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 World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/growthref/who2007_weight_for_age/en/.  
 250 
 
areas, while children in urban areas are more concerned with obesity. Besides, unlike 
in rural areas, resources are much more available in urban areas, such as food 
variation and health care products, therefore children in urban areas are less likely to 
be malnourished. The second reason, which is also a key reason, is that when 
household’s income is low, mothers’ work and income can play an important role on 
household’s consumption, especially on food and nutrition.  
Figure 6.1 demonstrates our sample selection progress. First, all individuals in urban 
site have been excluded, and the sample was then reduced to individuals aged 10 and 
younger. Similar to the previous two chapters, mother and children were matched 
based on three questions: (i) does your mother live in this household? (ii) who is your 
mother in this household? (iv) what is the relationship between you and your 
mother?
65
 Then mothers’ information, for example age, work status and education 
levels were obtained for each child in the sample. 
After matching the data, information about the children’s number of siblings can be 
obtained, which is another important factor influencing children’s health 
development. Selecting criteria for the remaining sample was purely based on the 
availability of data, and observations with missing data for any of the variables were 
deleted from the sample. 
Three sub-samples were created for sensitivity tests. The first sub-sample used 
mothers’ working hours, the second further controlled for parents’ BMIs and 
household infrastructure, and the last looked at mother and grandparents’ allocated 
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 Three options are provided for children to choose: biological mother, step-mother and adopted 
mother.  
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time for food preparation instead of the maternal work decision. In each sub-sample, 
observations with missing data for the control variables were excluded. 
Like the previous two chapters, a table containing statistics of raw data will be 
presented firstly as the comparison to the samples. Statistics of key variables are 
presented for children aged under 10 in Table 6.1 and sample statistics are presented 
in Table 6.2. Again, no tremendous difference is observed but the maternal 
employment rate in the sample is slightly lower than the raw data, which might be due 
to the missing information of variables. For example, during the matching process of 
mothers and children, observations were excluded from the sample if there is any 
uncertainty. 
In the sample, proportion of underweight children is about 12-13% and this number is 
double for underheight children, revealing that children in rural China are more 
vulnerable in terms of long-term health development. The statistics in this chapter 
pertaining to underweight and underheight are in line with facts presented in the 
Chinese Child (age 0-6) Nutrition Report, which indicate that, on the country level, 
the stunting rate is twice the number of those who are underweight. Gender 
distributions of children in all four samples were about half and half, and over 30% of 
children were living with grandparents. Left-behind children in our sample accounted 
for only about 4%, which is far below the official survey number in 2010
66
.  
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 Extrapolating from the 6
th
 National Census Data, the Report of Rural Left Behind Child and Urban 
Migrated Child developed by the China Women’s Federation and Research Center of Population and 
Development in Renmin University of China concluded that over 61 million children (aged between 0 
and 18) are left behind in rural areas, with one or both parents working away from home. The 
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Twenty-five per cent of mothers in rural China take on off-farm work, and this ratio 
varies slightly across the three sensitive test samples. Average education in years for 
the mothers in our sample was 6.40 with a standard deviation of 3.77, which means 
most mothers in our sample received primary school to junior middle school 
education. Time allocated to working and making food were 5.25 hours per day for 
mothers taking on off-farm work and 0.66 hours per day for all mothers in our 
sample. Mothers were also divided into two groups, living with and without 
grandparents, to see if there were any differences in time allocation between them. 
Mothers in the former group those who lived with grandparents, worked 50% longer 
per day and spent 50% less time making food than did mothers in the latter group. On 
the other hand, grandparents spent double the amount of time making food in a 
three-generation household or provide help with daily meals.  
Three variables indicated household characteristics, owning a refrigerator, access tap 
water and having a flush toilet, had different proportions in our sample. About 50% of 
the children in our sample reported that they had tap water, but only 3% of children 
reported having a flush toilet in the house. Another interesting figure in our sample is 
                                                                                                                                                        
proportion is 37.7% for children in rural China and 21.88% for the total number of children in China. 
http://acwf.people.com.cn/n/2013/0510/c99013-21437965.html 
The proportions of left-behind children in our sample and the proportions of left-behind children in the 
6
th
 National Census Data are not comparable. Our sample contains seven waves, namely 1991, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009, while the 6
th
 National Census Data was carried out in 2010. Observations 
with missing data were excluded from our sample, which means some left-behind children can be 
excluded due to selection criteria. However, as the research interest of this study is not the left-behind 
children, it is not necessary to take further actions to track these excluded children who answered no to 
the question “Does your mother live in this household?” 
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that, from Table 6.2, owning a refrigerator in rural China is more popular than 
building a flush toilet.   
Community infrastructure – market, health services, bus stops and road conditions –
varied slightly across the samples. In general, 60% of communities had a market and a 
bus stop in the village, slightly higher than the proportion of having health services 
and paved roads. 
A table showing statistics of children’s weight-to-age and height-to-age Z scores, 
including a t-test to reveal the difference between groups of children with mothers 
working off-farm and a group of children with agricultural mothers is also presented. 
It can be seen in Table 6.3 that the health conditions of children whose mothers taking 
off-farm work are better than their peers whose mothers taking farm work, and the 
difference is significant at 1% level.  
Distributions of WAZ and HAZ in the baseline sample are plotted in Figure 6.2. It 
shows that children’s long term health development, i.e. height, is worse comparing to 
the short term index, i.e. weight in the baseline sample. To further test the normality 
of WAZ and HAZ, Figure 6.3 and 6.4 are conducted using standardized normal 
probability plot, and the distribution of WAZ and HAZ are compared with the ideal 
theoretical normal distribution, which are the solid lines coloured in red. In each 
figure, WAZ and HAZ are identified as normal distributed since the dots of WAZ and 
HAZ observations fall almost into straight lines, which also almost replot the 
theoretical normal distribution line. 
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Except graphically test the distribution of WAZ and HAZ, Shapiro-Wilk test is also 
employed to numerically test the distribution of the indices. The null hypothesis of 
Shapiro-Wilk test is that the population is normally distributed and if p-value is less 
than the chosen significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected and there is evidence 
that the data tested is not from a normally distributed population. On the contrary, if 
the p-value is greater than the chosen significance level, the null hypothesis that the 
data tested is from a normally distributed population cannot be rejected.  
The two bottom lines of Table 6.2 report the test results for the samples. It is 
confirmed that baseline sample as well as the three sensitivity test samples are all 
normally distributed.  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Primary analysis of effect of maternal employment on children’s health  
In this section, baseline results from the baseline sample that contained 4,512 
observations (2975 children in total) are presented. OLS results are firstly presented 
followed by the 2SLS results to reveal the consistent estimators due to the 
endogeneity of the mothers’ work decisions67. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the results of 
maternal employment on short-term health development (underweight), and Tables 
6.6 and 6.7 show the results for long-term health development (underheight).  
Firstly, comparing columns 1 and 2 of OLS estimation results for short term and long 
term health status in Table 6.4 and 6.6 respectively, it is found that maternal 
                                                     
67
 To accompany the estimations, probit and IVprobit estimations are also carried out. Results are 
presented in Appendix P- S.  
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employment is more important for children’s long term development that with 
mothers taking off-farm work, children can have 6 percentage points less possible 
being underheight.  
Next, comparing columns 1 and 2 in the instrument estimation results, the second 
stages results show that there is a downward bias towards the estimation of maternal 
employment. Magnitudes of the effect of maternal employment on both short term 
and long term health development have been increased. By taking off-farm work, 
mothers can reduce the possibility of their children being underweight by eight 
percentage points and being underheight by 16 percentage points. 
Looking at the first stage results of column 1 and 2 in the four tables, instrument 
variables, bus stops and paved roads in the village, are strongly related to the 
possibility of mothers taking on off-farm work. F statistics for the instruments show 
that the instruments are valid, and the Sargan test results show that instruments are not 
over-identifying the endogenous variable. With a bus stop in the village, mothers can 
increase their possibility of taking on off-farm work by up to eight percentage points, 
while paved roads in the village can increase the possibility by up to 14 percentage 
points. Interestingly, being as the instrument, age of youngest child plays a negative 
role on the possibility of mothers taking off-farm work although the effect size is 
smaller than the other two instruments. It can be true in this estimation since the 
sample contains children in rural China, where multi-siblings are common. When a 
new baby was born in a family, mother can receive childcare even from her big 
children so that she can work outside that home. With the children growing bigger, 
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rural mothers may lose helping hands on family issues when their children go to 
school, so mothers need to stay home and look after the families.  
Other first stage results are within the expectation that being co-resident with 
grandparents or having healthy grandparents can help mothers to increase their labour 
supply, as well as the local community wage rate and market in the village. With a 
market in the village, rural mothers can have 5 percentage points higher chance of 
taking off-farm work comparing to those mothers living in the villages without a 
market. On the other hand, sibling numbers, household income and household wealth 
reduce the chance of mothers taking off-farm working. Especially family wealth, 
represented by owning a refrigerator in the household, can reduce up to 30 percentage 
points’ possibilities for mothers seeking a paid job outside home.  
Other second stage results confirm that left-behind children are more vulnerable. With 
other variable equal, a child who are left behind in rural areas are 10 percentage poins 
and 14 percentage points more likely to be underweight and underheight. Children 
from multi-sibling families are also at higher risk of being underdeveloped although 
the magnitudes of this negative effect are much smaller than they are of being left 
behind.  
As expected, household income and owning refrigerators in the household can 
improve children’s health development, either in short term or long term. With a 10% 
increase in household annual income, children will be about 7 percentage points lower 
possible being underweight and 9 percentage points lower possible being underheight. 
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This possibility is even higher if a household owns a refrigerator as it represents both 
family wealth and food hygiene.  
Comparing the effects for underweight and underheight, it can be easily found that 
maternal employment played a more important role in children’s long-term health 
development, as the magnitude of its negative effect in terms of being underheight 
was twice as great as was the negative effect with regard to children being 
underweight. Besides, even though household income and family wealth are 
controlled, mothers’ off-farm work is still negatively related to the possibility of 
children being underdeveloped. This could be because mothers can influence 
children’s diets or nutritional intake through their own income, or their intrahousehold 
bargaining power in terms of resource allocation (Thomas, 1990). Therefore, in 
sensitivity test 1, mothers’ annual wage is further controlled to see whether this 
negative effect would change. 
Columns 3 and 4 in the Table 6.4 to 6.7 in this section are another primary analysis by 
excluding left--behind children from the sample. No major changes in magnitude or 
significance were found when comparing these results to the previous results, both 
first stage and second stage. After excluding the left behind children, maternal 
employment can reduce the possibility of being underweight and underheight by up to 
10 and 20 percentage points, respectively. 
6.4.2 Sensitivity test 1 – Mother’s working hours and income 
The main aim of sensitivity test 1 is to see whether the mothers’ working hours 
mattered in terms of children’s health. Meanwhile, previous estimation results show 
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that maternal employment could encourage children’s health development, even 
though household income is controlled. Therefore, I divided the total household 
income into the mother’s annual wage and other household income to see whether 
there was any change in this negative effect of mothers’ off-farm work.  
Table 6.10 to 6.13 show the 2SLS results for the underweight and underheight 
estimations
68
. In Table 6.10 and 6.12, the far left columns are the baseline results 
containing the fundamental variables in the model. Compared with the primary 
analysis, the baseline results in this sensitivity test do not change significantly in terms 
of magnitude, direction of influence and significance.  
From the IV estimation, it can be seen that, after controlling for years of the mothers’ 
education, maternal employment still reduces children’s underweight or underheight 
conditions significantly, with the only exception being that the magnitude is slightly 
less than are baseline results, indicating that the mothers’ education level could 
influence children’s health via the employment channel. 
The first stage results show that access to a bus stop or having paved roads in the 
village are more important in terms of increasing working hours. With paved roads in 
the village, mothers can increase their working hours by 50%. For example, other 
things being equal, a mother living in a village with paved roads can work 2.5 hours 
longer than can another mother who works five hours per day and who lives in a 
village without paved roads. Apart from higher community wages for female workers 
and the existence of a market in the community, healthy grandparents can also help 
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 Probit and IVprobit estimation results are presented in Appendix T-W. 
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with mothers’ work decisions or working hours. By contrast, mothers from wealthy 
families tend to reduce their labour supply, especially in terms of working hours, and 
mothers from families that own refrigerators will reduce their working time by up to 
80 percentage points.  
From second stage results, effect of mothers’ working hours on children’s health 
development is not as important as mothers’ off-farm work decisions, as the 
parameters are insignificant for both children’s weight and height. The possible 
explanations are twofold. First, in this sensitivity test sample, the mothers’ average 
daily working hours less than are the normal working hours in urban areas and, as 
left-behind children are excluded, the mothers in this sample were working locally; 
therefore it is realistic for mothers to look after children when they take on off-farm 
work. Secondly, if mothers took on agricultural work before they transferred to 
off-farm work, a change in work intensity would not influence children’s health 
development (Morrill, 2011). 
More interesting results can be observed after dividing the household’s total income 
into the mother’s own wage income and the household’s other income. Looking at 
columns 7 and 8 in Tables 6.11 and 6.13, other variables being equal, maternal 
employment can reduce the possibilities of children being underweight by 5 
percentage points and being underheight by 21 percentage points with maternal 
income controlled. Comparing the numbers with the previous section, magnitude of 
the negative effect on underweight has decreased slightly but on underheight remains 
pretty much the same. Together with the high significance of maternal employment, it 
is showing that, mothers can improve children’s health status through other channels 
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rather than only through the income effect. This can be understood as, in addition to 
mothers’ intrahousehold bargaining power in terms of resource allocation, working 
mothers can improve their children’s health status through other channels, such as via 
the nutritional information they receive from work or from other community 
activities. Thus, after controlling for the mothers’ own wage income, maternal 
employment can reduce the possibility of children being underweight by seven 
percentage points.  
6.4.3 Sensitivity test 2 – Parents’ BMI and household infrastructure 
In this sensitivity test, the aim is to see how maternal employment affects children’s 
health when parents’ health status, such as the parents’ BMI, or external the 
environment, such as the household infrastructure, is controlled. Tables 6.14 to 6.19 
present the OLS and 2SLS results
69
. Similarly to sensitivity test 1, the baseline results 
are provided in the far left columns except Table 6.17 and 6.19. Comparing the 
baseline results from the previous tests, no major difference is observed.  
The first stage results continue suggesting that instrument variables are significantly 
related to maternal employment in rural areas. With a bus stop and paved road in the 
village, mothers can have over 20 percentage points higher chance of finding an 
off-farm work assuming other characters are the same. Living with elderly parents 
and elderly parents are in good health condition also can help mothers increase their 
participation in the labour market that holding other variables constant, mothers living 
with elderly parents can have 3 more percentage points chance being employed by a 
paid job. 
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 Probit and IVprobit estimation results are presented in Appendix X-AA. 
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In this sensitivity test, maternal employment still reduce the possibility of children 
being underweight or underheight significantly, and the effect size for underheight is 
much bigger than it is for underweight. With other variables constant, off-farm 
working mothers can lower the chance of their children being underheight by up to 20 
percentage points.  
Parents’ BMI is also highly significant in terms of children’s health, particularly with 
regard to weight. The higher the parents’ BMI, the less likely the children are to be 
underweight. The mother’s BMI is slightly more important than is the father’s BMI, 
as mothers with higher BMIs can reduce the chances of children being 
underdeveloped. This can be understood because, within the normal range of BMIs, 
mothers with higher BMIs are healthier and their dietary patterns will also influence 
their children. An association between parents’ BMI and children’s BMI has been 
investigated in clinical studies, and a positive relationship has been confirmed 
(Lindkvist, Ivarsson, Silfverdal, & Eurenius, 2015; Ohlund, Hernell, Hörnell, 
Stenlund, & Lind, 2010). 
On the other hand, water, hygiene and sanitation are confirmed as the basis of health 
(Bartram & Cairncross, 2010), especially in rural China where the health care system 
is relatively weak (Zhong, 2007). Two dummy variables indicating access to tap water 
and having a flush toilet in the household are included to control for household 
infrastructure.  
From the second stage results, having tap water available in the household is more 
important as it improves children’s health, with a greater effect in long term. Flush 
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toilets, however, did not influencing children’s health in this sensitivity test. This can 
be understood from the fact that flush toilets are not popular in rural China, as can 
also be seen from our sample statistics, as only 3% of children reported they had a 
flush toilet installed in their households.   
Another interesting finding of this sensitivity test is that magnitude of the negative 
effects of maternal employment after controlling for household infrastructure is the 
smallest, implying that working mothers from families with relatively modern 
facilities have a smaller impact on their children’s health. This can be understood 
because a family that owns modern equipment or which is benefiting from modern 
facilities either has good socioeconomic status or is located in one of the more 
developed rural areas. As a result, the effect of maternal employment on children’s 
health development would decrease slightly since there is less room in external 
environment or factors for working mothers to improve.  
6.4.4 Sensitivity test 3 – Mother and grandparents’ food-making time 
From sensitivity test 1, it is found that mothers’ working hours did not influence 
children’s health development. Thus, in this sensitivity test, mothers’ food-making 
time is used instead to estimate whether the time they allocated to this household 
activity mattered.  
In daily family life, household food preparation situations can be summarized 
according to three categories: (i) mothers only; (ii) mothers and other adults; and (iii) 
other adults only. In particular, other adults include husbands, grandparents, other 
relatives and nannies. The fact is, in many societies, including in China, women play 
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an important role in food production, selection, purchasing and processing. Therefore, 
I also controlled for grandmothers’ food-making time in this sensitivity estimation. 
From sample statistics, mothers’ food-making time is shorter when they are living 
with grandparents, and the first stage estimation results show that healthy 
grandparents can help with mothers’ labour supply. Tables 6.20 and 6.21 present 
estimation results for underweight and underheight, respectively. 
In each table, 4 estimations results are demonstrated that column 1 and 2 are 2SLS 
estimations and column 3 and 4 are OLS estimations with mothers’ food making time 
which is treated as exogenous in this sensitivity test. One may argue that mothers’ 
food making time could be endogenous as it can be simultaneously influenced with 
children’s health status. For example, a sick child may increase mothers’ food making 
time since the child needs more nutrition and it may also decrease mothers’ food 
making time since the child needs to be cared. The reason of mothers’ food making 
time is treated as exogenous here is that, in rural China, food making time is mainly 
determined by the resources that a family have access, i.e. food varieties and amount.  
It can be seen that mother’s food-making time is highly correlated to children’s health 
development. A one-hour increase in mothers’ food-making time can reduce the 
possibility of children being underweight or underheight by about three and six 
percentage points, respectively. Grandparents’ time, however, does not influence 
children’s health outcomes, which can be understood as it is easier for younger 
generations to accept new cooking materials or recipes, and then further improve the 
daily nutritional arrangement. Thus, the effort mothers’ put into making food is 
crucial. 
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Meanwhile, although it is a smaller effect compared to the negative effect when using 
maternal employment, it is reasonable to understand that time spent making food 
could not improve the quality of children’s nutritional intake unless good cooking 
ingredients are used. Therefore, the mothers’ income and purchasing power is more 
important for improving children’s health development.  
6.4.5 Health care and children’s development 
Looking at all the tables of the estimation results, there is no clue indicating the 
importance of having a health service in the village on children’s health development 
in rural China. The results in this chapter seem contrary to many health reports or 
literature, which show that a community based health service is very effective in 
terms of assessing, diagnosing, preventing and managing children’s diseases (Disease 
Control Priorities in Developing Countries 2nd edition, 2006; Ismail, Immink, Mazar, 
& Nantel, 2003; UNICEF, 1990), and is also positively related to local children’s 
health outcomes or satisfying local children’s special health care needs (McPherson et 
al., 2004). This point of finding indicates the weak health care provision in rural 
China, which was discussed in Section 3 institutional background. 
However, rural areas in China are still underdeveloped and rural families are 
relatively backward especially on household income. To a great extent, health care 
system could not ensure rural residents’ health but ultimately the household income 
can.  
6.5 Conclusion 
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In this chapter, impact of maternal employment on children’s health development in 
rural China using CHNS data has been investigated and an instrument estimation 
approach is used. Endogeneity of maternal employment when modelling this 
relationship can be due to various factors, such as simultaneous influence between 
maternal employment and children’s health condition, i.e. a serious ill child can 
reduce mother’s labour supply as s/he needs more care, at the same time mother may 
increase labour supply to cover child’s medical costs. Omitted variables are another 
factor that can cause endogeneity, such as mothers’ attitudes towards off-farm work, 
less-educated mothers may feel reluctant to take on off-farm works if skills are 
required, and this negative attitude towards off-farm work will also influence 
children’s health by mothers’ nutrition and diet arrangements.  
Many instruments have been used in an attempt to solve this endogeneity problem, 
such as youngest child’s eligibility of entering kindergarten. Liu and Dong (2010), 
who also carried out an investigation on mothers’ off-farm working time and 
children’s health development in rural China, select 4 variables from CHNS 
community level data as instruments and they found increase in maternal working 
time are negatively related to children’s health.  
However, Liu and Dong’s instrument are limited at reflecting external environment as 
well as personal availability for mothers to seek off-farm work. In this chapter, I 
employed three different instruments from CHNS community level data, accessing to 
a bus stop in the village, having paved road in the village and age of mothers’ 
youngest child to address both external and internal issues. By using 2SLS and 
IV-probit estimators, results show that maternal employment can significantly reduce 
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the possibility of children being underweight and underheight even after controlling 
mothers’ education level, mothers’ own wage income, parents’ health condition and 
household infrastructure. This can be understood that except these channels, active 
mothers can improve their children’s health condition through experiences they 
learned from their colleagues, information they received from work or community 
activities (Jenna & Elizabeth, 2009).  
Sensitivity tests show that, in terms of time allocation, mothers’ food making time is 
very important to children’s health development but mothers’ working time and 
grandparents’ food making time are not. With one hour increase in mother’s food 
making time, children will have 3 and 6 percentage points lower possibility of being 
underdeveloped in short term and long term. 
Some policy implications can be draw based on the results in this chapter. First, 
infrastructure construction like road improvement in rural areas is beneficial for 
people who intend to seek jobs locally or outside their hometown as it can 
significantly increase the possibility of participating in labour market. Second, 
creating more working opportunities in rural areas not only can help local economic 
development, but also help mothers improve children’s health. Third, healthcare 
system improvement in rural China is another important dimension of reform, not 
only providing more health services, but also strengthening the publicising health and 
nutrition information to rural households. 
6.6 Shortcomings and future research 
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The estimations in this section still has shortcomings. First, left behind children are 
excluded in the sensitivity test due to data limitations. As mothers’ demographic 
characteristics are controlled in sensitivity tests, such as mothers’ education, and 
mothers’ own annual wage income, the information on left behind child’s mother 
cannot be tracked. Second, mothers’ time allocation is not explored so that it is not 
known about the effect of mothers’ activities, i.e. household production, market work, 
active leisure and child care, on children’s health development. Third, children’s 
health status are simply identified as under development or not, rather than 
compartmentalized children’s height and weight into percentile.  
Therefore, future research can focus on the following aspects. The first aspect is 
investigating children’s nutrition outcomes and eating patterns to see what is (are) the 
mechanism(s) through which maternal employment can influence children’s health 
development. CHNS is a good example of data that can be used in this area of 
research. However, challenges still exist due to its nature of data collection. Health 
and nutrition survey in CHNS is a consecutive three days trail during which detailed 
household food consumption data collected are randomly allocated from Monday to 
Sunday. Criticism of nutrition data in CHNS is that it may not be representative. The 
second aspect is examining how mothers’ time allocation and/or supervision can 
influence children’s time allocation and then further children’s health status, for 
example, mothers’ time on household activities and childcare, and children’s time on 
physical activities and sedentary activities. The third aspect is estimating children’s 
health using quantile regressions to see how maternal employment can influence 
children’s health development in different statuses.  
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Except investigating the effect of maternal employment, another dimension of future 
research can be evaluating the effect of health insurance coverage on children’s health 
development in rural China since the health insurance in rural China has experienced 
a few stages of reforms. 
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Figure 6. 1 Selection progress of baseline sample in Chapter 3 
Whole data 
(174,635 observations) 
Urban site and missing  
(57,553 observations dropped) 
Rural site 
(Keep, 117,082observations left) 
Individual age above 10 
(104,756 observations dropped) 
Child age between 0 and 10 
(Keep, 12,326observations left) 
Complete information on weight and 
height 
(Keep, 7,893 observations left) 
Missing information on weight 
and height 
(4,433 observations dropped) 
Complete information on mothers’ 
working 
(Keep, 6,125 observations left) 
Complete information on other variables 
including living with grandparents, 
household income, etc.  
(Keep, 4,512 observations left) 
Missing information on other 
variables 
(1,613 observations dropped) 
Missing information on mothers’ 
working 
(1,768 observations dropped) 
  
Figure 6. 2 K-density distributions of HAZ and WAZ in baseline sample 
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Figure 6. 3 Plot test of normality of WAZ, baseline sample 
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Figure 6. 4 Plot test of normality of HAZ, baseline sample 
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Table 6. 1 Descriptive statistics of key variables, raw data 
  raw data 
Explanatory variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Underweight children (%) 13.82  34.51  
Underheight children (%) 27.37  36.14  
   Maternal employment (taking off-farm work, %) 32.87  46.97  
Age 5.28  2.88  
Left behind children (%) 4.67  21.10  
Co-resident with grandparents (%) 34.57  47.56  
Female child (1=yes, %) 46.49  49.88  
Number of siblings 0.64  0.89  
Mothers' education years 7.42  3.95  
Household income (logged value) 9.50  0.92  
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes, %) 30.60  46.08  
Wage per year for ordinary female worker in the community 
(logged value) 8.62  0.70  
Market in village (1=yes, %) 53.96  49.84  
Health service in village (1=yes, %) 44.29  49.67  
Mother's working hours （maternal employment=1) 3.45  3.21  
Mother's working hours (living without grandparents) 3.74 3.24 
Mother's working hours (living with grandparents) 3.02 2.69 
Mother's age 32.32  7.92  
Mother's individual income 8.23  1.17  
Other household income 1.12  0.98  
Mother's BMI 21.94  2.84  
Father's BMI 21.93  2.75  
Tap water in household 58.68  49.24  
Flushing toilet in household 3.49  18.34  
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food （in 
hours) 0.77  2.04  
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food (living 
without grandparents, in hours) 1.02  2.42  
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food (living 
with grandparents, in hours) 0.68  2.00  
Grandparents' time for buying, preparing and cooking food (in 
hours) 1.63  2.70  
Grandparents' health status (both are excellent/good, 1=yes, %) 30.96  46.23  
   Access to bus stop (1=yes, %) 61.82  48.58  
Paved road (1=yes, %) 54.74  49.78  
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Age of youngest sibling 4.81  2.85  
   Year dummy (%) 
  1991 15.78  36.45  
1993 13.26  33.92  
1997 10.62  30.82  
2000 8.54  27.95  
2004 7.25  25.93  
2006 7.38  26.14  
2009 7.76  26.76  
   Province dummy (%) 
  Liaoning 7.78  26.79  
Heilongjiang 4.28  20.25  
Jiangsu 8.94  28.53  
Shandong 8.19  27.43  
Henan 14.06  34.77  
Hubei 12.02  32.52  
Hunan 10.81  31.06  
Guangxi 15.92  36.59  
Guizhou 14.06  34.76  
   Total Observations 16,979  
  
  
Table 6. 2 Descriptive statistics of key variables, baseline sample 
  baseline sample                   
(children age 0-10) 
sample of sensitive test 1 
- mother's working hours 
sample of sensitive test 2 
- parents' BMI, 
household facilities & 
mother's income 
sample of sensitive test 3 
- mother and 
grandparents' food 
making time 
Explanatory variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviatio
n 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Underweight children (%) 12.50  33.08  13.48  34.15  13.41  34.09  12.05  32.56  
Underheight children (%) 23.71  42.54  25.10  43.37  25.17  43.41  23.25  42.25  
         Maternal employment (taking off-farm work, %) 25.13  43.38  20.46  40.34  27.07  44.44  24.32  42.91  
Age 5.68  2.78  5.81  2.72  5.79  2.72  5.68  2.79  
Left behind children (%) 3.77  13.20  / / / / 1.98  13.94  
Co-resident with grandparents (%) 36.33  48.10  33.93  47.35  36.59  48.18  39.59  48.91  
Female child (1=yes, %) 44.88  49.74  45.08  49.76  45.29  49.79  45.25  49.78  
Number of siblings 0.56  0.91  0.48  0.87  0.51  0.87  0.47  0.85  
Mothers' education years / / 6.40  3.77  6.62  3.82  / / 
Household income (logged value) 9.52  0.90  9.49  0.81  9.55  0.83  9.50  0.90  
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes, %) 20.19  40.15  16.70  37.30  18.90  39.16  19.74  39.81  
Wage per year for ordinary female worker in the 
community (logged value) 
8.53  0.72  8.45  71.25  8.47  0.71  8.51  0.73  
Market in village (1=yes, %) 60.64  48.86  60.35  48.93  60.94  48.80  61.48  48.67  
Health service in village (1=yes, %) 49.69  50.00  48.27  49.98  48.00  49.97  49.50  50.00  
Mother's working hours （maternal employment=1) 
  
5.25  3.29  / / / / 
Mother's working hours (living without grandparents) 
  
4.24  3.78  
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Mother's working hours (living with grandparents) 
  
6.33  2.21  
    Mother's age 
  
31.95  5.82  31.82  5.76  / / 
Mother's individual income 
    
8.12  0.54  / / 
Other household income 
    
1.43  0.78  / / 
Mother's BMI 
    
21.73  2.77  / / 
Father's BMI 
    
21.81  2.68  / / 
Tap water in household 
    
49.46  50.01  / / 
Flushing toilet in household 
    
3.08  17.29  / / 
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food 
（in hours) 
      
0.66  1.93  
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food 
(living without grandparents, in hours) 
      
0.75  2.11  
Mother's time for buying, preparing and cooking food 
(living with grandparents, in hours) 
      
0.51  1.61  
Grandparents' time for buying, preparing and cooking 
food (in hours)       
1.16  2.29  
Grandparents' health status (both are excellent/good, 
1=yes, %) 
31.14  46.31  29.53  45.62  30.59  46.09  34.18  47.44  
         Access to bus stop (1=yes, %) 58.89  49.21  58.88  49.21  59.76  49.05  58.10  49.35  
Paved road (1=yes, %) 48.76  49.99  44.01  49.65  46.04  49.85  47.55  49.95  
Age of youngest sibling 5.14  2.77  5.19  2.74  5.21  2.73  5.10  2.78  
         Year dummy (%) 
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1991 26.35  44.06  30.44  46.02  30.35 45.99 27.06 44.43 
1993 22.43  41.72  25.01  43.32  24.56 43.05 23.06 42.13 
1997 14.25  34.96  14.76  35.47  14.97 35.69 14.58 35.29 
2000 11.77  32.23  11.27  31.63  10.64 30.84 11.77 32.23 
2004 8.95  28.56  6.74  25.07  7.22 25.88 8.35 27.66 
2006 7.31  26.04  5.40  22.60  5.39 22.58 6.76 25.11 
2009 8.93  28.52  6.38  24.44  6.88 25.31 8.42 27.77 
         Province dummy (%) 
        Liaoning 9.26  29.00  9.39  29.18  8.67 28.15 9.5 29.32 
Heilongjiang 5.59  22.97  5.61  23.01  6.37 24.42 5.75 23.28 
Jiangsu 10.26  30.35  10.52  30.69  11.38 31.77 10.21 30.28 
Shandong 8.55  27.97  8.88  28.46  8.84 28.39 8.69 28.17 
Henan 13.16  33.81  12.13  32.66  10.94 31.22 13.22 33.88 
Hubei 13.14  33.79  14.55  35.27  13.65 34.34 13.11 33.75 
Hunan 9.15  28.84  9.03  28.67  8.81 28.35 9.13 28.8 
Guangxi 14.74  35.45  14.16  34.87  15.55 36.24 14.62 35.34 
Guizhou 16.13  36.79  15.71  36.40  15.79 36.47 15.77 36.45 
         Total Observations 4,512 3,339 2,940 3,733 
Shapirol-Wilk test for normality of WAZ 0.221 0.284 0.298 0.242 
Shapirol-Wilk test for normality of HAZ 0.264 0.301 0.310 0.278 
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Table 6. 3 HAZ and WAZ comparisons between children with off-farm working mothers and children with farm working mothers 
  Off-farm work mothers Farm work mothers 
 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Difference 
Weight-to-age Z score -0.69 1.29 -4.59 3.35 -1.24 1.29 -5.32 3.74 -0.42*** 
Height-to-age Z score -0.37 1.11 -3.94 3.42 -0.79 1.17 -5.72 4.72 -0.55*** 
Observations 1,134 3,378   
 
  
  
Table 6. 4 Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health 
development – underweight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0221* -0.0195* -0.0225* -0.0206* 
  (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0119) 
Age  0.0046 0.0043 0.0041 0.0038 
  (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Age square 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) 0.0884*** 0.0901*** 
  
  (0.0258) (0.0264) 
  
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) -0.0044 -0.0059 0.0059 -0.0046 
  (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0134) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with 
grandparents 
0.0434 0.0539 
  
  (0.0644) (0.0677) 
  
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0106 -0.0099 -0.0116 -0.0105 
  (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0123) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0234** 0.0212** 0.0235** 0.0216** 
  (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0097) 
Sibling number 0.0151* 0.0160* 0.0143* 0.0149* 
  (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0082) 
Household total annual income  -0.0468**
* 
-0.0482**
* 
-0.0472**
* 
-0.0488**
*   (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0652**
* 
-0.0660**
* 
-0.0668**
* 
-0.0679**
*   (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0114) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.0160** -0.0200** -0.0157* -0.0199** 
  (0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0077) (0.0093) 
Market in community (1=yes) 0.0103 0.0105 0.0095 0.0094 
  (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0111) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0032 0.0050 0.0032 0.0054 
  (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,512 4,512 4,344 4,344 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.235 0.281 0.235 0.281 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Household annual income and ordinary annual wage for female worker in community takes logged 
value, in RMB. 
 
  
  
Table 6. 5 Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – underweight & 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0668* 
 
-0.0829* 
 
-0.0773** 
 
-0.0904** 
  
 
(0.0354) 
 
(0.0457) 
 
(0.0360) 
 
(0.0430) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0747*** 
 
0.0702*** 
 
0.0856*** 
 
0.0725*** 
 
  (0.0115) 
 
（0.0127） (0.0118) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - paved road 0.1255*** 
 
0.1344*** 
 
0.1350*** 
 
0.1500*** 
 
  (0.0122) 
 
（0.0124） (0.0127) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0260*** 
 
-0.0235*** 
 
-0.0282*** 
 
-0.0254*** 
 
  (0.0036) 
 
（0.0036） (0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
Age  0.0067 0.0050 0.0070 0.0063 0.0003 0.0050 0.0005 0.0058 
  (0.0090) (0.0072) （0.0088） (0.0072) (0.0092) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0071) 
Age square -0.0021*** 0.0007 -0.0020*** 0.0007 -0.0019** 0.0008 -0.0017** 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0007) （0.0008） (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) -0.0836* 0.0895*** -0.0855* 0.1040*** 
    
  (0.0462) (0.0265) （0.0451） (0.0276) 
    
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0596*** -0.0062 0.0437*** -0.0017 0.0665*** 0.0080 0.0539*** 0.0004 
  (0.0161) (0.0143) （0.0160） (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0145) (0.0165) (0.0143) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0544** 0.0440 0.0552** 0.0586 
    
  (0.0266) (0.0650) （0.0291） (0.0686) 
    
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0429*** -0.0108 0.0451*** -0.0110 0.0317** -0.00857 0.0412*** -0.0130 
  (0.0137) (0.0123) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0140) (0.0126) (0.0143) (0.0125) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0189 0.0146 0.0196 0.0125 0.0154 0.0156 0.0171 0.0132 
  (0.0113) (0.0099) （0.0111） (0.0096) (0.0117) (0.0100) (0.0115) (0.0098) 
Sibling number -0.0268*** 0.0144* -0.0267*** 0.0146* -0.0205** 0.0152* -0.0182** 0.0157* 
  (0.0083) (0.0081) （0.0085） (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0086) 
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Household total annual income -0.0442*** -0.0662*** -0.0395*** -0.0655*** -0.0572*** -0.0687*** -0.0530*** -0.0667*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0061) （0.0071） (0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0063) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2590*** -0.0614*** -0.2585*** -0.0676*** -0.3240*** -0.0724*** -0.3280*** -0.0743*** 
  (0.0191) (0.0223) （0.0194） (0.0224) (0.0191) (0.0248) (0.0196) (0.0250) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in community 0.0428*** -0.0062 0.0454*** 0.0094 0.0375*** -0.0101 0.0345*** 0.0082 
  (0.0082) (0.0079) （0.0099） (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.0103) (0.0096） 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0428*** 0.0102 0.0432*** 0.0143 0.0593*** 0.0049 0.0550*** 0.0111 
  (0.0120) (0.0118) （0.0123） (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0124) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0123 0.0036 -0.0073 0.0045 -0.0126 0.0041 -0.0143 0.0060 
  (0.0116) (0.0100) （0.0117） (0.0101) (0.0120) (0.0101) (0.0122) (0.0102) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4512 4512 4344 4344 
F statistics on instrument 109.65 / 72.96 / 115.30 / 74.37 / 
 R-squared 0.260 0.236 0.297 0.276 0.262 0.236 0.257 0.074 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.67 (0.297) 3.67 (0.159) 2.67 (0.297) 3.67 (0.159) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
Marginal effects are presented for IV-Probit estimations. 
    Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes), paved road (1=yes) and age of youngest child. 
 
 
  
  
Table 6. 6 Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health 
development – underheight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0558**
* 
-0.0613**
* 
-0.0596**
* 
-0.0653**
*   (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0150) 
Age  0.0045 0.0047 0.0054 0.0060 
  (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
Age square -0.0015* -0.0015* -0.0016* -0.0016* 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) 0.1020*** 0.1260*** 
    (0.0389) (0.0406) 
  Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0164 0.0004 0.0142 -0.0025 
  (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with 
grandparents 
0.0083 0.0470 
    (0.0813) (0.0890) 
  Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0128 -0.0131 -0.0124 -0.0124 
  (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.0050 
  (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0122) 
Sibling number 0.0169* 0.0161* 0.0190* 0.0185* 
  (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
Household annual income  -0.0452**
* 
-0.0433**
* 
-0.0459**
* 
-0.0438**
*   (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0073) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0612**
* 
-0.0616**
* 
-0.0592**
* 
-0.0588**
*   (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0159) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.0546**
* 
-0.0499**
* 
-0.0531**
* 
-0.0478**
*   (0.0100) (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.0126) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0086 0.0164 0.0103 0.0182 
  (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0140) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0025 0.0123 0.0015 0.0120 
  (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0127) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,512 4,512 4,344 4,344 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.259 0.311 0.257 0.310 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
 
 
  
Table 6. 7 Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – underheight & 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1360* 
 
-0.1660** 
 
-0.1790** 
 
-0.1900*** 
  
 
(0.0794) 
 
(0.0797) 
 
(0.0736) 
 
(0.0734) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0747*** 
 
0.0702*** 
 
0.0856*** 
 
0.0725*** 
 
  (0.0115) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.1255*** 
 
0.1344*** 
 
0.1350*** 
 
0.1500*** 
 
  (0.0122) 
 
(0.0124) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0260*** 
 
-0.0235*** 
 
-0.0282*** 
 
-0.0254*** 
 
  (0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
Age  0.0067 0.0072 0.0070 0.0080 0.0003 0.0093 0.0005 0.0093 
  (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0099) (0.0090) (0.0097) 
Age square -0.0021*** -0.0017* -0.0020*** -0.0017** -0.0019** -0.0018** -0.0017** -0.0018** 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Left behind children (1=yes) -0.0836* 0.1200*** -0.0855* 0.1440*** 
    
  (0.0462) (0.0390) (0.0451) (0.0415) 
    
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0596*** 0.0228 0.0437*** 0.0069 0.0665*** 0.0225 0.0539*** 0.0055 
  (0.0160) (0.0180) (0.0160) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0181) 
left behind children * Co-resident with 
grandparents 
0.0542** 0.0284 0.0552* 0.0688 
    
  (0.0244) (0.0845) (0.0291) (0.0925) 
    
Grandparents' health condition 0.0429*** -0.0069 0.0451*** -0.0075 0.0317** -0.0075 0.0412*** -0.0159 
  (0.0137) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0159) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0189 0.0025 0.0196 0.0038 0.0154 0.0017 0.0171 -0.0025 
  (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0124) 
Sibling number -0.0268*** 0.0169* -0.0267*** 0.0150* -0.0205** 0.0178* -0.0282*** 0.0186* 
  (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0103) (0.0089) (0.0102) 
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Household income -0.0442*** -0.0708*** -0.0395*** -0.0782*** -0.0572*** -0.0843*** -0.0530*** -0.0902*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0079) (0.0074) (0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0084) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2590*** -0.0884*** -0.2585*** -0.0883*** -0.324*** -0.0949*** -0.3280*** 0.0941*** 
  (0.0191) (0.0284) (0.0194) (0.0284) (0.0191) (0.0314) (0.0196) (0.0315) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in community 0.0428*** -0.0566*** 0.0454*** -0.0502*** 0.0275*** -0.0634*** 0.0245** -0.0515*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0103) (0.0099) (0.0128) (0.0086) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0129) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0428*** 0.0121 0.0432*** 0.0220 0.0593*** 0.0085 0.0550*** 0.0210 
  (0.0120) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.0149) (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0128) (0.0154) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0123 0.0031 -0.0073 0.0122 -0.0126 0.0024 -0.0143 0.0137 
  （0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0129) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4512 4512 4344 4344 
F statistics on instrument 109.65 / 72.96 / 87.52 / 57.67 / 
R-squared 0.260 0.254 0.297 0.302 0.222 0.040 0.257 0.040 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.81 (0.245) 2.19 (0.243) 2.93 (0.240) 2.20 (0.234) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
Marginal effects are presented for IV-Probit estimations. 
    Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes) and paved road (1=yes). 
  
Table 6. 8 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underweight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4） 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0496*** -0.0341** -0.0404*** -0.0341**   -0.0499*** -0.0351** 
  (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0146)   (0.0141) (0.0146) 
Mother's working hours     -0.0248 -0.0209   
      (0.0194) (0.0020)   
Age  0.0056 0.0065 0.0050 0.0068 0.0044 0.0065 0.0046 0.00601 
  (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) -0.0085 (0.0085) 
Age square 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) -0.0008 (0.0008) 
Mother's age   0.0048 0.0043 0.0043 0.0040 0.0051 0.0040 
    (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0036) -0.0039 (0.0037) 
Mother's age square   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents -0.0001 -0.0127 -0.0154 -0.0140 -0.0033 -0.0158 0.0011 -0.0116 
  (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0164) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0137 -0.0225 -0.0133 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0213 -0.0135 -0.0217 
  (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0147) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0455*** -0.0457** -0.0462*** -0.0454*** -0.0452*** -0.0449*** 
  
  
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0068 0.0022 0.0067 0.0020 0.0069 0.0021 0.0064 0.0019 
  (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0115) 
Sibling number 0.0170* 0.0175* 0.0175* 0.0172* 0.0174* 0.0173* 0.0169* 0.0171* 
  (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0102) (0.0104) 
Household annual income  -0.0695*** -0.0645*** -0.0698*** -0.0651*** -0.0708*** -0.0661***   
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  (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0084)   
Mother's annual wage   
    
-0.0362** -0.0405** 
    
    
(0.0152) (0.0175) 
Other household income   
    
-0.0355*** -0.0344*** 
    
    
(0.0084) (0.0085) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0576*** -0.0286** -0.0576*** -0.0687*** -0.0676*** -0.0400*** -0.0556*** -0.0674*** 
  (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0145) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community -0.0009 0.0141 0.0004 0.0144 0.0002 0.0140 -0.0001 0.0143 
  (0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0104) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0165 0.0157 0.0171 0.0170 0.0155 0.0151 0.0163 0.0159 
  (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0132) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0063 0.0003 -0.0066 -0.0007 -0.0060 0.0019 -0.0062 0.0008 
  (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.237 0.287 0.237 0.287 0.236 0.286 0.238 0.288 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes fitted value. 
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Table 6. 9 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underheight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment(1=yes) -0.0949*** -0.0856*** -0.0845*** -0.0852*** 
  
-0.0946*** -0.0865*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0181) 
  
(0.0177) (0.0182) 
Mother's working hours     -0.0095 -0.0061 
  
      (0.0125) (0.0125) 
  
Age  -0.0006 0.0023 0.0005 0.0045 -0.0006 0.0036 0.0002 0.0034 
  (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Age square -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.001 -0.0012 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) （0.0010） （0.0010） 
Mother's age   -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0018 
    (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0062) （0.0061） （0.0062） 
Mother's age square   0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) （0.0001） （0.0001） 
Co-resident with grandparents -0.0085 -0.0105 -0.0076 -0.0136 -0.0022 -0.0181 -0.0089 -0.0106 
  (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0207) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0118 -0.0283 -0.0115 -0.0277 -0.0135 -0.0279 -0.0115 -0.0274 
  (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0313*** -0.0381*** -0.0325*** -0.0395*** -0.0314*** -0.0389*** 
  
  
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0023 -0.0097 -0.0024 -0.0099 -0.0019 -0.0096 -0.0025 -0.0098 
  (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0143) 
Sibling number 0.0110 0.0104 0.0184 0.0044 0.0180 0.0046 0.0104 0.0096 
  (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0119) 
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Household annual income  -0.0816*** -0.0809*** -0.0820*** -0.0805*** -0.0837*** -0.0824*** 
  
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0107) 
  
Mother's annual wage   
    
-0.0415** 0.0431** 
    
    
(0.0175） (0.0195) 
Household other income   
    
-0.0236** -0.0232** 
    
    
(0.0110) (0.0110) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0475** -0.0806*** -0.0779*** -0.0818*** -0.0659*** -0.0725*** -0.0772*** -0.0708*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0196) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community -0.0492*** -0.0446*** -0.0484*** -0.0441*** -0.0472*** -0.0447*** -0.0489*** -0.0444*** 
  (0.0118) (0.0141) (0.0118) (0.0141) (0.0117) (0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0141) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0224 0.0340** 0.0232 0.0258 0.0202 0.0222 0.0226 0.0245 
  (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0163) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0013 0.0142 -0.0010 -0.0149 -0.0009 -0.0166 -0.0008 0.0150 
  (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0149) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.32 0.260  0.320  0.257 0.317 0.260 0.321 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes predicted value. 
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Table 6. 10 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underweight & 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0772** 
 
-0.0716** 
 
-0.0693*** 
 
-0.0712*** 
  
 
(0.0318) 
 
(0.0330) 
 
(0.0210) 
 
(0.0226) 
Mother's working hours  
          
        Instrument - bus stop  0.0588*** 
 
0.0520*** 
 
0.0434*** 
 
0.0453*** 
   (0.0121) 
 
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - road type 0.125*** 
 
0.1290*** 
 
0.1190*** 
 
0.118*** 
   (0.0135) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0223*** 
 
-0.0212*** 
 
-0.0196*** 
 
-0.0190*** 
   (0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0038) 
 Age  -0.0129 0.0061 -0.0143 0.0075 -0.0099 0.0043 -0.0112 0.0064 
  (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0085) 
Age square -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Mother's age 
    
0.0116*** 0.0039 0.0100*** 0.00404 
  
    
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0038) 
Mother's age square 
    
-0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 
  
    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0524*** -0.0036 0.0521*** -0.0135 0.0232*** -0.0069** 0.0245*** -0.0048 
  (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0031) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0199 -0.0102 0.0359** -0.0211 0.0519*** -0.0027 0.0481*** -0.0122 
  (0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
Mother's education years 
    
0.0272* -0.0330** 0.0248* -0.0314** 
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(0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0148) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.00330 0.0078 0.0062 0.0026 0.0036 0.0073 0.0056 0.0021 
  (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
Sibling number -0.0272*** 0.0173* -0.0295*** 0.0068 -0.0291*** 0.0182* -0.0130 0.0070 
  (0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0092) (0.0104) 
Household income -0.0463*** -0.0656*** -0.0466*** -0.0660*** -0.0296*** -0.0614*** -0.0306*** -0.0643*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
Mother's annual wage 
          
        Other household income 
          
        Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2426*** -0.0883** -0.2413*** -0.0831** -0.3690*** -0.0790** -0.3520*** -0.0789** 
  (0.0230) (0.0404) (0.0234) (0.0397) (0.0233) (0.0388) (0.0235) (0.0377) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0164* -0.0036 0.0209** 0.0134 0.0278*** 0.0002 0.0234** 0.0145 
  (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0105) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0623*** 0.0090 0.0537*** 0.0148 0.0476*** 0.0124 0.0460*** 0.0152 
  (0.0126) (0.0147) (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0128) (0.0145) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0320*** -0.0042 0.0463*** 0.0014 -0.0190 -0.0043 -0.0172 0.0013 
  (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0125) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,354 3,354 3,354 3,354 
F statistics on instrument 75.34 / 69.60 / 72.34 / 63.55 / 
R-squared 0.286 0.233 0.323 0.286 0.326 0.035 0.365 0.088 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 3.05 (0.215) 2.99 (0.230) 2.98 (0.230) 2.33 (0.211) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables (household annual income and ordinary annual wage for female worker in community) take logged value, in RMB. 
Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes), paved road (1=yes) and age of youngest child. 
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Table 6. 11 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underweight & 2SLS estimation (continued) 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
（5） （6） （7） （8) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
     
-0.0458*** 
 
-0.0510*** 
  
     
(0.0185) 
 
(0.0205) 
Mother's working hours  
 
-0.0003 
 
-0.0108 
      
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0197) 
    Instrument - bus stop  0.2120** 
 
0.3360*** 
 
0.0430*** 
 
0.0439*** 
 
  (0.0851) 
 
(0.0985) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.5690*** 
 
0.4860*** 
 
0.1180*** 
 
0.1180*** 
 
  (0.0921) 
 
(0.0917) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.1110*** 
 
-0.0954*** 
 
-0.0189*** 
 
-0.0184*** 
 
  (0.0271) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0038) 
 
Age  -0.1270* 0.0043 -0.1260* 0.0058 -0.0096 0.00432 -0.0114 0.0064 
  (0.0712) (0.0085) (0.0678) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0085) 
Age square 0.0037 0.0009 0.0048 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0008 
  (0.0061) (0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Mother's age 0.0165 0.0040 0.0068 0.0038 0.0093** 0.0044 0.0076** 0.0039 
  (0.0279) (0.0039) (0.0263) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Mother's age square -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.1160*** -0.0069** 0.1250*** -0.0042 0.0206*** -0.0064** 0.0215*** -0.0050* 
  (0.0128) (0.0030) (0.0128) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0030) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.2317* -0.0025 0.2219* -0.0132 0.0516*** -0.0028 0.0478*** -0.0122 
  (0.1220) (0.0165) (0.1190) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0173) 
Mother's education years 0.2590*** -0.0429** 0.3450*** -0.0445** 0.0256* -0.0433** 0.0235* -0.0413** 
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  (0.1000) (0.0155) (0.1020) (0.0161) (0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0148) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0502 0.0072 0.0500 0.0023 0.0048 0.0069 0.0070 0.0022 
  (0.0859) (0.0118) (0.0830) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
Sibling number -0.2800*** 0.0182 -0.1380** 0.0059 -0.0290*** 0.0183* -0.0113 0.0071 
  (0.0601) (0.0113) (0.0597) (0.0108) (0.0090) (0.0105) (0.0092) (0.0104) 
Household income -0.1530** -0.0613*** -0.1550** -0.0635*** 
      (0.0628) (0.0087) (0.0622) (0.0090) 
    Mother's annual wage 
    
0.0705*** -0.0509*** 0.0810*** -0.0507*** 
  
    
(0.0198) (0.0068) (0.0205) (0.0089) 
Other household income 
    
-0.0246*** -0.0403*** -0.0265*** -0.0446*** 
  
    
(0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0089) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.7870*** -0.0885** -0.7530*** -0.0803** -0.3610*** -0.0783** -0.3460*** -0.0791** 
  (0.1710) (0.0417) (0.1690) (0.0395) (0.0237) (0.0385) (0.0236) (0.0374) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
0.1130* 0.0002 0.1230* 0.0156 0.0326*** 0.0014 0.0326*** 0.0145 
  (0.0596) (0.0090) (0.0699) (0.0108) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0097) (0.0105) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.2360*** 0.0125 0.1980** 0.0162 0.0480*** 0.0121 0.0458*** 0.0152 
  (0.0912) (0.0143) (0.0925) (0.0144) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0145) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0940 -0.0043 -0.0920 -0.0008 -0.0100 -0.0039 -0.0172 0.0013 
  (0.0889) (0.0126) (0.0901) (0.0134) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0125) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,354 3,354 3,354 3,354 
F statistics on instrument 56.65 / 45.64 / 78.12 / 68.94 / 
 R-squared 0.193 0.035 0.248 0.082 0.328 0.035 0.368 0.088 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 1.41 (0.689) 1.27 (0.359) 3.07 (0.216) 2.68 (0.267) 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 12 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underheight & 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1323** 
 
-0.1338** 
 
-0.1670** 
 
-0.2110** 
  
 
(0.0597) 
 
(0.0600) 
 
(0.0810) 
 
(0.0911) 
Mother's working hours  
          
        Instrument - bus stop  0.0588*** 
 
0.0520*** 
 
0.0434*** 
 
0.0453*** 
   (0.0121) 
 
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - road type 0.1250*** 
 
0.1290*** 
 
0.1190*** 
 
0.1180*** 
   (0.0135) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0223*** 
 
-0.0212*** 
 
-0.0196*** 
 
-0.0190*** 
   (0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0038) 
 Age  0.0129 0.0020 -0.0143 0.0044 -0.0099 0.0011 -0.0112 0.0047 
  (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0094) (0.0118) (0.0094) (0.0118) (0.0092) (0.0117) 
Age square 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0013 
  (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Mother's age 
    
0.0116*** -0.0006 0.0100*** -0.0001 
  
    
(0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0063) 
Mother's age square 
    
-0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 
  
    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0524*** 0.0145 0.0521*** -0.0034 0.0232*** -0.0094*** 0.0245*** -0.0047 
  (0.0177) (0.0219) (0.0177) (0.0218) (0.0018) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0037) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0199 -0.0077 -0.0359** -0.0299 0.0519*** 0.0129 0.0481*** -0.0033 
  (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0187) (0.0172) (0.0221) (0.0172) (0.0218) 
Mother's education years 
    
0.0872*** -0.0410*** 0.0848*** -0.0400** 
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(0.0139) (0.0183) (0.0142) (0.0185) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0033 -0.0014 0.0062 -0.0094 0.0036 -0.0020 0.0056 -0.0099 
  (0.0120) (0.0148) (0.0117) (0.0144) (0.0117) (0.0147) (0.0114) (0.0143) 
Sibling number -0.0272*** 0.0170 -0.0095 0.0080 -0.0291*** 0.0186 -0.0230** 0.0076 
  (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0091) (0.0120) (0.0091) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0121) 
Household income -0.0463*** -0.0733*** -0.0466*** -0.0767*** -0.0296*** -0.0692*** -0.0306*** -0.0649*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0119) (0.0090) (0.0119) (0.0088) (0.0113) (0.0089) (0.0115) 
Mother's annual wage 
          
        Other household income 
          
        Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2426*** -0.0180 -0.2413*** 0.0365 -0.3690*** -0.0191 -0.3520*** -0.0372 
  (0.0230) (0.0503) (0.0234) (0.0491) (0.0233) (0.0483) (0.0235) (0.0468) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0164* -0.0549*** 0.0209** -0.0119 0.0278*** -0.0494*** 0.0234** -0.0108 
  (0.0086) (0.0117) (0.0100) (0.0143) (0.0084) (0.0119) (0.0097) (0.0142) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0623*** 0.0229 0.0537*** 0.0403** 0.0476*** 0.0254 0.0460*** 0.0405** 
  (0.0126) (0.0180) (0.0131) (0.0179) (0.0124) (0.0175) (0.0128) (0.0178) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0320*** -0.0027 -0.0463*** 0.0109 0.0290** -0.0012 0.0372*** 0.0116 
  (0.0124) (0.0155) (0.0127) (0.0158) (0.0121) (0.0155) (0.0123) (0.0156) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3339 3339 3339 3339 
F statistics on instrument 78.59 / 77.03 / 76.58 / 75.37 / 
 R-squared 0.286 0.046 0.323 0.106 0.326 0.256 0.365 0.311 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.45 (0.301) 2.22 (0.318) 2.41 (0.309) 2.27 (0.321) 
Notes: The same Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 13 Sensitivity test 1, effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health 
development – underheight & 2SLS estimation (continued) 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
（5） （6） (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
     
-0.1680** 
 
-0.2120** 
  
     
(0.0811) 
 
(0.0912) 
Mother's working hours  
 
-0.0337 
 
-0.0381 
      
 
(0.0224) 
 
(0.0245) 
    Instrument - bus stop  0.2120** 
 
0.3360*** 
 
0.0430*** 
 
0.0439*** 
   (0.0851) 
 
(0.0985) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0131) 
 Instrument - road type 0.5690*** 
 
0.4860*** 
 
0.1180*** 
 
0.1180*** 
   (0.0921) 
 
(0.0917) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.1110*** 
 
-0.0954*** 
 
-0.0189*** 
 
-0.0184*** 
   (0.0271) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0038) 
 Age  -0.1270* -0.0011 -0.1260* 0.0012 -0.0096 0.0011 -0.0114 0.0044 
  (0.0712) (0.0119) (0.0678) (0.0123) (0.0094) (0.0118) (0.0092) (0.0117) 
Age square 0.0037 -0.0009 0.0048 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0013 
  (0.0061) (0.0011) (0.0058) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Moher's age 0.0165 -0.0020 0.0068 -0.0017 0.0093** -0.0008 0.0076** -0.0010 
  (0.0279) (0.0060) (0.0263) (0.0062) (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0038) (0.0063) 
Mother's age square -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.1160*** -0.0094*** 0.1250*** -0.0026 0.0206*** -0.0096*** 0.0215*** -0.0059* 
  (0.0128) (0.0036) (0.0128) (0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0036) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.3317*** 0.0053 0.3219*** -0.0114 0.0516*** 0.0130 0.0478*** -0.0034 
  (0.1220) (0.0212) (0.1190) (0.0217) (0.0172) (0.0221) (0.0171) (0.0218) 
Mother's education years 0.2590*** -0.0485** 0.3450*** -0.0454** 0.0856*** -0.0109 0.0835*** -0.0295 
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  (0.1000) (0.0193) (0.1020) (0.0209) (0.0139) (0.0183) (0.0141) (0.0185) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0502 -0.0011 0.0500 -0.0087 0.0048 -0.0019 0.0070 -0.0094 
  (0.0859) (0.0149) (0.0830) (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.0148) (0.0114) (0.0144) 
Sibling number -0.2800*** 0.0141 -0.2380*** 0.0021 -0.0290*** 0.0185 -0.0213** 0.0082 
  (0.0601) (0.0135) (0.0597) (0.0129) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0121) 
Household income -0.1530** -0.0690*** -0.1550** -0.0621*** 
      (0.0628) (0.0115) (0.0622) (0.0121) 
    Mother's annual wage 
    
0.0705*** -0.0451** 0.0810*** -0.0448** 
  
    
(0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0205) (0.0218) 
Other household income 
    
-0.0246*** -0.0297** -0.0265*** -0.0295** 
  
    
(0.0087) (0.0115) (0.0088) (0.0115) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.9870*** -0.0139 -0.7530*** -0.0671 -0.3610*** -0.0194 -0.3460*** -0.0353 
  (0.1710) (0.0523) (0.1690) (0.0515) (0.0237) (0.0480) (0.0236) (0.0464) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.1130* -0.0486*** 0.1230* -0.0060 0.0326*** -0.0500*** 0.0226** -0.0111 
  (0.0596) (0.0119) (0.0699) (0.0149) (0.0084) (0.0122) (0.0097) (0.0142) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.2360*** 0.0253 0.1980** 0.0433** 0.0480*** 0.0255 0.0458*** 0.0405** 
  (0.0912) (0.0176) (0.0925) (0.0184) (0.0124) (0.0175) (0.0127) (0.0178) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.1940** -0.00287 0.2920*** 0.0023 0.0300** -0.0013 0.0372*** 0.0115 
  (0.0889) (0.0159) (0.0901) (0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0155)   (0.0156) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3339 3339 3339 3339 
F statistics on instrument 56.12 / 53.90 / 78.12 / 74.33 / 
R-squared 0.293 0.238 0.248 0.237 0.328 0.256 0.368 0.311 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 3.88 (0.226) 3.69 (0.267) 2.64 （0.288） 2.59 （0.281） 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 14 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underweight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0376** -0.0325** -0.0382** -0.0326** -0.0376** -0.0346** -0.0525*** -0.0423*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0157) 
Age  0.0072 0.0078 0.0064 0.0080 0.0050 0.0071 0.0051 0.0067 
  (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
Age square 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Mother's age 
  
0.0046 0.0038 0.0044 0.0050 0.0044 0.0037 
  
  
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0037) 
Mother's age square 
  
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 
  
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0083 -0.0024 0.0084 -0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0057 -0.0055 -0.0037 
  (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0103 -0.0157 -0.0098 
-0.0149 
-0.0132 -0.0170 -0.0132 -0.0170 
  (0.0156) (0.0154) （0.0156） （0.0154） (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0153) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0442*** -0.0435* -0.0412*** -0.0467*** -0.0450*** -0.0442*** 
  
  
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.00199) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0084 0.0062 0.0082 0.0058 0.0082 0.0061 0.0088 0.0067 
  (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0122) 
Sibling number 0.0215* 0.0108 0.0196* 0.0177* 0.0187* 0.0179* 0.0186* 0.0183* 
  (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0109) 
Household total annual income  -0.0506** -0.0550** -0.0868*** -0.0855*** -0.0864*** -0.0852*** -0.0863*** -0.0853*** 
  (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0087) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0633*** -0.0645*** -0.0833*** -0.0851** -0.0930*** -0.0940*** -0.0950*** -0.0982*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0149) (0.0154) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 0.0011 0.0148 0.0014 
0.0151 
-0.0094 -0.0155 -0.0019 -0.0132 
  (0.0095) (0.0112) (0.0095) (0.0112) (0.0093) (0.0111) (0.0095) (0.0112) 
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Market in community (1=yes) 0.0123 0.0081 0.0129 0.0093 0.0084 0.0067 0.0098 0.0066 
  (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0136) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0023 0.0001 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0025 
  (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Mother's BMI 
   
 -0.0153*** -0.0210***  
   
   
 (0.0021) (0.0021)  
 Father's BMI 
   
 -0.0134*** -0.0189***  
   
   
 (0.0022) (0.0022)  
 Tap water in household 
   
 
  
-0.0629*** -0.0403*** 
  
   
 
  
(0.0143) (0.0150) 
Flush toilet in household 
   
 
  
-0.0312 -0.0401 
  
   
 
  
(0.0341) (0.0350) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.236 0.283 0.236 0.283 0.266 0.296 0.244 0.287 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes fitted value. 
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Table 6. 15 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underheight & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0723*** -0.0783*** -0.0718*** -0.0764*** -0.0638*** -0.0736*** -0.0821*** -0.0776*** 
  (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0193) 
Age  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0008 0.0028 -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0035 
  (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0014 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Mother's age   -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 
    (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0066) 
Mother's age square   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0162 -0.0016 0.0133 -0.0060 -0.0077 -0.0072 -0.0096 -0.0072 
  (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0221) (0.0220) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0319* -0.0458** 
-0.0322* 
-0.0458** -0.0348* -0.0468** -0.0320** -0.0457** 
  (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0389*** -0.0362** -0.0379*** -0.0353** -0.0372*** -0.0361** 
  
  
(0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0035) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0003 -0.0041 -0.0002 -0.00420 0.0012 0.0038 0.0014 0.0047 
  (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0153) 
Sibling number 0.0329** 0.0212 0.0269** 0.0225** 0.0262** 0.0226* 0.0267** 0.0226* 
  (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0131) 
Household annual income  -0.0531*** -0.0564*** -0.0545*** -0.0588** -0.0542*** -0.0588*** -0.0545*** -0.0588*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0116) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0598*** -0.0650*** -0.0618*** -0.0699*** -0.0866*** -0.0881*** -0.0689*** -0.0699*** 
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  (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0200) (0.0206) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community -0.0465*** -0.0120 -0.0452*** -0.0116 -0.0391*** -0.0113 -0.0462*** -0.0107 
  (0.0127) (0.0153) (0.0127) (0.0153) (0.0127) (0.0154) (0.0127) (0.0154) 
Market in community (1=yes) 0.0141 0.0157 0.0167 0.0197 0.0133 0.0187 0.0155 0.0202 
  (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0170) (0.0174) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0025 0.0118 0.00183 0.0121 0.0013 0.0115 0.0023 0.0099 
  (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
Mother's BMI 
    
-0.0220*** -0.0248*** 
    
    
(0.0027) (0.0027)  
 Father's BMI 
    
-0.0028 -0.0026  
   
    
(0.0028) (0.0028)  
 Tap water in household 
      
-0.0419** -0.0423** 
  
      
(0.0174) (0.0179) 
Flush toilet in household 
      
0.0501 0.0588 
  
      
(0.0506) (0.0512) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.261 0.313 0.260 0.311 0.27 0.312 0.262 0.312 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes fitted value. 
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Table 6. 16 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underweight & 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0587* 
 
-0.0602* 
 
-0.0542* 
 
-0.0577* 
  
 
（0.0309） 
 
(0.0344) 
 
(0.0306) 
 
(0.0340) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0802*** 
 
0.0709*** 
 
0.0605*** 
 
0.0604*** 
   (0.0143) 
 
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0152) 
 Instrument - road type 0.1470*** 
 
0.1610*** 
 
0.1390*** 
 
0.1470*** 
   (0.0158) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0299*** 
 
-0.0274*** 
 
-0.0260*** 
 
-0.0244*** 
   (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 Age  -0.0119 0.0069 -0.0105 0.0086 -0.0083 0.0053 -0.0076 0.0079 
  (0.0113) (0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0089) 
Age square -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0007 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Moher's age 
    
0.0127*** 0.0034 0.0117*** 0.0032 
  
    
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Mother's age square 
    
-0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001 
  
    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0695*** 0.0031 0.0587*** -0.0038 0.0272*** -0.0061** 0.0284*** -0.0040 
  (0.0204) (0.0182) (0.0206) (0.0180) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0032) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
good/excellent) 
0.0351** -0.0063 0.0501*** -0.0142 0.0671*** 0.0040 0.0518*** -0.0027 
  (0.0167) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0198) (0.0186) (0.0200) (0.0181) 
Mother's education years 
    
0.0323* -0.0390** 0.0347** -0.0344** 
  
    
(0.0163) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0156) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0113 0.0087 0.0138 0.0061 0.0104 0.0082 0.0118 0.0057 
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  (0.0141) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0121) 
Sibling number -0.0121 0.0212* 0.0038 0.0102 -0.0167 0.0223** -0.0026 0.0103 
  (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0113) 
Household income -0.0619*** -0.0731*** -0.0609*** -0.0769*** -0.0423*** -0.0794*** -0.0427*** -0.0752*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0097) (0.0107) (0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0094) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3990*** -0.0953*** 0.4020*** -0.0891** 0.3360*** -0.0868** 0.3360*** -0.0856** 
  (0.0233) (0.0352) (0.0238) (0.0347) (0.0237) (0.0338) (0.0239) (0.0329) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker 
in community 
-0.0256** -0.0013 0.0215* 0.0124 -0.0391*** 0.0022 0.0138 0.0134 
  (0.0103) (0.0095) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0706*** 0.0042 0.0655*** 0.0067 0.0538*** 0.0069 0.0549*** 0.0068 
  (0.0149) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0152) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0128 -0.0015 -0.0255* 0.0010 -0.0101 -0.0017 -0.0148 0.0008 
  (0.0145) (0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0127) 
Mother's BMI 
        
  
        
Father's BMI 
        
  
        
Tap water in household 
        
  
        
Flush toilet in household 
        
  
        
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 
F statistics on instrument 92.23 / 60.93 / 109.83 / 72.93 / 
R-squared 0.286 0.231 0.321 0.283 0.332 0.232 0.369 0.284 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.55 （0.254） 2.68 （0.267） 2.35 （0.248） 2.47 （0.260） 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 17 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underweight & 2SLS estimation (continued) 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0654** 
 
-0.0683** 
 
-0.0500** 
 
-0.0516** 
  
 
(0.0316) 
 
(0.0317) 
 
(0.0250) 
 
(0.0257) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0636*** 
 
0.0595*** 
 
0.0457*** 
 
0.0467*** 
 
  (0.0140) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.1360*** 
 
0.144*** 
 
0.1240*** 
 
0.1310*** 
 
  (0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0250*** 
 
-0.0238*** 
 
-0.0256*** 
 
-0.0236*** 
 
  (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
Age  -0.0072 0.0027 -0.0068 0.0061 -0.0091 0.0048 -0.0097 0.0067 
  (0.0111) (0.0091) (0.0108) (0.0090) (0.0110) (0.0090) (0.0107) (0.0089) 
Age square -0.0011 0.0011 -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0008 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Moher's age 0.0124*** 0.0046 0.0114*** 0.0039 0.0116*** 0.0038 0.0105** 0.0032 
  (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Mother's age square -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Coresident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0269*** -0.0076** 0.0281*** -0.0054* 0.0255*** -0.0057* 0.0259*** -0.0044 
  (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0032) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
good/excellent) 
0.0685*** -0.0076 0.0524*** -0.0082 0.0583*** 0.0048 0.0453** -0.0028 
  (0.0198) (0.0185) (0.0199) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0181) 
Mother's education years -0.0162 -0.0116 -0.0341** -0.0151 -0.0146 -0.0087 -0.0325** -0.0144 
  (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0156) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0113 0.0077 0.0128 0.0057 0.0104 0.0089 0.0128 0.0066 
  (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0121) 
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Sibling number -0.0162 0.0225** -0.0028 0.0111 -0.0184 0.0206* -0.0015 0.0108 
  (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0113) 
Household income -0.0418*** -0.0714*** -0.0422*** -0.0768*** -0.0421*** -0.0768*** -0.0421*** -0.0747*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0094) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0095) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3270*** -0.0843** -0.3290*** -0.0833** -0.3080*** -0.0821** -0.3000*** -0.0800** 
  (0.0240) (0.0334) (0.0241) (0.0330) (0.0240) (0.0342) (0.0241) (0.0329) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0412*** 0.0124 0.0141 0.0136 0.0421*** -0.0022 0.0098 0.0117 
  (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0551*** -0.0023 0.0563*** 0.0006 0.0508*** 0.0073 0.0479*** 0.0049 
  (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0150) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0103 -0.0016 -0.0140 -0.0002 -0.0055 0.0018 -0.0154 0.0025 
  (0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0144) (0.0127) (0.0142) (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0128) 
Mother's BMI 0.0023 -0.0158*** 0.0027 -0.0114*** 
    
  (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0022) 
  
 
 Father's BMI 0.0071** -0.0144*** 0.0082*** -0.0094*** 
  
 
   (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0024) 
  
 
 Tap water in household 
    
0.0240 -0.0393** 0.0220 -0.0388* 
  
    
(0.0150) (0.0195) (0.0150) (0.0209) 
Flush toilet in household 
    
0.0601 -0.0297 0.0493 -0.0389 
  
    
(0.0428) (0.0350) (0.0415) (0.0359) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 
F statistics on instrument 104.27 / 70.56 / 111.86 / 75.08 / 
 R-squared 0.330 0.251 0.363 0.294 0.345 0.243 0.381 0.287 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 1.28 (0.358) 1.27 (0.359) 3.07 (0.216) 2.68 (0.267) 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 18 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underheight &2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1440** 
 
-0.1342* 
 
-0.1705** 
 
-0.1956** 
  
 
(0.0668) 
 
(0.0601) 
 
(0.0874) 
 
(0.0949) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0802*** 
 
0.0709*** 
 
0.0605*** 
 
0.0604*** 
   (0.0143) 
 
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0152) 
 Instrument - road type 0.1470*** 
 
0.1610*** 
 
0.1390*** 
 
0.1470*** 
   (0.0158) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0299*** 
 
-0.0274*** 
 
-0.0260*** 
 
-0.0244*** 
   (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 Age  -0.0119 0.0019 -0.0105 0.0086 -0.0083 0.0006 -0.0076 0.0029 
  (0.0113) (0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0127) 
Age square -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0013 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Moher's age 
    
0.0127*** -0.0004 0.0117*** -0.0007 
  
    
(0.0041) (0.007) (0.0041) (0.0067) 
Mother's age square 
    
-0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 
  
    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0695*** 0.0207 0.0587*** -0.0038 0.0272*** -0.0079** 0.0284*** -0.0037 
  (0.0204) (0.0234) (0.0206) (0.0180) (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0037) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0351** -0.0286 0.0501*** -0.0142 0.0671*** 0.0192 0.0518*** 0.0038 
  (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0200) (0.0229) 
Mother's education years 
    
0.0473*** -0.0323* 0.0347** -0.0483** 
  
    
(0.0163) (0.0192) (0.0166) (0.0194) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0113 0.0006 0.0138 0.0061 0.0104 0.0003 0.0118 -0.0039 
  (0.0141) (0.0157) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0153) 
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Sibling number -0.0121 0.0309** 0.0038 0.0102 -0.0167 0.0326** -0.0026 0.0202 
  (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0134) 
Household income -0.0619*** -0.0747*** -0.0609*** -0.0769*** -0.0423*** -0.0714*** -0.0427*** -0.0724*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0106) (0.0125) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3990*** -0.0909*** -0.4020*** -0.0991*** -0.3360*** -0.0988** -0.3360*** 0.0906** 
  (0.0233) (0.0334) (0.0238) (0.0347) (0.0237) (0.0417) (0.0239) (0.0406) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0256** -0.0538*** 0.0215* 0.0124 0.0391*** -0.0490*** 0.0138 -0.0126 
  (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0131) (0.0114) (0.0156) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0706*** 0.0133 0.0655*** 0.0067 0.0538*** 0.0150 0.0549*** 0.0209 
  (0.0149) (0.0193) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0188) (0.0148) (0.0190) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0128 0.0028 -0.0255* 0.0010 -0.0101 0.0028 -0.0148 0.0119 
  (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0149) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.0161) 
Mother's BMI 
    
      
    
    Father's BMI 
    
      
    
    Tap water in household 
    
      
    
    Flush toliet in household 
    
      
    
    Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 
F statistics on instrument 92.23 / 60.93 / 104.27 / 70.56 / 
R-squared 0.286 0.054 0.321 0.083 0.332 0.26 0.369 0.309 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 1.82 (0.288) 1.65 (0.301) 1.68 (0.326) 1.34 (0.349) 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 19 Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development 
– underheight &2SLS estimation (continued) 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) 
2SLS 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1642** 
 
-0.1741** 
 
-0.1400* 
 
-0.1470** 
  
 
(0.0788) 
 
(0.0874) 
 
(0.0710) 
 
(0.0727) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0636*** 
 
0.0595*** 
 
0.0457*** 
 
0.0467*** 
 
  (0.0140) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.1360*** 
 
0.1440*** 
 
0.124*** 
 
0.131*** 
 
  (0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0250*** 
 
-0.0238*** 
 
-0.0256*** 
 
-0.0236*** 
 
  (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
Age  -0.0072 -0.0013 -0.0068 0.0022 -0.0091 0.0009 -0.0097 0.0030 
  (0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0126) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0013 
  (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Moher's age 0.0124*** 0.0006 0.0114*** -0.0003 0.0116*** -0.0005 0.0105** -0.0011 
  (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0067) 
Mother's age square -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0269*** -0.0089** 0.0281*** -0.0042 0.0255*** -0.0076** 0.0259*** -0.0041 
  (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0038) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0685*** 0.0109 0.0524*** 0.0017 0.0583*** 0.0171 0.0453** 0.0014 
  (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0199) (0.0230) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0199) (0.0229) 
Mother's education years 0.0462*** -0.0343* 0.0341** -0.0487** 0.0446*** -0.0413** -0.0325** -0.0476** 
  (0.0163) (0.0190) (0.0166) (0.0194) (0.0163) (0.0192) (0.0165) (0.0194) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0113 0.0002 0.0128 -0.0034 0.0104 0.0002 0.0128 -0.0043 
  (0.0136) (0.0156) (0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0131) (0.0153) 
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Sibling number -0.0162 0.0328** -0.0028 0.0205 -0.0184 0.0317** -0.0015 0.0205 
  (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0134) 
Household income -0.0418*** -0.0327*** -0.0422*** -0.0230* -0.0421*** -0.0302** -0.0421*** -0.0230* 
  (0.0104) (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.0125) (0.0104) (0.0125) (0.0105) (0.0126) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3270*** -0.0958** -0.3290*** -0.0972** -0.3080*** -0.0985** -0.3000*** -0.0938** 
  (0.0240) (0.0410) (0.0241) (0.0407) (0.0240) (0.0423) (0.0241) (0.0406) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker 
in community 
0.0412*** -0.0415*** 0.0141 -0.0122 0.0421*** -0.0512*** 0.0098 -0.0125 
  (0.0101) (0.0132) (0.0114) (0.0156) (0.0103) (0.0133) (0.0113) (0.0156) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0551*** 0.0087 0.0563*** 0.0188 0.0508*** 0.0154 0.0479*** 0.0197 
  (0.0146) (0.0189) (0.0148) (0.0192) (0.0146) (0.0189) (0.0148) (0.0189) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0103 0.0028 -0.0140 0.0116 -0.0055 0.0035 -0.0154 0.0103 
  (0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0142) (0.0161) (0.0144) (0.0161) 
Mother's BMI 0.0023 -0.0123*** 0.0027 -0.0147*** 
      (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
    Father's BMI 0.0071** -0.0097*** 0.0082*** -0.0096*** 
      (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
    Tap water in household 
    
0.0220 -0.0503** 0.0220 -0.0532** 
  
    
(0.0150) (0.0234) (0.0150) (0.0248) 
Flush toilet in household 
    
0.0601 0.0440 0.0493 0.0518 
  
    
(0.0428) (0.0515) (0.0415) (0.0519) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 
F statistics on instrument 111.86 / 75.08 / 114.22 / 75.24 / 
R-squared 0.334 0.271 0.371 0.312 0.349 0.26 0.389 0.311 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.59 (0.215) 1.78 (0.304) 1.44 (0.328) 2.64 (0.205) 
Notes: The same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6. 20 Sensitivity test 3, effect of maternal employment and food making time on children's health development - underweight, 
2SLS & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight(1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 2SLS OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0697** 
 
-0.0809** 
    
 
(0.0302) 
 
(0.0371) 
  Mother's food making time 
    
-0.0260*** -0.0246*** 
  
    
(0.0025) (0.0027) 
Grandparent's food making time * co-resident with 
grandparents     
-0.0021 -0.0027 
  
    
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0854*** 
 
0.0697*** 
 
    (0.0128) 
 
(0.0143) 
 
  Instrument - road type 0.1160*** 
 
0.1310*** 
 
    (0.0138) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
  Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0277*** 
 
-0.0252*** 
 
    (0.0038) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
  Age  0.0059 0.0050 0.0063 0.0066 0.0033 0.0036 
  (0.0098) (0.0078) (0.0096) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Age square -0.0023*** 0.0006 -0.0022*** 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Left behind children (1=yes) -0.0208 0.0870*** -0.0156 0.0896*** 0.0905*** 0.0939*** 
  (0.0492) (0.0278) (0.0487) (0.0290) (0.0272) (0.0281) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.1290*** -0.0053 0.1090*** 0.0078 -0.0142 -0.0050 
  (0.0247) (0.0211) (0.0242) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0169 0.1030 0.0443 0.0972 0.1050 0.0988 
  (0.1420) (0.0876) (0.1420) (0.0930) (0.0884) (0.0935) 
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Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0479*** 0.0069 0.0580*** -0.0077 -0.0114 -0.0006 
  (0.0162) (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0017 0.0189* 0.0031 0.0137 0.0179* 0.0134 
  (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0123) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0104) 
Sibling number -0.0356*** 0.0074 -0.0193* -0.0063 0.0090 -0.0043 
  (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Household total annual income  -0.0617*** -0.0666*** -0.0583*** -0.0641*** -0.0491*** -0.0490*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0060) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3260*** -0.0650** -0.3320*** -0.0617** -0.0820*** -0.0642*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0283) (0.0212) (0.0289) (0.0108) (0.0110) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0246*** -0.0160** 0.0257** 0.0022 -0.0155* 0.0014 
  (0.0093) (0.0081) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0079) (0.0100) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0554*** 0.0057 0.0539*** 0.0141 0.0035 0.0079 
  (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0115) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0217* 0.0029 0.0223* 0.0058 0.0033 0.0082 
  (0.0130) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0108) 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No Yes 
County effect No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 3733 3733 3733 3733 
F statistics on instrument 91.86 / 60.58 / / / 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.232 0.276 0.281 0.231 0.283 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables (household income and Ordinary annual wage for female worker in community) take logged value, in RMB. 
Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes), paved road (1=yes) and age of youngest child.  
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Table 6. 21 Sensitivity test 3, effect of maternal employment and food making time on children's health development - underheight, 
2SLS & OLS estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight(1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 2SLS OLS 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1670* 
 
-0.1540* 
 
   
 
(0.0859) 
 
(0.0861) 
 
 Mother's food making time 
    
-0.0560*** -0.0546*** 
  
    
(0.0026) (0.0027) 
Grandparent's food making time * co-resident with 
grandparents     
-0.0021 -0.0027 
  
    
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0854*** 
 
0.0697*** 
 
    (0.0128) 
 
(0.0143) 
 
  Instrument - road type 0.1160*** 
 
0.1310*** 
 
    (0.0138) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
  Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0277*** 
 
-0.0252*** 
 
    (0.0038) 
 
(0.004) 
 
  Age  0.0059 0.0115 0.0063 0.0114 0.0033 0.0036 
  (0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0096) (0.0105) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Age square -0.0023*** -0.0019** -0.0022*** -0.0019** 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Left behind children -0.0208 0.1240*** -0.0156 0.1590*** 0.0905*** 0.0939*** 
  (0.0492) (0.0408) (0.0487) (0.0428) (0.0272) (0.0281) 
Co-resident with grandparents 0.1290*** -0.0146 0.1090*** -0.0117 -0.0142 -0.0050 
  (0.0247) (0.0265) (0.0242) (0.0254) (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0169 -0.0324 0.0443 -0.0153 0.1050 0.0988 
  (0.1420) (0.0552) (0.1420) (0.0649) (0.0884) (0.0935) 
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Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0479*** 0.0074 0.0580*** -0.0120 0.0114 0.0006 
  (0.0162) (0.0188) (0.0166) (0.0191) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0031 -0.0092 0.0149 0.0134 
  (0.0125) (0.0136) (0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0107) (0.0104) 
Sibling number -0.0356*** 0.0332*** -0.0193* 0.0209* 0.0090 0.0043 
  (0.0110) (0.0127) (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Household total annual income  -0.0617*** -0.0722*** -0.0583*** -0.0785*** -0.0709*** -0.0750*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0099) (0.0080) (0.0094) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3260*** -0.0769*** -0.3320*** -0.0794*** -0.0820*** -0.0842*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0156) (0.0212) (0.0160) (0.0108) (0.0110) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
0.0246*** -0.0613*** 0.0257** -0.0209 -0.0165** -0.0214** 
  (0.0093) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0140) (0.0079) (0.0100) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0554*** 0.0184 0.0539*** -0.0321* 0.0035 0.0079 
  (0.0134) (0.0165) (0.0136) (0.0167) (0.0113) (0.0115) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0217* 0.0020 0.0223* 0.0155 0.0033 0.0082 
  (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0107) (0.0108) 
Year effect No No Yes Yes No Yes 
County effect No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 3733 3733 3733 3733 
F statistics on instrument 91.86 / 60.58 / / / 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.251 0.276 0.112 0.231 0.283 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Mother's annual income takes fitted value and household other income excludes mother's income. All income variables take logged value, 
in RMB. Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes), paved road (1=yes) and age of youngest child.  
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7. Conclusion 
The OCP, a unique population growth control experiment in China, has provided a 
good foundation for research on fertility and female labour force participation. 
Starting from this point, three chapters using CHNS data are included in this thesis to 
investigate how fertility and grandparents’ childcare can influence mothers’ labour 
force participation and how mothers’ labour supply can influence children’s health 
development.  
When modelling the relationship between fertility and female labour force 
participation, one fundamental issue is the endogeneity of fertility, either due to an 
omitted variable, such as attitude, or a simultaneous influence on both female labour 
force participation and fertility. This feature also applies to grandparents’ childcare 
when modelling the effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers’ labour force 
participation, and maternal employment when modelling the effect of maternal 
employment on children’s health development.  
For each endogenous variable, I have employed different instruments to represent 
them in the estimations, and all the instruments are strong and effective. In general, 
the research in this thesis has shown that women will reduce their labour supply when 
they have more children, but mothers will increase their labour supply if they can 
receive childcare support from grandparents. In particular, women in rural areas are 
more vulnerable than women in urban areas, in that they have lower possibility of 
returning to the labour market if they have more children. I also found evidence of 
mothers’ employment having a positive effect on children’s health, in that children 
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will be less likely to be underweight and/or underheight if their mothers take on 
off-farm work.  
The main contribution of this thesis is it is among the first to investigate female labour 
force participation in China from the perspective of the OCP and to investigate how 
maternal employment could impact on children’s health development in rural China. 
Instruments used in this thesis are the second contribution, in that they open up new 
channels representing endogenous variables and result in more precise results from 
the estimations. 
The main limitation of this thesis is that migrant women are not identified in Chapters 
4 and 5, and left-behind children are excluded in Chapter 6. That means that future 
work is needed to explore the more specific effects of migrant mothers’ labour force 
participation and left-behind children’s health development. 
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Appendix 
A．Matching mothers and children 
Basically, mothers and children are matched based on two inter-household links in the 
CHNS data, one is the relationship to the household head from the individual survey 
and the other is mother's line number from the child survey. Children were asked 
three questions about their mothers: (i) does your mother live in this household, (ii) 
what is your mother's name, which will be recorded as line number in the data, and 
(iii) what is the relationship with your mother. For the last question, three options are 
available for children to choose, (i) biological mother; (ii) step-mother; and (iii) 
adopted mother. 
The strategy is to created identical ID numbers for mother and children so that 
biological mother and children would be blocked together. However, the trick is that 
not all the households have clear record of household relationship, for example, some 
households change their household head because the previous one passed away. This 
household alteration usually happens in rural households in the data and most of the 
rural households have a big family which means the relationship to household head is 
complicated after the household head alteration. 
Therefore, the first step is to clean and restore the household relationship that has 
been recorded the first time. Then, for those households with only two generations, I 
can simply use the household relationship to identify mothers and children and further 
count the number of children the households have. For those households with three or 
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even more generations, I can only identify mothers and children in the presence of 
linkage between mothers and children. 
One problem related to this matching process is that in some households, it is possible 
to have the case of absence of child(ren). That is to say, in the first wave, the data 
contains information of one child but in the next wave, this child is not recorded. The 
consequences of the absence of child(ren) is that it can lead to a misleading fertility 
number obtained from this strategy. The solution is to use the maximum number of 
children counted for a mother. 
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B. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - OLS 
estimation, whole sample 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0413*** 0.0428*** 0.0459*** 0.0430*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
Age2 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Household structure 
      basecase: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0635*** -0.0839*** -0.0802*** -0.0848*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0175) 
  number of child under 6 -0.0183* -0.0180* -0.0177* -0.0175* 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0209** -0.0234** -0.0212** -0.0266** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0116) 
  number of child under 16 0.0177 0.0193 0.0187 0.0197 
 
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0144) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0123 0.0223 0.0229 0.0213 
 
(0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
  Upper middle school 0.0459*** 0.0668*** 0.0580*** 0.0691*** 
 
(0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0150) 
  College or more 0.1328*** 0.1392*** 0.1329*** 0.1397*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) 
Health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0746*** 0.0706*** 0.0762*** 0.0705*** 
 
(0.0084) (0.0157) (0.0082) (0.0157) 
Ethnic minority -0.0241* -0.0253* -0.0257* -0.0247* 
 
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0155) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0709** 0.0693** 0.0702** 0.0698** 
 
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0310) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0399** -0.0402** -0.0405** -0.0410** 
 
(0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0206) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0541* 0.0572* 0.0567* 0.0574* 
 
(0.0300) (0.0308) (0.0302) (0.0309) 
Women's annual wage                                        0.0977*** 0.1110*** 0.1095*** 0.1250*** 
 
(0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0238) (0.0240) 
Women's other income  -0.1281*** -0.1233*** -0.1293*** -0.1234*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0476*** -0.0405*** 
   
(0.0046) (0.0067) 
Constant -0.4309** -0.9400*** -0.4214** -0.9772*** 
 
(0.2040) (0.2050) (0.2040) (0.2160) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5029 5029 5029 5029 
R-squared 0.318 0.362 0.335 0.364 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women’s annual income takes fitted value. All income variables take logged value and in RMB.  
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C. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - probit 
estimation, whole sample 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0482*** 0.0640*** 0.0631*** 0.0660*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0197) 
Age2 -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Household structure 
      basecase: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0863*** -0.150*** -0.128*** -0.156*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0389) (0.0399) (0.0474) 
  number of child under 6 -0.0195* -0.0181* -0.0185* -0.0174* 
 
(0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0119) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0214** -0.0244** -0.0227** -0.0243** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0108) (0.0125) 
  number of child under 16 0.0176 0.0182 0.0181 0.0191 
 
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0156) 
Education categories 
      basecase: primary or less 
      lower middle school 0.0318 0.0358 0.0426 0.0462 
 
(0.0269) (0.0380) (0.0340) (0.0409) 
  upper middle school 0.0483*** 0.0651*** 0.0437*** 0.0661*** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0233) (0.0133) (0.0234) 
  College or more 0.1338** 0.1383** 0.1361*** 0.1435** 
 
(0.0281) (0.0341) (0.0330) (0.0374) 
health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0735*** 0.0757** 0.0754*** 0.0782** 
 
(0.0264) (0.0400) (0.0313) (0.0440) 
Ethnic minority -0.0405* -0.0530* -0.0571** -0.0572* 
 
(0.0253) (0.0297) (0.0302) (0.0316) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0685** 0.0645** 0.0655** 0.0649** 
 
(0.0282) (0.0288) (0.0301) (0.0310) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0329* -0.0340* -0.0390* -0.0400* 
 
(0.0189) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0225) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0512* 0.0525* 0.0545* 0.0557* 
 
(0.0310) (0.0320) (0.0325) (0.0329) 
Women's annual wage                                        0.0915*** 0.1174*** 0.0916*** 0.1200*** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0290) (0.0235) (0.0302) 
Women's other income  -0.1102*** -0.1139*** -0.1279*** -0.1226** 
 
(0.0270) (0.0279) (0.0235) (0.0254) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0504*** -0.0526*** 
   
(0.0144) (0.0184) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5029 5029 5029 5029 
Pseudo R-squared 0.300 0.378 0.335 0.382 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women’s annual income takes fitted value. All income variables take logged value and in RMB. 
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D. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - OLS 
estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0299** 0.0357*** 0.0300** 0.0356*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0116) 
Age2 -0.0004** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0617* -0.0685** -0.0619* -0.0678** 
 
(0.0355) (0.0328) (0.0353) (0.0328) 
  number of child under 6 -0.0033 -0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0052 
 
(0.0277) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0267) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0489** -0.0470** -0.0508** -0.0465** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0229) 
  number of child under 16 0.0238 0.0256 0.0228 0.0248 
 
(0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0367) (0.0256) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0054 0.0288 0.0082 0.0283 
 
(0.0258) (0.0249) (0.0257) (0.0249) 
  Upper middle school 0.0373 0.0801*** 0.0345 0.0796*** 
 
(0.0271) (0.0260) (0.0269) (0.0260) 
  College or more 0.1600*** 0.2061*** 0.1578*** 0.2056*** 
 
(0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0259) 
Health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0626*** 0.0748*** 0.0689*** 0.0749*** 
 
(0.0145) (0.0217) (0.0146) (0.0217) 
Ethnic minority -0.0214 -0.0268 -0.0241 -0.0271 
 
(0.0325) (0.0328) (0.0324) (0.0328) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0773*** 0.0654*** 0.0747*** 0.0655*** 
 
(0.0255) (0.0249) (0.0256) (0.0249) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0410 -0.0419 -0.0408 -0.0412 
 
(0.0293) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0282) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0363** 0.0494*** 0.0406** 0.0493*** 
 
(0.0174) (0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0181) 
Women's annual wage                                        0.0972*** 0.0989*** 0.0936*** 0.0927*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0115) (0.0077) (0.0101) 
Women's other income  -0.1001*** -0.1002*** -0.1001*** -0.1002*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0408*** -0.0466*** 
   
(0.0106) (0.0115) 
Constant 0.3931 -0.5583** 0.4922* -0.5255* 
 
(0.2530) (0.2522) (0.2611) (0.2716) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2411 2411 2411 2411 
R-squared 0.283 0.384 0.288 0.384 
Notes: The same as Appendix B. 
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E. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - probit 
estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0289*** 0.0399*** 0.0296*** 0.0408*** 
 
(0.0096) (0.0089) (0.0096) (0.0066) 
Age2 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.0613** -0.0653** -0.0585* -0.0656** 
 
(0.0310) (0.0281) (0.0311) (0.0286) 
  number of child under 6 0.0060 0.0029 0.0061 0.0066 
 
(0.0277) (0.0262) (0.0277) (0.0174) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0433** -0.0447** -0.0448** -0.0539** 
 
(0.0205) (0.0190) (0.0205) (0.0191) 
  number of child under 16 0.0276 0.0246 0.0273 0.0261 
 
(0.0260) (0.0256) (0.0260) (0.0251) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary or less 
      lower middle school 0.0037 0.0219 0.0071 0.0287 
 
(0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0195) (0.0135) 
  upper middle school 0.0328 0.0620*** 0.0295 0.0686*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0154) 
  College or more 0.2111*** 0.2348*** 0.2052*** 0.2654*** 
 
(0.0298) (0.0271) (0.0294) (0.0220) 
health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0676*** 0.0659** 0.0654*** 0.0693** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0264) (0.0164) (0.0221) 
Ethnic minority -0.0246 -0.0162 -0.0264 -0.0154 
 
(0.0300) (0.0312) (0.0300) (0.0321) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0525*** 0.0399** 0.0510*** 0.0356** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0178) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0366 -0.0367 -0.0353 -0.0345 
 
(0.0246) (0.0250) (0.0245) (0.0273) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0342* 0.0432** 0.0378* 0.0376* 
 
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0133) 
Women's annual wage                                  0.0917*** 0.0901*** 0.0964*** 0.0975*** 
 
(0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0079) (0.0064) 
Women's other income  -0.1000*** -0.1000*** -0.1002*** -0.1002*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0013) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0378*** -0.0484*** 
   
(0.0097) (0.0067) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2411 2411 2411 2411 
Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.315 0.234 0.357 
Notes: The same as Appendix C. 
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F. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - OLS 
estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0558*** 0.0539*** 0.0578*** 0.0551*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Age2 -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.1464*** -0.1651*** -0.1474*** -0.1645*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0308) 
  number of child under 6 -0.0452** -0.0506** -0.0473** -0.0502** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0220) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0325 -0.0359 -0.0352 -0.0656 
 
(0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0297) (0.0300) 
  number of child under 16 0.0408 0.0479 0.0424 0.0471 
 
(0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary or less 
      lower middle school 0.0207 0.0363 0.0233 0.0356 
 
(0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0225) 
  upper middle school 0.0588** 0.0742*** 0.0597** 0.0750*** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0248) 
  College or more 0.1748*** 0.2382*** 0.1770*** 0.2394*** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0289) (0.0265) (0.0289) 
health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0824*** 0.0774** 0.0785*** 0.0767** 
 
(0.0165) (0.0384) (0.0166) (0.0384) 
Ethnic minority -0.0227 -0.0175 -0.0264 -0.0184 
 
(0.0252) (0.0267) (0.0252) (0.0268) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0543*** 0.0559*** 0.0543*** 0.0577*** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0179) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0658** -0.0532** -0.0632** -0.0512* 
 
(0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0269) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0249 0.0241 0.0267 0.0232 
 
(0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0174) (0.0182) 
Women's annual wage                                        0.0819*** 0.0891*** 0.0847*** 0.0888*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0100) (0.0081) (0.0093) 
Women's other income  -0.1320*** -0.1301*** -0.1318*** -0.1311*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0333*** -0.0255** 
   
(0.0099) (0.0107) 
Constant -0.0310 -0.307 0.0272 -0.2137 
 
(0.2363) (0.2443) (0.2382) (0.2523) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2618 2618 2618 2618 
R-squared 0.272 0.313 0.276 0.315 
Notes: The same as Appendix B. 
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G. Effect of household structure on female labour force participation - probit 
estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.0463*** 0.0479*** 0.0479*** 0.0486*** 
 
(0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
Age2 -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Household structure 
      Base case: no child 
      number of child under 3 -0.1382*** -0.1568*** -0.1382*** -0.1560*** 
 
(0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0254) 
  number of child under 6 -0.0462** -0.0435** -0.0476** -0.0432** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0201) (0.0208) (0.0201) 
  number of child under 12 -0.0314 -0.0326 -0.0318 -0.0332 
 
(0.0280) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0282) 
  number of child under 16 0.0421 0.0431 0.0432 0.0449 
 
 (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0294) (0.0296) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0187 0.0309 0.0204 0.0315 
 
(0.0194) (0.0213) (0.0194) (0.0213) 
  Upper middle school 0.0551** 0.0690*** 0.0549** 0.0688 
 
(0.0232) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0227) 
  College or more 0.2253*** 0.2728*** 0.2267*** 0.2729*** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0355) 
Health condition (good/ excellent) 0.0868*** 0.0826** 0.0841*** 0.0823** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0364) (0.0178) (0.0364) 
Ethnic minority -0.0200 -0.0230 -0.0247 -0.0243 
 
(0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0232) (0.0247) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0544*** 0.0526*** 0.0560*** 0.0542*** 
 
(0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0165) 
Co-resident with adult children -0.0739** -0.0627** -0.0714*** -0.0608** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0255) 
Co-resident with elderly parents 0.0251 0.0322 0.0265 0.0311 
 
(0.0188) (0.0215) (0.0187) (0.0214) 
Women's annual wage                                        0.0837*** 0.0907*** 0.0910*** 0.0963*** 
 
(0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0092) 
Women's other income  -0.1020*** -0.1002*** -0.1017*** -0.1001*** 
 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0315*** -0.0331** 
   
(0.0094) (0.0096) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2618 2618 2618 2618 
Pseudo R-squared 0.276 0.321 0.279 0.322 
Notes: The same as Appendix C. 
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H. Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation - OLS 
estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lfp lfp lfp lfp 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1418*** 0.1361*** 0.1417*** 0.1350*** 
 
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0185) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0603* -0.0720** -0.0629* -0.0732** 
 
(0.0331) (0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0327) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0187 0.0106 0.0156 0.0119 
 
(0.0209) (0.0214) (0.0208) (0.0214) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0194 0.0199 0.0133 0.0111 
 
(0.0136) (0.0147) (0.0136) (0.0146) 
Age  0.0440** 0.0462** 0.0454** 0.0464** 
 
(0.0185) (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0186) 
Age square -0.0005* -0.0006** -0.0005* -0.0006** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0487** 0.0404** 0.0453** 0.0372* 
 
(0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0197) 
  Upper middle school 0.0617** 0.0627** 0.0638** 0.0675** 
 
(0.0296) (0.0290) (0.0296) (0.0291) 
  College or more 0.1200*** 0.1409*** 0.1256*** 0.1444*** 
 
(0.0355) (0.0360) (0.0356) (0.0360) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.0871*** 0.0826*** 0.0816*** 0.0824*** 
 
(0.0170) (0.0230) (0.0172) (0.0230) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0146 -0.0134 -0.0103 -0.0126 
 
(0.0236) (0.0286) (0.0237) (0.0285) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0619** 0.0609** 0.0603** 0.0586** 
 
(0.0257) (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0252) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0322 0.0226 0.0339 0.0247 
 
(0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0133 -0.0030 -0.0107 -0.0044 
 
(0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0216) (0.0213) 
Age of youngest child 0.0126 0.0109 0.0113 0.0098 
 
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0082) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0271 0.0247 0.0277* 0.0250 
 
(0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
Women's annual wage 0.0831*** 0.0814*** 0.0870*** 0.0881*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0066) 
Women's other income -0.05833*** -0.05851*** -0.0581*** -0.0584*** 
 
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0253*** -0.0241*** 
   
(0.0073) (0.0075) 
Constant 0.9845*** 0.5435* 1.0493*** 0.6543** 
 
(0.3103) (0.3156) (0.3067) (0.3145) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
R-squared 0.192 0.234 0.196 0.238 
Notes: The same as Appendix H. 
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 I. Effect of grandparents’ childcare on mothers' labour force participation - probit 
estimation 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lfp lfp lfp lfp 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1390*** 0.1237*** 0.1394*** 0.1240*** 
 
(0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0173) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0608** -0.0693*** -0.0648*** -0.0719*** 
 
(0.0287) (0.0280) (0.0284) (0.0277) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0112 0.0153 0.0176 0.0184 
 
(0.0215) (0.0221) (0.0214) (0.0220) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0202 0.0196 0.0135 0.0222 
 
(0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0154) 
Age  0.0568*** 0.0560*** 0.0580*** 0.0569*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0175) 
Age square -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education categories 
      Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0488** 0.0457** 0.0467** 0.0434** 
 
(0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0198) 
  Upper middle school 0.0548* 0.0532** 0.0501* 0.0588** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0288) (0.0292) (0.0290) 
  College or more 0.1250*** 0.1416*** 0.1309*** 0.1464*** 
 
(0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0366) (0.0370) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.0926*** 0.0785*** 0.0875*** 0.0790*** 
 
(0.0187) (0.0225) (0.0190) (0.0230) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0188 -0.0209 -0.0177 -0.0211 
 
(0.0246) (0.0274) (0.0247) (0.0274) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0469** 0.0514** 0.0461** 0.0500** 
 
(0.0210) (0.0204) (0.0209) (0.0203) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0306** 0.0348** 0.0302** 0.0340** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0133) (0.0138) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0106 -0.0172 -0.0109 -0.0183 
 
(0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0148) 
Age of youngest child 0.0115 0.0120 0.0101 0.0107 
 
(0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0074) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0298* 0.0259* 0.0313** 0.0276* 
 
(0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0153) 
Women's annual wage  0.0905*** 0.0981*** 0.0922*** 0.0998*** 
 
(0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0069) 
Women's other income  -0.0652*** -0.0654*** -0.0648*** -0.0651*** 
 
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0261*** -0.0276*** 
   
(0.0079) (0.0079) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1651 1651 1651 1651 
Pseudo R-squared 0.128 0.172 0.135 0.179 
Notes: The same as Appendix I. 
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 J. Effect of grandparental childcare on mothers' labour force participation - OLS 
estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grandparent's childcare 0.0824** 0.0787** 0.0823** 0.0789** 
  (0.0377) (0.0382) (0.0377) (0.0384) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.3335*** -0.3494*** -0.3324*** -0.3484*** 
  (0.1245) (0.1298) (0.1249) (0.1309) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1136* 0.1124* 0.1126* 0.1106* 
  (0.0692) (0.0641) (0.0694) (0.0647) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0324 0.0235 0.0401 0.0067 
  (0.0733) (0.0817) (0.0727) (0.0823) 
Age  0.0702** 0.0697** 0.0625* 0.0681** 
  (0.0388) (0.0314) (0.0383) (0.0304) 
Age square -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0006* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.1060 0.0872 0.0975 0.0807 
  (0.1066) (0.1028) (0.1055) (0.1016) 
  Upper middle school 0.1926* 0.1768* 0.1836* 0.1887* 
  (0.1076) (0.1048) (0.1065) (0.1036) 
  College or more 0.2374** 0.2369** 0.2394** 0.2437** 
  (0.1004) (0.1126) (0.1001) (0.1125) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.0945*** 0.0966*** 0.0933*** 0.0936*** 
  (0.0389) (0.0376) (0.0317) (0.0390) 
Ethnic minority  0.0066 0.0066 0.0117 0.0134 
  (0.0734) (0.0797) (0.0756) (0.0806) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.1793** 0.1663** 0.1775** 0.1641** 
  (0.0798) (0.0814) (0.0795) (0.0811) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0581 0.0579 0.0523 0.0492 
  (0.0431) (0.0481) (0.0428) (0.0478) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0423 -0.0503 -0.0432 -0.0551 
  (0.0428) (0.0448) (0.0425) (0.0453) 
Age of youngest child 0.0399*** 0.0409*** 0.0381*** 0.0402*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0125) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0076 0.0107 0.0072 0.0102 
  (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0357) (0.0363) 
Women's annual wage  0.1048*** 0.1069*** 0.1038*** 0.1029*** 
  (0.0210) (0.0274) (0.0225) (0.0264) 
Women's other income -0.0777*** -0.0773*** -0.0766** -0.0766** 
  (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0064) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0580** -0.0461* 
  
  
(0.0235) (0.0237) 
Constant 1.4718 1.3535 1.5160 1.4831 
  (0.9660) (1.0789) (0.9570) (1.0723) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.210 0.237 0.211 0.239 
Notes: The same as Appendix H. 
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K. Effect of grandparental childcare on mothers' labour force participation - probit 
estimation, urban areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grandparent's childcare 0.0662** 0.0651** 0.0668** 0.0653** 
  (0.0338) (0.0327) (0.0339) (0.0329) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.2156*** -0.2231*** -0.2135*** -0.2192** 
  (0.0830) (0.0841) (0.0829) (0.0838) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.1075* 0.1055* 0.1061* 0.1029* 
  (0.0606) (0.0601) (0.0602) (0.0597) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0234 0.0501 0.0283 0.0478 
  (0.0688) (0.0574) (0.0662) (0.0547) 
Age  0.0677* 0.0742** 0.0617* 0.0784** 
  (0.0340) (0.0398) (0.0328) (0.0375) 
Age square -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0009* -0.0009* 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0470 0.0593 0.0352 0.0489 
  (0.0571) (0.0357) (0.0556) (0.0349) 
  Upper middle school 0.1119** 0.1026*** 0.1045** 0.0920*** 
  (0.0437) (0.0286) (0.0414) (0.0282) 
  College or more 0.2271*** 0.2379*** 0.2320*** 0.2454*** 
  (0.0749) (0.0759) (0.0747) (0.0754) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.0912*** 0.0949*** 0.0951*** 0.1002*** 
  (0.0375) (0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0334) 
Ethnic minority  0.0216 0.0370 0.0305 0.0346 
  (0.0622) (0.0408) (0.0586) (0.0362) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.1092** 0.0921* 0.1067** 0.0891* 
  (0.0471) (0.0485) (0.0471) (0.0485) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0497 0.0446 0.0487 0.0467 
  (0.0438) (0.0357) (0.0417) (0.0324) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0273 -0.0399 -0.0253 -0.0355 
  (0.0401) (0.0304) (0.0393) (0.0290) 
Age of youngest child 0.0357*** 0.0308*** 0.0337*** 0.0280*** 
  (0.0103) (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0079) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0040 0.0081 0.0052 0.0115 
  (0.0347) (0.0275) (0.0340) (0.0265) 
Women's annual wage  0.1196*** 0.1144*** 0.1233*** 0.1251*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0170) (0.0197) (0.0172) 
Women's other income -0.0819*** -0.0890*** -0.0804** -0.0877** 
  (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0033) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0603** -0.0607* 
  
  
(0.0326) (0.0314) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 408 408 408 408 
Pseudo R-squared 0.228 0.34 0.195 0.352 
Notes: The same as Appendix I. 
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L. Effect of grandparental childcare on mothers' labour force participation - OLS 
estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1287*** 0.1296*** 0.1280*** 0.1293*** 
  (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0320) (0.0309) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.2363*** -0.2257*** -0.2436*** -0.2322*** 
  (0.0885) (0.0861) (0.0884) (0.0857) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0566 -0.0582 -0.0542 -0.0520 
  (0.0774) (0.0821) (0.0765) (0.0814) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0672 0.0761 0.0664 0.0755 
  (0.0582) (0.0586) (0.0582) (0.0587) 
Age  0.0701* 0.0769* 0.0815* 0.0870** 
  (0.0426) (0.0427) (0.0424) (0.0425) 
Age square -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0372 0.0355 0.0387 0.0366 
  (0.0697) (0.0701) (0.0692) (0.0695) 
  Upper middle school 0.0607 0.0586 0.0657 0.0626 
  (0.0749) (0.0784) (0.0750) (0.0784) 
  College or more 0.1845** 0.2141** 0.1870** 0.2159** 
  (0.0887) (0.0926) (0.0884) (0.0920) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.1576*** 0.1375** 0.1472*** 0.1309** 
  (0.0491) (0.0648) (0.0497) (0.0647) 
Ethnic minority  -0.103 -0.0779 -0.112* -0.0855 
  (0.0630) (0.0643) (0.0636) (0.0638) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0796* 0.0712* 0.0789* 0.0805* 
  (0.0439) (0.0427) (0.0440) (0.0428) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0645** 0.0619** 0.0634** 0.0608** 
  (0.0286) (0.0305) (0.0287) (0.0305) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0176 -0.0259 -0.0179 -0.0268 
  (0.0368) (0.0377) (0.0364) (0.0373) 
Age of youngest child 0.0469*** 0.0468*** 0.0455*** 0.0454*** 
  (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0120) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0675* 0.0626* 0.0694* 0.0642* 
  (0.0381) (0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0379) 
Women's annual wage  0.1218*** 0.1188*** 0.1169*** 0.1336*** 
  (0.0234) (0.0245) (0.0228) (0.0240) 
Women's other income  -0.0622*** -0.0651*** -0.0524*** -0.0535*** 
  (0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0071) (0.0059) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0840*** -0.0837*** 
  
  
(0.0198) (0.0198) 
Constant -0.0421 -0.0568 -0.0335 0.0482 
  (0.6992) (0.8002) (0.6905) (0.7946) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 430 430 430 430 
R-squared 0.135 0.233 0.145 0.238 
Notes: The same as Appendix H. 
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M. Effect of grandparental childcare on mothers' labour force participation - probit 
estimation, rural areas 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1130*** 0.1159*** 0.1141*** 0.1166** 
  (0.0314) (0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0317) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1992*** -0.2231*** -0.2167*** -0.1928*** 
  (0.0693) (0.0841) (0.0698) (0.0654) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0492 -0.0455 -0.0532 -0.0488 
  (0.0397) (0.0301) (0.0393) (0.0374) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0781 0.0900 0.0764 0.0883 
  (0.0547) (0.0557) (0.0545) (0.0558) 
Age  0.0853* 0.0802* 0.0841* -0.0811* 
  (0.0423) (0.0410) (0.0421) (0.0411) 
Age square -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0439 0.0436 0.0439 0.0413 
  (0.0609) (0.0611) (0.0605) (0.0610) 
  Upper middle school 0.0660 0.0633 0.0694 0.0649 
  (0.0594) (0.0593) (0.0588) (0.0593) 
  College or more 0.1959** 0.2379*** 0.1945** 0.2062*** 
  (0.0799) (0.0759) (0.0799) (0.0786) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.1598*** 0.1076** 0.1514*** 0.1241** 
  (0.0496) (0.0516) (0.0499) (0.0580) 
Ethnic minority  -0.1084 -0.0694 -0.1174 -0.0718 
  (0.0690) (0.0699) (0.0699) (0.0703) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0837* 0.0869** 0.0816* 0.0764* 
  (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0417) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0677** 0.0618** 0.0658** 0.0624** 
  (0.0292) (0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0306) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0142 -0.0274 -0.0154 -0.0281 
  (0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0359) 
Age of youngest child 0.0488*** 0.0509*** 0.0475*** 0.0508*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0115) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0785** 0.0654* 0.0816** 0.0664* 
  (0.0396) (0.0392) (0.0397) (0.0392) 
Women's annual wage 0.1168*** 0.1139*** 0.1142*** 0.1212*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0250) (0.0243) (0.0256) 
Women's other income -0.0632*** -0.0586*** -0.0633*** -0.0583*** 
  (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) 
Husband's income  
  
-0.0862*** -0.0858*** 
  
  
(0.0297) (0.0289) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 430 430 430 430 
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.271 0.145 0.237 
Notes: The same as Appendix I. 
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N. Robustness check using sample excluding farmer, fisher and hunters – OLS 
estimation 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lfp lfp lfp lfp 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1087*** 0.1023*** 0.1098*** 0.1029*** 
 
(0.0386) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0385) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.2578*** -0.2669*** -0.2595*** -0.2689*** 
 
(0.0698) (0.0695) (0.0700) (0.0698) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0849 0.0824 0.0893 0.0866 
 
(0.0638) (0.0655) (0.0637) (0.0655) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0201 -0.0344 -0.0208 -0.0348 
 
(0.0435) (0.0429) (0.0436) (0.0430) 
Age  0.0855*** 0.0840*** 0.0845*** 0.0843*** 
 
(0.0335) (0.0354) (0.0333) (0.0352) 
Age square 0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0529 0.0520 0.0496 0.0489 
 
(0.0567) (0.0566) (0.0564) (0.0563) 
  Upper middle school 0.1123* 0.1206** 0.1108* 0.1190** 
 
(0.0595) (0.0607) (0.0593) (0.0605) 
  College or more 0.2056*** 0.2359*** 0.2047*** 0.2346*** 
 
(0.0625) (0.0642) (0.0624) (0.0639) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.1391*** 0.1434*** 0.1330*** 0.1335*** 
 
(0.0337) (0.0423) (0.0345) (0.0429) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0267 -0.0047 -0.0324 -0.0082 
 
(0.0474) (0.0494) (0.0480) (0.0495) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0611* 0.0682** 0.0606* 0.0682** 
 
(0.0349) (0.0339) (0.0349) (0.0340) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0898*** 0.0884*** 0.0890*** 0.0872*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0247) (0.0233) (0.0247) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0193 -0.0318 -0.0181 -0.0310 
 
(0.0253) (0.0260) (0.0253) (0.0260) 
Age of youngest child 0.0430*** 0.0439*** 0.0414*** 0.0425*** 
 
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0086) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0355 0.0260 0.0363 0.0267 
 
(0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0261) 
Women's annual wage 0.1035*** 0.1086*** 0.1023*** 0.1019*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0159) 
Women's other income -0.0894*** -0.0873*** -0.0844*** -0.0869*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0047) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0336** -0.0300** 
   
(0.0148) (0.0147) 
Constant 0.5803 0.4398 0.6745 0.5694 
 
(0.5503) (0.5848) (0.5478) (0.5878) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 838 838 838 838 
R-squared 0.156 0.206 0.158 0.208 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
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O. Robustness check using sample excluding farmer, fisher and hunters - probit 
estimation 
 
Explanatory variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lfp lfp lfp lfp 
Grandparent's childcare 0.1020*** 0.1018*** 0.1039*** 0.1033*** 
 
(0.0369) (0.0361) (0.0368) (0.0361) 
Having children under 3 (dummy, 1=yes) -0.1935*** -0.2007*** -0.1975*** -0.2041*** 
 
(0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0497) 
Having children age between 4-6 (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0620 0.0627 0.0687 0.0682 
 
(0.0447) (0.0449) (0.0446) (0.0450) 
Having children age between 7-16  (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0267 -0.0462 -0.0283 -0.0472 
 
(0.0377) (0.0366) (0.0376) (0.0364) 
Age  0.1027*** 0.1069*** 0.1016*** 0.1076*** 
 
(0.0302) (0.0311) (0.0298) (0.0307) 
Age square -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education categories 
    Base case: primary school or less 
      Lower middle school 0.0367 0.0374 0.0312 0.0294 
 
(0.0417) (0.0411) (0.0414) (0.0406) 
  Upper middle school 0.1031** 0.1101** 0.1013** 0.1077** 
 
(0.0472) (0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0469) 
  College or more 0.2134*** 0.2363*** 0.2126*** 0.2339*** 
 
(0.0531) (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0523) 
Health condition (good/excellent, 1=yes) 0.1388*** 0.1442*** 0.1334*** 0.1339*** 
 
(0.0321) (0.0379) (0.0326) (0.0385) 
Ethnic minority  -0.0182 0.0227 -0.0223 -0.0292 
 
(0.0416) (0.0433) (0.0418) (0.0432) 
Non-agriculture registration 0.0473* 0.0504* 0.0482* 0.0196 
 
(0.0287) (0.0299) (0.0287) (0.0298) 
Other female members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0891*** 0.0890*** 0.0865*** 0.0860*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0234) (0.0224) (0.0232) 
Other male members in the household (dummy, 1=yes) -0.0163 -0.0293 -0.0162 -0.0298 
 
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0256) (0.0255) 
Age of youngest child 0.0423*** 0.0417*** 0.0407*** 0.0403*** 
 
(0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0077) 
Male youngest child (dummy, 1=yes) 0.0357 0.0283 0.0378 0.0301 
 
(0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0261) (0.0253) 
Women's annual wage  0.1095*** 0.1029*** 0.1018*** 0.1019*** 
 
(0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0157) 
Women's other income  -0.0763*** -0.0728*** -0.0701*** -0.0759*** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0036) 
Husband's income 
  
-0.0362** -0.0312** 
   
(0.0149) (0.0146) 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 838 838 838 838 
Pseudo R-squared 0.164 0.219 0.167 0.221 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Women's annual income takes fitted value and logged, in RMB; income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
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P. Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – 
underweight & probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0253* -0.0230* -0.0261* -0.0213* 
  （0.0133） (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Age  0.0099 0.0100 0.0094 0.0095 
  （0.0079） (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
Age square 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
  （0.0007） (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) 0.1287** 0.1405** 
    （0.0652） (0.0613) 
  Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) -0.0061 -0.0055 0.0081 -0.0039 
  （0.0132） (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0129) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0569 0.0836 
    （0.1203） (0.1171) 
  Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0082 -0.0075 -0.0089 -0.0077 
  (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0103) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0237** 0.0215** 0.0234** 0.0213** 
  （0.0096） (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0095) 
Sibling number 0.0142** 0.0155** 0.0149** 0.0140** 
  （0.0069） (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0068) 
Household total annual income  -0.0469*** -0.0484*** -0.0473*** -0.0489*** 
  （0.0056） (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0632*** -0.0622*** -0.0661*** -0.0650*** 
  （0.0167） (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.0155** -0.0169* -0.0152* -0.0170* 
  (0.0073) (0.0091) (0.0074) (0.0092) 
Market in community (1=yes) 0.0116 0.0124 0.0102 0.0111 
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0034 0.0045 0.0033 0.0044 
  (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,512 4,512 4,344 4,344 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.252 0.317 0.251 0.316 
Notes：Marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Household annual income and ordinary annual wage for female worker in community takes logged value, in 
RMB.  
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Q. Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – 
underheight & probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0631*** -0.0707*** -0.0679*** -0.0757*** 
  （0.0168） （0.0167） (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Age  0.0044 0.0042 0.0052 0.0052 
  （0.0092） (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0092) 
Age square -0.0015* -0.0015* -0.0016* -0.0016* 
  （0.0008） (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) 0.1416** 0.1570** 
    （0.0661） (0.0682) 
  Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0201 0.0041 0.0183 0.0016 
  （0.0167） (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0166) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0137 0.0584 
    （0.1313） (0.1344) 
  Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0050 -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0051 
  (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0150) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0012 -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0047 
  （0.0123） (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0121) 
Sibling number 0.0162* 0.0149* 0.0181* 0.0171* 
  （0.0088） (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0087) 
Household annual income  -0.0456*** -0.0449*** -0.0462*** -0.0455*** 
  （0.0076） (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0076) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0830*** -0.0839*** -0.0798*** -0.0789*** 
  （0.0195） (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0199) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.0523*** -0.0420*** -0.0510*** -0.0401*** 
  （0.0094） (0.0114) (0.0095) (0.0115) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0085 0.0154 0.0100 0.0168 
  （0.0133） (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0137) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0048 0.0168 0.0038 0.0163 
  （0.0126） (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4,512 4,512 4,344 4,344 
 R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.258 0.312 0.255 0.311 
Notes：The same as Appendix P. 
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R. Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – underweight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) IV-probit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0666* 
 
-0.0831* 
 
-0.0723** 
 
-0.0914** 
  
 
（0.0353） 
 
（0.0427） 
 
(0.0348) 
 
(0.0394) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0744*** 
 
0.0715*** 
 
0.0725*** 
 
0.0725*** 
 
  （0.0117） 
 
（0.0127） 
 
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - paved road 0.1256*** 
 
0.1345*** 
 
0.1500*** 
 
0.1500*** 
 
  （0.0123） 
 
（0.0124） 
 
(0.0130) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0260*** 
 
-0.0229*** 
 
0.0254*** 
 
0.0254*** 
 
  （0.0035） 
 
（0.0036） 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
Age  0.0067 0.0103 0.0075 0.0124 0.0005 0.0506 0.0005 0.0613 
  （0.0090） （0.0083） （0.0088） （0.0083） (0.0090) (0.0416) (0.0090) (0.0438) 
Age square -0.0021*** 0.0002 -0.0020*** 0.0001 -0.0017** 0.0016 -0.0017** 0.0008 
  （0.0008） （0.0007） （0.0007） （0.0007） (0.0008) (0.0036) (0.0008) (0.0038) 
Left behind child  (1=yes) -0.0837* 0.1292*** -0.0852* 0.1464*** 
    
  （0.0462） （0.0357） （0.0449） （0.0328） 
    
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0596*** -0.0077 0.0436*** -0.0008 0.0539*** -0.0447 0.0539*** -0.0027 
  （0.0160） （0.0141） （0.0159） （0.0134） (0.0165) (0.0717) (0.0165) (0.0720) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0544** 0.0566 0.0546** 0.0887 
    
  （0.0262） （0.1211） （0.0287） （0.1191） 
    
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.0429*** -0.0136 0.0455*** -0.0138 0.0412*** -0.0457 0.0412*** -0.0732 
  (0.0137) (0.0198) (0.0139) (0.0199) (0.0143) (0.0605) (0.0143) (0.0628) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0190 0.0148 0.0195 0.0130 0.0171 0.0778 0.0171 0.0696 
  （0.0113） （0.0097） （0.0110） （0.0095） (0.0115) (0.0495) (0.0115) (0.0510) 
Sibling number -0.0268*** 0.0136* -0.0265*** 0.0140** -0.0152* 0.0709* -0.0152* 0.0267 
  （0.0083） （0.0070） （0.0085） （0.0068） (0.0089) (0.0372) (0.0089) (0.0379) 
Household income -0.0442*** -0.0664*** -0.0394*** -0.0652*** 0.0530*** -0.0679** 0.0530*** -0.0672*** 
  （0.0071） （0.0063） （0.0071） （0.0062） (0.0074) (0.0134) (0.0074) (0.0147) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2590*** -0.0910*** -0.2584*** -0.0924*** -0.3280*** -0.0900*** -0.3280*** -0.0920* 
  （0.0191） （0.0250） （0.0193） （0.0244） (0.0196) (0.0280) (0.0196) (0.0276) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in community 0.0428*** -0.0055 0.0454*** 0.0063 0.0445*** -0.0469 0.0445*** 0.0287 
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  （0.0082） （0.0077） （0.0098） （0.0095） (0.0103) (0.0374) (0.0103) (0.0511) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0428*** 0.0113 0.0431*** 0.0168 0.0550*** 0.0258 0.0550*** 0.0702 
  （0.0120） （0.0116） （0.0123） （0.0119） (0.0128) (0.0602) (0.0128) (0.0638) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0123 0.0039 -0.0073 0.0038 -0.0143 0.0218 -0.0143 0.0271 
  （0.0116） （0.0099） （0.0117） (0.0101） (0.0122) (0.0505) (0.0122) (0.0543) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4512 4512 4344 4344 
F statistics on instrument 99.31 / 63.89 / 109.63 / 75.81 / 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.33 (0.316) 3.16 (0.194) 2.67 (0.297) 3.67 (0.159) 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 6.48 (0.047) 6.58 (0.038)  6.23 （0.049） 6.40 （0.040） 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented for IV-Probit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes), paved road (1=yes) and age of youngest child. 
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S. Primary analysis, effect of maternal employment on child health development – underheight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) IV-Probit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1441* 
 
-0.1915** 
 
-0.1643** 
 
-0.2065*
*   
 
(0.0787) 
 
(0.0837) 
 
(0.0743) 
 
(0.0870) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0760*** 
 
0.0754*** 
 
0.0856*** 
 
0.0725*** 
 
  (0.0116) 
 
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.1250*** 
 
0.1331*** 
 
0.1350*** 
 
0.1500*** 
 
  (0.0123) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0130) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0258*** 
 
-0.0224*** 
 
-0.0282**
*  
-0.0254**
* 
 
  (0.0036) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
Age  0.0069 0.0072 0.0079 0.0081 0.0003 0.0319 0.0005 0.0324 
  (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0326) (0.0090) (0.0340) 
Age square -0.0021*** -0.0017* -0.0020*** -0.0018** -0.0019** -0.0062** -0.0017** -0.0065*
*   (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0031) 
left behind child  (1=yes) -0.0831* 0.1677** -0.0842* 0.1823** 
    
  (0.0461) (0.0711) (0.0449) (0.0736) 
    
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0596*** 0.0264 0.0436*** 0.0114 0.0665*** 0.0906 0.0539*** 0.0369 
  (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0605) (0.0165) (0.0627) 
Left behind child * Co-resident with grandparents 0.0536** 0.0416 0.0532* 0.0459 
    
  (0.0242) (0.1364) (0.0287) (0.1397) 
    
Mother's education years 0.0466*** -0.0291** 0.0482*** -0.0252*** -0.0317** -0.0223 -0.0412**
* 
-0.0437 
  (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0140) (0.0517) (0.0143) (0.0540) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0188 0.0003 0.0192 0.0030 0.0154 0.0077 0.0171 -0.0064 
  (0.0113) (0.0124) 0.0110 (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0424) (0.0115) (0.0438) 
Sibling number -0.0267*** 0.0152* -0.0262*** 0.0145* -0.0205** 0.0547* -0.0082 0.0216 
  (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0322) (0.0089) (0.0329) 
Household income -0.0442*** -0.0710*** -0.0394*** -0.0787*** -0.0572**
* 
-0.0488 -0.0530**
* 
-0.0406 
  (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0071) (0.0084) (0.0074) (0.0308) (0.0074) (0.0322) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.2591*** -0.0851*** -0.2583*** -0.0847*** -0.3240**
* 
-0.2130* -0.3280**
* 
-0.0005 
  (0.0191) (0.0311) (0.0193) (0.0319) (0.0191) (0.1160) (0.0196) (0.1260) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in community 0.0428*** -0.0540*** 0.0453*** -0.0520*** -0.0275**
* 
-0.2040**
* 
0.0145 -0.0808* 
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  (0.0082) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0117) (0.0086) (0.0327) (0.0103) (0.0429) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0426*** 0.0119 0.0429*** 0.0221 0.0593*** 0.0311 0.0550*** 0.0782 
  (0.0120) (0.0143) (0.0123) (0.0146) (0.0124) (0.0504) (0.0128) (0.0539) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0124 0.0053 -0.0073 0.0163 -0.0126 0.0143 -0.0143 0.0627 
  (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0433) (0.0122) (0.0463) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4512 4512 4344 4344 
F statistics on instrument 99.31 / 63.89 / 84.39 / 53.26 / 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.16 (0.340) 2.14 (0.294) 2.28 (0.310) 2.26 (0.300) 
Wald test of exogeneity (p value in bracket) 6.16 (0.042) 5.51 (0.045) 4.95 (0.047) 4.57 (0.049) 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented for IV-Probit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1     Income variables take logged value, in RMB. 
Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes) and paved road (1=yes). 
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T. Sensitivity test 1, Effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health development – 
underweight & probit estimation  
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4） 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0645*** -0.0415** -0.0651*** -0.0414** 
  
-0.0646*** -0.0415** 
  (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0191) 
  
(0.0189) (0.0191) 
Mother's working hours 
  
 
 
-0.0058 -0.0053 
  
  
  
 
 
(0.0047) (0.0047) 
  
Age  0.0118 0.0141 0.0111 0.0142 0.0121 0.0134 0.0107 0.0138 
  (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0099) 
Age square 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 
  (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Mother's age 
  
0.0052 0.0054 0.0049 0.0050 0.0054 0.0051 
  
  
(0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0043) 
Mother's age square 
  
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents -0.0007 -0.0139 -0.0007 -0.0144 -0.0040 -0.0041 -0.0007 -0.0128 
  (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0164) (0.0157) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
-0.0155 -0.0142 -0.0152 -0.0228 -0.0159 -0.0220 -0.0155 -0.0229 
  (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0142) (0.0140) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0536*** -0.0545*** -0.0471*** -0.0473*** -0.0448*** -0.0444*** 
  
  
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0059 0.0009 0.0061 0.0009 0.0058 0.0055 0.0056 0.0005 
  (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0112) 
Sibling number 0.0162* 0.0071 0.0155* 0.0156* 0.0163* 0.0205** 0.0161* 0.0162* 
  (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0084) 
Household annual income  -0.0697*** -0.0652*** -0.0602*** -0.0661*** -0.0621*** -0.0679*** 
  
  (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
  
Mother's annual wage 
      
-0.0386** -0.0390** 
  
      
(0.0184) (0.0187) 
Other household income 
      
-0.0365*** -0.0347*** 
  
      
(0.0084) (0.0084) 
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Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0866*** -0.0577** -0.0868*** -0.0885*** -0.0920*** -0.0828*** -0.0841*** -0.0861*** 
  (0.0223) (0.0233) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0233) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 
-0.0002 0.0125 0.0006 0.0128 0.0101 0.0115 0.0007 0.0129 
  (0.0088) (0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0088) (0.0105) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0169 0.0181 0.0176 0.0192 0.0145 0.0150 0.0168 0.0183 
  (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0130) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0065 -0.0011 -0.0068 -0.0004 -0.0070 -0.0072 -0.0065 -0.0004 
  (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.251 0.317 0.253 0.287 0.251 0.320 0.254 0.322 
Notes: the same as Appendix P. 
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U. Sensitivity test 1, Effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health development – 
underheight & probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment(1=yes) -0.1150*** -0.1050*** -0.0849*** -0.0846*** 
  
-0.1143*** -0.1049*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) 
  
(0.0225) (0.0225) 
Mother's working hours 
  
  
-0.0018 -0.0084 
    
  
  
(0.0031) (0.0033) 
  Age  -0.0010 0.0013 0.0003 0.0037 0.0020 0.0029 0.0014 0.0028 
  (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
Age square -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0012 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Mother's age 
  
-0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0019 
  
  
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0060) 
Mother's age square 
  
0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents 0.0137 -0.0077 -0.0132 -0.0092 -0.0086 -0.0150 -0.0142 -0.0073 
  (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0205) (0.0197) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0103 -0.0230 -0.0099 -0.0222 -0.0108 -0.0220 -0.0102 -0.0222 
  (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0174) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0309*** -0.0377*** -0.0320 
*** 
-0.0390*** -0.0303*** -0.0379*** 
  
  
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0030 -0.0100 -0.0029 -0.0101 0.0124 -0.0098 -0.0033 -0.0104 
  (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0022) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0141) 
Sibling number 0.0190* 0.0085 0.0167 0.0033 0.0165 0.0035 0.0186 0.0072 
  (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0106) 
Household annual income  -0.0816*** -0.0802*** -0.0818*** -0.0810*** -0.0833*** -0.0828*** 
    (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0251) (0.0107) 
  Mother's annual wage 
  
    
-0.0410** -0.0388*** 
  
  
    
(0.0203) (0.0239) 
Household other income 
  
    
-0.0307*** -0.0300*** 
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(0.0109) (0.0109) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0729*** -0.0746*** -0.0733*** -0.0849*** -0.0958*** -0.0908*** -0.0714*** -0.0735*** 
  (0.0255) (0.0262) (0.0254) (0.0260) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0261) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community -0.0479*** -0.0460*** -0.0471*** -0.0456*** -0.0463*** -0.0465*** -0.0466*** -0.0457*** 
  (0.0112) (0.0128) (0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0128) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0222 0.0325** 0.0229 0.0239 0.0209 0.0212 0.0223 0.0228 
  (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.0008 0.0179 -0.0013 -0.0190 0.0021 0.0203 0.0016 0.0189 
  (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 3,339 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.259 0.321 0.259 0.313 0.256 0.317 0.259 0.321 
Notes: the same as Appendix P. 
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V. Sensitivity test 1, Effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health development – 
underweight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight 
(1=yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV-probit 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
     
-0.0626** 
 
-0.0694** 
  
     
(0.0243) 
 
(0.0276) 
Mother's working hours  
 
-0.0080 
 
-0.0607 
      
 
(0.0862) 
 
(0.1060) 
    Instrument - bus stop  0.2160** 
 
0.3380*** 
 
0.0438*** 
 
0.0445*** 
 
  (0.0848) 
 
(0.0980) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.5650*** 
 
0.4820*** 
 
0.1170*** 
 
0.1170*** 
 
  (0.0919) 
 
(0.0914) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.1110*** 
 
-0.0954*** 
 
-0.0189*** 
 
-0.0184*** 
 
  (0.0271) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
Age  -0.1290* 0.0478 -0.1280* 0.0668 -0.0099 0.0483 -0.0117 0.0715 
  (0.0711) (0.0483) (0.0677) (0.0513) (0.0093) (0.0486) (0.0091) (0.0514) 
Age square 0.0039 0.0019 0.0049 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0019 -0.0001 0.0006 
  (0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0008) (0.0041) (0.0008) (0.0044) 
Moher's age 0.0166 0.0209 0.0068 0.0249 0.0094** 0.0227 0.0076** 0.0265 
  (0.0279) (0.0213) (0.0263) (0.0220) (0.0038) (0.0221) (0.0038) (0.0228) 
Mother's age square -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001*** -0.0003 -0.0001** -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0348 -0.0134 0.0246 -0.0712 0.0520*** -0.0190 0.0482*** -0.0681 
  (0.1220) (0.0792) (0.1190) (0.0812) (0.0171) (0.0838) (0.0171) (0.0856) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 
0.2570** -0.0696 0.3440*** -0.0760 0.0352** -0.0747 -0.0332** -0.1190 
  (0.0997) (0.0716) (0.1010) (0.0788) (0.0138) (0.0688) (0.0141) (0.0734) 
Mother's education years 0.1150*** -0.0333** 0.1240*** -0.0400** 0.0205*** -0.0306** 0.0213*** -0.0334** 
  (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0178) (0.0022) (0.0134) (0.0022) (0.0157) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0500 0.0299 0.0499 0.0044 0.0049 0.0273 0.0070 0.0026 
  (0.0855) (0.0560) (0.0826) (0.0577) (0.0116) (0.0560) (0.0113) (0.0581) 
Sibling number -0.2790*** 0.0464 -0.1380** 0.0254 -0.0289*** 0.0465 -0.0112 0.0327 
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  (0.0601) (0.0474) (0.0596) (0.0462) (0.0090) (0.0439) (0.0092) (0.0441) 
Household income 0.1530** -0.0777** 0.1540** -0.0813** 
      (0.0626) (0.0322) (0.0620) (0.0374) 
    Mother's annual wage 
    
0.0706*** -0.0500** 0.0809*** -0.0490** 
  
    
(0.0197) (0.0236) (0.0205) (0.0214) 
Other household income 
    
0.0245*** -0.0344*** 0.0262*** -0.0353*** 
  
    
(0.0086) (0.0119) (0.0087) (0.0121) 
Owning refrigerator in household 
(1=yes) 
-0.7993*** -0.2630** -0.7570*** -0.2620** -0.3620*** -0.2410*** -0.3460*** -0.2300*** 
  (0.1710) (0.1040) (0.1690) (0.1200) (0.0236) (0.0800) (0.0236) (0.0750) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in 
community 
0.1140* 0.0026 0.1210* 0.0727 0.0328*** 0.0112 0.0123 0.0666 
  (0.0595) (0.0425) (0.0697) (0.0560) (0.0084) (0.0438) (0.0097) (0.0551) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.2370*** 0.0626 0.1990** 0.1010 0.0483*** 0.0590 0.0461*** 0.0940 
  (0.0908) (0.0678) (0.0921) (0.0720) (0.0123) (0.0678) (0.0127) (0.0738) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.1970** -0.0236 0.2950*** -0.0170 0.0305** -0.0197 0.0378*** -0.0009 
  (0.0885) (0.0597) (0.0897) (0.0690) (0.0120) (0.0587) (0.0122) (0.0647) 
Year effect No Yes   No   Yes   
County effect No Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Observations 3,354 3,354 
 
3,354 
 
3,354 
 F statistics on instrument 56.65 / 45.64 / 78.12 / 68.94 / 
Wald test on endogeneity (p value in 
bracket) 
2.21 （0.034） 3.16 （0.017） 2.67 （0.024） 3.00 （0.019） 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 1.41 (0.689) 1.27 (0.359) 3.07 (0.216) 2.68 (0.267) 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented for IV-Probit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Income variables (household income, mothers' annual wage, household other income and ordinal annual wage for female workers) take logged value, in 
RMB.Mother's annual wage takes predicted value. Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes) and paved road (1=yes) 
 
  
 355 
 
W. Sensitivity test 1, Effect of maternal employment, mothers’ working hours and mothers’ income on child health development – 
underheight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight 
(1=yes) 
（1） （2） （3） （4） 
IV-probit 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
     
-0.1634*** 
 
-0.1922*** 
  
     
(0.0573) 
 
(0.0527) 
Mother's working hours  
 
-0.0724 
 
-0.0728 
      
 
(0.0719) 
 
(0.0731) 
    Instrument - bus stop  0.2160** 
 
0.3380*** 
 
0.0438*** 
 
0.0445*** 
   (0.0848) 
 
(0.0980) 
 
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0131) 
 Instrument - road type 0.5650*** 
 
0.4820*** 
 
0.1170*** 
 
0.1170*** 
   (0.0919) 
 
(0.0914) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0132) 
 Instrument - age of youngest child -0.1110*** 
 
-0.0954*** 
 
-0.0189*** 
 
-0.0184*** 
   (0.0271) 
 
(0.0265) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
 Age  -0.1290* -0.0049 -0.1280* -0.0004 -0.0099 0.0026 -0.0117 0.0136 
  (0.0711) (0.0380) (0.0677) (0.0383) (0.0093) (0.0384) (0.0091) (0.0400) 
Age square 0.0039 -0.0028 0.0049 -0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0001 -0.0045 
  (0.0061) (0.0034) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0008) (0.0036) 
Moher's age 0.0166 -0.0069 0.0068 -0.0067 0.0094** -0.0012 0.0076** -0.0024 
  (0.0279) (0.0188) (0.0263) (0.0188) (0.0038) (0.0198) (0.0038) (0.0214) 
Mother's age square -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.2048* 0.0322 0.2246* 0.0274 0.0520*** 0.0617 0.0482*** 0.0051 
  (0.1220) (0.0681) (0.1190) (0.0674) (0.0171) (0.0723) (0.0171) (0.0746) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 0.2570** -0.0567 0.3440*** -0.1420** 0.0552*** -0.0339 0.0532*** -0.0893 
  (0.0997) (0.0607) (0.1010) (0.0612) (0.0138) (0.0594) (0.0141) (0.0623) 
Mother's education years 0.1150*** -0.0287** 0.1240*** -0.0320** 0.0205*** -0.0289** 0.0213*** -0.0353*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0149) (0.0022) (0.0117) (0.0022) (0.0139) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0500 -0.0080 0.0499 -0.0304 0.0049 -0.0115 0.0070 -0.0376 
  (0.0855) (0.0483) (0.0826) (0.0476) (0.0116) (0.0488) (0.0113) (0.0502) 
 356 
 
Sibling number -0.2790*** 0.0383 -0.1380** 0.0045 -0.0289*** 0.0555 -0.0112 0.0192 
  (0.0601) (0.0425) (0.0596) (0.0381) (0.0090) (0.0389) (0.0092) (0.0385) 
Household income -0.1530** -0.0686** -0.1540** -0.0709** 
      (0.0626) (0.0295) (0.0620) (0.0309) 
    Mother's annual wage 
    
0.0706*** -0.0516** 0.0809*** 0.0597** 
  
    
(0.0197) (0.0241) (0.0205) (0.0257) 
Other household income 
    
0.0245*** -0.0313** 0.0262*** -0.0378*** 
  
    
（0.0086） (0.0139) (0.0087) (0.0141) 
Owning refrigerator in household 
(1=yes) 
-0.9930*** -0.1250** -0.7570*** -0.1270** -0.3620*** -0.1380** -0.3460*** -0.1430** 
  (0.1710) (0.0610) (0.1690) (0.0610) (0.0236) (0.0630) (0.0236) (0.0629) 
Ordinary wage for female worker in 
community 
0.1140* -0.1580*** 0.1210* -0.0234 0.0328*** -0.1620*** 0.0123 -0.0464 
  (0.0595) (0.0371) (0.0697) (0.0456) (0.0084) (0.0386) (0.0097) (0.0461) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.2370*** 0.0931 0.1990** 0.0490 0.0483*** 0.0908 0.0461*** 0.0500 
  (0.0908) (0.0660) (0.0921) (0.0540) (0.0123) (0.0577) (0.0127) (0.0613) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.1970** -0.0109 0.2950*** -0.0007 0.0305** -0.0031 0.0378*** 0.0425 
  (0.0885) (0.0516) (0.0897) (0.0586) (0.0120) (0.0514) (0.0122) (0.0569) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 3339 3339 3339 3339 
F statistics on instrument 35.55 / 25.68 / 90.46 / 63.00 / 
Wald test on endogeneity 3.29 (0.040) 4.95 (0.026) 1.46 (0.049) 3.57 (0.038) 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 3.67 (0.216) 3.58 (0.238) 2.69 （0.285） 2.64 （0.271） 
Notes: The same as appendix V. 
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X. Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development – 
underweight & probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0418** -0.0357** -0.0423** -0.0361** -0.0406** -0.0348** -0.0541*** -0.0437*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
Age  0.0128 0.0148 0.0117 0.0146 0.0090 0.0127 0.0107 0.0134 
  (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0102) 
Age square 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Mother's age 
  
0.0046 0.0043 0.0060 0.0051 0.0042 0.0040 
  
  
(0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
Mother's age square 
  
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0077 -0.0044 -0.0088 -0.0035 -0.0012 -0.0069 -0.0065 -0.0046 
  (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0172) (0.0164) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0108 -0.0158 
-0.0104 -0.0145 -0.0122 -0.0144 -0.0097 -0.0140 
  (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0144) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0416*** -0.0435*** -0.0415*** -0.0436*** -0.0447*** -0.0040 
  
  
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0077 0.0054 0.0077 0.0051 0.0087 0.0067 0.0078 0.0058 
  (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0118) 
Sibling number 0.0205** 0.0107 0.0203** 0.0100 0.0213** 0.0110 0.0187* 0.0104 
  (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0092) 
Household total annual income  -0.0574*** -0.0565*** -0.0873*** -0.0862*** -0.0857*** -0.0857*** -0.0876*** -0.0868*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0087) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0887*** -0.0835** -0.0884*** -0.0820*** -0.0731*** -0.0794*** -0.0985*** -0.0981*** 
  (0.0220) (0.0227) (0.0220) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0219) (0.0225) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community 0.0018 0.0112 
0.0017 0.0116 0.0089 0.0115 0.0014 0.0102 
  (0.0093) (0.0114) (0.0092) (0.0114) (0.0092) (0.0113) (0.0093) (0.0115) 
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Market in community (1=yes) 0.0130 0.0105 0.0127 0.0104 0.0056 0.0052 0.0090 0.0073 
  (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0136) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0013 0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0029 
  (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Mother's BMI 
   
 
-0.0175*** -0.0133*** 
 
   
   
 
(0.0027) (0.0027) 
 
 Father's BMI 
   
 
-0.0162*** -0.0113*** 
 
   
   
 
(0.0029) (0.0028) 
 
 Tap water in household 
   
 
  
-0.0569*** -0.0339** 
  
   
 
  
(0.0131) (0.0132) 
Flush toilet in household 
   
 
  
-0.0300 -0.0320 
  
   
 
  
(0.0382) (0.0385) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.251 0.317 0.251 0.318 0.296 0.340 0.260 0.321 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented for Probit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes fitted value. 
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Y. Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development – 
underheight & probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight (1=yes) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Probit 
Maternal employment (1=yes) -0.0798*** -0.0879*** -0.0796*** -0.0877*** -0.0716*** -0.0848*** -0.0890*** -0.0887*** 
  (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0213) 
Age  0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0019 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0017 
  (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Age square -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Mother's age 
  
-0.0007 -0.0015 0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0016 
  
  
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) 
Mother's age square 
  
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  
  
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0186 -0.0026 0.0188 -0.0026 0.0128 -0.0033 0.0158 -0.0035 
  (0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0219) (0.0210) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0291 -0.0402** -0.0295 -0.0402** -0.0316* -0.0409** -0.0286 -0.0403** 
  (0.0188) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0185) 
Mother's education years 
  
-0.0386*** -0.0361*** -0.0387*** -0.0362*** -0.0388*** -0.0359** 
  
  
-0.0023 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Female child (1=yes) -0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0008 -0.0042 0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0012 -0.0049 
  (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0151) 
Sibling number 0.0311** 0.0197* 0.0311** 0.0193 0.0309** 0.0194 0.0302** 0.0193 
  (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Household annual income  -0.0330*** -0.0265** -0.0331*** -0.0265** -0.0309*** -0.0260** -0.0332*** -0.0266** 
  (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0115) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.0850*** -0.0315 -0.0857*** -0.0311 -0.0692*** -0.0292 -0.0920*** -0.0306 
  (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0261) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker in 
community -0.0456*** -0.0155 -0.0457*** -0.0153 -0.0405*** -0.0153 -0.0472*** -0.0144 
  (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0120) (0.0140) (0.0121) (0.0140) (0.0121) (0.0141) 
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Market in community (1=yes) 0.0130 0.0143 0.0130 0.0145 0.0102 0.0137 0.0118 0.0152 
  (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0170) 
Health service in village (1=yes) 0.00537 0.0177 0.0050 0.0182 0.0036 0.0172 0.0056 0.0158 
  (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
Mother's BMI 
    
-0.0129*** -0.0050 
    
    
(0.0030) (0.0031) 
  Father's BMI 
    
-0.0111*** -0.0029 
    
    
(0.0032) (0.0032) 
  Tap water in household 
      
-0.0403** -0.0416** 
  
      
(0.0167) (0.0168) 
Flush toilet in household 
      
0.0392 0.0474 
  
      
(0.0432) (0.0422) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.258 0.313 0.258 0.313 0.269 0.314 0.260 0.313 
Note: The same as appendix X. 
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Z. Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development – 
underweight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underweight (1=yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV-probit 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.0638** 
 
-0.0610** 
 
-0.0558** 
 
-0.0552** 
  
 
(0.0270) 
 
(0.0285) 
 
(0.0242) 
 
(0.0245) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0651*** 
 
0.0614*** 
 
0.0467*** 
 
0.0483*** 
 
  (0.0139) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.136*** 
 
0.1440*** 
 
0.1250*** 
 
0.1310*** 
 
  (0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0253*** 
 
-0.0242*** 
 
-0.0259*** 
 
-0.0241*** 
 
  (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
Age  -0.0073 0.0357 -0.0067 0.0649 -0.0092 0.0502 -0.0096 0.0703 
  (0.0110) (0.0539) (0.0108) (0.0553) (0.0110) (0.0518) (0.0107) (0.0537) 
Age square -0.0011 0.0034 -0.0009 0.0016 -0.0009 0.00161 -0.0007 0.0008 
  (0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0009) (0.0047) (0.0009) (0.00440) (0.0009) (0.0046) 
Mother's age 0.0121*** 0.0228 0.0111*** 0.0251 0.0113*** 0.0187 0.0101** 0.0213 
  (0.0042) (0.0226) (0.0042) (0.0227) (0.0041) (0.0213) (0.0041) (0.0220) 
Mother's age square -0.0002*** -0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0004 -0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0002*** -0.0004 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0686*** -0.0528 0.0528*** -0.0499 0.0585*** 0.0203 0.0458** -0.0230 
  (0.0197) (0.0881) (0.0199) (0.0893) (0.0198) (0.0892) (0.0199) (0.0894) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) 0.0166 -0.0559 0.0345** -0.0715 0.0150 -0.0466 0.0330** -0.0739 
  (0.0163) (0.0719) (0.0165) (0.0761) (0.0163) (0.0724) (0.0165) (0.0763) 
Mother's education years 0.0269*** -0.0361*** 0.0282*** -0.0251 0.0256*** -0.0273* 0.0260*** -0.0201 
  (0.0020) (0.0137) (0.0021) (0.0160) (0.0020) (0.0145) (0.0020) (0.0163) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0111 0.0402 0.0125 0.0347 0.0102 0.0378 0.0125 0.0303 
  (0.0135) (0.0607) (0.0132) (0.0626) (0.0134) (0.0601) (0.0131) (0.0620) 
Sibling number -0.0159 0.1140** -0.0031 0.0597 -0.0183 0.0940** -0.0018 0.0543 
  (0.0115) (0.0465) (0.0118) (0.0485) (0.0117) (0.0474) (0.0119) (0.0484) 
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Household income -0.0417*** -0.1070** -0.0420*** -0.0935* -0.0420*** -0.0939** -0.0420*** -0.0869* 
  (0.0104) (0.0458) (0.0106) (0.0501) (0.0103) (0.0469) (0.0105) (0.0505) 
Owning refrigerator in household (1=yes) -0.3270*** -0.0850** -0.3290*** -0.0830** -0.3070*** -0.0830** -0.3000*** -0.4960*** 
  (0.0239) (0.0340) (0.0240) (0.0350) (0.0239) (0.0340) (0.0240) (0.1860) 
Ordinary annual wage for female worker 
in community 
0.0440*** 0.0624 0.0094 0.0586 0.0448*** -0.0015 0.0051 0.0534 
  (0.0101) (0.0476) (0.0115) (0.0600) (0.0102) (0.0487) (0.0114) (0.0599) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0547*** -0.0137 0.0566*** 0.0121 0.0504*** 0.0336 0.0481*** 0.0400 
  (0.0145) (0.0727) (0.0148) (0.0791) (0.0146) (0.0719) (0.0148) (0.0776) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0111 -0.0102 -0.0149 -0.0035 -0.0063 0.0130 -0.0164 0.0144 
  (0.0142) (0.0624) (0.0144) (0.0678) (0.0141) (0.0619) (0.0144) (0.0673) 
Mother's BMI 0.0022 -0.0889*** 0.0026 -0.0721*** 
      (0.0027) (0.0135) (0.0027) (0.0146) 
    Father's BMI 0.0075*** -0.0850*** 0.0087*** -0.0621*** 
      (0.0029) (0.0144) (0.0029) (0.0155) 
    Tap water in household 
    
0.0260 -0.0456** 0.0230 -0.0410** 
  
    
(0.0150) (0.0200) (0.0150) (0.0200) 
Flush toilet in household 
    
0.0586 -0.1570 0.0509 -0.1660 
  
    
(0.0416) (0.1880) (0.0405) (0.2030) 
Year effect No Yes No Yes 
County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2940 2940 2940 2940 
F statistics on instrument 103.22 / 69.21 / 107.38 / 73.83 / 
Wald test on endogeneity (p value in 
bracket) 
2.18 (0.041) 2.22 (0.037) 2.73 (0.033) 3.00 (0.030) 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 1.26 (0.354) 1.30 (0.355) 3.00 (0.219) 2.60 (0.270) 
Notes: Marginal effects are presented. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All income variables take logged value, in RMB. Mother's annual wage takes fitted value. 
Instruments are access to bus stop (1=yes) and paved road (1=yes) 
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AA. Sensitivity test 2, effect of maternal employment, parents’ BMI and household infrastructure on child health development – 
underheight & IV-probit estimation 
Dependent variable: underheight 
(1=yes) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV-probit 
Explanatory variables 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Maternal employment (1=yes) 
 
-0.1570** 
 
-0.1632** 
 
-0.1522** 
 
-0.1682** 
  
 
(0.0741) 
 
(0.0776) 
 
(0.0761) 
 
(0.0726) 
Instrument - bus stop  0.0651*** 
 
0.0614*** 
 
0.0467*** 
 
0.0483*** 
 
  (0.0139) 
 
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0151) 
 
Instrument - road type 0.1360*** 
 
0.1440*** 
 
0.1250*** 
 
0.1310*** 
 
  (0.0153) 
 
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
Instrument - age of youngest child -0.0253*** 
 
-0.0242*** 
 
-0.0259*** 
 
-0.0241*** 
 
  (0.0045) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
(0.0044) 
 
Age  -0.0073 -0.0060 -0.0067 0.0072 -0.0092 0.0033 -0.0096 0.0108 
  (0.0110) (0.0419) (0.0108) (0.0429) (0.0110) (0.0414) (0.0107) (0.0428) 
Age square -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0007 -0.0046 
  (0.0009) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0038) 
Mother's age 0.0121*** 0.0030 0.0111*** 0.0004 0.0113*** -0.0008 0.0101** -0.0019 
  (0.0042) (0.0205) (0.0042) (0.0217) (0.0041) (0.0203) (0.0041) (0.0219) 
Mother's age square -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Co-resident with grandparents (1=yes) 0.0686*** 0.0439 0.0528*** 0.0098 0.0585*** 0.0668 0.0458** 0.0077 
  (0.0197) (0.0782) (0.0199) (0.0780) (0.0198) (0.0771) (0.0199) (0.0778) 
Grandparents' health condition (1=both 
excellent/good) -0.0166 -0.1070* -0.0345** -0.1540** -0.0150 -0.0965 -0.0330** -0.1520** 
  (0.0163) (0.0630) (0.0165) (0.0657) (0.0163) (0.0630) (0.0165) (0.0658) 
Mother's education years 0.0269*** -0.0283** 0.0282*** -0.0115 0.0256*** -0.0232* 0.0260*** -0.0102 
  (0.0020) (0.0124) (0.0021) (0.0143) (0.0020) (0.0126) (0.0020) (0.0147) 
Female child (1=yes) 0.0111 0.0025 0.0125 -0.0099 0.0102 -0.0036 0.0125 -0.0157 
  (0.0135) (0.0523) (0.0132) (0.0536) (0.0134) (0.0519) (0.0131) (0.0535) 
Sibling number -0.0159 0.1040** -0.0031 0.0668 -0.0183 0.0977** -0.0018 0.0672 
  (0.0115) (0.0411) (0.0118) (0.0422) (0.0117) (0.0416) (0.0119) (0.0423) 
 364 
 
Household income -0.0417*** -0.1030** -0.0420*** -0.0752* -0.0420*** -0.0996** -0.0420*** -0.0755** 
  (0.0104) (0.0428) (0.0106) (0.0457) (0.0103) (0.0438) (0.0105) (0.0368) 
Owning refrigerator in household 
(1=yes) 
-0.3270*** -0.0930** -0.3290*** -0.0982** -0.3070*** -0.1000** -0.3000*** -0.0932** 
  (0.0239) (0.0410) (0.0240) (0.0450) (0.0239) (0.0430) (0.0240) (0.0445) 
Ordinary annual wage for female 
worker in community 0.0440*** -0.1380*** 0.0094 -0.0494 0.0448*** -0.1660*** 0.0051 -0.0478 
  (0.0101) (0.0424) (0.0115) (0.0497) (0.0102) (0.0421) (0.0114) (0.0497) 
Market in village (1=yes) 0.0547*** 0.0367 0.0566*** 0.0761 0.0504*** 0.0553 0.0481*** 0.0793 
  (0.0145) (0.0634) (0.0148) (0.0677) (0.0146) (0.0621) (0.0148) (0.0669) 
Health service in village (1=yes) -0.0111 0.0117 -0.0149 0.0531 -0.0063 0.0166 -0.0164 0.0467 
  (0.0142) (0.0540) (0.0144) (0.0580) (0.0141) (0.0539) (0.0144) (0.0584) 
Mother's BMI 0.0022 -0.0433*** 0.0026 -0.0157 
      (0.0027) (0.0103) (0.0027) (0.0112) 
    Father's BMI 0.0075*** -0.0372*** 0.0087*** -0.0066 
      (0.0029) (0.0112) (0.0029) (0.0121) 
    Tap water in household 
    
0.0226 -0.0680* 0.0226 -0.0667** 
  
    
(0.0150) (0.0353) (0.0150) (0.0313) 
Flush toilet in household 
    
0.0586 0.1440 0.0509 0.1890 
  
    
(0.0416) (0.1450) (0.0405) (0.1500) 
Year effect No 
  
Yes 
  
No 
  
Yes 
  County effect No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 
F statistics on instrument 99.89 / 69.21 / 107.38 / 75.24 
 
Wald test on endogeneity 3.01 (0.030) 2.79 (0.037) 3.02(0.032) 2.85 （0.038） 
Sargan Test (p value in bracket) 2.36 (0.205) 1.89 (0.298) 1.55 (0.318) 2.60 (0.200) 
Notes: The same as appendix Y. 
